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Abstract  
 
 
Written in response to a current gap in academic and industry based 
literature, this thesis was written on the topic of Trade Based Money 
Laundering (TBML) and risk assessment, within the banking context. Despite 
the increased use of TBML, most academic descriptions of money laundering 
have used the cash based model of placement and integration of large cash 
deposits acquired from criminal activity, which are then merged into legitimate 
pre-existing funds. However, there are a significant number of examples to 
show that cash transferred into goods and then shipped to other countries 
can be easier to move and less conspicuous or traceable than simple cash 
based deposits. One of the main challenges for detecting shipping based 
laundering techniques is that they involve a number of agencies sharing data 
and information, in order to catch the criminals. Simple banking checks may 
not always elicit the required information without verification from either 
customs or law enforcement agencies. The research sought to identify the 
current challenges and issues facing risk assessment professionals in the 
banking sector and to identify gaps in the current systems being used. The 
data collected included interviews and survey information taken from 
professionals working on AML risk assessment in banking and financial 
institutions from across the globe. In addition to the description of different 
money laundering schemes, much of the current academic discussion on 
money laundering in banking has focused on the regulation requirements for 
financial institutions to stop money laundering activity, but there has been little 
empirical guidance on how regulation can be adapted and implemented at the 
individual banking level. This research accessed a number of legal cases 
available in the public domain, which were analysed to see how and where 
some of the larger banks have failed to implement current anti-money 
laundering controls and to consider how this could impact on the detection of 
TBML activity. This research uses an Agency theory model to look at the 
pressures banks are under to manage client’s accounts efficiently, versus the 
requirements of outside regulation to undertake extensive checks on business 
transactions and accounts. Finally, the researcher proposed a simple risk 
matrix approach that developed the current thinking of client behaviour and 
transaction monitoring risk analysis associated with cash based laundering, to 
develop a four-point risk model that added geography and third party 
behaviour, to account for shipping and trade based laundering activity. 
  
 
Keywords: TBML, Trade Based Money Laundering, Banking AML risk 
assessment, Anti Money Laundering, Risk Assessment. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
This research project aims to explore the topic of Trade-Based 
Money Laundering as an emerging risk area, and to consider the 
implications for developing a risk assessment model. Interest in this topic 
arose after undertaking preliminary reading in money laundering and 
financial crime risks across the globe. It was discovered that most of the 
current reading still appeared to focus on cash based laundering schemes 
and older traditional models of moving drug money through the banking 
sector. However, many publications 1  mentioned the development of a 
newer and more complex laundering scheme that could move money 
                                            
1
 Liao, J. and Acharya, A., 2011. Transhipment and trade-based money laundering. Journal of 
Money Laundering Control, 14(1), pp.79-92. 
Sullivan, C., & Smith, E. (2011). Trade based money laundering- risks and regulatory responses. 
Australia: Australian Institute of Criminology. Retrieved from 
http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rpp/rpp115.pdf 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, National Money Laundering Risk Assessment, June 12, 2015, at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/ 
National%20Money%20Laundering%20Risk%20Assessment%20%E2%80%93%2006-12-
2015.pdf. 
Buehn, A., & Eichler, S. (2011). Trade misinvoicing: The dark side of world trade. The World 
Economy, 34(8), 1263-1287. 
KPMG. (2014). Global anti-money laundering survey. Retrieved from 
https://www.kpmg.com/KY/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/PublishingImages/global-anti-
money-laundering-survey-v3.pdf 
PwC. (2014). Goods gone bad. Addressing money-laundering risk in the trade finance system.  
Ferwerda, J., Kattenberg, M., Chang, H., Unger, B., Groot, L., & Bikker, J. (2011). Gravity Models of 
Trade-based Money Laundering. Discussion paper 11-16 Tjalling C Koopmans research Institute, 1-
23. 
Mauro, J. S. (2014). THE NEW ECONOMY IN FINANCIAL CRIMES. Understanding the effects of 
under-invoicing, double invoicing and false invoicing in trade-based money laundering and terrorist 
financing (TBML & TF) schemes [ ] ACAMS. 
Buehn, A., & Eichler, S. (2011). Trade misinvoicing: The dark side of world trade. The World 
Economy, 34(8), 1263-1287. 
Kar, D., & LeBlanc, B. (2013). Illicit financial flows from developing countries 2002-2011. 
Yalta, A. Y., & Demir, I. (2010). The extent of trade mis-invoicing in turkey: Did post-1990 policies 
matter? 
Soudijn, M. (2014). A Critical Approach to Trade-Based Money Laundering. Journal of Money 
Laundering Control Vol 17, Iss 2, 230-242. 
FCA. (2013). Bank's control of financial crime risks in trade finance. London: Financial Conduct 
Authority. 
de Boyrie, M. E., Nelson, J. A., & Pak, S. J. (2007). Capital movement through trade misinvoicing: 
The case of Africa. Journal of Financial Crime, 14(4), 474-489. doi:10.1108/1359079071082818. 
Keene, S. D. (2011). Emerging threats: Financial crime in the virtual world. J of Money Laundering 
Control, 15(1), 25-37. doi:10.1108/1368520121119471. 
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internationally using the shipping sector. Works such as Sullivan and 
Smith’s 2 review of TBML risks and regulatory responses highlighted how 
this newer technique worked, whilst examples from the APG report 3 
showed the reality of how current TBML techniques operated in the Asia 
Pacific region. Despite these initial publications there appeared to be very 
little other research material dedicated specifically to examining how TBML 
activity could be detected within the banking sector. This research project 
aimed to address the dearth of material available by providing an in-depth 
review of all the current TBML material and speaking to the major players 
within the AML sector that might have inside knowledge and experience in 
TBML crimes.  
 
The research study focuses specifically on banking risk assessment 
and detection, since researchers have acknowledged that risk assessment 
is difficult given the complex nature of the methods used in TBML crimes. 
In particular, the research examines the role of other internal monitoring 
mechanisms within the bank such as internal audit and front office staff 
and considers the options for strengthening AML compliance through 
these existing systems.  
 
In order to offer a relevant risk assessment, model the research 
aims to explore and understand the different components of the financial 
crime of ‘Trade-based Money Laundering’(“TBML”), and to provide greater 
                                            
2
Sullivan, C., & Smith, E. (2011). Trade based money laundering- risks and regulatory responses. 
Australia: Australian Institute of Criminology. Retrieved from 
http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rpp/rpp115.pdf 
3
 APG Typology Report on Trade Based Money Laundering. (2012) Sydney: Asia Pacific Group on 
Money Laundering. 
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insight into how this crime can be detected. This is considered to be 
particularly important to the researcher due to the limited coverage of 
TBML currently available in academic research.4 This is coupled with the 
empirical challenges that banks are faced with trying to understand how 
risk assessment approaches can be developed or enhanced to support 
TBML detection.5 This is seen as an important and relevant topic to the 
industry given the increasing proliferation of financial crime across the 
globe and the heightened media coverage of recent TBML and money 
laundering schemes linked to the banking sector.6 
 
The term TBML in this research context is defined as the movement 
of illicit funds through trade finance options and which uses access to the 
main financial services for the purposes of laundering. This is opposed to 
other forms of trade deceit activities such as tax evasion which may use 
similar techniques to TBML. Unlike some forms of financial crime where 
the crimes may start with money already in the banking system, the 
starting process for the financial trail with TBML usually occurs outside of 
                                            
4
 Soudijn, M. (2014). A Critical Approach to Trade-Based Money Laundering. Journal of Money 
Laundering Control Vol 17, Iss 2, 230-242. 
Kumanayake, N.S., 2015. TRADE-BASED MONEY LAUNDERING: AN OBSTACLE TO TRADE 
FACILITATION. First published 16 April 2013 (License for publishing–KB № 19433–9233P from 
2012-09-21, Ukrainian Academy of Customs) The Customs Scientific Journal CUSTOMS is 
published twice a year. The website is at: www. ccjournals. eu/ojs/index. php/customs© 2015 
Regional Office for Capacity Building & Regional Training Centers for the European Region, p.47. 
Naheem, M.A., 2015. Trade based money laundering: towards a working definition for the banking 
sector. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 18(4), pp.513-524. 
Sullivan, C., & Smith, E. (2011). Trade based money laundering- risks and regulatory responses. 
Australia: Australian Institute of Criminology. Retrieved from 
http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rpp/rpp115.pdf 
Keesoony, S. and Keesoony, S., 2016. International anti-money laundering laws: the problems with 
enforcement. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 19(2), pp.130-147. 
Durrieu, R., 2013. Rethinking money laundering & financing of terrorism in international law: towards 
a new global legal order. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
5
 FATF. (2008). Trade based money laundering. France. Financial Action Task Force 
6
ICIJ (2015) Swiss leaks: Murky cash sheltered by bank secrecy http://www.icij.org/project/swiss-
leaks/banking-giant-hsbc-sheltered-murky-cash-linked-dictators-and-arms-dealers 
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the banking sector.7 It is only after the actual criminal activity has occurred 
and the criminal has acquired money, which they wish to use for legitimate 
purposes, that the financial services sector becomes involved. Traditional 
models of money laundering have centred around a model of placing, 
layering and integrating money 8  before it is clean and available for 
legitimate transactions, However, this research will examine whether that 
model is applicable in the context of TBML activity, which also includes 
other financial and business services, in order to move and disguise the 
source of the funds. 
  
                                            
7
 Durrieu, R. (2013). Rethinking money laundering & financing of terrorism in international law. 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff. 
8
 McDowell, J., & Novis, G. (2001). The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime. 
Economic Perspectives, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, 6(2), 3-. 
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1.1.1 Exploratory Study 
 
Most academic studies set out to prove a testable theory; a 
hypothesis is what the researcher anticipates the result will be, and is 
typically formulated in the introduction. He or she postulates a hypothesis, 
a speculative answer to the question, “what is the expected outcome of the 
study?”.9 Many researchers, when composing their thesis, do not even 
consider themselves to be “testing a theory”.10 Yet there are many studies 
that do not pose a hypothesis. These are either exploratory or 
interpretative in nature.11  The design of a hypothesis for this research 
study was not undertaken, because it is an exploratory piece 12 of research 
and not a quantitative research topic - therefore the chapters explaining 
the research aims and objectives cover this in greater detail. 
                                            
9
 Anon, ‘An Introduction to Research’, 2008, https://www.soas.ac.uk/cedep-
demos/000_P506_RM_3736-Demo/unit1/page_25.htm 
10
 Kothari, C.R., 2004. Research methodology: Methods and techniques. New Age International. 
11
 An exploratory study is defined as a study in an area where the basis of knowledge is so low that it 
is not possible to make a meaningful hypothesis. An example of exploratory research could be: Will 
mobile sharing apps affect economic development in Africa?  
There are simply not enough people using these applications across the continent to make 
meaningful predictions, or gather statistically relevant results. However, e-commerce businesses are 
still invested in understanding what the impacts could be, and what barriers could exist to the spread 
and uptake of the applications. Exploratory research is therefore based more on information 
gathering such as questionnaires and focus groups, as well as literature reviews, than testing a 
specific theory. Exploratory research theses may not require hypotheses, but they are nonetheless 
required to state clearly the study’s research objectives and methods. 
An interpretative study is the second type of study that does not require a hypothesis. These studies 
seek to build knowledge by understanding meaning. The essential goal of the study is usually to 
understand how others attach meaning to events and experiences. Interpretative studies feature 
comparatively often in the educational or pedagogic sciences. Interpretative studies draw data from a 
variety of sources such as interviews and observations, and interpret the data according to prevailing 
theoretical models. The researcher is usually the primary interpreter of the observations, and 
categorizes the data into patterns or themes, which are then interpreted through the researcher’s 
own disciplinary lens. An example of an interpretive study would be: How are 9
th
 grade students at 
Columbia High School responding to the new interactive instructional techniques? 
Interpretative studies of this kind should, in lieu of a hypothesis, clearly state their methodology, 
nature of their sample groups, context, background and objectives as well as any theoretical 
paradigms the researcher will apply to their observations. 
12
 Grove, W.M. and Andreasen, N.C., 1982. Simultaneous tests of many hypotheses in exploratory 
research. The Journal of nervous and mental disease, 170(1), pp.3-8. 
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1.1.1.1  Introductory Justification 
 
The underlying context for the research is the belief that trade 
based money laundering is a complex issue that affects all banks involved 
in international financial transfers. The AML response from banks requires 
a number of monitoring and regulatory approaches to be adopted, if they 
are to remain non-complicit in supporting this type of criminal activity. 
These typically include collecting data on customer and client business 
transactions however many countries 13 have weak AML systems 14 and 
                                            
13
 The Basel Institute on Governance in its 2016 Basel Anti-Money Laundering Index, (an annual 
ranking assessing 149 countries - the only research-based risk rating of countries in this field by an 
independent non-profit institution) stated that “The top 10 countries of highest risk are Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Swaziland Tajikistan, Uganda.” 
("Fighting money laundering remains weak in most countries according to Basel AML Index 2016". 
(2016) Basel Institute of Governance, Basel, Switzerland. Available at : 
https://index.baselgovernance.org/sites/index/documents/Basel%20AML%20Index%202016_Media
%20Release.pdf) 
The 2013 publication Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Country Database commissioned by 
the United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs grouped countries into three categories: 
1. Jurisdictions of Primary Concern. 
2. Jurisdictions of Concern.  
3. Other Countries/Jurisdictions Monitored. 
“Jurisdictions of Primary Concern” are those identified, pursuant to INCSR reporting requirements, as 
“major money laundering countries.” A major money laundering country is defined by statute as one 
“whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of 
proceeds from international narcotics trafficking.” However, the complex nature of money laundering 
transactions today makes it difficult in many cases to distinguish the proceeds of narcotics trafficking 
from the proceeds of other serious crime. Moreover, financial institutions engaged in transactions that 
involve significant amounts of proceeds from other serious crimes are vulnerable to narcotics-related 
money laundering. The category “Jurisdiction of Primary Concern” recognizes this relationship by 
including all countries and other jurisdictions whose financial institutions engage in transactions 
involving significant amounts of proceeds from all serious crimes or are particularly vulnerable to 
such activity because of weak or non-existent supervisory or enforcement regimes or weak political 
will. Thus, the focus in considering whether a country or jurisdiction should be included in this 
category is on the significance of the amount of proceeds laundered, not of the anti-money 
laundering measures taken. This is a different approach taken than that of the Financial Action Task 
Force’s International Cooperation Review Group exercise, which focuses on a jurisdiction’s 
compliance with stated criteria regarding its legal and regulatory framework, international 
cooperation, and resource allocations.” Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern: Afghanistan, 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, British Virgin 
Islands, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Cayman Islands, China People Rep, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Curacao, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guernsey, Guinea 
Bissau, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Kenya, 
Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macau, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, St. Maarten, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Reference: (2013 Vol. II country database of "Money Laundering and 
Financial Crimes Country Database". (2013). United States Department of State Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/211396.pdf) 
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information such as client details and beneficial ownership are often 
missing.15 Therefore, part of the aim for this research is to establish what 
kind of information is required to support an effective TBML risk 
assessment framework. 
 
1.2 Overview of TBML  
 
The focus of this research is on the detection and tracking of money 
acquired through illicit activity. As this money enters into the financial 
services industry it is detected through the implementation of anti-money 
laundering (AML) regulation. However, many banks have struggled to 
develop effective AML responses and there have been a number of legal 
cases,16  especially in the US, where large banks have been fined for 
                                                                                                                       
14
The FATF statement of 19 February 2016 stated “As part of its on-going review of compliance with 
the AML/CFT standards, the FATF has to date identified the following jurisdictions which have 
strategic AML/CFT deficiencies for which they have developed an action plan with the FATF. While 
the situations differ among each jurisdiction, each jurisdiction has provided a written high-level 
political commitment to address the identified deficiencies. The FATF welcomes these commitments. 
A large number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF. The FATF continues to 
identify additional jurisdictions, on an on-going basis, that pose a risk to the international financial 
system.” Jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guyana, 
Iraq, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Syria, Uganda, Vanuatu, and Yemen. ("Improving 
Global AML/CFT Compliance: on-going process – 19 February 2016". (2016). FATF, Paris, France 
Available at www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/fatf-
compliance-february-2016.html) 
15
 OECD. (2014). Illicit financial flows from developing countries: Measuring OECD responses. 
France: OECD 
16
 Money Laundering Bulletin. (2016) "Cases" Money Laundering Bulletin, Informa UK Limited. 
Available at: www.moneylaunderingbulletin.com/legalandregulatory/cases/  
Thompson Jennifer. (2016). "Ulster Bank fined €3.3m by Irish central bank" The Financial Times Ltd. 
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/a95c6ad4-85c4-3fb7-872b-ad70b38415ea 
FCA. (2017) "FCA fines Deutsche Bank £163 million for serious anti-money laundering controls 
failings." The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) UK. Available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-
releases/fca-fines-deutsche-bank-163-million-anti-money-laundering-controls-failure 
AML ABC. (2016). "100+ AML fines on historical timeline scale" AML ABC. Available at: 
https://amlabc.com/aml-timelines-on-historical-scale/ 
Kitten, Tracy. (2014) "JPMorgan Chase Fines Exceed $2 Billion" Information Security Media Group, 
Corp. Available at:  www.bankinfosecurity.com/chase-a-6356 
FCA. (2016). "FCA imposes penalties on Sonali Bank (UK) Limited and its former money laundering 
reporting officer for serious anti-money laundering systems failings."The Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA)m UK. Available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-imposes-penalties-sonali-
bank-uk-limited-money-laundering 
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failing to implement the regulations 17 such as HSBC.18 As a result, money 
laundering (ML) has become a key area of focus for risk assessment 
within the global banking sector 19 particularly within AML units but also for 
management and corporate governance structures. Part of the increased 
focus may also be that in addition to the legal cases, the media and the 
public’s attention has also been focused on watching how banks are 
responding to this issue. Within the banking context the impact of weak 
AML controls and increased fines has also brought into question the role 
of governance and internal audit 20 in protecting the bank from the risk that 
ML poses. These risks include both the reputation of the bank amongst 
stakeholders as well as the social and economic damage that ML can 
cause if it remains undetected.21 
 
A key element of this research project is to understand how the 
capacity of banks can be further developed to undertake TBML risk 
assessment. This includes increasing corporate governance involvement 
                                                                                                                       
DailyBriefing. (2016) "Italian bank Intesa Sanpaolo fined £189m for breaching US anti-money-
laundering rules" Available at: biz.newsbelow.com/daily-briefing-italian-bank-intesa-sanpaolo-fined-
189m-for-breaching-us-anti-money-laundering-rules-22294/ 
Freifeld, Karen. (2017) 'Deutsche Bank fined for $10 billion sham Russian trades'. Thomson Reuters. 
Available at: www.reuters.com/article/us-deutsche-mirrortrade-probe-idUSKBN15F1GT 
Mexian, Lee. (2016) "StanChart and Coutts fined by MAS for anti-money laundering breaches" SPH 
DIGITAL NEWS. Available at: www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/stanchart-and-
coutts-fined-by-mas-for-anti-money-laundering-breaches 
17
 McCarthy, K. J., van Santen, P., & Fiedler, I. (2014). Modelling the money launderer: Micro 
theoretical arguments on anti-money laundering policy. International Review of Law and Economics. 
doi: 10.1016/j.irle.2014.04.00 
18
Homeland Security. (2012). HSBC exposed US financial system to money laundering, drug, 
terrorist financing risks. From permanent sub committee on investigations. US Senate. Retrieved 
from http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/hsbc-exposed-us-finacial-
system-to-money-laundering-drug-terrorist-financing-risks 
19
 Demetis, D. S., & Angell, I. O. (2007). The risk‐based approach to AML: Representation, paradox, 
and the 3rd directive. J of Money Laundering Control, 10(4), 412-428. 
doi:10.1108/136852007108309 
20
 Altamuro, J., & Beatty, A. (2010). How does internal control regulation affect financial reporting? 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49(1-2), 58-74 
21
 Arnone, M & Borlini, L. (2010) "International Anti‐Money Laundering Programs." J of Money 
Laundering Control 13, no. 3: doi:10.1108/13685201011057136 
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and also developing systems for the inclusion of internal audit, in relation 
to AML reporting and compliance. The systems that are developed for 
TBML detection also need to work alongside or enhance current AML 
systems for other money laundering techniques. 
 
1.2.1 Money Laundering and Its Sources. 
 
Money laundering has remained a vital component of criminal 
transactions since it was first devised. Although its origins are officially 
unknown, some authors have pointed to early Chinese traders hiding 
profits from rulers as an example of early money laundering activity this 
has dated as far back as 2000BC. 22  Nowadays many of the criminal 
activities including piracy, 23  drug and human trafficking, illegal arms 
smuggling and organised criminal gangs, produce or generate illegally 
acquired money, which cannot be used in the mainstream economy until it 
has been laundered.24 The biggest market for illicit cash is from drugs, 
which account for approximately 20% of all crime proceeds 25  and 
represents the equivalent to 0.6% of global GDP, with the cocaine market 
alone estimated to be worth $88 billion according to UN sources 26 which 
is an increase from the more conservative estimate in 2009 from the 
                                            
22
 Morris-Cotterill (2002) A Brief History of Money Laundering 
http://www.countermoneylaundering.com/public/content/brief-history-money-laundering 
23
 Do, Q. -T., Blanc, J., Kruse, A., Le, T., Levchenko, A., Ma, L., Shortland, A. (2013). The pirates of 
Somalia: Ending the threat, rebuilding a nation. The World Bank Regional Vice-Presidency for Africa 
24
 Durrieu, R. (2013). Rethinking money laundering & financing of terrorism in international law. 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff. 
25
 UNODC. (2011). Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other 
transnational organized crimes 
26
Simser, J. (2012). Money laundering: Predicate crimes, laundering techniques and the AML 
response. Emerging Issues 6195: Matthew Bender & Company. Inc 
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European RAND report of $10 billion.27 However, in order for this money 
to be accessed and used freely within the wider economy, at some point it 
needs to be entered into the legitimate financial system. ‘Clean’ money 
can be consumed, converted and invested easier and without being 
traced, while ‘dirty’ money can only be consumed in certain situations and 
leaves criminals exposed and at greater risk of being caught until the 
money has been cleansed. Dirty money, thus, has fewer uses, and it is 
therefore worth less”.28 
 
In order to understand the risks that money laundering poses to 
global banking systems, AML officers need practical examples of how 
criminals are currently using and exploiting the banking sector. These are 
obviously difficult to acquire without breaching law enforcement protocols 
and risking current and ongoing investigations. Instead Financial 
Intelligence Units work with sanitised cases that have all the legal 
information removed.  
 
For AML officers there are a number of publications that explain in 
detail how money laundering occurs using case examples, such as the 
APG report 29 or the AUSTRAC reports 30 both of which provide sanitized 
cases and typologies relating to a variety of different money laundering 
schemes that have been discovered. In addition, there are also country 
                                            
27
Kilmer, B & Pacula, R, L (2009) Estimating the size of the global drug market A demand –side 
approach. 
28
 McCarthy, K. J., van Santen, P., & Fiedler, I. (2014). Modelling the money launderer: Micro 
theoretical arguments on anti-money laundering policy. International Review of Law and Economics. 
doi: 10.1016/j.irle.2014.04.00 p2 
29
APG. (2014). APG yearly typologies report 2014. Australia: APG. Methods and trends of Money 
Laundering and Terrorism Financing 
30
AUSTRAC. (2014). Typologies and case studies report. Australia: AUSTRAC. Retrieved from 
http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/typologies-report-2014.pdf 
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specific reports which examine how AML strategies are working in 
detecting money laundering within the financial system such as AML 
issues in Chinese banks 31 and AML / CFT in the Irish Banking sector.32 
 
Despite the simplicity in the schemes that have been identified, the 
process of capturing money laundering activity and being able to attribute 
it to the actual criminals involved is far from simple.33 The cases that have 
been identified in these reports do not explain the wider impact of the 
money laundering activity 34  or give a full picture of what is not being 
caught. 
 
In addition, and especially for TBML cases, the situations can be a 
lot more complicated than simplified case studies depict. The complexities 
of trade misinvoicing 35 and the attempts to thwart it 36 illustrate that the 
current money laundering techniques require an in-depth level of 
understanding of both trade finance practices and the opportunities 
available to criminals within the international shipping and trade sector. 
Whereas traditional money laundering schemes can often be applied 
generically across different countries and regions, in contrast TBML cases 
                                            
31
Identifying Anti-Money Laundering Issues in Chinese Banks. (2009). TEMENOS 
32
Report on Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Financial Sanctions 
Compliance in the Irish Banking Sector. (2015). Central Bank of Ireland. 
33
Murray, K. (2013). A square go: Tackling organised crime where it doesn't want to be tackled. 
Journal of Money Laundering Control, 16(2), 99-108. doi:10.1108/13685201311318458 
34
McDowell, J., & Novis, G. (2001). The consequences of money laundering and financial crime. 
Economic Perspectives, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, 6(2) 
35
Buehn, A., & Eichler, S. (2011). Trade misinvoicing: The dark side of world trade. The World 
Economy, 34(8), 1263-1287. 
36
de Boyrie, M. E., Nelson, J. A., & Pak, S. J. (2007). Capital movement through trade misinvoicing: 
The case of Africa. Journal of Financial Crime, 14(4), 474-489. doi:10.1108/1359079071082818 
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have tended to be studied within more concentrated contexts either at a 
country or regional level.37 
 
Despite the additional trade context there are still some generalities 
that can be applied to all forms of money laundering activity. For example, 
the standard process whereby in order to hide the source of their income, 
criminals use a series of complex financial transactions to move money 
about and inter mingle it with other monies already in the system. 
Eventually it becomes fully integrated with legitimate funds and in so doing 
the criminal groups are able to “disguise the source of financial assets”.38 
 
The process described above is what is traditionally known as 
money laundering and banks can obviously play a major role, albeit often 
unknown, in facilitating this. However, the activity of money laundering and 
the criminal activities that produce such funds, which are often referred to 
as predicate offences, are two distinct and separate criminal activities.39 It 
is only in recent times that money laundering itself has become recognized 
as a criminal activity. Instead the judicial focus was placed on establishing 
links between the criminal activity and the cash trail. The concept of 
money laundering as a crime in its own right is slowly gaining prominence 
in many countries 40 with the result that there is increasing pressure on 
                                            
37
Yalta, A. Y., & Demir, I. (2010). The extent of trade mis-invoicing in turkey: Did post-1990 policies 
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banks to be more vigilant and proactive, since they can now be 
inadvertently involved in a crime.  
 
The risk to global banks of being caught in the middle of illicit 
financial transactions has increased even more with the advent of 
technology and electronic transfer and payment systems, which amongst 
other things have increased the speed of illicit money transfers. In 
addition, the introduction of virtual currencies 41 means that the nature of 
AML risk has changed dramatically since electronic payments cannot 
always be tracked or easily followed. Therefore, financial investigations 
are slower processes, which could potentially impact on banking 
resources, especially if law enforcement need their help and support in 
cases.  
 
All of these advancements in technology have meant that the 
financial regulators have also changed their list of compliance 
requirements, which in some cases has left banks behind the system and 
vulnerable to financial investigations. Evidence of this can be seen in the 
results of a recent KPMG survey,42 which asked financial services firms 
from over 40 countries 43 noting that recent changes such as the U.S. 
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Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and the Fourth European Money 
Laundering Directive have all meant that budgets for AML compliance 
were seriously underestimated for the third year running. Other countries 
are also noticing the difficulties and challenges of trying to implement 
regulation that is constantly changing and evolving, some countries such 
as Malaysia noted a significant impact on the banking sector 44 whereas in 
Russia many banks were still struggling to implement even earlier forms of 
AML compliance.45 
 
1.2.2 Impact of Technology on Global Money Laundering 
Activity 
 
There are many advantages to living in a globalised community with 
access to advanced technology and communication systems. In business 
and financial terms one of the main advantages is the increase with which 
business can be conducted, supported by faster and less cumbersome 
means to ship and transfer goods and faster mechanisms through which to 
receive or make payments. There is however also a downside to this 
phenomenon and that is witnessed through the increase in multi-national 
organised crime groups, who can quickly and effortlessly move illicit goods 
and their financial gains across the globe at the click of a button. In the 
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words of Arnone & Borlini (2010) 46  ‘The multi-faceted process of 
globalization has created new opportunities for transnational economic 
crime’.47 
 
This growth in transnational crime can be witnessed in the projected 
estimates for global money laundering (ML) activity. These figures show 
that money laundering activity accounts for approximately 2-5% of the 
world’s GDP 48 with 50% of all money laundering activity occurring through 
the US banking sector.49 In addition to the financial impact that money 
laundering has on the banking sector, ML also has a severe economic 
impact on countries across the world, this is due to the nature of both its 
direct and indirect effects.50 These indirect effects can include increasing 
the political instability of countries due to the supply of arms to rebel and 
insurgent groups; or increasing illegal drug supplies into communities.  
The removal of money from weakened economies through illicit financial 
flows can also destroy community infrastructure by depleting governments 
of structural funds. 51  ML can destroy the local economic structure by 
destabilising legitimate businesses and providing access to cheaper cash 
or credit for those businesses supporting the criminal organisations.52 The 
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social and political impact of money laundering 53 means that international 
responses have been called for in order to address the scale of the 
problem. Organizations such as the FATF 54 have tried to address some of 
the concerns by producing a series of guidelines that focus on each of the 
various aspects of money laundering including best practices on TBML 55 
and also virtual currency threats.56 This has resulted in a number of agreed 
standards for AML compliance 57 that banks across the globe must adhere 
to, and which countries have agreed to monitor and supervise. The 
challenge to the banking sector is to try and turn these generic guidelines 
into working policies that can be administered practically within each 
specific local banking context. 58  Unfortunately, many of the guidelines 
have been developed to focus on simple money laundering techniques in 
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isolation, whereas research 59 would suggest that schemes like TBML, mix 
and match money laundering techniques. This means that AML red flags 
also need to become broader. 
 
Despite the increased regulation and reporting procedures, 
criminals involved in laundering money have become increasingly more 
complex in their exploitation of financial products,60 as a way to launder 
the proceeds of their illicit activity. 61  As a result of these evolving 
techniques the industries and agencies that respond to money laundering 
(ML) activity have seen a continued increase in the growth of illicit funds 
entering the global economy.62 Within the area of financial crime ML is 
now recognised as possibly the biggest major problem, and constitutes the 
third largest ‘business’ in the world.63 
 
1.2.3 Trade Based Money Laundering (TBML) 
 
TBML is one example of how money laundering systems have 
evolved in response to stricter AML controls.64 In TBML scenarios criminal 
organisations and individuals disguise the source of their funds through 
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the use of trade and international shipping transactions.65 These type of 
activities are harder to detect for the banking system because they involve 
multiple bank accounts and traverse several jurisdictions.  In addition, it is 
difficult to verify the trading documentation that is presented to the bank 
without some level of expertise in international shipments. Since it is a 
newer form of money laundering technique, case studies and real life 
scenarios are scarce and provide a limited source from which to develop 
indicators and red flags, although some financial intelligence units have 
begun this process.66 Some guidelines on TBML indicators have also been 
developed by the international advisory body FATF (Financial Action Task 
Force) in 2006 and updated in 2008.  
 
1.2.3.1 Financial Action Task Force 
 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 67 is an inter-governmental 
body comprised of Ministers from each of the 34 member countries 68. The 
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group was first established in 1989 and aims to monitor every member 
country for vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the country’s approach to 
addressing money laundering and terrorist financing.  
 
“The objectives of the FATF are to set standards and 
promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory 
and operational measures for combating money 
laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats 
to the integrity of the international financial system”.69 
 
As part of their remit FATF have developed a series of 
recommendations, the main framework on money laundering was 
published in 2012 with additional publications on specialised areas and ML 
schemes being added. These recommendations provide the basis for a 
global framework of AML standards, which can assist and guide banks to 
detect money laundering type activity and to raise red flags or alerts.70 As 
part of their ongoing role FATF have assumed a role of monitoring 
individual country progress, and analysing how they are implementing 
these guidelines. The results of these findings are published as a series of 
annual country reports, which also inform other countries of progress 
and/or areas of concern within a specific region.  These country reports 
can then be incorporated into the risk assessment framework of individual 
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banks, to check if their client’s businesses have financial transactions or 
trading agreements in those areas deemed to be at additional risk. 
 
FATF was originally developed to address money laundering 
concerns linked to the movement of cash by drug cartels. However, its 
remit has expanded over time and now includes all types of money 
laundering and terrorist finance risks including TBML. This has led to 
criticism that by trying to be all things to all people their guidelines and 
material is very generic and hard to translate into practical and working 
guidelines, 71  which was also a message that came through from this 
research data. 
 
As part of their role FATF has sought to actively encourage a 
dynamic and responsive risk based approach rather than a rigid rules 
based system, stating that it is more flexible and responsive. They 
highlight the inherent risk within a strict rules based approach, which they 
state tends to encourage a tick box attitude without real consideration of 
the actual risks.72 The approach suggested by FATF has sometimes been 
criticised for failing to provide clearer guidance for banks on the kinds of 
scenarios to expect and even whether the definition FATF provides for 
TBML is really adequate.73 
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“…..precisely because the FATF is accorded such 
high status and is involved in inspecting the 
implementation of anti-money-laundering policies in its 
member countries, one would expect the reports to be 
exempt from criticism. It is strange, then, that the 
definition is somewhat ambiguous and contains 
inconsistencies and undeveloped terms”.74 
 
The nature of TBML means that criminals are always fluctuating and 
adapting their approach to respond to the AML regulation in the region.75 
However, research critics on TBML and most notably Soudijn, who is from 
a law enforcement background, have suggested that crime displacement 
may not be accurate since we do not actually have enough data or 
research on this topic to be able to make such claims at this stage. 
 
“As it turns out, nobody, including the FATF, 
really knows if TBML results from crime 
displacement. There is a simple explanation for 
this lack of knowledge: the non-existence of 
sufficient empirical data”.76 
 
In response to some of these concerns and most notably about the 
lack of understanding of TBML, this research aims to explore whether 
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clearer support guidelines can still be developed despite the changing 
nature of TBML schemes. 
 
1.2.3.2 Suspicious Alerts  
 
As part of the international response recommended by FATF, all countries 
should establish a financial intelligence unit or FIU to analyse data and 
intelligence sent on by financial services including banks.77 This data is 
received in the form of a suspicious transaction report (STR), or 
sometimes called a suspicious activity report (SAR) depending on the 
country or jurisdiction. Whenever a transaction or client might be 
considered involved in any criminal laundering activity, alerts are passed 
onto the centralised financial intelligence unit (FIU) within each country. 
This process has an administrative cost to the banks, which may explain 
some of their reluctance to invest too many resources into this work, for 
example; the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in the United 
States investigated the HBUS bank (part of HSBC) in 2012. They 
discovered as part of this investigation that 15,000 SARs had been 
reported internally in the bank but that these were still waiting to be sent 
onto the FIU. The backlog was reportedly due to a lack of dedicated staff 
to the AML compliance unit.78  
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Suspicious reports can only work if the system of risk assessment is 
able to detect what the suspicious behaviour is. If risk assessment 
framework has not incorporated the relevant risks associated with TBML 
activity, then it is unlikely to be raised as a potential SAR.  
 
Other media cases have highlighted that the definition of suspicious 
activity can vary and some banks have taken different approaches towards 
reporting the client’s suspicious use of offshore accounts.79 The reporting 
of suspicious activity is a key cornerstone of AML compliance and 
fundamental differences such as these, amongst banks provide gaps in 
the system that can be further exploited by financial criminals. 
 
The lack of an internationally agreed definition of ‘suspicious’ is still 
a potential stumbling block for many banks.80 Some countries such as the 
UK 81 have opted for a very wide legal interpretation of what suspicious 
activity might involve, whereas the banking sector is looking for a more 
focused and specific definition that they can link to a risk assessment 
framework. It can be said that at one extreme we have a very focused 
definition held by the United Kingdom, and on another extreme we have 
the approach taken by Switzerland, whereby they have adopted a 
statutory definition seen to be very narrow, with a process obligating the 
bank to compile a report if it is grounded in evidence that a client has 
committed a criminal act or that his proceeds are of criminal activity. Police 
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enquiries commence after the banks submit their report. A third example of 
the differing definition is seen in the Australian definition which is similar to 
the United Kingdom albeit censored a little further, whereby the Australia’s 
legislation 82 seems to be written differently 83 from the UK’s and focussed 
far more on false documentation than criminal proceeds, and suspicion.84 
 
The Wolfsberg Trade Finance principles, which were developed by 
a cluster of the world’s largest banks, have also suggested areas that 
could be deemed suspicious. However even with these principles the 
focus is still on providing examples and research material. Within an 
individual bank an AML officer needs to be able to interpret all this 
information, and then turn it into a working risk assessment system that 
can be implemented within his or her own bank. 
 
The reporting of suspicious activity is a cornerstone of AML 
compliance; however, fundamental differences in definitions amongst 
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states and inevitably banks create vulnerabilities in the system that can be 
further exploited by financial criminals.85 
 
The lack of an internationally agreed definition of ‘suspicious 
activity’ is still a potential obstacle for many banks.86 A comparison of how 
various countries interpret “suspicious activity” is helpful in understanding 
how AML regulations remain pervious.87  
 
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) are tools the FATF (Financial 
Action Task Force) recommends as a first line of defence in detecting 
money laundering and trade based money laundering activity. SARs are a 
granular level measure of the potential laundering threat of any particular 
system. How banks and other financial institutions approach SARs, and 
how governments define them, illustrates differences in how various 
systems define suspicious activity.  
 
All financial institutions in countries that are members of the FATF 88 
are required to install procedures, and training, in order to better detect 
and respond to suspicious activity. They require banks to complete an 
official report of suspicious activity noticed by staff, and forward it to the 
authorities. By comparing a country’s requirements for an SAR and the 
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number of SARs submitted, we develop an idea of how varied the 
definition of “suspicious activity” is. 
 
In 2012, the USA recorded 860, 858 SRAs, whereas Brazil’s 
financial institutions reported only 38, 417 incidents.89 Given that Brazil’s 
economy and financial sector is of relative sophistication and size to the 
USA’s, the non-relative difference in SRAs indicates a difference in 
attitude and interpretation of “suspicious activity”.  
 
A shell bank is a bank that does not have a physical address in the 
country from which it operates. The FATF strongly recommends against 
transacting with shell banks.90 Despite this, a number of countries that are 
members of the FATF do not specifically prohibit their banks from doing 
business with shell banks; examples include Argentina, Japan and 
Finland.91 This is another indication of how malleable the definitions within 
AML regulations are. This, again, describes differences in attitudes and 
interpretations of FATF and standard AML regulations.  
 
The Wolfsberg Trade Finance Principles, updated as recently as 
January 2017, acknowledge that the differences in interpretation of the 
AML regulations are less an indication of deliberate resistance to AML, 
and rather a function of immaturity within a financial sector’s 
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development.92  Nonetheless, differences exist – for one reason or another 
- and risk mitigation when analysing a client’s transactions absolutely 
requires an understanding of AML statutory and institutional differences 
between countries, particularly with regard to trade transactions, where 
partner banks in other territories will be required to collect, validate and 
interrogate documentation pursuant to a client’s trade transaction.  
 
In essence the complexity 93  of criminal schemes and money 
laundering activities is continually evolving;94 this is partly in response to 
the banks tightening their AML screening processes and therefore 
criminals needing newer schemes in order to circumvent them. However, 
the AML structures and systems at a global banking level are perhaps 
adapting more slowly than the criminal schemes since there is a time 
delay between new ML schemes being identified and recognised and the 
new structures to defeat them being implemented.  This delay is because 
the process of developing new schemes is quite complex and requires a 
thorough understanding of how the schemes actually operate, followed by 
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Suspicious Activity Reports Regarding Trade-Based Money Laundering, advisory, FIN-2010-A001, 
February 18, 2010. 
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a process of identifying how they managed to bypass the banking 
screening system. The lack of specific guidance provided by bodies such 
as FATF means that individual banks have to develop schemes and risk 
assessment processes on their own. This issue is further compounded by 
different legislative interpretations of money laundering crimes and the link 
to predicate offences. In some countries money laundering has only 
recently been seen as a crime in its own right,95 which is all a bank can 
raise suspicion about. In other countries evidence of a predicate offence 
i.e. the source of the money coming from a crime has to be determined 
before it will be deemed as a money laundering crime. In either scenario, 
stronger links between outside agencies such as law enforcement, 
customs and tax offices is needed with the banking sector in order to 
develop a fuller picture of potential money laundering crimes that the legal 
system can utilise. 
 
The FATF guidelines on TBML provide some generic case 
scenarios and red flag indicators, but they fail to go further than this. 
Banks are therefore challenged to develop a system that reflects their 
individual country needs, as well as utilizing the skills within the bank to 
incorporate the red flags in a way that is meaningful and can be used in a 
risk assessment process.  
 
                                            
95
 “It follows from the simple definition above that money laundering cannot occur without being 
preceded by a crime which gives rise to the illegally obtained funds. Such crimes are called 
‘predicate crimes’. Countries differ in what they define as predicate crimes and what they define as 
money laundering. Each country’s definition is critical because if a crime is not a predicate crime then 
there is no money laundering activity” taken from "Module 3: Notes Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing – Definitions and Nature" of Advanced Certification in Anti Money Laundering. 
International Compliance Training Ltd England. Source: www.int-
comp.com/members/attachments/Mal-module3.pdf 
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1.2.3.3 Comparative AML Approaches With a Focus on the United 
Kingdom  
 
A brief overview of the United Kingdom’s AML legislation and 
enforcement is valuable, especially as London is considered one the 
world’s major financial centres. The UK’s POCA (Proceeds of Crime Act) 
came into effect in 2002, and replaced laws that were considered too 
specific to drug related offenses. Tracking the reasons for the new laws, 
and their passage into law is useful in discovering legislative realities and 
challenges of implementing AML laws. Constant review is another aspect 
of the UK’s AML legislative process, POCA has subsequently endured a 
range of critiques, particularly with regard to enforcement; we will briefly 
explore how the UK’s ongoing institutional development of AML 
enforcement has proceeded within both existing sector bodies, as well as 
newly established enforcement agencies. 
 
1.2.3.4 Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA)  
 
The Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 96 enacted in 2002, contained 
the UK Judiciary’s provisions for the detection and prosecution of money 
laundering offences. The logic was immutable, at the time the Home Office 
stated, “The aim of the asset recovery scheme in POCA is to deny 
criminals the use of their assets, recover the proceeds of crime, and deter 
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 UK Government. (2002). "Proceeds of Crime Act 2002". UK Parliament. Available at: 
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/contents 
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and disrupt criminality”. 97  Exploring sections 327 – 329 98  of POCA 
provides an overview of the statutory mechanisms the UK uses in its fight 
against money laundering. It is also of benefit to study the Home Affairs 
Select Committee’s report (2016) on the proceeds of crime, which is all but 
damning of the enforcement and supervision structures issuing from 
POCA with specific regard to money laundering. 
 
Criminal property is defined in POCA as either “a person’s benefit 
from criminal conduct or a representation of that benefit or the alleged 
offender knows or suspects that the property constitutes or represents 
such a benefit.” Section 327 of POCA defines what concealment of 
criminal property means. Concealment of criminal property is the disguise, 
conversion, transfer or removal of criminal property. Section 328 concerns 
itself with arrangements and labels as an offence, anyone entering into or 
becoming concerned in an arrangement which he knows or suspects 
facilitates the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property. 
Section 328 speaks to use and acquisition of criminal property, it is an 
offence to be in possession of, acquire or use criminal property.  
 
1.2.3.5 POCA Case Law  
 
Section 328 has been further refined in cases such as R v GH 
(Respondent) [2015] UKSC 24, 22 April 2015. The Supreme Court found 
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Written submission by the Home Office on enacting POCA 2002. Retrieved from: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-
committee/proceeds-of-crime/written/29812.html 
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  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/section/328 
  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/section/329 
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that any arrangement entered into prior to the existence of criminal 
property, could not be tried as a money laundering offence. 99  This is 
naturally of importance to banks and investment institutions who may 
unwittingly open bank accounts for criminals who intend to obtain criminal 
property, but have yet to commit an actual crime. The findings in JSC BTA 
Bank v Ablyazov [2009] EWCA Civ 1124 at para 14 also speak to the 
importance of criminal property existing prior to an arrangement for money 
laundering to have occurred.100  Finally R v Sarwar [2011] HCJAC 13, 
makes interesting reading with regard to “knowing or suspecting”. Here the 
court finds that prosecutions must be able to prove an offender knew or 
suspected the property was criminal property in order for the offender to 
be charged with money laundering.101 
 
1.2.3.6 POCA Analysis  
 
There are successful aspects to POCA: prior to POCA prosecutors 
had to prove an underlying crime before they could argue the crime of 
money laundering, POCA created a single set of money laundering 
offences applicable in all circumstances, without regard to the precise 
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 United Kingdom Supreme Court. "Judgement R v GH (Respondent)". (2015). United Kingdom 
Supreme Court. Available at: https://www.supremecourt.uk/decided-
cases/docs/UKSC_2014_0035_Judgment.pdf Cited as : [2015] 2 Cr App R 12, [2015] Lloyd's Rep 
FC 387, [2015] UKSC 24, [2015] WLR(D) 178, [2015] 1 WLR 2126, [2015] WLR 2126, [2015] Crim 
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nature of the base crime. In fact, no prosecution for the criminal offence is 
required for the prosecution of the money laundering offence to occur.102 
 
Criticism of the UK’s POCA legislation was focused on the 
confiscation regime and enforcement it created. 103  The Home Office 
enquiry of 2016 104 was motivated by a set of startling figures: statistics 
from 2014-15 showed that 640,000 individuals were convicted of a crime 
in the UK, and over the same period, 5,924 confiscation orders were 
made; less than 1% of convictions.105 Of the approximately one thousand 
confiscation orders used to freeze assets, 45% of those were enforced. In 
addition, the enforcement of orders appeared to have a higher rate of 
success where the amount of the assets involved was £1000 or less (a 
rate of 96%) as compared to those involving assets valued over £1 million 
(a rate of 22%). At the time there were at least 15 bodies 106 administering 
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 The 15 Bodies are Home Office (Responsible for government policy on criminal finances and 
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confiscation orders leading to an unnecessarily complicated and confusing 
scenario. Key findings of the committee included:  
 At least a hundred billion pounds, equivalent to the GDP of 
Ukraine, is being laundered through the UK every year. 
 Keith Vaz, a member of the UK parliament who chaired the 
select commons committee stated "The main method of 
reporting suspicious transactions, the ELMER system, is not fit 
for purpose. Designed to identify money laundering or terrorist 
financing, it is desperately overloaded to the point where it is 
now completely ineffective. Capable of managing 20,000 reports 
a year, it is currently burdened with 381,882. This has rendered 
the whole system a futile and impotent weapon in the global 
fight against criminal financing, with no indication from the Home 
Office as to when a new state of the art system will be 
purchased".107 
                                                                                                                       
prosecuting cases and enforcing the more complex, high-value orders), Serious Fraud Office 
(Responsible for investigating, prosecuting and enforcing the complex, high-value cases 
related to fraud, bribery and corruption), HM Revenue & Customs (Carries out financial investigations 
into tax cases, and assists HM Courts & Tribunals Service with related confiscation order 
enforcement),Department for Work & Pensions (Carries out financial investigations into benefits 
cases), National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC)  (Replaced the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) in April 2015. Professional forum for the chief police officers in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland to share ideas and best practice and, in some areas, coordinate resources), Regional Asset 
Recovery Teams (RARTs) (Regional teams responsible for investigating more complex cases, often 
on behalf of other law enforcement agencies), Asset Confiscation Enforcement teams (ACE) 
(Teams responsible for providing financial investigator support to enforcement agencies - including 
regional teams co-located with RARTs), Police forces  (Carry out criminal and financial investigations 
on a wide range of crimes and criminals), Crown Court judges  (Make judgments regarding 
confiscation order imposition), Magistrates (Make judgments on enforcement processes, including 
imposing default prison sentences), and  Receivers (Private companies appointed by the courts to 
either manage or collect criminal assets). 
Ref: National Audit Office (NAO). (2016). "Confiscation Orders: Progress Review". National Audit 
Office (NAO), United Kingdom. Available at: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Confiscation-orders-progress-review.pdf 
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 Investigators are delaying in freezing assets, ideally, assets 
should be frozen simultaneously with the criminal becoming 
aware of the investigation for the first time (this will often be at 
the time of arrest, although not always). Waiting for a conviction 
is far too late. 
 There is a lack of interest in confiscation orders among 
prosecutors and judges, which has led in turn to a lack of 
training and specialist skills. Specialist courts would enable 
complex confiscation hearings to be dealt with more efficiently 
and with much greater expertise.108 
 The Parliamentary Home Affairs Select Committee’s verdict 109 
was damning stating that huge gaps existed in the Kingdom’s 
efforts to tackle money laundering, trade based money 
laundering and other financial crimes, effectively undermining 
the authority of the AML Framework of the United Kingdom.110 
 
1.2.3.7 POCA Amendments Since 2002 
 
Since initially being written into law in 2002, POCA has been 
subsequently amended by the addition of the Serious Crime Act 2015, and 
as well as amendments via amendments to the Policing and Crime Act 
2009, and the Crime and Courts Act 2013. All three amendments were 
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written into law in 2015. Confiscation orders were altered with the addition 
of the determination of third party interests, the timing of confiscation 
orders (now payable on the day they are made), and far reaching powers 
provided to the court in the enforcement of compliance of confiscation 
orders. Sentencing scales were also amended, with longer sentences 
being recommended ranging from 6 months to 14 years and ending 
automatic release at the halfway point for orders in excess of £10 million. 
Restraint orders had also been made easier to obtain by lowering the 
threshold from ‘belief’ to ‘suspicion’. The definition of cash detention had 
also been extended to cover items of value such as cars, watches, 
jewellery and furniture. Finally, the onus was now on the 
respondent/interested party to indicate that he objected to the forfeiture of 
cash otherwise it would take place without a hearing. 
 
The changes have received critical reviews 111 from those within the legal 
industry.112 
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“Some of the amendments are almost eye watering and 
their supposed practical effect simply does not reflect the 
realities faced by criminal lawyers routinely engaged in the 
application and enforcement of confiscation orders. The 
idea that there are thousands of criminals languishing in 
prison instead of using concealed assets to repay 
confiscation orders is frankly delusional and the 
amendments made to the Act appear to be nothing more 
than political window dressing. The simple fact of the 
matter is that they are likely to lead to further injustice and 
further extensive litigation in the Appellate Courts of this 
country which had just started to get to grips with the 
sharper edges of the current regime”.113 
 
1.2.4 International Review 
 
The UK’s teething problems with AML regulations and institutional 
development are not unique. When assessing other jurisdictions and their 
AML frameworks, the FATF reports are a reasonable starting point for 
assessing the country and understanding its AML risks, although as a 
caveat the FATF has also been criticised for its differential application of 
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standards from one country to another.114 In the following paragraphs I 
briefly explore a few AML models by country (Spain, Malaysia and 
Australia).  
 
Comparing these countries offers a small yet powerful comparative 
sample that allows comparison and contrast across diverse verticals such 
as FATF ranking, economy size, sector exposure, risk profile and 
geography. These particular four countries are useful to compare for a 
number of reasons. The first is that they are all members of the FATF 115 – 
Financial Action Task Force – meaning they have all been reviewed by the 
organization with specific focus on their AML regulations and enforcement. 
In this sense, there is a useful set of measurables, across which each 
country has been rated using a standardized methodology. The UK was 
included as London is currently considered the financial capital of the 
world.116 As such, one can make a reasonable assumption such a country 
would experience high rates of money laundering incidents, comparing 
their AML approaches is therefore insightful. As a parallel, the Basel AML 
index report of 2016,117 names Malaysia and Australia as amongst the five 
countries with the lowest AML risk. It is therefore also useful to compare 
their AML regulations with both each other, as well as higher risk 
countries. Spain, as both a member of the EU, as well as a major port of 
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entry for criminal property – particularly proceeds of drug trafficking – is 
consequently a useful point of comparison with regard to its AML Laws. 
 
1.2.4.1 Spain Review 
 
Spain has set a good example 118  for many countries. 119  As an 
economy with a very strong export industry as well as key entry ports into 
Europe, 120  Spain is more exposed than most to Trade Based Money 
Laundering. The FATF report in 2014 121  stated “Spain has sound 
AML/CFT institutions” and “Spain has a high level of understanding of its 
ML/TF risks”, a positive and glowing review of Spain’s AML/CFT system, 
offset somewhat by other reports that state the problems faced by Spain in 
relation to ML activity and CDD processes.122 
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1.2.4.2 Malaysia Review 
 
Malaysia's AML/CFT system is seen to be in line with international 
guidelines and the nation can proficiently counter such activities– a result 
of the state forming the National Coordination Committee (NCC) in 
2000.123 The FATF report in 2015 124 stated: “Malaysia’s legal framework 
for supervision is sound and all regulators apply a risk-based approach to 
supervision”. The report continued, “The regulatory framework for 
preventative measures is highly compliant, which sets a good starting 
point” and further stated, “Malaysia’s robust policy framework for AML/CFT 
reflects strong political commitment and well-functioning coordination 
structures for AML/CFT and combating proliferation financing.” The report 
portrayed an overall positive reflection of the efforts of the Malaysian 
government in addressing global risks and concerns of AML. However, the 
1MDB scandal in 2016 125 shocked the country, opening up a great deal of 
public outcry, 126  which ultimately led to the firing of the deputy prime 
minister, and a review of the country’s financial crime policies.127 
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1.2.4.3 Australia Review 
 
Australia, one of the first nations among the OECD to form a 
financial intelligence Unit (FIU) 128  had its anti-money laundering legal 
system receive an FATF endorsement.129 The Mutual Evaluation Report of 
2015 130  issued by the FATF stated “Operationally, national AML/CTF 
coordination is very comprehensive” and “…Australia’s legal framework to 
combat TF is comprehensive” further stating “Australia’s legal framework 
to implement targeted financial sanctions is a good example for other 
countries.” The FATF and GAFI went on to say, “The Mutual Evaluation 
Report of Australia recognises that Australia has a good understanding of 
its money laundering risks, coordinates domestically to address these 
risks, and has highly effective mechanisms for international cooperation. 
However, the authorities focus more on the disruption of predicate crimes, 
rather than on the laundering of the proceeds of these crimes and their 
confiscation. Therefore, while the report recognises that Australia develops 
good quality financial intelligence which it shares with law enforcement 
bodies and other authorities, the report concludes that this information 
should lead to more ML/TF investigations.”131 
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It should be noted that despite the positive inclination of the reports, 
countries within the FATF system still endure mass breaches of their AML 
activity. The very same report 132 on Australia also found that its legislative 
regime was not meeting the FATFs global standards. The organisation 
Transparency International released a document highlighting flaws in the 
Australian system. The report 133 stated, “The current AUSTRAC method 
of regulation is analogous to the approach taken in the United Kingdom 
(UK) which resulted in a significant portion of UK banks being unwilling to 
turn away profitable business relationships even when there appeared to 
be an unacceptable risk of handling the proceeds of crime”.  
 
1.2.4.4 International Growth Phase 
 
It is clear from our initial exploration of the UK AML procedures and 
institutions, and the subsequent quick review of other countries that AML 
is still in an organic phase of growth, countries have to grapple with quickly 
changing criminal and technological environments and very often the 
private sector is less than enthusiastic about incorporating additional 
regulation and administration. It is tempting to ask the question, are all 
these efforts not being duplicated, could the lessons learned by the UK, in 
the above examples with regards to for instance separate confiscation 
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courts be immediately replicated by other countries, who need not 
necessarily learn that lesson the hard way.  
 
It is, or should be, the FATF’s task to coordinate this reporting, 
making lessons learned as well as institutional or procedural successes 
available to members in a way that helps younger members avoid 
replicating mistakes made. However, of preeminent consideration are the 
inherent differences in the AML realities of different countries, making it 
unlikely that one-size-fits all approach will soon be developed.  
 
1.2.5 Sovereignty 
 
Sovereignty is a nation state’s absolute right to self-rule, free from 
outside influence and answerable to no higher power.134 Impinging on a 
nation’s sovereignty by attempting to control parts of its territory, people or 
resources is essentially an act of war. As an increasingly global 
community, however, the concept of sovereignty is changing.135 Human 
rights treaties, and to some lesser extent climate change treaties, are 
examples of the global community reserving the right to interfere in the 
internal actions of a sovereign state.136 Anti-money laundering and trade-
based money laundering in particular are swiftly becoming global issues, 
requiring close co-operation between nations. However, membership, 
participation, reporting and information sharing on platforms such as the 
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FATF and its associate organizations is entirely voluntary; FATF 
regulations are effectively only suggestions, and are in no way 
enforceable. Sovereignty also means that corrupt regimes, where much 
criminal money originates, are entirely disinclined to participate, 137 
perpetuating the problem.  
 
1.2.5.1 Critical Challenges to AML Enforcement. 
 
Money laundering and trade based money laundering are global 
crimes with no attention to borders; successfully tackling them requires an 
international effort. This is hampered at times by issues not solely 
restricted to the issue of sovereignty. A corollary of sovereignty is the fact 
that, by definition, national security apparatus is designed to maintain and 
enforce the law within a national boundary, TBML and most other ML 
transactions are cross-border by nature, requiring strong communication 
and agreement between countries:  
“by definition, transnational crime crosses borders. But the 
law enforcement institutions that have developed over 
centuries were constructed to maintain order primarily within 
national boundaries.”138 
 
The finer details of criminality – in other words whether both 
countries involved in the transaction necessarily agree that a crime has in 
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fact been committed – is a further complication, and speaks to how well-
written and enforced the AML laws are:  
“the requirement of dual criminality, whereby assistance is only 
possible if the alleged offense violates both countries' law.”139  
 
Should both countries agree on the definitions of ML crimes, and 
have sufficient law enforcement resources, it is additionally necessary that 
bi-lateral communication be of a very high calibre. Tracking and updating 
information on the nature and details of ongoing investigations with other 
enforcement agencies leads to greater rates of detection and prosecution. 
Naturally, the more widely spread information is, the more unsecure it 
becomes, making trust and co-ordination in these instances of high 
importance:  
“The delegate of Tanzania hailed the cooperation of the 
partners of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), which had adopted programmes for information 
exchange to combat money laundering.”140 
 
A further complication in this regard is that law enforcement 
agencies are famously unwilling to surrender hard-won data and 
information with regards to ongoing investigations, furthermore that 
information is often also politicized, making it even less likely to be shared 
with other countries:  
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" the international community requires solid data to gauge 
the challenge and effectiveness of responses, but data on 
transnational organized crime is notoriously difficult to gather 
and is often politicized.”141 
 
Transnational AML enforcement is further complicated when 
involving developing countries. Here judicial systems are still in a phase of 
development, and also respond relatively slowly, as such AML laws are 
seldom at an advanced stage by comparison to developed countries.142 
 
No matter how developed enforcement and legal systems are, FIUs 
seeking to retain a measure of control over their ML risk, need to dedicate 
significant resources to retain up-to-date contact and cooperation with 
partner FIUs in other countries:  
“AUSTRAC has taken the initiative to set up regulatory overseas contacts 
with the FIUs of Canada and New Zealand.”143 
 
A further list of 5 critical challenges to AML enforcement, from the 
academic perspective of Verdugo-Yepes are: 
“1. The lack of a universal criminalization of money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism according to UN 
instruments.  
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2. The existence of financial institutions with secrecy laws in 
some jurisdictions, acting as a hindrance for the 
effectiveness of the AML/CFT strategy.  
3. Even if the existence of an effective national Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU) may help the effectiveness of the 
AML/CFT implementation, this is not operational in some 
countries, or if it is, it is sometimes unable to exercise its role 
due to a lack of effective power.  
4. Some domestic Anti Money-Laundering and the 
Combating of Terrorist Financing Regimes have failed to 
provide the mutual legal assistance and assistance for 
carrying out law enforcement action if necessary, as well as 
to enhance information sharing and cooperation across 
borders.  
5. The financial regulators of banking, insurance and 
securities have a lack of authority to investigate, limited 
access to time-sensitive data needed for surveillance 
purposes, insufficient resources for inspection, surveillance 
and investigation, and often a limited enforcement 
mandate.”144 
 
1.2.5.2 FATF Challenges in Developing Countries 
 
                                            
144
 Verdugo-Yepes, C., 2008. Enhancing international cooperation in the fight against the financing of 
terrorism. Journal of Global Change and Governance, 1(3), pp.1-27 
 72 
The FATF as a task team convened by a set of core member 
countries, has formalised good AML practice, as a useful measure for AML 
compliance, and a helpful knowledge base for developing countries hoping 
to improve their AML laws. However, the FATF is in no way responsible for 
either the development of country-specific policies, nor does it enforce 
AML regulation within countries. These tasks fall to policy makers and 
whatever Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) the country has in place. With 
particular regard to developing countries, there is often a lack of internal 
capacity, technology, budget, training and in some instances, political will 
to reform internal banking systems in line with the FATF’s regulations. 
Additionally, the judiciary as well as border control systems and policies 
are underdeveloped, and lack sufficient training to mitigate ML.  
“The FATF approach is highly data-driven. The FIU is 
expected to have the capacity to store and efficiently analyze 
huge amounts of diverse data. The fact that developing 
country FIUs often lack this budget and staff technical 
capacity contributes to such countries being rated as non-
compliant with the relevant FATF standards. Moreover, it is 
not just an issue with FIU capacity. Many developing 
countries lack sufficient training of police or border patrol. 
Judges and prosecutors regularly have too little experience 
or specialized knowledge to handle the complexities of a 
money laundering or terrorist financing case. All of these are 
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commonly raised issues in developing country FATF 
assessments.” 145 
 
1.2.6 AML Regulation 
 
The banking regulation sector is responsible for monitoring the 
mechanisms and effectiveness of AML systems, which in turn are 
responsible for detecting and reporting suspicious activities within banks.  
However, the increased regulation, along with the training and recruitment 
of staff to implement the financial control mechanisms, also has a 
significant cost impact on the banking industry. It is estimated that for Anti-
Money Laundering (AML) regulation alone it costs the banking sector in 
the region of $5.8 billion for 2014.146 This places banks in a dilemma since 
they ultimately have to operate as a viable business and AML controls are 
sometimes viewed as beyond the scope of the main banking business.147 
Since some banks may have been viewed as showing reluctance to 
engage with the regulation approach this has caused regulators to harden 
their position and introduce legal cases and fines as a way of instilling a 
culture of AML compliance, although this has been criticised as an 
ineffective long term approach.148 One of the advantages of legal cases is 
that they provide an opportunity for academics and industry experts to 
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examine some of the underlying issues within the sector and to provide 
alternative solutions to the problem. This research uses one such case 
study produced through the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in 
the US, it examines the situation at HBUS where a number of AML 
breaches were reported by the regulator against the HSBC bank. 
 
Case studies provide one source of information relating to what 
happens in a banking context. Another option that was used in this 
research was to engage with officials working on AML compliance across 
the financial services sector. The role of reporting suspicious AML related 
transactions or activity is usually designated to a particular unit within the 
bank, often supported by a money laundering reporting officer (MLRO). In 
the data section of this research the respondents were selected from 
across these and/or similar positions and also asked which other areas of 
the bank should be involved in money laundering and TBML detection. In 
particular, the research was interested in the relationship between the 
internal audit function and AML compliance, and whether this was a 
resource that was utilised fully within the banking sector. This link was 
chosen because a number of industry papers 149  had suggested that 
internal audit should play a greater role in AML compliance processes. In 
addition to internal audit there were a number of other links that the 
research wanted to explore, including the role of governance and the 
impact of technology on AML regulation and compliance. 
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The development, issuance and enforcement of AML banking 
regulations have been of great focus. It is however helpful to briefly 
explore how these banking regulations in general are issued, and 
enforced. This will give context to the challenges of AML enforcement.  
 
The global banking system, when viewed as individual country-
based systems, is governed by thousands of laws emanating from national 
and local regulators, 150  not to mention the global regulations (firm 
suggestions rather than enforceable laws) issued by inter-governmental 
organisations such as the FATF. Over time, the banking sector has 
become increasingly regulated,151 usually because of successive systemic 
failures: the most recent being the sub-prime meltdown of 2006/7.  
 
Regulation is developed across a number of vectors: ownership, 
capitalisation, deposit guarantees, credit regulations and foreign 
ownership to name a few. It is, however, dramatically easier to write a law, 
than to enforce it. Some countries, like the USA, have five distinct financial 
regulation enforcement agencies 152  whilst others, such as Zimbabwe, 
make do with only one. In Zimbabwe’s case, it is the Reserve Bank 
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itself.153 The near collapse of the Zimbabwe banking sector in 2004, whilst 
occurring against a backdrop of severe lack of investor confidence, can be 
traced back to an under resourced enforcement agency.154 
 
Whilst many banks are complicit in breaking regulations 155 a lack of 
enforcement in part or full is also to blame.156 Regulations are only as 
powerful as a regulator’s ability to enforce them.157 Very often training, 
resources and budget are labelled as the primary reasons for why 
enforcement fails.158 This illustrates that not only is the development of 
regulation crucial, but political will and funding is essential to truly effective 
enforcement.159 
 
This brief discussion on the limitations of banking regulation 
enforcement reminds us that AML and TBML regulation and enforcement 
has to succeed within these contexts and challenges, with the added 
difficulty of being applied consistently across national borders. 
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1.3  Governance 
 
Ultimately within the banking structure managing the overall 
assessment and detection of money laundering activity is the responsibility 
of the directors, although they are very dependent on the quality of 
information being provided to them through the management and auditing 
structures. For example, weaknesses in this structure have been noted in 
the past through cases such as HBUS. 160  As part of the governance 
structure, the internal audit function (IAF) is considered to be one of the 
four pillars of banking governance; along with the audit committee, board 
of management and the external auditors. However, although internal 
audit is part of that governance structure, the internal audit role should 
ideally be used to check on the extent to which policies have been carried 
out and applied rather than as a tool of management.161 Instead its role 
has been considered by some academics to have been side-lined from 
debates, especially since the financial crisis of 2007. 162  This research 
explores whether TBML auditing and TBML compliance are different 
issues for governance and what should be the difference between the two 
areas. 
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1.3.1 Ethical Behaviour 
 
The trust placed in banks is contingent on a constant and 
unassailable ethical standard evident at every level of a bank’s operations. 
This naturally includes the behaviour and personal moral framework of 
individual employees, which becomes another area one needs to consider 
when studying the money laundering risks faced by banks.163 The risk that 
an employee will “go rogue” has existed 164 ever since we began entrusting 
others with our money.165 
 
In the context of this category of research, bank insiders can 
perform a range of functions on behalf of criminals. This type of insider 
complicity often plays a role in money laundering and trade-based money 
laundering.166 Bank employees, as with most human beings, are fallible 
and can be bribed, coerced or blackmailed into assisting criminals.  
 
“It is estimated that there are between 2000 and 3000 
compromised employees working within the UK’s top 500 
banks. Criminals start the relationship, usually, by asking a 
low- rung employee to bend the rules slightly, they then go to 
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use evidence of the first corruption to blackmail employees 
into conducting more serious offences.”167 
 
A lack of ethics need not always be why employees overlook 
suspicious transactions, a lack of training, insight or competency can also 
lead to an SAR not being submitted, as can the employees preference to 
not endure a burdensome process of ‘paperwork’. As we have discussed 
earlier,168 certain bank employees have some measure of discretion when 
it comes to identifying suspicious banking activity or transactions. Simply 
not filing a suspicious activity report (SAR) with the authorities can ensure 
that cases of money laundering go undetected.169 Bank employees also 
have insider information that could be exploited by money launderers. We 
can therefore safely conclude that not only are a bank’s employees a key 
factor in determining a bank’s exposure to money laundering and trade 
based money laundering, but also by its nature, this type of risk is harder 
to detect. The HSBC case study, discussed later in the thesis, allows one 
to understand the magnitude of such behaviour. 
 
1.3.1.1 Beyond the Ethics of Bank Employees 
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It is of course possible and in many countries probable, that 
banking fraud and money laundering is facilitated by those in power. 
Corrupt regimes and governments are bolstered, and in some cases 
consist entirely of dense criminal networks that operate within the highest 
echelons of government 170. In these circumstances, even the most honest 
and ethical of bank employees would be hard-pressed to question the 
transactions of a political elite:  
“Businessmen involved in these different activities are linked 
together in criminal networks, and also linked to powerful 
figures in the bureaucracy, police, military and politics. Some 
cabinet members in recent governments have been 
implicated in various illegal activities.”171 
 
It must also be noted that organized crime, and by extension the 
laundering of large amounts of money, would in no way be possible 
without the complicity of a number of high ranking officials and 
professionals,172 stressing its links with the upper world by highlighting the 
“indispensable functions for professional criminals played by “certain 
specialized persons or groups,” including doctors, lawyers, politicians, and 
corrupt officials.”173 
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1.3.2 Evolving Risk  
 
Assessing risk is an essential function for the financial sector, 
particularly in its aims of preventing money laundering and trade based 
money laundering. It also remains one of the most complex strategic 
requirements, particularly because meaningful risk assessment needs to 
be almost by-the-minute analysis of fast-changing realities, with practically 
no end in sight.174 The constantly changing environment 175 e.g. legislative, 
technological, economic and political, in which banks operate means their 
risk assessments must constantly evolve and adapt.176 The fast pace of 
change itself is a risk, as criminals become ever more sophisticated in 
their use of new technologies.177 
 
Banks must assume that with each new technological change, be it 
a new device, virus, or software update comes a correlated risk that their 
systems will not adapt as quickly as a criminal’s ability to exploit those 
changes.178 Additionally, with every step taken 179 to narrow, or eliminate, a 
bank’s money-laundering risk through technology investment, procedural 
changes or improved detection and punishment of money laundering, 
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criminals are conducting their own risk assessments,180 and evolving in 
tandem.181 This is especially pertinent when considering the discussion 
above and the role insiders can play in a bank’s overall risk profile. 
Criminals have a natural incentive to uncover new and ingenious ways to 
defeat existing risk policies;182 it is, in effect, a battle doomed to rage on.183  
 
1.3.3 Internal Audit 
 
Internal audit function (IAF) is not normally seen as the lead player 
in the detection of money laundering activity within banks.  However, as 
the global rise in money laundering activity continues it is likely that a 
revised approach to AML risk management is needed, and within that a 
different function for internal audit might need to be considered as well. 
The financial conduct authority in the UK 184 highlighted weaknesses in 
internal audit involvement in AML compliance, and stated that from their 
findings auditors tended to focus “on whether processes had been 
followed rather than whether reasonable judgements had been made by 
relevant staff.”185  
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This means that auditors need to examine the underlying 
assumptions made by the company in their AML process, and focus on the 
relevance of the approach taken and the questions asked of the client. 
This is especially important since auditors will not usually be in a position 
to verify individual client transactions especially when using limited 
sampling approaches. In addition, many of the documents will often 
appear to be in order and it is not until further investigations or checks are 
carried out that anomalies will appear. It is also important to remember 
that this is not a forensic auditor and at this stage the assumption of 
wrongdoing is not evidenced.  
 
The nature of an Auditor’s duty of care in the performance of an 
audit was considered by Lopes LJ in Re Kingston Cotton Mills (No 
2) [1896]2Ch 279 at pp 288-9.186  
“It is the duty of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he 
has to perform that skill, care, and caution which a 
reasonably competent, careful, and cautious auditor would 
use. What is reasonable skill, care, and caution must depend 
on the particular circumstances of each case. An auditor is 
not bound to be a detective, or, as was said, to approach his 
work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there 
is something wrong. He is a watch-dog, but not a 
bloodhound. He is justified in believing tried servants of the 
company in whom confidence is placed by the company. He 
                                            
186
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is entitled to assume that they are honest, and to rely upon 
their representations, provided he takes reasonable care. If 
there is anything calculated to excite suspicion he should 
probe it to the bottom; but in the absence of anything of that 
kind he is only bound to be reasonably cautious and 
careful.”187 
 
Despite the challenges there is no doubt that continued pressure 
will be applied to audit companies to recognise potential areas of AML 
weakness based on evidential outcomes in the audit process and to make 
recommendations to management to ensure that the bank is adequately 
protected.188  This includes analysing the risk of exposure from outside 
money launderers as well as identifying potential threats from internal 
rogue traders 189 and those facilitating laundering.  
 
This research aims to explore how the role of IAF could fit into 
TBML compliance, and to determine how its relationship with the 
traditional corporate governance structure could be enhanced for this 
purpose.  
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1.3.4 Technology 
 
One area that the research is also interested in is the relationship 
between technology and AML compliance and whether this can facilitate 
TBML compliance and auditing, or whether these skills are currently not 
available in the market. One of the challenges, in trying to detect TBML 
activity, is the complex amount of data that can be generated between all 
the paperwork including trade documentation, finance details and client 
information. The research asks the respondents which specific forms of 
technology and software are used or whether IT is the solution at all for 
TBML investigations. Another reason for considering a role for IT is to 
address how criminal organisations have been facilitated in their 
international money laundering activity, by the banking and technology 
sectors. It is now possible to quickly and easily move large amounts of 
money across the globe and avoid detection, or remove the money out of 
the legal jurisdiction of those seeking to stop the transactions. However, 
O’Brien and Dixon 190 (2013) have also highlighted how developments in 
the global banking sector have created large global structures that are not 
easily monitored.  
 
“..the recent banking scandals have shown that in each case 
compliance risk was exacerbated by globalized institutional 
                                            
190
 O'Brien, J., & Dixon, O. (2013). Common link in failures and scandals at the world's leading 
banks, the. Seattle University Law Review, 19, 941-972 
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structures that were too big to manage internally and too big 
to regulate externally.”191 
 
It is submitted that O’Brien and Dixon’s point is particularly relevant 
to the trading finance sector. Even if individual banks are not as large and 
many trade banks might be considerably smaller, the global scale of 
shipping and international finance transfers means that millions of 
transactions are taking place across the globe involving thousands of air 
and shipping ports. The scale and speed of how trade finance operates 
means that even a dedicated team of trade finance analysts within a bank 
would not necessarily pick up on all the anomalies or red flag indicators. 
The capacity of banks therefore, regardless of their size, is currently 
limited in terms of trade finance laundering and that is why it could become 
the preferred method of money laundering in the future. 
 
There is the need to develop an international response to AML 
regulation and compliance so that all banks are aware of what is 
happening in other countries and sharing information across banks can be 
facilitated easier. The research therefore also considers the future 
international framework of AML and TBML, and the challenges that banks 
are likely to face as global money laundering continues to expand. 
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1.4 Trade Based Money Laundering Research 
Project 
 
This research project aims to explore the issue of money laundering 
and the role that banks can play in detecting and reporting it to financial 
intelligence units across the globe. Since the scale and scope of money 
laundering activities is quite vast this research will focus on one particular 
type of money laundering activity, which involves the exploitation and 
misuse of international trading procedures. This is often referred to as 
trade based money laundering or TBML,192 and it involves slightly more 
complex financial arrangements than traditional cash smuggling and 
earlier types of money laundering activities. However, since many of the 
easier techniques for money launderers to enter the financial system are 
being monitored and assessed by banks, then TBML is increasing in 
popularity and gaining in sophistication.193 
 
1.4.1  Methodology 
 
The research methodology is based upon a pragmatist design 194 
and a mixed method approach,195 which will seek to establish a picture of 
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TBML as it applies within the banking sector. Part of the reason for 
choosing this approach is due to the relatively new definition of (TBML) 
which is also used in this research, i.e. value (cash, goods or 
documentation of either) can be moved through a number of banks and 
across jurisdictions. 196  Many jurisdictions have only recently begun to 
separate generic money laundering (ML) activity from trade based money 
laundering (TBML), and so there are only a limited number of reports 
specifically available on TBML cases, such as the APG report, (2012).197  
This research will use the limited data available and further enhance that 
information through its own primary data collection, in order to explore the 
empirical and theoretical challenges of assessing TBML risk within the 
global banking sector. 
 
In order to establish current thinking from the TBML industry the 
research uses a modified version of the Delphi approach 198 and includes 
conducting an online survey 199 with targeted experts that have written or 
been involved in the subject. The survey covers responses from across 
the globe and across a number of industries including: banking, financial 
services, academic, internal audit, AML compliance and regulation. A 
second stage data collection is then utilised to interview a cross section of 
the survey respondents, in order to gain more insight and clarity from the 
perspective of their sector. 
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The research uses a mixed method approach 200 and supports the 
primary source findings with a combination of secondary data sources 
including; a number of industry based financial crime surveys, secondary 
data from leading industrial reports, case studies and legal reports that are 
in the public domain, typologies and academic discussions. All of these 
sources are used to establish a picture of what challenges banks are 
facing.  From this information the project provides a thematic analysis of all 
the key findings and will use this information to develop an appropriate risk 
assessment model that could be applied within the banking context. 
 
1.4.2 Justification for the Research 
 
The underlying context for the research is the belief that trade 
based money laundering is a complex issue that affects all banks involved 
in international financial transfers. The AML response from banks requires 
a number of monitoring and regulatory approaches to be adopted, if they 
are to remain non complicit in supporting this type of criminal activity. 
Although there are critics of using risk based approaches 201 because, they 
suggest, it is too vague. On the other side there is an acknowledgement 
that following a strict ‘rules based’ procedures can frequently miss the 
more complicated ML activities because there is not enough flexibility in 
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the risk assessment model.202 Despite the difficulties with the current risk 
assessment systems, some experts have estimated that the global 
response to the filing of suspicious reports from financial institutions 
accounted for 90% of all money laundering investigations 203 highlighting 
the importance of the system. 
 
Recent findings from the FATF 204 have acknowledged that there 
have been significant gains made towards increased AML monitoring 
within financial institutions, but they have also noted gaps, especially in 
detecting the more complex ML schemes such as TBML. This is probably 
an underestimation of the situation given that many academic reports on 
countries such as Russia 205  and Turkey 206  have highlighted the 
complexities and challenges that the banking sector are currently 
struggling with in trying to implement standard AML regulation. There has 
also been a recent spate of whistle-blower reports 207 such as the ICIJ 
reports on Panama 208 and HSBC 209 in Switzerland, which have indicated 
that the gaps in implementation are probably significantly higher than 
FATF 210 is suggesting. 
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Other reports such as the OECD report (2014) 211  have also 
discovered that many countries have weak AML systems and information 
such as client details and beneficial ownership are often missing. This has 
also been highlighted on a number of occasions recently through leaked 
documents and investigative journalism reports 212  indicating that a 
thorough understanding of AML procedures is still lacking within many 
larger international banks.  All of these factors will inevitably have a 
detrimental impact on banks trying to carry out their own risk assessment 
processes, and the trust that exists between banks if shared BOI and CDD 
information cannot be verified or accepted. 
 
Part of the aim for this research is to establish what kind of 
information is required within an adequate and practical risk assessment 
framework that can be used for the full spectrum of money laundering 
schemes, or whether that is even possible to achieve. 
 
1.4.3 Research Problem 
 
The current resource and cost implications for banks and financial 
institutions seeking to implement and maintain AML regulation is quite 
high.  In Germany alone AML compliance has an estimated annual cost of 
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€775 million.213 The challenge for banks therefore is to develop an AML 
system that is not too costly or resource intensive; that is flexible in design 
to cater for all emerging scenarios and which is robust enough to be 
implemented across all sections and units within the bank. 
 
In order to develop a deeper understanding of some of the specific 
issues facing banks, involved in ML operational risk assessment, the focus 
of this research is to explore the issue of money laundering and trade in 
more depth. This research aims to focus on the different types of money 
laundering activities that can occur through the misuse of trade operations 
214 as a means of laundering, and to determine how these transactions 
present and can be detected within a global banking context. From this 
information the aim is to develop a risk assessment tool that utilises the 
findings from the data collected. 
 
1.4.4 The Research Context 
 
The research will seek to examine both the current empirical and 
the theoretical contexts for trade based money laundering. The theoretical 
model is based upon an Agency theory analysis similar to that applied by a 
number of authors 215  looking at TBML related issues. It explores the 
different types of agency relationship within a money laundering scenario 
i.e. between bank and client, bank and regulator and clients and 
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professional launderers.  The theoretical model in this context is therefore 
important in order to establish the impact of any changes between these 
various relationships, should the contextual environment alter, e.g. 
increased regulation. 
 
The empirical context is harder to determine since information on 
criminal transactions, law enforcement investigations and banking 
procedures are kept confidential. The research sought to bridge some of 
this gap by directly surveying current and former banking / financial crime 
experts within the area of AML, and gaining some direct insight into the 
challenges that are being faced at a practical level. During the course of 
the research a number of cases emerged into the public domain and were 
available to support the research analysis, such as the HBUS case in the 
US.216 In this situation the bank was found to be in breach of five different 
AML compliance regulations including failing to file STRs, dealing with bulk 
travellers cheques, and anonymous bond transfers. Cases such as these 
offer a useful insight into areas of weakness within the banking sector and 
also highlight how the regulation industry are tackling lack of compliance 
issues within the industry. Many AML officers obtain their research 
material from sanitised case study reports such as those made available 
through individual financial intelligence units within countries, such as 
FinCEN in the US and AUSTRAC in Australia. The FIUs often produce 
country specific reports or issue press releases to inform interested parties 
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of the latest developments and changes in regulatory focus,217 which tend 
to be very generic to avoid legal difficulties but can also offer new insights 
into trends in money laundering. The main difficulty with these cases is 
that they are dated because the legal cases have to be cleared before 
they can publish any information, so banking research is effectively always 
operating several years behind current trends in money laundering. Other 
related sector documents such as the OECD report (2014) on addressing 
illicit financial flows, is another source of information that focuses on 
related and overlapping issues of laundering and banking interest, such as 
customer due diligence systems and beneficial ownership information.  
 
The introductory chapter introduces the research context and 
overview of the problem being explored in this study. The literature review 
section presents and discusses the main literature relevant to this topic. 
The methodology chapter covers the research framework including the 
philosophy, approach, strategy, choices, timeline and data collection 
based on the research onion model developed by Saunders. 218  The 
specific methods chosen for the research included a Delphi approach 
using an expert panel developed through a series of email 
communications between leading experts in the field of TBML and ML 
across both the academic and banking industry sectors. 
 
The data results and the findings chapters both present an overview 
and analysis of the survey results and the themes that emerged from the 
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semi-structured interviews. These findings are linked into the relevant 
empirical and theoretical literature. From these findings a proposed risk 
assessment model is suggested that encapsulates the key learning from 
the research. The final chapter is the conclusion, which summarises the 
research findings and links this back to the original research questions and 
literature results, suggestions are made for future areas of research.   
 
1.4.5 Delimitations of Scope and Key Assumptions 
 
Trade-based money laundering uses a number of techniques that 
can also be used in other illicit activity such as tax evasion and avoidance 
of tariffs and shipping costs. This paper does not focus on the other gains 
except where there is a direct correlation to actual TBML activity linked to 
money laundering. Many of the AML compliance measures are also used 
to target terrorist related activities (CTF) which may also include an 
element of TBML. However, for this research the concern is on using 
TBML to launder illicit gains rather than transferring legal money for 
possible future illegal activities. 
 
1.4.6 Conclusion 
 
This research project explores some of the key issues involved in 
trade-based money laundering (TBML), as it occurs using goods and 
 96 
services. The main focus of the research is on the role of the banking 
sector and the possible ways in which these TBML activities can be 
detected and reported both within the bank and also to the financial crime 
and intelligence gathering offices across the globe. In order to assess the 
effectiveness of AML compliance, the role of governance and internal audit 
are vital components in this process, despite the lack of papers and 
reports that specify the exact nature of this role. This project aims to 
highlight the relationship between audit, governance and AML compliance 
and to discuss a model that applies to all three sectors using a multi-
dimensional AML framework. The findings from the research have been 
applied to the development of a risk assessment framework that can be 
used within the banking and global financial services sector.  
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2 Introduction 
 
This section outlines the background and context to trade based 
money laundering and the key problems that it brings to the banking 
sector. The FATF typologies studies indicate that  
“criminal organisations and terrorist groups are exploiting 
vulnerabilities in the international trade system to move value 
for illegal purposes. A number of specific money laundering 
cases were identified which involved the proceeds from 
various types of predicate offences to include, but not limited 
to, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, illicit trafficking in stolen 
or other goods, corruption and bribery, fraud, 
counterfeiting/piracy of products and smuggling. The most 
basic schemes involve fraudulent trade practices such as: 
over- and under-invoicing of goods and services, multiple 
invoicing of goods and services, over- and under-shipments 
of goods and services, and falsely describing goods and 
services. More complicated schemes integrate these 
fraudulent practices into a complex web of transactions and 
movements of goods. Inherent vulnerabilities in the 
international trade system, including the enormous volume of 
trade flows, which obscures individual transactions, provide 
abundant opportunity for criminal organisations and terrorist 
groups to transfer value across borders.” 219 
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It also describes how current schemes that have been uncovered 
have influenced risk assessment approaches within the banking and 
regulatory sectors. 
“There are three main methods by which criminal 
organisations and terrorist financiers move money for the 
purpose of disguising its origins and integrating it into the 
formal economy. The first is through the use of the financial 
system; the second involves the physical movement of 
money (e.g. through the use of cash couriers); and the third 
is through the physical movement of goods through the trade 
system.” 220 
 
In recent years, the Financial Action Task Force has focused 
considerable attention on the first two of these methods. By 
comparison, the scope for abuse of the international trade system 
has received relatively little attention.  The international trade 
system is clearly subject to a wide range of risks and vulnerabilities 
that can be exploited by criminal organisations and terrorist 
financiers. In part, these arise from the enormous volume of trade 
flows, which obscures individual transactions; the complexities 
associated with the use of multiple foreign exchange transactions 
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and diverse trade financing arrangements; the commingling of 
legitimate and illicit funds; and the limited resources that most 
customs agencies have available to detect suspicious trade 
transactions.  
 
For the purpose of this study, trade based money laundering is 
defined as the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and 
moving value through the use of trade transactions in an attempt to 
legitimise their illicit origins. In practice, this can be achieved 
through the misrepresentation of the price, quantity or quality of 
imports or exports. Moreover, trade-based money laundering 
techniques vary in complexity and are frequently used in 
combination with other money laundering techniques to further 
obscure the money trail. This study provides a number of case 
studies that illustrate how the international trade system has been 
exploited by criminal organisations. It also has made use of a 
detailed questionnaire to gather information on the current practices 
of more than thirty countries. This information focuses on the ability 
of various government agencies to identify suspicious activities 
related to trade transactions, to share this information with domestic 
and foreign partner agencies, and to act on this information. The 
study concludes that trade-based money laundering represents an 
important channel of criminal activity and, given the growth of world 
trade, an increasingly important money laundering and terrorist 
financing vulnerability. Moreover, as the standards applied to other 
money laundering techniques become increasingly effective, the 
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use of trade-based money laundering can be expected to become 
increasingly attractive.”221 
 
2.1.1 Trade Based Money Laundering (TBML) 
 
Money laundering using the trade sector 222  has been detected 
within various financial services as far back as the1960s.223 However, it is 
in more recent years that money laundering has become a more notable 
area of focus for risk assessment, especially within the global banking 
sector, as criminals have continued to broaden their scope of activity.224 
Criminals and organised gangs can now exploit nearly all forms of financial 
services in order to launder the proceeds of their illicit activity,225 including 
using documentation and financial services from the trade and shipping 
sector.226 
 
Despite the long history of known and established money 
laundering offences, the diversification into modern trade based options for 
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laundering is relatively new and this has meant that the definition of TBML 
is still vague and unclear.227 Although the name TBML includes the term 
‘money laundering’ which implies cash transactions of some kind, in reality 
it focuses almost exclusively on the falsified use of documents and 
shipping information to transfer goods and services 228 hence the term 
trade based. This is highlighted in the FATF definition, which actually 
doesn’t include the term money or cash at all but instead uses the term 
value “the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value 
through the use of trade transactions in an attempt to legitimise their illegal 
origins or finance their activities.” 229  The FATF definition has been 
criticised for being too vague 230 and in reality most trade based money 
laundering activities can cover an array of different processes and criminal 
defrauding activities, as the next few sections will describe. 
 
There has recently been an increased focus on trade-based money 
laundering (TBML)231 since it has been identified as one of the newest and 
possibly most complex forms of money laundering to affect the banking 
and regulatory sectors, across the globe.232 The rapid expansion of the 
global trade sector,233 along with the increasing development of payment 
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technology, has provided an ideal environment for money launderers to 
transfer illegally gained money, either in cash or through goods, across the 
world.234 It is now recognised that the misuse of the financial trade system 
is one of the main ways in which criminal gangs move money and 
integrate it into the formal economy. However, as mentioned earlier it is 
only part of an overall criminal process and the money may have 
originated from a variety of criminal activities 235 which are often referred to 
as predicate offences, including drug and human trafficking, hijacking, 
piracy and illegal arms dealing. 236  In the past the focus of criminal 
prosecutions was on the predicate offences only, whereas nowadays 
money laundering is recognized as a crime in its own right. In addition to 
the cleansing of dirty money, the transfers may also be used in order to 
facilitate on criminal activity and terrorist related activities.237 
 
The main difficulty and challenge for banks dealing with TBML, is 
that money is often placed into the bank using legitimate businesses as 
fronts. Criminals then use complex systems of misrepresentation of 
pricing, invoicing and shipping to merge money gained from criminal 
activities into legitimate business transactions.238 In addition, sophisticated 
money laundering practices such as TBML usually require a partnership 
between the criminal, who acquires the money, and a professional 
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launderer who is often connected or familiar with the financial sector.239 All 
of these factors make TBML one of the more difficult techniques to detect, 
which places an additional stress on the bank’s risk assessment strategies 
and systems. Sanitized case studies might offer some form of support and 
some of these cases appear in the next section of the review. These 
examples consider some of these generic typology studies and practical 
cases. The cases also seek to provide an explanation of the banking 
methods that were used in the detection of the money laundering 
activities.  
 
2.1.2 Normal Trading Practices 
 
In order to understand how TBML activity occurs it is first necessary 
to understand how trade finance operates in legitimate trading 
transactions. A main trade agreement is made between a buyer who 
provides payment and the seller who provides the goods. Since most 
buyers will only pay for goods after or upon receipt the seller needs to 
raise some form of trade finance in order for the transaction to occur. This 
is known as pre-shipping finance.240 It is a key role of financial institutions 
to provide trade finance to the sector and this can be done through a 
number of means and involves using standard trade documents. 
 
                                            
239
 McCarthy, K. J., van Santen, P., & Fiedler, I. (2014). Modelling the money launderer: Micro 
theoretical arguments on anti-money laundering policy. International Review of Law and Economics. 
doi: 10.1016/j.irle.2014.04.00 
240
 APG. (2012). APG Typology Report on Trade Based Money Laundering. Sydney: Asia Pacific 
Group on Money Laundering. 
 105 
All of these systems leave areas of vulnerability for TBML to occur, 
the message to banks is that fraudulent use of documentation can occur at 
any of these levels.  This is in addition to the reality of collusion between 
trading parties, which is a necessity for most trade based money 
laundering to occur. 
 
2.1.3 Using Trade Based Money Laundering 
 
One of the major impacts of money laundering is the transfer of 
funds from one country to another known as illicit financial flows.  This 
transfer of money from one country to another is often disguised as a 
genuine business transaction in order to avoid detection. Illicit financial 
flows account for approximately 3.5-5.7% of GDP across the globe 241 
although less than 1% of all global illicit trade is actually seized and 
frozen.242 It is estimated that approximately 2.7% of global GDP, worth 
US$1.6 Trillion in 2009 is available to money launderers. 243  Of these 
figures the estimated value of illicit funds leaving developing countries was 
estimated as worth close to $1 Trillion 244  the majority of which was 
smuggled out using trade based money laundering techniques by 
criminals linked to arms smuggling, drug trafficking, terrorism or public 
corruption.245 
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According to Stack 246  (2015) on his work on illicit trade in the 
former Soviet Union (FSU), there is little doubt that trade-based money 
laundering played a significant role in the 1990s in obscuring illicit trade 
movement out of the former Soviet Union, with estimates of $9 billion 
dollars being lost to the FSU between 1995-1999. More recent research 
from Global Financial Integrity, 247  which is an NGO specialising in the 
recording of illicit trade data, suggested that the figure from 1991 to date is 
now in the region of between $211bn and $782bn. 
 
Money laundering often occurs between developing economies and 
developed western economies,248 according to Kar & LeBlanc, (2013) it is 
estimated that over $946 billion was transferred from developing countries 
by illicit transactions in 2011. One of the reasons that illicit flows are an 
attractive option to money launderers is because there is more guarantee 
of a stable financial and political environment with less corruption in 
developed economies,’ as opposed to leaving the money in developing 
economies where there is also a risk of the money losing value or being 
lost completely through corruption.249 
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2.1.4 Banking Services and TBML  
 
The following case studies provide examples of how different 
elements of the banking and financial services can be exploited to facilitate 
money laundering activity. In order to accurately depict TBML patterns, a 
detailed collection of data on the buyers and sellers, as well as the goods 
and methods of transportation are all required, before an accurate picture 
of illicit trade can be properly established.250 However, many of the factors 
mentioned in the following section can be recognised and flagged as 
alerts, especially if risk assessments are detecting a number of concerns, 
including difficulty in establishing the true ownership of the business, 
and/or a lack of information on the bank customer.  The next section looks 
at some of the adaptations that criminals have made in order to circumvent 
recent AML regulation in the financial services sector. 
 
2.1.5 Hijacking Customer Accounts 
 
A new phenomenon in money laundering in order to avoid 
detection, is to temporarily hijack another client’s account and synchronise 
a money laundering transaction to match the legitimate client’s transaction. 
This is sometimes referred to as cuckoo smurfing 251 after the bird that 
uses another bird to raise its chicks unbeknown to the new parent. 
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Hijacking requires a corrupt or criminal involvement at one stage of 
the transaction, for example a client in Nepal wishes to purchase goods 
worth £10,000 from a UK based company through the services of a 
Hawala. The money is deposited with a local Hawala 252 in Nepal ready for 
transmission to the bank account of the UK Company. A criminal gang is 
informed of this transaction and the cash is then removed from the Nepal 
system and given to the gang. In exchange the gang uses its UK contacts 
who are holding illicit funds in pounds sterling and they deposit this money 
through different branches in the UK account of the company matching the 
amount of the transaction from Nepal.253  
                                                                                                                       
account holders’ knowledge. This system has been compared to the activity of the cuckoo bird, 
which sneaks its eggs into other birds’ nests and lets them hatch and rear its offspring. The criminal 
gang uses the knowledge of legitimate accounts and transactions and hijacks this information for 
money laundering purposes, without the account holders’ knowledge. No money is taken from the 
account holder but the knowledge of the type and amount of a transaction is hijacked for the 
criminals to alter to suit their own means. Usually this entails diverting legitimate money in the middle 
of a trading transaction and replacing it with dirty money.  
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"The term hawala is traditionally associated with a money 
transfer mechanism that operated extensively in South Asia 
many centuries ago and had strong links along traditional 
trade routes in Middle East and parts of East Africa. It 
operated as a closed system within corridors linked by 
family, tribe or ethnicity. In recent times, the term hawala has 
often been used as a “proxy” to describe a wider range of 
financial service providers, beyond these traditional and 
geographically tied systems. In other countries, the term 
hawala is actually not used at all. However, there is a 
general recognition of the existence of hawala or hawala-like 
providers in many jurisdictions and of the type of methods 
they use and services they provide. There is also a general 
agreement as to what they are not: global money transfer 
networks (including agents) operated by large multinational 
money transmitters and money transfers carried out through 
new payment methods including mobile money remittance 
services."254 
 
In order for businesses to undertake any trade transaction they 
require documentation 255  as evidence in order to ship the goods and 
                                                                                                                       
Nepal and its UK arm, in having been able to move £10,000 from the UK to Nepal without any paper 
trail or any suspicion being raised. 
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provide legal records of the business carried out. An example of 
documentation has been broken down into two categories.  
1. Financial documents: The two main financial instruments 
are bills of exchange and promissory notes. Both are 
negotiable, so that they can be used to raise finance. 
Additional documents: Commercial invoice; A pro-forma 
invoice; Consular invoice or certificate (a standard form 
prepared by the destination country).256  
2. Insurance documents: Cargo insurance; Packing list; Bills 
of Lading; Export Cargo Shipment Instruction (ECSI); 
CMR form (Convention des Marchandises Routiers); CIM 
consignment note (Convention International des 
Marchandises par Chemin de Fer); Air Waybills (AWBs); 
Sea Waybills; Courier Waybills; Standard shipping notes; 
Dangerous Goods Note; Certificates of Origin (EU 
Certificates of Origin, Arab-British Chamber of Commerce 
Certificates of Origin, EUR1 Movement Certificates); 
Certificate of Conformity; Health certificates. 257  
 
In criminal activity the only difference is that many of these trade 
documents are also forged and illegal.258 The complexities of using the 
trade misinvoicing systems are well recognised by regulatory bodies and 
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AML compliance officers. FATF (2006) has identified TBML as using 
classic misinvoicing schemes, which have then been developed into 
complicated and complex schemes of fraudulent business.259 
 
2.1.6 Enterprise of Letters Of Credit  
 
International trade is not regulated by an international body of 
law, 260  in other words trading goods across national borders is an 
enterprise in trust. To mitigate against the high risks that a buyer will not 
pay after the goods have been shipped or sellers do not ship the goods 
after payment is received banks step in to add a layer of trust to the 
transaction.261 The role of banks in the control and management of money 
laundering is strongly linked to the role they play in facilitating international 
trade. Briefly we explore what, if any, legal or regulatory responsibility 
banks have to interrogate the underlying transactions with which they are 
involved, given the prevalence of trade based money laundering. 
 
The principle way in which banks facilitated trade between sellers 
and buyers in different countries is the letter of credit. Letters of credit are 
guarantees issued by the bank of a buyer to the bank of seller that goods 
will be paid for, when the criteria stipulated by the letter of credit are met. 
As such, they are powerful mechanisms for international trade, because 
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they generate trust between sellers and buyers who do not necessarily 
have an existing business relationship.  
 
What makes letters of credit especially powerful in this context is 
that they are considered independent of the underlying transaction – in 
other words the banks rely solely on the documentation, and do not 
concern themselves with what is actually traded, and how. This is what 
banks call the “autonomy principle” 262 which makes letters of credit “as 
good as cash” within international trade. Because banks are not obliged to 
interrogate the underlying transaction, letters of credit are ripe for abuse by 
TBML organisations, mainly criminal and terror networks.  
 
The requirements of a letter of credit can vary, most will require 
proof of insurance, certificate of origin, packing lists, invoices, industry 
certifications of safety or sanitation, and transportation documents such as 
a bill of lading.263  Bills of lading are essentially formal documents that 
acknowledge the shipment of goods by the seller, and act as evidence that 
specified goods have been shipped to a specified destination. A bill of 
lading will be an important document that must be submitted when 
meeting the terms and conditions of the letter of credit. A bill of lading will 
detail precisely what is contained in the cargo and at what quantities. 
Shipping agents and receiving buyers use bills of lading to check that what 
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was shipped is in fact what arrived, and act as a receipt of the goods. The 
bank’s sole responsibility is to validate all documentation is correct, 
complete and original. The bank does not have an obligation to investigate 
the nature of the transaction, the financial history of the seller, or the 
regulations followed by the seller’s bank (who will take receipt of the 
funds).  
 
So, whilst banks have every right to refuse payment when fraud is 
clearly indicated in the documentation itself,264once all tests of validity 
have been passed with regard to the documentation the banks are obliged 
to issue payment.265  
“Bank’s concern themselves only with the terms of the letter 
of credit, and not with the terms and requirements of the 
sales contract. While letters of credit are not strictly governed 
by any international laws, the principles of strict compliance 
have evolved from international banking practices, as 
enunciated in the Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credit.”266 
 
The issuing of letters of credit is a formidable task that requires 
batches upon batches of documentation, as well as administrative 
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stamina. Errors, accidental or intentional, within the documentation that 
can lead to suspicions of money laundering are sometime, and often by 
design, quite small. Being able to compare originals with previously 
transmitted copies is for instance standard procedure as per the UCP 
600.267 Date, technical, cargo modifications, small name changes can all 
effectively change the underlying transaction, and lead to money 
laundering – however banks, once engaged in the issuing of a letter of 
credit are unlikely to have the technical insight to know when 
documentation fraud has been committed with a LC.268  
 
With AML and ABC 269  gaining traction amongst regulation 
agencies and terrorism task forces, banks are being asked to refine and 
bolster their anti-money laundering processes, particularly with regard to 
applications for letters of credit. Banks have the greatest amount of control 
over the process at the application stage. At this stage, they can request 
validation of identities of all participants, regulatory compliance of any 
partner banks and details of the country of origin. In this way, international 
agencies such as the FATF hope that banks will begin to accept a degree 
of responsibility for preventing money laundering, as they are key fulcrums 
in facilitating international trade. 
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2.1.7 UCP 600 and Money Laundering 
 
The UCP 600, similar in fact to the FATF, is a set of recommended 
guidelines that are in no way enforceable by a global authority. In any 
case, the wording of the UCP 600, as it currently stands, possibly 
promotes, rather than hinders, money laundering because it specifically 
states that the agreement of credit, is distinct from the underlying sale – 
even if the sale is detailed within the letter of credit.  
 
So, even those banks that assiduously follow the UCP 600, are not 
required to understand any details of the underlying transaction 
whatsoever.270 The wording is in fact unambiguous in its definition of the 
roles and responsibilities of banks in the issuing of LCs:  
“The UCP rules widely govern commercial letters of credit 
globally. They were first published in 1933 and are used by 
banks all over the world. The most current version of the 
rules is UCP 600, which came into effect from 1 July 2007 
and replaced UCP 500. Article 4 of the UCP600 provides 
that: ‘A credit by its nature is a separate transaction from the 
sale or other contract on which it may be based. Banks are in 
no way concerned with or bound by such contract, even if 
any reference whatsoever to it is included in the credit. 
Consequently, the undertaking of a bank to honour, to 
negotiate or to fulfil any other obligation under the credit is 
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not subject to claims or defences by the applicant resulting 
from its relationships with the issuing bank or the 
beneficiary’. Article 5 UCP 600 further provides that: ‘Banks 
deal with documents and not with goods, services or 
performance to which the documents may relate.”271 
 
The UCP 600 goes further to state that: 
“All Letters of Credit issued under UCP600 are irrevocable. 
This can neither be modified nor cancelled without the 
agreement of all the parties concerned. The payment by the 
Issuing Bank is guaranteed provided that the Beneficiary 
(Seller/Exporter) satisfies all the terms and conditions of the 
Letter of Credit.”272 
 
2.1.8 Over and Under Invoicing  
 
One of the main forms of TBML activity is to either over estimate or 
under estimate the price of invoices. Case studies described in the FATF 
report 273  highlight how banks may be involved in facilitating TBML 
transactions by not having the relevant documentation to fully understand 
the transaction process or realizing the full value of the shipments. In 
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these scenarios although business checks and assessments were 
undertaken within the banks, the use of false shipping documentation and 
falsified documents by the client effectively rendered standard risk 
assessment systems null and void. 
 
This falsification and over invoicing process can be used in either 
direction depending on where the money needed to be transferred. From 
this it can be seen that trade-based money laundering is a complex mini 
financial system of its own, which involves a number of partners, 
transactions and goods. 274  The challenge for the banking sector is to 
develop a system that will unravel those elements that are relevant to their 
work as a financial institution; rather than considering themselves as an 
extra arm of law enforcement.   
 
For the banking sector generally and especially for global banks 
involved in international transfers, there are a number of points that need 
to be acknowledged when implementing the current AML requirements. 
The main one is to be clear how TBML affects banking business and 
therefore establish what the benefits are to addressing and improving AML 
compliance within the banking structure. In other words, the financial 
sector needs to develop its own understanding and definition of TBML as it 
applies to their work. 
  
                                            
274
 Sullivan, C., & Smith, E. (2011). trade-based money laundering: Risks and regulatory responses. 
Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 
 118 
2.1.9 Detecting Trade Anomalies. 
 
Research by Hong, Pak & Pak (2014) 275 focused on the specific 
trading of bananas between the US and the Caribbean and Latin America. 
In their work they focused on a 10-year period and calculated by the 
weights and quantities, how much discrepancy existed between global 
trade prices and those in the US study. They looked at three different 
methods for analysing trade patterns. The first was partner country trade 
data comparing exports and imports stated between both countries, the 
second was the price filter analysis approach which uses an arm’s length 
calculation for each product, set against a maximum and minimum set of 
values. The final method supported by the research was an arm’s length 
approach again, but this time using US data UNCTAD (UN Conference on 
Trade and Development) with the range being 10% either side for the max 
and min range. Their study highlighted how some trade data filter methods 
can obscure the activities that are actually taking place and are not able to 
detect the anomalies in pricing for certain situations.   
 
It is important to note that trade misinvoicing is not the only 
mechanism by which TBML activity occurs and some researchers have 
identified a weakness in trying to tackle TBML and data analysis solely 
from this standpoint.276 However, it is perhaps reasonable to assume that it 
is the largest form of TBML activity since it is the simplest method to 
implement and provides challenges for banks to fully verify without an 
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onsite shipping inspection or detailed knowledge of international prices. It 
is however the easiest method to check internationally as databases are 
being developed specifically for the analysis of shipping prices,277 as Yalti 
and Demir highlighted in their study on trade misinvoicing in Turkey. 
 
“As opposed to the general trend in misinvoicing, exports to 
China are underinvoiced and imports are over invoiced. We 
also analyse how the liberalization policies and the customs 
union agreement with the European Union countries affect 
trade misinvoicing. We find that, with trade liberalization 
policies, import misinvoicing has decreased at the aggregate 
level.” 
 
This technique has the potential to be detected by using data 
management software. Other methods of TBML activity such as smuggling 
are more covert and rely on custom checks or police surveillance in order 
to detect. 
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2.1.10 Criminal Behaviour 
 
In order to fully understand the activities of the TBML criminal it is 
important to develop an understanding of the behaviour and motivation of 
a client who might be involved in TBML activity. However, it is beyond the 
scope of this research project to consider the predicate crimes and 
motivations of all of those involved in illegal criminal activity that might 
generate the dirty money initially. The focus instead is on the behaviour of 
the money launderers acting either on behalf of a criminal gang, or who 
are senior criminals who are receiving the money and acting alone. 
 
2.1.10.1 Corporate Fraud 
 
A common misnomer regarding the motivation of many of the Wall 
Street scandals, was the notion that it was individuals who were ‘bad 
apples’ in the financial barrel. In other words, these individuals were 
greedy and acted alone to secure their own personal financial gain. 
Hansen & Movahedi, (2010) 278 talk about the dangers of pursuing this 
myth of individual greed as the sole cause of financial crime, especially 
amongst the large investment companies and Wall Street. They apply a 
systemic analysis to suggest that instead financial and white collar crime 
occurs within a combination of culture, Wall street ideology and 
compensation structures, which permeated the mind set of all involved and 
which along with a weak mechanism of regulatory oversight all became 
                                            
278
 Hansen, L. L., & Movahedi, S. (2010). Wall street scandals: The myth of individual greed1. 
Sociological Forum, 25(2), 367-374. doi:10.1111/j.1573-7861.2010.01182. 
 121 
factors underpinning the financial scandals which have come to light in 
recent years. This lack of understanding is captured by Hansen (2009) 
who describes the lack of engagement by social science academics on 
this topic, “those in the social sciences have done little to assist in policy 
making or theory building in the case of unethical behaviour.” 279 
One of the reasons for this reluctance might be because there is a 
fine line to be crossed, in financial business, between unethical behaviour 
and criminal behaviour, especially for white collar crime such as insider 
trading. The lack of successful prosecutions has been blamed on the 
inability to gather enough evidence to determine that a fraudulent crime 
had been committed, rather than declare that an organisation had been 
acting unethically or had made a genuine mistake. Some researchers 
have suggested that it is as much about the politicisation of white collar 
crime 280 with political leaders wary of pursuing major banks and lacking 
the political drive to review the legislation. Defining unethical behaviour 
then becomes part of the topic of social corporate responsibility where 
financial organisations subscribe to and support their own understanding 
of ethical business behaviour. The challenge for regulators is to ensure 
that there are reasonable levels of overlap between accepted international 
approaches to preventing money laundering and the banks own code of 
ethics towards staff and client behaviour. 
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2.1.10.2 False Identification 
 
TBML crime requires a certain level of ingenuity and imagination to 
invent schemes that can circumvent AML regulation. The successful 
criminals can adapt in a multitude of ways, to exploit weaknesses or gaps 
in any financial trading system.281 One of the ways for clients to avoid 
detection in AML risk assessment is by thwarting the customer due 
diligence (CDD) process, through the use of a false identity. Buying fake 
identities appears to be a fairly straightforward process on Dark Net sites, 
such as Angora or through other sites dealing specifically with false 
passports.282 The increase in sites available for these types of purchases 
has been noted, where some researchers into Darknet activity have 
calculated that in the six months after the Silk road site was taken down by 
the FBI, sales in illicit drugs increased by 100%.283 This is also supported 
by the reported speed at which replacement sites appeared after the 
closure of the Silk Road site in October 2013.284 The rise in cybercrime 285 
means that as well as using false identities, criminals are also using stolen 
credit card details, stolen details from PayPal or other internet payment 
systems and forged details on other forms or documents needed by the 
bank to support and verify their new identity. In short it is no longer 
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acceptable for a risk assessment framework to accept identity 
documentation at face value, and instead this needs to be used in 
conjunction with other risk factors. 
 
There is a growing concern, of the selling and production of falsified 
documents 286  and the implications for criminal activity. These ID 
documents can be falsified for a number of reasons including terrorism, 
underage drinking as well as identity theft and money laundering. Law 
enforcement officers are slowly being trained in the skills used for 
detecting the use of false identities and some of these skills could be used 
by banking officials in their Beneficial Ownership Information (BOI) and 
Customer Due Diligence  (CDD) assessments. Skills such as knowing that 
owners of false identities will have to have remembered all their new 
details, therefore questions on CDD or BOI assessments should avoid 
using straightforward easy to recall answers. 
 
2.1.10.3 Straw Men  
 
Another scheme that criminals use to avoid running into problems 
with the initial CDD checks, is to use legitimate people as fronts to their 
own activities. These people may be existing clients in the bank or new 
clients who have no apparent connection to the criminal organisation.287 
These clients are known as ‘Straw Men’ and will pass initial banking CDD 
checks in order to enable the criminal organisation to carry out their 
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transactions undetected. In these situations, banks need to be aware of 
monitoring account activity as well, but also to use beneficial ownership 
information. The BOI becomes even more important in these situations in 
order to determine who is actually behind the flow of money and to track 
where the money is actually going. 
 
2.1.10.4 False Shipping Documents 
 
In addition to falsifying identification documents, clients involved in 
TBML activities can also present other business documentation to the 
bank that has been altered, forged or acquired illegally. The nature of the 
forged document will depend on the transaction that they wish to 
undertake and the underlying purpose of the criminal activity; therefore, 
understanding the nature of the business may give some clues as to the 
nature of the crime. 288  Part of the ongoing training needs of bank 
employees would be the need to develop and then constantly update a 
system of typologies of typical TBML or money laundering offences or 
schemes that have been uncovered.289  This is one method that might 
support the bank so that AML officers know the types of activity to look out 
for. Banks do not need to look for everything that might be highlighted, but 
there might be specific types of activity that would suit the bank’s own 
skills and expertise, for example this could include looking for sudden 
withdrawals of large amounts of cash especially after receiving a shipment 
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of goods that were valued at a lot lower than either the shipping 
documents show or reflected in the money that arrived in the bank. 
 
2.1.10.5 United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority on 
Training 
 
It has been found that banks do not necessarily have the correct 
procedures and ethical frameworks in place to assist staff in detecting 
suspicious transactions. A part of this negligence is the lack of dedicated 
anti-money laundering training. Staff should be routinely updated on the 
latest trends and criminal behaviour patterns and be regularly reminded of 
both the causes and consequences of ML. In this way, staff would become 
more alert and knowledgeable, in their role at the front lines of detecting 
suspicious transactions and documents.  
 
The 2013 publication 290 by the UK`s FCA highlighted this in very clear 
words. Point 90 within the publication stated:  
“A number of trade finance staff had passed a globally 
recognised professional qualification for international trade 
finance practitioners. However, this qualification did not 
cover, in any detail, the financial crime risks in trade finance 
business.”291 
Point 91 within the publication stated:  
                                            
290
 The FCA, Banks’ Control of Financial Crime Risks in Trade Finance (Thematic Review, TR13/3, 
July 2013) (hereinafter “the FCA Report”) Available at : https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/thematic-
reviews/tr-13-03.pdf 
291
 Ibid. Point 90. 
 126 
“We were therefore concerned that, although all banks had 
generic money laundering/terrorist financing and sanctions 
training programmes, many banks had not delivered 
adequate training to relevant staff on the specific money 
laundering risks in trade finance. Many banks’ trade-specific 
financial crime training was focused on sanctions risks, with 
limited coverage of money laundering. One bank’s training 
material did not mention any of the FATF/Wolfsberg red 
flags. While it was encouraging to see that training on 
sanctions risks was generally well-considered, we were 
disappointed that many banks had not placed an equivalent 
focus on money laundering and terrorist financing risks.”292 
 
Point 92 within the publication stated:  
“As a result, some trade processing staff did not have the 
knowledge or awareness to identify transactions that posed a 
high risk of money laundering and had not made appropriate 
enquiries to satisfy themselves about potential money 
laundering risks. In addition, staff outside trade processing 
teams were often unable to challenge the decisions taken by 
trade processing staff.”293 
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2.2 Trade Based Money Laundering Detection 
 
This next section considers the processes that banks currently use 
in order to detect and assess for the risks posed by TBML activity.  
 
2.2.1 Banking and TBML 
 
Banks have played a key role in detecting money laundering activity 
in the UK since the passing of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 and 
they remain at the forefront for detecting much of the illegal activity today. 
 
The classical description of money laundering activity has also been 
used to describe TBML activity,294 however trade-based money laundering 
may do all or none of the three stages described by McDowell & Novis 
(2001) as other authors have suggested. 295  Firstly, by moving value 
through goods there may be no placing of illegally obtained cash into the 
banking sector. Instead letters of credit may be used or the cash may 
already have been converted directly into goods.296 Secondly the layering 
and integrating processes are ongoing in TBML transactions through a 
series of trading interactions. These transactions may also occur across 
several different countries, or trading zones and/or banking facilities. 
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Therefore, the pattern of behaviour for TBML and banking transactions 
would be more aligned to:  
1) Application for a loan or letter of credit to purchase and export 
goods  
2) Placement of cash or repayment of loan in bank supported by 
legitimate transfer of goods details  
3) Wire transfer of money to purchase new goods supported by 
invoices and import documents. Or using the original 
terminology, Integration – Placement – Layering. This 
therefore makes tracking money being placed into the banking 
system that much harder since it has potentially already been 
integrated into the system before it is placed in a bank.  
For the banking sector in general, but especially for global banks 
who are involved in international transfers, there are a number of factors 
that need to be acknowledged when implementing anti money laundering 
regulations. Trade finance is one of the most important aspects of 
maintaining the economy 297 along with confidence in the banking sector. 
Trade-based money laundering therefore has the potential to distort and 
upset both of these components if appropriate regulation and control is not 
maintained. However, the main question to be asked is, how does TBML 
affect banking business and why does the financial sector need its own 
understanding and definition of TBML? 
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2.2.1.1 TBML Definition in Banking 
 
For the banking sector the definition and application of Trade-based 
money laundering is most commonly used during the risk assessment of a 
client’s overall business proposal.  Whilst this is part of a standard ‘Know 
Your Customer’ approach, there are additional TBML components. The 
first is to determine the source of the materials being used (cash /goods or 
services) and secondly to assess whether these are feasible for the 
business proposition under consideration. The bank cannot determine 
whether these goods or money are from illegal gains, but it can highlight 
whether it is possible to run this proposal using cash or goods acquired 
illegally or whether another form of business might be operating in the 
background to supply illegal cash. 
 
In this context perhaps a more accurate definition of TBML for the 
banking sector would be “The use of the financial services to facilitate the 
movement of money, through the use of fraud or deception”. This clearly 
defines the role that banks have in engaging with TBML activities, since 
their own systems of risk assessment will have been compromised, by the 
deception process. The use of the term ‘money’ is important to reintroduce 
into the banking definition because that is the part of the TBML transaction 
that will manifest in the bank risk assessment.  
 
 
 130 
2.2.2 Risk Assessment 
 
Risk assessment underpins many of the modern banking 
approaches to AML detection. However, the biggest challenge facing the 
banking sector is how to develop a model of risk assessment that is 
dynamic enough to be able to keep abreast of modern AML breaches, 
whilst simultaneously ensuring that banking personnel are able to 
understand and able to implement the system easily.  The current shift in 
risk assessment is towards a system of risk based approaches (RBA) 298 
whereby the highest money laundering risk should receive the highest 
amount of attention and resources. The traditional and alternative system 
is to use a strictly rule based approach whereby clearly defined 
procedures and questions are rigidly adhered to and applied equally to all 
accounts regardless of risk. Although a risk based model cannot replace 
the ease of the rules approach, it can integrate the two approaches in 
order to filter attention onto the most likely high risk scenarios. 
 
The EU Third Directive on Money Laundering also advocates for a 
risk based approach to dealing with AML compliance and risk assessment 
within banks. Demetis and Angell (2007) in their paper are highly critical of 
risk based approaches and use a systemic analysis to highlight the main 
flaws in such an approach. They describe two types of risk that banks 
have to address, firstly ‘taking risks’ where the bank is actively undertaking 
actions that have an underlying risk component and ‘being at risk’ where 
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outside forces threaten the business of the bank. They also highlight that 
risk is not a straightforward process and its complexity can be further 
misunderstood through the simplified terminology often used to describe 
its’ use in banking, such as ‘risk control’ or ‘risk management’.299 
 
Demetis and Angell (2007) are equally sceptical of the lack of 
guidance being offered to banks to try and explain how a risk based 
system would actually operate in reality.  They suggest that the lack of 
guidance is itself indicative of the impracticalities of such as approach. 
“The fact that significant flexibility is being allowed to the financial 
institutions implies that the regulators cannot provide substantial guidance 
in dealing with the risk-based approach.” 300  Subbotina, (2009) also 
describes regulators as moving beyond the bounds of the banking 
environment in their attempt to assess ML risk and yet providing little in the 
way of guidance as to how to interpret the legislation in practice.  
 
Instead of guidance there appears to be a strategy put in place to 
increase the regulatory pressure on banks with the subsequent threat of 
legal action for non-reporting. This has resulted in a level of over reporting 
of suspicious alerts,301 which has meant that financial intelligence units 
now have less information to work from since it is unclear which reports 
are genuine red flag alerts and which are knee jerk reactions. In Germany 
the FIU has note an increase of over 100% between the number of STRs 
                                            
299
 Demetis, D. S., & Angell, I. O. (2007). The risk‐based approach to AML: Representation, paradox, 
and the 3rd directive. J of Money Laundering Control, 10(4), 412-428. 
doi:10.1108/1368520071083090 
300
 Demetis, D. S., & Angell, I. O. (2007) p420 
301
 Takáts, E. (2007). A theory of "crying wolf": The economics of money laundering enforcement. 
Ana Lucia Corofnel. IMF Working Paper 
 132 
in 2003 (6,802) and the figures released in 2012 (14,361).302 Other FIUs 
such as the Belgium FIU also saw an increase from 5,896 in 2012 up to 
7,078 in 2013.These figures represent substantiated disclosures, for the 
Belgium FIU this figure was from a total received of over 22,000 
notifications. 
 
Overall this regulatory led system has effectively increased the 
potential risk of ML activity becoming undetected, since without the ability 
to tell the difference between a suspicious and non-suspicious alert the 
central component to any risk based approach is lacking.303 
 
The growth in international money laundering is due to continue 
with a predicted 6-10% increase in global ML activity.304 The problem of 
ML detection is therefore destined to continue unless a different approach 
to assessing compliance and risk is introduced and understood by the 
regulators. The problem at the moment is that AML compliance cannot be 
quantified very easily on an incremental scale, in other words banks are 
either compliant or they are not.305 Researchers have also determined that 
in the current system, compliance does not appear to be a clear indicator 
of what needs to be addressed within the banking sector, in order to 
improve AML detection “The case studies highlighted …….that compliance 
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served no real function beyond window dressing.”306 As a solution perhaps 
a quality framework for compliance needs to be developed further, so that 
banks can receive feedback on both the areas in which they are doing well 
and also receive support for the areas requiring improvement. By setting 
targets for improvement, units such as internal audit and governance can 
monitor the progress and ensure that resources are prioritised into these 
areas of development. This would encourage a longer term and more 
strategic approach to addressing AML deficiencies, something that other 
commentators have already advocated.307 
 
2.2.2.1 TBML Risk Assessment 
 
In order to provide an effective risk assessment process against 
trade based money laundering, it is also necessary to understand how 
money launderers actually use the financial services and present it in the 
banking context. The process of money laundering (ML) has traditionally 
been described as consisting of three key stages.308 
 
1) Placing of illegally gained money into the banking sector,  
2) Layering the money through a series of transactions including 
investments into other legitimate businesses, 
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3) Integrating it fully into the financial system as legitimate money 
which can be traced back through legal transactions to 
legitimate businesses and banks.  
 
It is at each one of these stages that a bank selected by the 
launderers has the potential to play a role in facilitating or detecting that 
ML activity is taking place. However, even fairly recent reviews by the FCA 
have determined that this does not always happen and that despite the 
illegality of the crime, the FCA review in 2011 found that many banks were 
still unwilling to turn down a profitable business relationship even “when 
there appeared to be an unacceptable risk of handling the proceeds of 
crime.”309 
 
2.2.3 Detecting TBML activity 
 
In traditional cash based money laundering activity the easiest way 
to detect suspicious activity is at the beginning during the placement 
stage.310 This is because the criminal is at his or her most vulnerable and 
is handling newly acquired illegal money, it is at this stage that the cash is 
at its dirtiest in the laundering process.  However, the system for trade-
based money laundering (TBML) is slightly different, since many of the 
transactions that are presented to the banks also involve or are merged 
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with legitimate business transactions 311  right from the beginning. 
Therefore, there is no starting point of really dirty money, the cash may be 
halfway through its cleaning cycle by the time it enters a financial 
institution. Some of the businesses that bring this money into the banking 
sector may either act as a front company for the criminals seeking to 
launder money, or they are legitimate criminal businesses that are already 
layering the money into the system from other crimes. Detection is 
therefore more complicated and requires significantly more information to 
be analysed and understood compared to normal ML transaction. 
 
Once the money does enter the banking system a system of red 
flag alerts and regulation requirement checks are used, which is often 
referred to as a risk assessment approach.312 Traditionally this system has 
been designed as a ‘rules based’ approach whereby certain tick box 
criteria were met and ML checks were undertaken as part of a routine 
procedure. However, the evolving complexity of ML techniques has 
caused some to question the wisdom of continuing to use a one size fits all 
response 313  especially since banks need to be constantly aware of 
emerging trends and increased levels of complexity within ML 
transactions.314 As part of its guidance and recommendations FATF have 
promoted a ‘risk based’ approach 315 rather than a rules based system. 
This they argue encourages banks to be more flexible and possibly more 
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thorough in their assessment processes. However, the disadvantage to 
this system is that it requires a greater level of understanding of TBML 
crime processes and needs more time to undertake the in-depth and 
thorough analysis of the data.  
 
2.2.3.1 Current AML detection 
 
On a practical level there are a number of AML measures that 
banks can, and regularly do implement as part of their AML regulatory and 
risk assessment processes, and all of these can be adapted for future or 
newer models that may be developed on AML or TBML risk assessment. 
The following section describes the main tools that banks currently use, at 
the end of each description a key point to be specifically applied to TBML 
risk assessment has been added in bullet point. 
 
2.2.3.2 Customer Due Diligence (CDD) 
 
The first of these measures is the customer due diligence (CDD) 
and enhanced due diligence (EDD) systems,316 whereby client information 
and background account information are gathered. Clients need to satisfy 
a number of criteria before the bank is willing to work with them. However, 
from the information already ascertained in relation to TBML risk and in 
light of the newly proposed definition of TBML for banks, there is now one 
important element to be considered in the old AML system. 
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The increasing use of legitimate businesses as front companies is 
one way in which criminal syndicates have sought to circumvent many of 
the risk assessment processes.317 This means that initial customer due 
diligence checks in these situations will show that the client documentation 
can be verified and be valid. However, it is at the second level of checks, 
seeking beneficial ownership that the bank can begin to unravel some of 
the deception. Other factors such as unusual business transactions for this 
client and sudden changes in transaction patterns can flag to the bank that 
something is amiss. 
 
 CDD checks and EDD risk assessments are only effective if the 
information can be verified. If the information cannot be verified or 
raises suspicions this needs to be noted. 
 
2.2.4 Beneficial Ownership Information (BOI) 
 
This is not a regulatory requirement in all countries but it is 
becoming stronger in light of recent ML cases, especially in the US. 
Beneficial ownership information focuses on establishing who the actual 
benefactor of a business is, rather than the traditional approach of listing 
the named shareholders or shell companies that might be operating under 
that name. Beneficial ownership is seen as moving one step closer 
towards unravelling where financial transactions might be originating from 
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or ultimately heading towards. Although banks might complain that this is 
another layer of paperwork, 318  perhaps from the new definition it is 
apparent that it might be a more cost effective process than other methods 
of verifying business transactions.  
 
One of the challenges facing the banking sector is the achievability 
of such a request especially where companies have been legally 
registered in countries that have less stringent recording systems 319 
and/or free trade zones.320 The FATF in its 2014 document on beneficial 
ownership and transparency 321 acknowledges that the actual owner could 
be through a chain of ownership, which makes the task of tracing the 
source even more complicated, it is also one of the reasons that the real 
estate sector 322 is popular amongst money launderers because chains of 
ownership are easy to set up and can become complex very quickly. This 
means that money moved into a country through TBML can then be 
moved straight into property investment, thus legitimising large sums of 
money in one transaction. The 4th EU Directive on Money Laundering 323 in 
Article 13 also extends the requirement to establish the legal owner or to 
establish who has the ultimate control or controls the dominant power 
                                            
318
 Pellegrina, L. D., & Masciandaro, D. (2008). The Risk Based Approach in the new European Anti-
Money Laundering Legislation: A Law and Economics View. “Paolo Baffi” Centre Research Paper 
Series No. 2008-22, 1-24. 
319
Davilas, C. (2014). AML compliance for foreign correspondent accounts: A primer on beneficial 
ownership requirements and other challenges. Journal of Investment Compliance, 15(1), 4-16. 
doi:10.1108/joic-01-2014-0003 
320
Shen, W., & Vanhullebusch, M. (2015). Where is the alchemy? The experiment of the shanghai 
free trade zone in freeing the foreign investment regime in china. European Business Organization 
Law 
321
 FATF. (2014). Transparency and beneficial ownership. France: Financial Action Task Force. 
FATF Guidance.  
322
ESMAALG. (2013). Typologies Reporton Money Laundering Through the Real Estate Sectorin 
the ESAAMLG Region. Namibia. Retrieved from ttp://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/file/TYPOLOGIES-
REPORT-ON-ML-THROUGH-THE-REAL-ESTATE-SECTOR(1).pdf 
323
Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
(2015).content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L0849&from=E 
 139 
source of a company, however for this to be fully enacted all parties 
involved in registering companies and ownership need to be regulated, 
otherwise banks cannot access the data even if checks are run. These are 
some of the challenges that the Wolfsberg group has noted as part of their 
response to beneficial ownership requirements.324 
 
There are however, inherent difficulties in BOI because it relies 
extensively on third party organizations to have collected the appropriate 
data. This is especially noticeable in free trade zones where legal entities 
can be established relatively easily and with minimal checks of ownership 
or intent. 
 
Determining beneficial ownership can become a banking priority 
over checks of shipping and lading information, since the latter can all be 
falsified and would need the support of agencies such as customs and 
exercise in order to verify accurately. 
 
2.2.5 Multiple Banking Partners 
 
A final risk assessment area that is often used, is to check the AML 
requirements of partner banks i.e. external banks that might be involved in 
the transaction. However, it is possible that other banks have perfectly 
good AML requirements, and if they do not then ironically enough they will 
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be more vulnerable to easier methods of transporting cash rather than 
using TBML transactions. Instead the very fact that multiple banks are 
involved should be a trigger in its own right, but again the assessment 
should be made against the overall business viability of the client’s 
company.325  
 
Checking the anti money laundering compliance of partner banks 
i.e. external banks that might be involved in the transaction is a useful risk 
assessment tool. AML regulations are issued by oversight bodies such as 
FINRA in the United States, and the HMRC in the United Kingdom. 
Consequently, one country’s AML regulations can be quite different from 
another’s. Differences can be so distinct that PWC felt compelled to issue 
a guide detailing the differences between the AML regulations and 
environment of 74 countries.326 
 
Different geographical locations will have different rules and 
regulations in place, attitudes to AML requirements also differ. Take for 
instance a coffee producer who uses a local Kenyan bank and supplies a 
UK coffee chain which uses a London-based bank. Both banks will have 
varying policies and varying frameworks, and as such when the paperwork 
looks in order to the Kenyan bank it is dispatched to the UK bank for 
payment. Both banks must ensure, in such instances, that each 
understands what the other’s AML regulations are, how they are applied 
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and what measures apply to the specific transaction, before payments are 
made.  
 
The differing approaches to AML are most obvious between certain 
types of banking systems. More technologically based systems will have 
money-laundered through, for instance, the purchase and re-sale of 
expensive goods; in cash-cultures, such as the Middle East and Africa, the 
physical movement of the cash is the predominant means of laundering 
it.327  
 
Naturally, it is most likely that partner banks have AML 
requirements that match those of the other partner banks, in these cases 
membership of the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) would be a good 
indicator. The FATF is a voluntary inter-governmental agency, whereby 
member countries co-operate on the development and enforcement of 
AML and terrorist financing regulations. Banks and countries that are not 
members, or who fall short of the agreed norms, (these reports can be 
easily downloaded from the FATF website), are more vulnerable to easier 
methods of transporting cash compared to TBML (Trade-Based Money 
Laundering) and so, ironically, suffer less money-laundering activity as a 
consequence. It follows that multi-bank, trans-national transactions should 
be analysed more carefully for AML regulatory compliance (from the 
perspective of both countries) than those involving only one bank.  
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However, it is a typical Venn diagram: whilst the majority of multi-
bank, bi-national transactions fully comply with AML regulations and are 
not vehicles for money laundering or terror finance, the vast majority of 
transactions that involve money laundering and trade based money 
laundering are multi-bank, bi-national transactions. This is because the 
gaps in technological capacity, cultural differences and varying 
interpretations of AML regulations make it that much harder to track or 
trace laundering activity. It is therefore simply useful to flag these types of 
transactions for particular attention when auditing for AML compliance, as 
they are ideal vehicles for laundering, and more recently, terror finance. A 
final note on AML regulations: in terms of the risk management of inter-
country transactions, the final assessment should be made against the 
overall business viability of the client’s company. 
 
Transactions involving multiple banks should trigger a system of 
checks that seek to establish the overall viability of the business, rather 
than focusing only on the area that funding is sought for. In this 
assessment system, which doesn’t have to be too detailed, the following 
points should be considered: 
 Is there an undue amount of complexity involved in the 
shipping and movement of goods? 
 Are there sound business reasons for choosing the export 
countries and shipping routes?  
 Would a normal business transaction of this nature make the 
expected financial returns that the client is predicting or 
showing has happened? 
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 Could this business achieve the same expected outcomes 
using illegal goods, laundered money or falsified information 
at any stage? 
 
2.3  Red Flags 
 
FATF (2006, 2008) in both its reports on trade-based money 
laundering has recommended implementing a system of red flag alerts, 
that should warn banking personnel about the possibility of TBML activity. 
These red flags have been developed from studies and typologies from 
TBML situations that have been discovered so far. However, some 
researchers such as Soudijin 328 are critical of the current red flag alert 
system. Soudijin maintains that the approach of FATF is fairly ‘tunnel 
visioned’ towards over and under invoicing as the main means of 
conducting TBML transactions. However, in his research with Dutch law 
enforcement officials he discovered that other methods for TBML activity 
were equally used and would not have been detected using the red flags 
focused on misinvoicing. Two other red flag areas that he suggested could 
also be included were a) spotting large amounts of cash deposits often in 
lower denomination notes entering into the banking system, and b) sudden 
changes in business type, such as a company that usually ships 
machinery suddenly dealing in rice. Soudijin’s (2014) main criticism of the 
definition and understanding of TBML adopted by FATF, is the lack of 
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empirical data supporting the claims that misinvoicing is the main method 
for detecting TBML activity.  
 
One researcher who has examined TBML activity in more detail is 
Stack 329 who has been following some of the Baltic money laundering 
schemes 330 where trade has been used as a component in the process. 
He maintains that organised criminal gangs engaged in money laundering 
have developed sophisticated illicit trading platforms, often in collusion 
with financial institutions and other professionals.  These ML platforms 
comprise of a series of shell and front companies, with collaborative banks 
that help to distort the transactions and ‘systematize minsinvoicing.’ 331 
Although many developed countries may not face the same challenges as 
the Baltic States 332 the reality of organised gangs, having support from 
some financial institutions and operating large scale sophisticated money 
laundering platforms, is a situation that will affect both developed and 
emerging economies at some point.  
 
Studies following illicit trade 333 recognise that the increased stability 
of developed economies provides a better opportunity to retain and grow 
illicit funds.  Therefore, illicit money moves from where it has been taken 
from, in the developing economies and moves into the more stable area of 
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developed economies 334 and into formal banking institutions. Sometimes 
instead of cash the equivalent value is moved in the form of illicit or 
smuggled goods 335 or it may be derived from illegal activities such as 
bribery and corruption. 336  This not only removes money from weaker 
economies and countries that need it, but it also gives financial control of a 
country over to the criminals, which can cause or increase political 
instability within a region.337 At some point this money will inevitably enter 
financial institutions in the Western hemisphere or in off shore accounts or 
in other developed countries.“GFI research suggests that about 45% of 
illicit flows end up in offshore financial centers, and 55% in developed 
countries,”338 since this is the safest way to store large amounts of money. 
 
2.3.1 TBML Patterns - Red Flag Alerts 
 
Despite the reservations of some experts, 339  red flag alerts still 
remain the main tool available for TBML risk assessment. From the 
descriptions and cases provided in this research so far it can be seen that 
there are a number of ways in which TBML can occur 340 and these can be 
                                            
334
Kar & Spanjiers (2014) 
335
Basu, G. (2014). Concealment, corruption, and evasion: A transaction cost and case analysis of 
illicit supply chain activity. Journal of Transportation Security, 7(3), 209-226 
336
Julius Otusanya, O., Omobola Ajibolade, S., & Olajide Omolehinwa, E. (2011). The role of 
financial intermediaries in elite money laundering practices: Evidence from Nigeria. Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, 15(1), 58-84 
337
McDowell, J., & Novis, G. (2001). The consequences of money laundering and financial crime. 
Economic Perspectives, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, 6(2) 
338
http://www.gfintegrity.org/issue/illicit-financial-flows/ 
339
Zdanowicz, J. S. (2009). Trade-Based money laundering and terrorist financing. Review of Law & 
Economics, 5(2). doi:10.2202/1555-5879.1419 
340
Sullivan, C., & Smith, E. (2011). Trade based money laundering- risks and regulatory responses. 
Australia: Australian Institute of Criminology. Retrieved from 
http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rpp/rpp115.pdf 
 146 
seen in the typology studies.341 Despite the simplicity of some of the case 
studies 342 in most cases trade based money laundering is not a simple 
process and often several money laundering techniques can be used at 
the same time.343  
 
Trade misinvoicing 344 is the most common way that TBML crimes 
are currently detected and this form of activity might be represented 
through a number of different schemes, including: 
 Price misrepresentation (over or under invoicing).  
 Fictitious invoicing (for goods that don’t exist). 
 Multiple invoicing. 
 Falsely describing goods or misrepresenting the quality or 
quantity of goods. 
 Legitimate shipment of goods between criminal groups. 
 Ghost or phantom shipments (paperwork exists but goods 
were never moved). 
 Disguising laundered funds as consultancy or other service 
related fees. 
 Using free trade zones to unload and reload goods and 
disguise the initial port of loading. 
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Other techniques for moving money that have been discovered can 
also include abuse of the financial services in either the client’s country, or 
in other countries where trading partners of the client are in operation:345 
 Cuckoo smurfing 346  & Smurfing 347  funds (structuring 
funds into smaller amounts – see Figure 1 on 
Page148 ).  
 Using investment and retail property to disguise the 
source of dirty money. 
 Disguising the true beneficial owner of a company or 
business (through shell companies or front companies) 
 Using false businesses or companies to receive or 
export goods. 
 Using false identification and documentation for 
clients. 
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 Naming family members and relatives as directors of 
the companies and businesses.348 
 Using third party countries and companies to 
complicate trading routes making it harder to follow the 
shipment and goods. 
All of the above mentioned points can also act as indicators of suspicious 
activity if they are discovered or suspected.  
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Figure 1 - Example of smurfing activity reproduced from AUSTRAC 
(2014, p77) 
 
 
2.3.2  Use of Data Technology in Risk Assessment 
 
Despite the simplicity of a red flag system, it still tends to rely on the 
physical detection of suspicious activity by trained personnel, primarily 
because the analysis of data and the technology required to support this 
type of assessment is still being developed. Recent discoveries of ML 
cases by law enforcement and the banking sector have highlighted the 
levels of complexity that exist in money laundering schemes, which in turn 
has led to the recognition of a number of specific areas of money 
laundering activity such as trade based money laundering. In response to 
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this recognition there has been a slow development in technology and 
software to support AML officers in their work. These developments include 
software designed as web-crawling tools, such as trade finance algorithms 
that could be developed to capture all shipping related documentation that 
banks could use. PWC 349 outline two basic methods in which software can 
be used in TBML detection; firstly, text analysis to identify specific words, 
numbers or phrases such as customer names or certain product types, and 
secondly web analytics which can compare actual shipping details against 
the documentation being submitted. Other technologies such as AML 
sanctions software are available to enable banking staff to follow news 
reports of different countries.350 Of most importance to TBML detection is 
perhaps the work in the US on trade data comparisons. 
 
2.3.3  Use of Trade Data Technology 
 
It is recognised at this stage that the amount of information that has 
to be processed to satisfy AML regulation and risk assessment is 
considerable.351 The use of technology and in particular the programmes 
required to analyse large data projects will become increasingly common in 
the financial services sector. 
 
“Technology is essential for fulfilling regulatory requirements 
and gathering customer knowledge, not just to fix short-term 
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issues but doing so in a manner flexible enough to meet 
future requirements.”352 
 
The challenge that software developers and the banking profession 
both face is to determine what data needs to be analysed and for what 
purpose. As trade data analyst Chris Bingham a CEO for a data analysis 
software company said in an interview “For us, in particular, there’s been a 
tremendous amount of hype around Big Data, and people realize that data 
by itself is just that, an enormous pile of data. Unless you have the right 
tools, visualizations, processes and applications to turn that data into 
insights and then actions, it’s just a bunch of data.”353 
 
Is it possible to justify each bank engaging in this level of investment 
for AML software and training or should other systems such as that 
suggested by McCarthy, van Santen, & Fiedler, (2014) be considered? 
They proposed the need to establish an international intelligence database 
to increase the effectiveness of sharing and communicating information 
across jurisdictions. However, this would also require a high level of inter-
agency cooperation and communication, and this might pose challenges 
for institutions and domestic legislation that are not designed to operate in 
this manner. 
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2.3.4 Trade Transparency Units 
 
There have been some developments on the academic and 
research side towards developing a trade database using US trading data. 
In the US model, the use of trade data analysis has been proposed as one 
way in which law enforcement and customs officials can thwart price 
alterations and changes to weights of shipments.354 In the work undertaken 
by Zadanowicz 355 using US Trade data, Zdanowicz monitored bi-lateral 
trade transactions into and out of the US. He looked at trade disparities and 
pricing anomalies compared to international trading prices. He discovered 
obvious suspicious trading prices were in operation such as the following 
examples: 
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Table 1: U.S. Exports at Low Averages Prices  
 
Product Country Country Average Price World Average Price 
Cooking Stoves Colombia $ 76.62/unit $ 425.65/unit 
Erythromycin Iran $ 0.10/gram $ 1.20/gram 
Nickel Alloy Wire Venezuela $ 2.21/kg $ 12.26/kg 
Herring-Bone Tire France $ 7.69/each $ 192.25/unit 
Machine Guns France $ 364.08/unit $ 2,022.67/unit 
Enriched Uranium 235 Spain $ 15.50/kg $ 172.22/kg 
Military Rifles UK $ 106.87/unit $ 387.55/unit 
 
Based on these findings Zdanowic declared that it should be 
possible to categorise trading patterns using a percentile of the results, i.e. 
a broad pattern that covered normal trading discrepancies. He then stated 
that any prices that fell out of this normal pattern of data could be deemed 
as suspicious. 
 
Using these results Zdanowicz 356 developed a model that focused 
on four key areas of data interest that customs and excise could monitor: 
1. Country risk profiles,  
2. Customs district risk profiles,  
3. Product risk profiles and  
4. Transaction price risk profiles.  
Zdanowicz’s work was based solely on US bi-lateral studies however 
other research into bilateral trade statistics such as work undertaken by 
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Yalta & Demir, (2010) on Turkey, show that TBML is country specific 
depending on which direction the value is moving. Patterns of trade data 
discrepancies for countries are therefore either reported using over 
invoicing or for movement in the other direction countries would be using 
trade under invoicing.  
 
Since this information is often collected by different agencies at different 
points in the trading process there was a strong need to share data across 
agencies and increase interagency co-operation. 357  This interagency 
sharing of data was facilitated through a Trade Transparency Unit. The 
introduction of Trade Transparency Units in the US, now offers one 
example of an interagency model to illustrate how co-operation and sharing 
of trade data can benefit those working to combat TBML transactions.358  
 
2.3.5 Challenges of Trade Data Comparisons 
 
Trade data can be a useful tool where obvious discrepancies arise 
from deliberate criminal manipulation of the trade process, however in 
order to compare data the destination and source countries need to be 
known. There are therefore additional complications to be overcome when 
using bilateral trade statistics as highlighted by Berger & Nitsch (2008), 
such as verifying the actual source country, rather than the last port of 
departure. Another problem is ensuring that the corresponding trade data is 
recorded in the same calendar year particularly for shipments near the end 
                                            
357
 FCA. (2013). 
358
 Zdanowicz, J. (2009). Trade Based Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. Review of Law 
and Economics Vol 5 No.2, 855-878. 
 155 
of the year, and that the valuation of goods are similar and tally across both 
countries. 359  Other factors that trade data can overlook include the 
exchange rates “a real depreciation of the exchange rate affects the level 
of import under invoicing only but not the other types of trade 
misinvoicing.”360 
 
In reality most TBML cases, either for money laundering or tax 
evasion are currently uncovered through manual spot checks by customs 
and excise, as goods are being unloaded. This was the case in Ireland in 
2012 when a business man involved in tax evasion was caught for falsely 
declaring the contents of the shipping container.  
 
“….the scam was uncovered on 9 October, 2007 when 
customs officers at Dublin Port investigated a container that 
was supposed to contain 18 tonnes of apples and two tonnes 
of garlic. When they looked inside they found 21 tonnes of 
garlic and no apples.  Officer Twohig said the import duty on 
apples is 9% while the duty on garlic is €120/kg and 9.6% of 
the total value. The outstanding tax on this consignment 
alone was €25,000.”361 
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The point being here is that you need an actual customs check to verify the 
goods stated on any trade invoice, which also applies to money laundering 
situations especially TBML. 
 
Studies from the Global Financial Integrity organization who monitor 
global trends in illicit trade flows, suggest that the easier trade transactions 
to measure are those of misinvoicing of goods, such as Zdanowicz’s 
system.362 However, this means that trade misinvoicing in services, same 
invoice trade misplacing, Hawala and informal financial sector transactions 
as well as bulk cash transactions are not included in the overall TBML 
picture at the moment, therefore more sophisticated measuring system do 
need to be developed. 
 
2.3.6  Implications for the Banking Sector 
 
The bulk of this work within the banking sector is usually undertaken 
through the AML compliance unit within the bank, however, other areas of 
the bank would benefit from acquiring a level of understanding about 
money laundering and TBML activity, such as trade finance and audit. In 
particular, the role of internal audit, which to date has been largely ill 
defined within this complex and regulatory led process, could develop a 
level of expertise in order to monitor AML compliance more effectively 
within the bank. 
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2.4  Internal Audit 
 
The internal audit function (IAF) is often considered as the main 
control mechanism that supports management 363 and is part of the overall 
governance system. The COSO definition for internal control states that 
“internal control is broadly defined as a process, affected by an entity’s 
board of directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding achievement of effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations, reliable financial reporting, and compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations.”364 However, the role of internal control 
within AML compliance is often less easily defined, and this lack of clarity 
has been recently criticised by financial regulators.365 
 
Although internal audit might be considered an integral part of 
banking governance it was not actually until the 1940s that it began to 
become a professional discipline recognised within management.366 The 
current definition of internal audit as outlined by the IIARF, sees its role as 
an independent and objective mechanism to add value and assurance to 
the overall governance process. 
“Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and 
consulting activity designed to add value and improve an 
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organization’s operations. It helps an organization accomplish 
its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach 
to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk 
management, control, and governance processes.”367 
 
However, for internal audit to be viewed as effective it must also possess 
an “appropriate level of quality.”368 One of the challenges that internal audit 
faces lies in that definition of quality, since the question really is, who 
defines quality and who ensures that it has been achieved. Internal Audit is 
designed to serve multiple clients including the audit committee and 
management. 369  It also offers both assurance and consulting services, 
which could be viewed as contradictory roles for one function to cover.370 
Reporting on AML compliance could also be considered as another 
contradictory role since it runs the risk of criticising the group that provides 
resources for its work, which could either be the audit committee or 
governance. Avianti’s (2009) definition of quality is therefore very 
subjective when considering the role of internal audit.  
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2.4.1 Role of Internal Audit in AML  
 
Part of the role of internal audit is to report to the audit committee 371 
on the effectiveness of AML compliance systems being used in the bank.372 
Currently this seems to be done in a tick box format as to whether systems 
are in place and to appease the audit committee 373  as opposed to 
assessing whether effective systems are being used. 374  This system is 
unlikely to change until IAF becomes more skilled in AML auditing and 
banks introduce specific AML auditing and reporting criteria that guide how 
audit committees require data to be analysed and presented to them. The 
weakness of IAF in this regard are highlighted in the lack of skills available 
to identify a strong AML compliance system and to offer an evidence based 
assessment of what is and is not working well within the unit.375 
 
2.4.2  An Independent Role for the IAF 
 
If maintaining independence and objectivity is not a realistic option 
for most IAF, since they are too closely aligned or integrated into the 
overall governance structure, perhaps a broader and more independent 
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role is needed, especially in relation to AML and compliance. Such a role 
could see internal audit acting as a link between different banks through a 
regional audit committee, rather than answerable at a smaller branch level. 
This might overcome some of the issues raised in the global internal audit 
report 376  where internal audit was struggling to find recognition with 
governance because many governance issues are outside the remit and 
focus of IAF and this hampers communication and an understanding of the 
issues affecting IAF within governance and local audit committees. This 
could facilitate the transfer of information to financial intelligence units as 
well as ensure compatibility across all branches in a region, which could 
then be connected globally. In his analysis of IAF and the relationships with 
regulators, Andrew`s 377 points out that both Basel and the UK guidelines 
provide opportunities for direct engagement between regulators and 
internal auditors, and so directly engaging with a regional audit body or FIU 
would be in a similar role. 
 
It ensures that the primary role of IAF is there to support and 
enhance the work of management but is answerable externally to the local 
regional audit office.  There are many challenges to this approach not least 
logistics and practical reporting and communication issues. There is also 
an identified problem of skill level and requirements within internal audit 
function, especially the lack of investigative skills in areas of fraud and 
financial abuse, as some researchers have highlighted.378 
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2.4.2.1 Assessing Effectiveness in IAF 
 
At this stage the challenge is to begin to think outside the traditional 
audit box, and begin to streamline audit function across branches. Industry 
reports such as PwC 379 have also emphasized that it is important that 
internal audit does not lose its function and can continue to operate 
effectively as the international and global banking context continues to 
evolve specifically with AML compliance. One of the ways for IAF to 
maintain its importance and relevance is to ensure that the system for 
measuring its effectiveness is updated and is also using the appropriate 
outcomes and key performance indicators. This is especially important 
given the ongoing evolvement of the IAF role 380 in response to changes in 
business and banking generally as well as AML and compliance. 
 
2.4.2.2  Links to External Audit 
 
As mentioned earlier a key component of the IAF is to assume a 
position of independence and objectivity from the rest of the banking 
units.381 The quality of independence of the IAF is usually assessed from 
the perspective of the external auditor, 382  who is also supposed to be 
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providing an independent and objective assessment. This has often led to 
an overlap in function and roles between developing the external and 
internal audit reports, and in some cases internal audit has contributed to a 
significant amount of the preparation of the external audit report.383 This is 
despite several recommendations after the financial crisis,384 including the 
UK House of Lords report that internal audit is separate and should not be 
outsourced and should work independently to external audit companies.385 
 
The problem though is the increasing cost of compliance and 
regulation, which is causing many smaller banks to reconsider whether IAF 
is a function that they can fund full time and whether there are sufficient 
skills 386  in house to maintain this function. If the requirements for IAF 
continue to increase it may no longer be an economical option to retain 
internal audit function within the organization. This may provide another 
option to centralize IAF expertise 387  through a regional AML regulatory 
committee that can supply expertise to banks of AML risk and AML audit 
reporting. 
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2.4.2.3  IAF and AML Risk Assessment  
 
The focus of IAF reform has tended to have been influenced by the 
recent financial crisis 388  and the exposure of banks to risk taking and 
managing their own investments. 
 
This is a different focus to looking at AML risk and audit within the 
banking context. One of the main differences is that the prevention of crime 
and risk assessment is developed across a number of different functions 
within the bank.  Criminals will take any opportunity to infiltrate a system 
and this could be through trading, front office staff or business and 
investment.  
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Above 389 highlighted in diagram form, is how criminal opportunity 
strikes in relation to fraud and the possibility of targeting specific members 
of staff within the bank, with the main factors being opportunity, pressure 
and rationalization. But the diagram could equally illustrate the factors 
impacting on money laundering and the gaps in any AML system that need 
to be filled by the governance and banking units. 
 
Part of a revised role for IAF would be to identify gaps in the overall 
AML system across all units in the bank, including the risk of bribery and 
corruption 390 within certain regions. 
 
2.4.2.4  Banking Implications  
 
The role of internal audit is thus compromised in many situations; for 
example, when problems are identified and/or there is a conflict in 
requirements between the audit committee and other banking units? In 
essence the IAF is placed in a position where they are answerable to 
internal bosses and a dual agency role between the audit committee and 
the priorities of governance. It makes the independent role of IAF very 
difficult to maintain- what if neither the audit committee nor the board 
listens to concerns that the IAF has about the risk exposure of the bank, 
does that place the IAF as the organisational whistle blower? 
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One example of the complexities and dual roles of internal audit can 
be illustrated through one role that internal audit has been described as 
holding; which is to ensure that resources are prioritised adequately for the 
bank.391 The difficulty with this role is that it will be heavily influenced by the 
body overseeing the work of IAF. So that if the audit committee has the 
primary oversight function then their assessment of IAF effectiveness will 
be linked to whether they view IAF audits as supporting their own funding 
and resource priorities for the bank. The management board may be the 
oversight body and their funding priorities for the strategic development of 
the bank may not always tally with the operational priorities of the audit 
committee. IAF effectively becomes the middle person to be bounced 
between the two and sometimes conflicting, pillars of governance. There is 
probably no easy solution to this dilemma since it is not possible to offer a 
truly independent function within a bank when that same function also has 
a vested interest in the outcome and is on the payroll of the organisation it 
is examining. Within the confines of this study the IAF could have the 
potential to act as an additional pair of eyes to ensure that the overall 
system is as effective as possible and avoid risk exposure from ML activity.  
 
The dilemma of IAF and audit committee involvement has been 
defined by some researchers already 392 this is in addition to the existing 
challenges and potential conflict of trying to serve two different masters 
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between the audit committee and management.393 However, as banking 
becomes increasingly international in both its operational business and 
also in its compliance requirements, the question cold be asked is there a 
more efficient use to which internal audit can be used? A clear role 
perhaps, one that removes it from being a pawn in the governance 
structure and instead gives it a central and clearly defined role, one that is 
more fitting for the expectations of today’s banking structure. 
 
 
2.5  Internal Audit and Financial Intelligence 
Analysis 
 
One of the ways in which internal audit could become more 
independent is to retain its focus on its own audit findings. If these are not 
listened to, as suggested by some researchers 394 then the IAF could report 
this to an outside body. At this stage Internal Audit is probably only one 
step away from being a whistle blower,395 given that the first part of the 
description by Yeoh (2014) 396 is already part of the IA role.397 There could 
be other options though to enable IAF to report externally, in a more 
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structured way,398 since whistleblowing tends to be a last resort indicating 
that internal mechanisms have failed. 
 
One example to consider could be to use the model of suspicious 
activity reports that are generated in money laundering cases, and are sent 
onto a national financial intelligence unit (FIU). This is done to provide 
dedicated resources and expertise to analyse the reports. If IAF had a 
similar system whereby an external audit committee was responsible for 
overseeing the work of IAF within different banks would this enhance the 
role of IAF within each bank? These regional audit committees could 
provide information on regulation, IT data software and feedback from 
FIUs, clarity on international terrorist activities and suspected country lists 
could be updated.  As a model it would help to ensure a consistency to IAF 
roles within banks whilst at the same time ensuring that management 
would be receiving externally verified support but dedicated to their own 
internal systems. A regional unit would address some of the issues raised 
by Lenz & Sarens (2012) when they identified one of the weaknesses of 
IAF, as having to be answerable to multiple stakeholders. “The more IA 
lacks a distinct chief stakeholder/“boss” and a clear and realistic role, the 
more it is principally exposed to over-promising and under-delivering.”399 
 
The reliance on audits, either internal or external, to uncover 
evidence of money laundering and trade based money laundering is 
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misplaced.400  Typically, when rogue clients use the banking process to 
launder money the paperwork is pristine, and in order. It is impossible for 
an auditor to investigate the underlying reality of every transaction, 
particularly when the paperwork itself is not in the least suspicious.401 
 
In fact, the only reason banks cannot spot money laundering 
themselves 402  (i.e. prior to criminal investigation) is that all required 
documents are in perfect order. Banks, being large and complex entities, 
consist of numerous departments with overlapping functions that manage a 
myriad of products.403 Risk assessment is standardised, especially within 
the retail-banking sector, by applying rigor to the validation of client 
documentation;404 however, once the documentation is deemed correct and 
in order, the system pays out.405 
 
Money laundering and trade based money laundering schemes are 
initiated with the twin purposes of laundering illicit funds, and remaining 
undetected; by nature, they are indistinguishable from legal transactions, 
even during the application of sound and thorough audit methodologies 
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and practices. Additionally, the blame 406  is not attributable to the audit 
function, which must be viewed as having a limited scope and ability. It is a 
common misrepresentation of both audit functions 407 that they are able, 
and should, uncover forensic details of financial crimes. The sheer 
workload and process of an audit relies on, and assumes absolutely, that 
banks only act on paperwork that is perfectly in order. If suspicion is not 
aroused by either banking staff or evidence of dubious transactions, then in 
no way 408  will any auditor (internal or external) be able to identify the 
transaction as a risk. 
 
This fact was substantially illustrated in the Kingston Cotton Mills 
case 409 of 1896, where Lord Justice Lopes found that, “An auditor is not 
bound to be a detective or, as was said, to approach his work with 
suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He 
is a watch-dog, but not a bloodhound. He is justified in believing tried 
servants of the company in whom confidence is placed by the company. 
He is entitled to assume that they are honest, and to rely upon their 
representations, provided he takes reasonable care.”  
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More recently, the limitations of both internal and external audit 
functions in relation to financial institutions’ operations and structure 410 
were clearly illustrated in the spectacular failure of Barings, 411  BCCI, 
Worldcom, Enron, Parmalat, HBOS, RBS and Northern Rock. 412  It is 
outside the scope of this research to suggest a detailed role for the IAF, 
However, the role is discussed further in relation to AML compliance, and 
in particular to the changing nature of international money laundering and 
the need for increased inter-bank co-operation. 
 
2.5.1  AML Compliance 
 
A normal AML compliance system consists of a number of 
processes and checks that ensure that client’s details are verified and that 
the business being operated is actually owned by the client. Other checks 
are also carried out such as to ascertain that the transactions recorded are 
for the activities stated by the client. Within banking one of the key 
mechanisms for ensuring these checks are carried out is the customer due 
diligence process (CDD) and beneficial ownership information (BOI) 
checks.413 If either the business or the client is seen to be complicated in 
any way or is deemed potentially suspicious then a suspicious alert is 
raised internally and another system of enhanced due diligence checks can 
be undertaken by the bank. If during the further process of undertaking 
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these enhanced levels of checks anything suspicious is flagged up by the 
bank, then a suspicious activity report (or SAR) is filed, this is external to 
the bank and sent on to the financial investigation unit for them to 
undertake further analysis.  
 
2.5.2 Internal Audit and Risk Assessment  
 
Mihret (2014) suggested that the assurance aspect of IAF could be 
developed further in order to support AML compliance within the bank 
“[IAF]...helps prevent and detect irregularities that could result from 
mistakes or fraud.”414 If that was the case, then there is a clearer argument 
for IAF to oversee the AML compliance unit. The difficulty is that in order 
for IAF to achieve this effectively, they would have to be part of the risk 
assessment design and monitoring process, and understand all the 
complexities of AML. Does this lead to a danger of merely duplicating the 
work of AML? Similarly, PwC (2014) recently stated that improved data 
was one of the main issues in the TBML detection race, and there could be 
a role for internal audit to become au fait with the latest IT and software 
programmes for AML.  
 
However, all these suggestions merely seem to be subsuming IAF 
into existing areas of work, already being done by existing units within the 
bank. The agency dilemma still exists with the pull between strategic 
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oversight and operational assurance and IAF is no clearer on its specialism 
and unique qualities that it brings to governance and AML compliance.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has covered an array of different issues in an attempt to 
cover the basic tenets of TBML activity as it specifically affects the global 
banking sector. The key points that have been covered in this review have 
focused on how trade-based money laundering is a growing area of 
concern for both banks and regulators as it becomes the method of choice 
for many criminal gangs to move goods and money across the globe.415 
The empirical research would suggest that banks have a limited 
understanding of the types of activities that TBML could present to the 
bank and/or how to adequately assess the bank’s risk of exposure to 
TBML.416 In this respect there would appear to be a clear need for changes 
within the governance and audit structures of the bank and in particular for 
internal audit to play an enhanced role in AML regulation, compliance and 
suspicious reporting.417 
 
In order to explore this issue further the research will explore the 
perception of those working in the sector and what their responses towards 
the current risk assessment processes for TBML are. Alongside this 
information the research will also explore other relevant models that could 
protect the bank and its stakeholders from the impact of TBML. The gap in 
the literature that has emerged and which this research seeks to contribute 
towards addressing, is to consider an appropriate risk assessment 
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approach that could be easily implemented within the banking system. In 
particular, there appears to be a need to analyse the red flag indicators of 
client behaviour and transaction patterns that accompany TBML activities, 
and from this information to develop an empirical model with its 
underpinning theoretical assumptions, which can accurately detect TBML 
risk within a global banking context. 
 
In developing such a risk assessment tool this research uses an 
ontological perspective that risk assessment approaches for TBML 
transactions involve dealing with complex social and financial processes in 
trade based money laundering. There is often the involvement of multiple 
financiers and businesses 418 and the business transactions can be located 
across a range of different countries. This means that in effect each bank 
will only ever be presented with a small component of a much larger 
financial operation. Therefore, in order for TBML activity to be effectively 
assessed there need to be links either between different banks and/or 
between law enforcement, financial intelligence units and banks.419 
 
This paper has focused on one small but important area, the overlap 
between trade-based money laundering and the banking sector. Unlike 
previous research that has provided a focus on TBML, which has tended to 
cover aspects of how it operates and the economic predictions on its 
impact, there is also scope for research to support financial institutions in 
their fight against TBML. This research aims to focus specifically on the 
                                            
418
 APG. (2012). APG Typology Report on Trade Based Money Laundering. Sydney: Asia Pacific 
Group on Money Laundering. 
419
 AUSTRAC. (2013). Typologies and case studies report 2013. Australia: AUSTRAC Retrieved 
from http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/typ13_full.pdf 
 175 
banking context and to be realistic about the limited financial information 
that banks are likely to have at any one time, for each TBML client. The 
research is considering a model that focuses on the strengths of the 
banking sector which is to assess business risk. The risk assessment 
model to be developed should still form the basis of the bank’s own 
business work and AML compliance tasks should fit into this model of 
working rather than the other way around. 
 
2.6.1 Empirical Implications  
 
From the above analysis and in order to process information 
effectively and efficiently, it would appear that a combination of approaches 
could be the logical solution towards addressing TBML risks in banking.420 
Since many banking units are involved in TBML including front office, 
business, trade and internal audit then a cohesive system that can be 
tiered across all these units to suit the different knowledge bases would be 
ideal. This could include a broad rule based framework which was then 
supported by a risk based strategy.421 This could then enable information to 
be processed quicker and with more meaning. This could lead to an 
approach similar to that of the Netherlands, 422  which contrary to other 
countries has seen a reduction in SAR reports but with an increased quality 
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of material being reported.423 Otherwise the situation continues to prevail 
as in most other countries, where there has been increased reporting of 
SARs but this has led to a diminishing amount of quality information 
produced 424  resulting in less information or evidence to work from, 
described by economists in the theory of ‘Crying Wolf’.425 
 
From the literature it would appear that in order to process 
information banks need guidance beyond a list of red flags, which is 
growing exponentially as each new money laundering scheme is 
uncovered. In other words, the red flags need to be part of an overall risk 
assessment system that enables staff to process what information they 
have gathered and link it directly into their own system of reviewing client 
accounts and transactions. Computer systems may be able to speed up 
reviewing transaction patterns but if the operator is not aware of what 
information to request then this could be a wasted resource. The rest of the 
literature review considered the different elements that would need to be 
considered when developing even a simple risk assessment design and to 
identify which red flag information would need to be incorporated into a risk 
based framework.  
 
The literature also highlighted several reports warning against 
increased regulation and its impact aside from the resource implications to 
the banking sector and the additional burden this would place on AML 
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compliance units in banks. In particular McCarthy, van Santen, & Fiedler, 
(2014) highlighted the possible negative impact that regulation alone would 
have on curtailing money laundering activity,426 and the risks it could cause 
to developing professional money launderers using trained former finance 
staff.427 McCarthy et al suggested in their study that investment into police 
services to track and capture money launderers would ultimately be a more 
productive and effective use of resources, rather than increasing the cost of 
regulation and compliance monitoring. This would strengthen investigation 
work from the law enforcement side but it could still increase the time and 
effort the banks spend on AML compliance, except they now support law 
enforcement efforts rather than regulator inquiries. In addition, McCarthy 
determined that a focus on banking regulation would produce little or no 
impact in stemming the involvement of professional money launders thus 
making it increasingly more difficult to trace money as it is being hidden by 
professional finance people. 
 
“Current approaches, we find, do not deter money launderers 
from supplying the market, but simply increase the profitability 
of money laundering.”428 
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2.6.2 Key Findings 
 
At this stage in the research a number of topics and possible 
solutions have begun to emerge from the literature review. The practical 
data collection stage will seek to examine some of these preliminary 
suggestions or concepts in more detail and explore the empirical 
implications for staff working in the field. The final part of the literature 
section provides a summary of some of the key points that could be 
examined for further exploration.  
 
2.6.3  Risk Based system 
 
A risk based approach to AML compliance should enable banks to 
use their own flexibility and incorporate simple business viability models, to 
determine the likelihood of whether their client’s business proposal is 
legitimate or not. This would move the focus of banks away from 
determining the source of the money and instead focus on the business 
model being presented to them.  There will still be questions asked in 
relation to whether there is a risk of illegal money being used or whether by 
funding this transaction illegal activity will occur. If during the course of their 
analysis flags are raised, then outside sources of expertise can be brought 
in.  
  
 179 
2.6.4 Banking Definition and Focus for TBML detection 
 
In law enforcement there has to be a clear pattern of criminal activity 
in order for a successful conviction to occur, so perhaps banking and legal 
definitions of TBML need to overlap at some point. In order for a fraudulent 
transaction to be successful in a bank, which implements robust AML 
compliance measures, then an element of deception and fraud is required 
by the client. It is this level of deception and fraud that is the responsibility 
of the bank to uncover, since it is undermining their own risk analysis of the 
business being undertaken not to do so.  From the case study examples it 
can also be seen that the banking definition of trade-based money 
laundering has to be tied into a ML risk assessment of a client’s overall 
business proposal.  The additional component from an ordinary 
assessment is the source of the materials being used (cash /goods or 
services). The bank cannot determine whether these are from illegal gains 
but it can highlight whether it is possible to run this proposal using cash or 
goods acquired illegally. Perhaps a more accurate definition of TBML for 
the banking sector would be “The use of the financial services to facilitate 
the movement of money, through the use of fraud or deception”. This 
clearly defines the role that banks have in engaging with TBML activities 
because their own systems of risk assessment will have been 
compromised by the deception process.  
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2.6.5 Implication for the Governance of Banks 
 
The globalisation of financial crime and money laundering 429  has 
implications for the management and governance of financial institutions 
throughout the world. The expansion of international money laundering 
activity and the constant evolvement of techniques such as trade based 
money laundering means that other banking units apart from AML 
compliance, such as trade finance and internal audit, need to become 
centre staged. In addition, individual banks also need to be working 
together to commission and develop the specific software systems that 
they need, in order to track and detect money laundering and spot 
anomalies in their client’s business transactions. This requires adaptations 
in AML specialisation across all the banking units and feedback into 
software developing platforms..430 
  
This chapter has explored the contextual framework to the research 
and outlined the main theoretical and empirical challenges associated with 
money laundering activity and its detection within the formal banking 
sector. The next chapters are of the research focus on an empirical survey 
and follow up interviews undertaken with leading AML experts across the 
globe. The survey asked what are the current challenges that AML staff 
face, and where so they feel future priorities should lie. 
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The reason for undertaking this survey was to enable the researcher 
to examine the results of existing industry reports 431 and to see if any other 
developments had occurred within the sector, specifically within AML 
compliance. The survey was also designed to explore what role internal 
audit 432 played in AML risk assessment and governance reporting, which 
would not be a standard question within most industry AML surveys. 
Finally, it was hoped that the survey and follow on interview questions 
would give additional insights into what the current problems and 
challenges in the AML sector were. These were expected to focus on the 
type of input required from governance and management, training needs 
and staff to be trained, use of risk assessment strategies and future 
resource implications. 
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CHAPTER 3 ACADEMIC BACKGROUND 
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3.1 Introduction  
 
This section focuses on the academic and empirical literature that 
was used in the research and which helped to provide a background 
context for the work being studied. Every piece of research needs to fit into 
other studies undertaken in the same area so that research students and 
other experts can develop a bigger picture of what is happening. This 
section reviewed and studied the literature that was seen as relevant to this 
study area, i.e. trade based money laundering in the banking sector. 
 
Most literature reviews are written to provide evidence for a research 
project or support a particular viewpoint in which to justify the direction of 
the research.433 This review is no exception, since its focus is on trying to 
present a contextual framework that explains and justifies the research 
approach and methodology.  The overall approach of the research was to 
be an exploratory piece, since the subject matter is still an emerging issue 
and there are relatively few papers on the subject matter. Perhaps most 
notably there were very few academic papers 434  that had conducted 
primary research on the topic, so there were challenges when choosing a 
comparable technique or using established baseline data. Instead the 
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review collated opinions from within the sector, which could then be used to 
support or enhance the discussions from the research’s own primary data. 
In addition to the peer reviewed articles the search was expanded to 
include a certain element of ‘grey literature’ which includes items such as 
policy documents and reviews. 435  These were included in the review 
section in order to ensure that any publisher bias that might occur from only 
using the limited number of printed articles on the subject matter, did not 
lead to any distortions in developing an accurate context. 
 
3.1.1 Systematic Review 
 
The type of literature review that has been adopted for this paper is 
a systematic review, as opposed to the older more traditional narrative 
literature review.436 The main difference between the two techniques is that 
a systematic review is a piece of mini research that explores and collects a 
number of different articles in order to answer a specific literature 
question.437  A traditional review usually focuses on specific keywords and 
collects all papers using this phrase. In the case of this research the 
literature question focused on what information does the paper provide on 
TBML (see the following page for the sample coding techniques applied).  
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Table 2: Sample coding paper 
Colour  
Code Paper Summary 
Yellow Generic ML information Focus on IAF and role 
with Audit committee  
Pull between different 
agendas of 
management and 
audit committee 
Blue TBML   
Green Authors comments   
Pink Methodology either their 
research or implications 
for this project 
Interviewed 134 Chief 
Internal Auditors across 
various companies - On 
resources in 2005 
Used 3 factors - 
budgetary control, 
termination rights & 
reporting lines 
10% from financial 
services  
Used Agency-model 
economic application 
of agency costs 
associated with 
monitoring  
Purple Findings Less than 5% of IA time 
spent on risk 
management, 
compliance and fraud 
audits combined. 
Correlation suggested 
between level of 
involvement and 
oversight by audit 
committee and focus 
on internal control 
functions rather than 
other areas 
Orange  Other Breakdown of IAF 
activities  
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The systemic approach enabled the criteria used by Hamilton and 
Clare of relevance, credibility and authenticity to be incorporated more 
easily, because the analysis looked at whether practical research, opinion 
or analysis of other papers was used. This was important because the topic 
had been written on by a number of different disciplines across law, 
economics, accounting and banking regulation and the thesis wanted to 
ensure some consistency in comparing and using papers from across 
multiple disciplines.  
 
The particular question the review was seeking to answer was to 
determine what the key themes and topics were related to the issue of 
trade based money laundering. Most of the research reports were 
qualitative or discussion papers and as noted by Evans and Pearson 438 
there are differences in reviewing qualitative research compared to the 
random control designs of quantitative research. In qualitative research it is 
more exploratory and interpretative in nature, and each situation is 
different. In this research there was also a global review of literature, which 
added other differences into the interpretation, such as cultural differences, 
exposure to different types of criminal organisational activity and the 
different stages of progress in national legislative and banking regulation. 
 
Most papers on ML activity were fairly generic 439  and included 
discussion on either legal frameworks,440 definitions, typologies or cases 441 
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and challenges facing banks / other financial services or agencies.442 Some 
published papers contributed a little piece to each theme 443 and so at the 
same time covered all the themes. This is probably a typical challenge with 
new and emerging topics but it became a very piecemeal approach. 
Although there are exceptions to this with some authors very specialised 
on certain topics, there are many authors who keep appearing in many of 
the sections of the review because of the more generic nature of their work.  
 
3.2  Literature Methodology 
 
The literature review has used a systemic approach to reviewing 
and analysing content relevant to TBML activity within the global banking 
sector. This meant that academic research specific to this topic was 
analysed using specific headings and from within a specific time period as 
outlined in the following section. Given the limited availability of specific 
cases and the relative newness of TBML being recognised as a specific 
type of money laundering activity,444 the research has used findings from 
academic journal articles alongside empirical papers and typology reports.  
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3.2.1 Scope of the review 
 
The purpose of the literature review was to establish the full context 
of TBML activity and the issues that the sector was trying to address. Since 
the recognition of TBML activity is fairly recent within the financial and trade 
sectors, the literature review concentrated on a period covering the last 12 
years i.e. from 2004 until present. The review used academic journals 
across a number of areas including, auditing, financial crime, criminology, 
money laundering, economics and law.  In addition, specific TBML reports 
have been used, especially those developed through the various regulatory 
bodies including the FATF, The World Bank and Financial Intelligence Unit 
publications across different jurisdictions. 
 
The literature has been themed using a funnel approach starting 
from the general financial crime topic and narrowing the focus down to 
consider money laundering schemes and finally, the specifics of TBML 
transactions. In other words, all papers that were written on financial crime 
were originally considered; however, the literature question was only 
interested in links to TBML. The difficulty was that many disciplines have 
only recently started separating TBML from other money laundering activity 
so earlier papers in particular may have mentioned TBML activity but not 
used the name explicitly. 
 
In response to the emerging topics that were raised in the 
preliminary literature review, the final review also considered the regulatory 
and response frameworks for addressing TBML activity. The aim of the 
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data collection section of the research was to consider how the role of 
banks could be used to ensure that an appropriate risk assessment 
strategy was developed. The literature review aimed to develop a clearer 
context to illustrate how that engagement would be most meaningful.  
 
3.2.2 Literature Search 
 
The literature headings were initially developed during the course of 
the proposal writing and the preliminary literature review process. It was 
decided that the review would focus on four key areas of  
 Financial crime,  
 Money laundering (TBML),  
 Bank responses and  
 Risk assessment / compliance.  
These four areas were divided across the two main emerging literature 
themes, which were; ‘Crime’ and ‘Regulatory Response’. 
 
3.2.3  Crime  
 
This looked at the area of financial crime and some of the specific 
typologies of crime and techniques used in money laundering activities. It 
also focused on the criminal behaviour, theories of white collar crime and 
reasons for money laundering. This section was subdivided into two main 
areas: Criminal Motivation and Money Laundering / TBML regulation.  
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3.2.3.1 Criminal Motivation  
 
Initially the research was open to considering the broader realm of 
general financial crime and the theories of criminal behaviour and 
motivation. As the literature review developed it became clearer that the 
only link to financial crime activity and theories that this research actually 
needed was relation to the AML risk assessment faults, which were 
identified in the legal cases. These were used as secondary data on money 
laundering activity, but which could equally be applied to TBML.  
 
3.2.3.2 Money Laundering / TBML regulation  
 
This explored the specific typologies of TBML and the kinds of 
situations that could be presented to the banks. It looked at case studies 
from across a number of countries, since most typology studies tended to 
be specific to only one country or region. 
 
3.2.4 Banking Regulatory Response  
 
The second section of the literature review focused on the 
regulation, legal context and risk assessment techniques currently 
employed by banks to combat TBML and money laundering generally. 
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3.2.4.1 Intelligence Data  
 
Many of the global reports and surveys that are widely available 
such as the KPMG report or PWC publications 445 were very broad and 
generic and often non-specific in relation to TBML, instead they focused on 
financial crime generally including fraud, money laundering and tax 
evasion. In order to source specific TBML examples and to critically 
analyse the findings, the literature review considered articles that were 
more specific to one region or country such as the AUSTRAC reports, 
these provided typologies and sanitized case studies that had been 
developed from actual events. 
 
3.2.5 Risk Assessment & AML Compliance  
 
Many of the papers that were in this section were descriptive papers 
that explained the various compliance requirements of individual countries. 
These papers did provide insights into the progress that countries were 
making on applying the FATF guidelines on suspicious alerts and 
monitoring suspicious client accounts. 
 
The research was also interested in the governance and internal 
audit responses to AML compliance. There were limited papers available 
on this topic since most AML regulation focused papers dealt with the 
issues affecting the direct staff involved in AML compliance, which are the 
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Money Laundering reporting officers (MLROs). This fact in itself said a lot 
in relation to the role of internal audit and AML, and so the lack of data in 
certain areas also became of interest during the review.
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The four headings listed above were also sub divided into the three types 
of literature sources as shown below, in table 3.  
Table 3: Sub-division of different literature sources (The literature 
has been sub categorised into four key areas.  The broader background area 
of f inancial crime linking into money laundering specif ically and then the 
focus of this research, which is trade based money laundering.)  
 
 Financial Crime Regulatory Response 
Primary theme Financial Crime  Money Laundering Bank  AML Risk Assessment 
Approaches 
Practical 
Literature 
Survey based 
responses on types 
of crime across 
banking sector 
Trade Based Money 
Laundering, case 
study examples 
(FATF, World Bank) 
Red Flag 
issues 
 
Know Your Customer, 
Customer Due 
Diligence, 
Corporate governance, 
Compliance & 
Regulation (AML 
focus) 
AML legal frameworks 
Theoretical 
‘Risk Based’ 
framework 
White Collar Crime. 
Criminal motivation 
theories. 
Criminal motivation 
and Economic 
Criminology theories. 
Agency 
theory / 
Game 
theory 
responses 
by bank 
and client  
Agency relationships. 
Theories on impact of 
regulatory approach 
(AML focus).  
Research 
Literature 
 
Impact of crime on 
banks 
Case study analysis 
and documentation  
Regulatory 
roles and  
Legislation 
Impact of regulation on 
banking efficiency 
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The four headings above were also subdivided into three types of 
literature sources as shown in the table above. These were empirical 
studies and reports from the banking and regulatory sectors; theoretical 
and academic literature on any of the themes and finally, generic research 
literature that might provide more general links to the topics, this might 
include investigative journalism and political media reports on certain 
countries where money laundering or TBML activity had been the subject 
of discussion. 
 
 
3.3 CRIMINAL MOTIVATION 
3.3.1 Client Behaviour - Money Launderer Behaviour 
 
The other side of Game theory is to try and predict how criminal 
behaviour and ML crimes will change as regulation changes.446 One of the 
ways in which the Game theory has been applied is to analyse the 
relationship and the bargaining game that occurs between criminals who 
acquire dirty money and the professional launderers who have access and 
knowledge of the financial services sector.  Traditionally these roles have 
been seen as one and the same, but increasingly it is recognised that 
experts and financial professionals can also be involved at this stage of 
the ML placing and layering processes. According to McCarthy, van 
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Santen, & Fiedler, (2014) the behaviour of professional money launderers 
is a vital component in the overall regulatory equation. Many financial 
professionals are in well paid jobs and ML is a risk to them and their 
reputation.447 However, as criminals need to acquire greater financial skills 
in order to combat the increasing complex regulation requirements, then 
the cost that these professionals can charge for their services will also 
increase. A point will inevitably be reached whereby it pays more for the 
professional to launder money than to focus on the paid job and the 
reputation. Another side effect therefore of increased regulation is that a 
market of skilled professional launderers will be developed and 
strengthened.448 
 
In part the reason that TBML has become such an emerging area of 
concern for the financial and trade sectors, is because criminal syndicates 
have responded to the increase in AML regulation, designed for other 
traditional sources of ML such as cash smuggling and the use of financial 
institutions. 449  TBML has thus become the next stage in defeating 
regulation, and the type of response developed from within the financial 
and trade sectors, to combat this problem, will determine to a large extent 
the future direction of ML activity. Game theory has been used to highlight 
the complexity and see-saw elements of regulation and to predict or 
highlight the likely effects of change in this area. The learnings from Game 
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theory have also been applied to the relationship between the bank and 
the client and both elements have been included in the theoretical 
framework of this project. It is however beyond the scope of this project to 
undertake a full Game theory analysis, for any of the options suggested 
above as part of the data analysis.  
 
 In all of these theoretical contexts and banking scenarios, the role 
of the bank is recognised as a middle player between the demands of the 
state agencies and AML regulation on one side, and the demands of the 
clients who are laundering money on the other side.  It is only by 
understanding the two game theory scenarios and their link to agency 
relationships that the full complexity of AML compliance can be realised.  
 
3.3.2  Criminal Motivation Theories  
 
The theoretical framework for the research includes three different 
but interrelated aspects, which are;  
1. The regulatory response  
2. The banking processes   
3. The client’s responses  
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Figure 2: AML risk model  
 
AML risk model for bank responses is based on two major factors, 
the behaviour of the client and the requirements of the AML regulation.  It 
is the Principal – Agent- Client relationship which governs AML risk 
assessment in banks.450 
 
For each one of these empirical elements the research is making 
the assumption that an Agency relationship exists between the various 
players. However, in order to fully understand the relationships involving 
the risk taking behaviour of TBML clients, more information is required 
about the crime and the criminal. From this information it should be 
possible to develop a more in-depth understanding of the criminal 
decision-making process. This knowledge can then be incorporated into 
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the theoretic framework, in order to determine the importance of the 
various influences on criminal decision making. These influences will 
include understanding criminal motivation options and being able to 
assess the risk for potential corruption or insider involvement.451 This is 
also linked to knowing the capacity of criminals to access resources, 
including support networks and to have an understanding of the criminal 
networking structures.452 Finally, it will provide knowledge of the economic 
factors that will influence the market for and availability of, professional 
money launderers.453 
 
All these different elements are necessary to understand, in order to 
ascertain how TBML operations can succeed and the actual risk that they 
pose to banks. By developing a deeper understanding of criminal thinking 
it is possible to understand how criminals can influence or corrupt 
individual bank employees to facilitate their ML activities. In essence 
banks and regulatory bodies need to be able to think as an ML operative 
would think, in order to know the questions that risk assessment 
processes should be asking. 454  The application of this multi-discipline 
framework for the topic of TBML activity across the banking sector, is an 
original approach that this research offers. 
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3.3.3  Criminals 
 
Crime is inevitable to some extent but the motivation of individuals 
to become involved in financial criminal activity can vary.455 One of the 
main economic motivations for ordinary people to enter into criminal 
activity is when the cost of being involved in crime is more profitable than 
working within the legitimate sector. McCarthy, van Senten & Fielder 
described this phenomenon in their Agency theory model for 
understanding how professional money launderers were recruited.456 As a 
result of this information one of the challenges for any work undertaken in 
developing risk assessment for ML, is to ensure that one of the 
consequences of the risk assessment approach is not to increase the 
profitability of supporting money launderers, since this would be 
counterproductive if the aim is to reduce the amount of ML activity within 
the banking structure.  
 
Another challenge is to try and encourage money launderers to 
maintain some link with the formal banking sector, in order for regulation 
and law enforcement agencies to catch them, otherwise there is a risk of 
driving the activity into the shadow banking sector which has minimal 
regulation and control. 
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The ability to change direction in response to challenges and 
opportunities has already been described through agency theory. Some of 
the supporters and even critics of agency theory have specifically focused 
on the concept of opportunism amongst agents,457 which is also a key 
component in determining the potential for some white collar crime. 458 
Although Wright, Mukherji & Kroll, (2001) challenge the traditional concept 
in agency theory, declaring that agents do not have any financial benefit in 
supporting the principal, they still neglected to focus on the financial 
benefits when rogue agents decide to support criminal activity and do 
receive financial reward; albeit at the risk of losing their own salary and job 
should they be caught. This is noted by their statement on risk aversion 
and diversification when they state that “agents cannot diversify their 
employment,” 459  whereas agents acting as bank officials and also 
facilitating money laundering are actually illustrating diversification. It 
would appear from an analysis of these pieces of research that the 
preponderance towards criminal behaviour within clients is not considered, 
and therefore agency theory is applied only to normal banking operations. 
This research is doing the opposite and only applying agency theory within 
criminal operations. This is the important difference of AML risk 
assessment; it is specifically about the risk from outside criminal 
behaviour. 
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3.3.4 Socio-economic Risk 
 
Socio-economic risk is another risk area that criminologists have 
studied that may have some impact on money laundering recruitment. This 
is the sociological impact on criminal choice, which often according to 
strain theory explains how social and economic factors can influence why 
individuals choose to engage in criminal activity.460 This could therefore be 
applied to explain why certain countries with weaker and poorer 
economies are more susceptible to bribery and corruption related money 
laundering activity.  
 
However, from a banking risk assessment perspective white collar 
crime is itself an anomaly since white collar criminals are not necessarily 
at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum.461 Money laundering 
may also offer other benefits to people such as enjoying the challenge of 
defrauding the system, as well as acquiring personal financial gain. Money 
laundering is also a necessity for other types of crime such as drug 
trafficking and piracy, and might not actually be considered as a white 
collar crime at all for the organisations behind the money. Therefore, risk 
matrices based on socio-economic factors are not really applicable 
because of the complex nature of the money laundering activity and the 
number of different skills required especially within complicated and large 
scale money laundering schemes. 
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Socio-economic risk can be used by criminals to recruit and exploit 
people to join their money laundering operation and this can include the 
recruitment or acquisition of insider knowledge from banking officials. 
 
 
3.3.5 Bribery and Corruption 
 
The impact of money laundering on the banking sector has, until 
recently not necessarily been classed as a high priority in banking risk 
assessment, since it was not really considered the responsibility of the 
bank to determine where the money had originated from. However, this 
situation is changing and now money laundering can have a number of 
direct impacts on financial institutions.462 One of the ways in which they 
can be directly affected is through staff corruption and exposure to bribery. 
Research into criminal motivation in white collar crime has shown that 
there is a relationship between increases in employee fraud and links to 
facilitating ML activity. 463  Countries that are particularly susceptible to 
employee corruption are those where the economy is poor or volatile due 
to conflict and with higher poverty rates.  In these situations, banking pay 
and conditions are often relatively low, coupled with financial and family 
pressures, which can make these individuals open to be bribed or coerced 
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to work for criminal gangs operating in the area.  A socio-economic 
analysis is useful for understanding how primary loyalties influence 
choices in relation to engaging with criminal activity, and how social and 
familial pressures are all interlinked and can be exploited by criminal 
gangs seeking new recruits. 
 
Despite the increased AML risks from certain countries there are 
also many cases that highlight how corruption is not solely restricted to 
emerging or developing economies. One prominent case that highlights 
this very clearly is the House Bank Affair 464 where members of the US 
House of Representatives were involved in fraudulent activity including 
writing cheques to non-existent businesses. Preece et al., applied an 
agency theory model to determine how this situation arose and who was 
more likely to be involved in the activities of over cheque writing. They 
highlight that agency theory suggests where inappropriate measures or 
incentives are not provided to deter from engaging in criminal activity, 
agents will inevitably succumb to the profitability offered through the 
criminal route. Their research also highlighted that the longer the 
politicians had been in power the greater the chance that they would 
abuse the system.  
 
Other developed countries have also highlighted examples of 
enquiries into their politicians’ use of expense accounts and investigations 
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into fraudulent claims. 465  All of these situations illustrate that criminal 
motivation is not a cultural phenomenon that only applies in certain areas 
of the world. The application of agency theory 466 as it is being used in this 
thesis implies that in certain situations most individuals will eventually 
succumb to seeking personal gain at the expense of others.467 There may 
however, be certain cultural factors that could be used to influence people 
not to engage in criminal activity, and these are considered more in the 
next section on systemic theories and corporate governance models. 
 
3.3.6  Professional Launderers  
 
The final agency relationship in money laundering systems is 
between the criminal and the professional money launderer. Although 
criminals do launder their own money some prefer to use the services of 
professional launderers, people who may work outside of the criminal 
business but also use their knowledge and expertise of the financial sector 
to facilitate money laundering activity.468 They describe this professional 
launderer as “a third party agent, to whom criminals outsource their money 
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laundering needs.”469 They develop this concept further into a theoretical 
model of a bargaining game, which they argue can be used to determine 
how AML regulation will ultimately impact on money laundering through 
these professional laundering services.  Their findings support the work of 
Takats that increased fines not only dilute the quality of reporting being 
produced, as defensive reporting becomes the norm, but it also increases 
the demand for professional launderers and so increases the profitability 
for and temptation to enter this sector. A situation which McCarthy, van 
Santen, & Fiedler maintain will only expand the money laundering sector 
and not decrease the number of incidents as intended.470 
 
 
3.4 Money Laundering & International Regulation 
 
Money laundering, for many researchers is viewed primarily as an 
economic crime.471 However, as mentioned in the previous section it can 
also be considered an international relations issue, due to the nature of its 
cross border transactions and support to political and criminal 
organisations across the globe. Within that international relations context 
global banks will remain a prominent financial service to money launderers 
since they have the capacity to move large amounts of money around the 
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globe.472 Another strategic and operational vulnerability that leaves global 
banks open to ML, is that they have branches in countries with less 
manageable AML procedures and where entry points into the bank, either 
through corruption or less streamlined monitoring, are easier for ML clients 
to access.473 
 
3.4.1  Global Economic Implications of AML 
 
Studies that have undertaken an economic analysis of international 
patterns of money laundering, have concluded that where AML measures 
are weak, criminals will tend to opt for easier ways of laundering money.474 
Ironically TBML is more likely to be a risk to a bank that has strict AML 
measures in place, since the launderer will have to use more creative and 
complex mechanisms to bypass the regulation. This process has been 
explained economically by Masciandaro, 475  as a principal-agent 
relationship between the regulator and the banks. In this model the 
increasing cost of regulation to match the complexity of criminal laundering 
and the overall economic environment are all factors that have to be 
considered when developing an appropriate AML model.476 According to 
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Pellegrina & Masicandaro, at some point it may not be economically viable 
for banks to constantly invest in regulation if criminals are only developing 
other ways to achieve their end result. 
 
At a global level and in the context of international investment 
banking, criminal launderers also tend to move funds from developing 
countries into more stable developed economies.477 This causes a flow of 
illicit funds from developing economies, which in turn weakens and 
destabilises these regions even more.478 The importance of challenging 
and deterring ML activity is thus vitally important to banks and also to the 
whole country or state in which the bank operates. Perhaps this broader 
economic understanding of money laundering is now moving beyond the 
normal focus that banks place on reputational risk within their normal 
business operations. Now both banks and governments are having to think 
in broader corporate social responsibility concepts and strategies.  
 
However, this approach and the resources that will be required may 
be considered as a luxury for countries that have weaker economies. “it is 
argued that developing countries perceive money-laundering reforms as 
necessary to satisfy powerful outside interests rather than a policy that can 
deliver significant local benefits.”479 In particular, banks and governance 
structures may see AML measures as supporting the work of law 
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enforcement, rather than being of any direct benefit to the banks 
themselves.  This particular corporate attitude would need to be 
challenged in future AML compliance systems, if an international response 
is to be successful and reach a global impact. 
 
3.4.2  A Theoretical Perspective on Regulation 
 
At another level it could be argued that the potential influence of 
national regulatory control is becoming of less relevance as AML takes on 
a global perspective and now requires a global AML response by both 
regulators and banks alike. 480  Strategies to address money laundering 
need to become more strategic and applicable across the entire global 
banking context. There are two different theoretical perspectives to 
increasing regulation and describing he impact this will have on deterring 
money laundering activity. From a criminology perspective increased 
regulation tends to act as deterrent to criminal activity “opportunities for 
crime appear to rise as regulation declines.”481 However, from a business 
perspective the corporate costs associated with compliance and regulation 
482 as well as the cost to the bank of being a victim of corporate crime and 
/or facing fines for noncompliance issues, means that the money 
laundering is always going to be a costly business. As a result, larger 
organisations will be better able to absorb the costs of corporate crime and 
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are therefore likely to be less affected by increased regulation.483 Applying 
Gottschalk’s thinking further then smaller banks are unlikely to be able to 
afford any increase in regulatory costs and therefore weaknesses in the 
system will become inevitable. 
 
There are also critics of changing the regulation too much as this 
itself can cause new problems especially for organisations such as banks 
that are running a business. This is opposed to the regulators who work for 
the state interests and therefore do not have to manage a business model 
in the application of their work. Both economists and criminologists have 
acknowledged that there needs to be a realistic understanding of the 
structure of business operations and over regulation will not be conducive 
to business growth “Additionally, the prevention of corporate and elite 
crime is doomed to fail if regulation is the only applied solution. Business 
practices do not happen in an environment of strict regulation.”484 As an 
example of this Yeoh,485 describes the impact of some of the UK AML 
legislation that requires banks to freeze assets until SARs have been 
cleared. This act would then leave a potential loss of revenue to legitimate 
clients and increase pressure unnecessarily upon small businesses. 
Instead it would appear that AML systems require the use of both 
repression and prevention to shape ML strategies 486  as well as 
encouraging a stronger involvement and cooperation from the banks.  
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Criminologists have also criticised the reactionary approach that 
regulators have currently taken to try to address ML crimes “Regulation 
and prevention of elite corporate crime tends to be reactive rather than 
prophylactic in nature.”487 This could also be linked to a lack of strategic 
and non-political control of AML regulation, which Hansen argues needs 
AML regulation to move beyond the current political arena which has so 
far prevented any consistent approach towards prosecuting corporate 
criminals. Demetis and Angell from a systemic analysis of ML suggest that 
this obsession by regulators, to try and control the ML risk situation 
through increased regulation, has largely been ineffective; a view that is 
also supported by proponents of agency theory. 488  Individual countries 
have also highlighted weaknesses in their banking regime’s attempts to 
comply with the rules and regulations as stipulated by the regulators and 
domestic legislation. 489  Finally, research into economic predictions of 
TBML have highlighted that where countries implement strong AML 
regulation, then incidents of TBML tend to be more prevalent.490 This could 
be as a result of crime displacement 491 in which criminals evolve their 
techniques for money laundering, in response to barriers placed in their 
way. The implications for banks are quite clear, whatever the reason 
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increased AML compliance is obviously not the only deterrent required to 
prevent TBML activity taking place. 
 
 
3.4.3  Regulators 
 
Within each country the responsibility for monitoring AML 
compliance is undertaken by local financial regulators. They are 
responsible for ensuring that both domestic and international AML 
regulation is adhered to within the banking sector. This can place the 
regulator in a strong influential role within the local banking context 492 or 
they can equally have a powerful effect as in the case of HBUS, if they 
choose not to intervene. 493  From various pieces of research, it would 
appear that different banks and countries appear to have experienced 
different types of relationships depending on the influence and scope of 
the regulatory body. Subbotina looked specifically at the Russian banking 
context and found that regulators often provided little in the way of 
guidance, which was a major challenge since many of the AML laws were 
deemed to be lacking clarification and open to multiple interpretations, 
“most of the interviewees agreed that as the AML laws are too flexible to 
different interpretation and basically do not explain what is allowed and 
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what is not absolutely allowed.”494 Other researchers have looked at the 
Chinese banking sector 495 and have again challenged the approach to 
money laundering 496 and the lack of support or guidance being given to 
developing AML systems. 497   Researchers appear to be consistently 
repeating the point that regulation alone cannot be viewed as the panacea 
to corporate and money laundering crime.498 
 
3.4.4 International Regulatory Context 
 
Global banks operate within an international AML regulatory 
framework that has directed domestic and regional responses.  The 
international framework effectively started in the US with the introduction 
of the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970 499 and then later with the UN Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in 
1988. Although combating the drugs trade and its associated cash profits 
started back in the 1960s 500 there was no international legal framework 
until the 1988 UN Convention, also known as the Vienna Convention. The 
                                            
494
 Subbotina, N. (2009). Challenges that Russian banks face implementing the AML regulations. J 
of Money Laundering Control, 12(1), 19-32. doi:10.1108/136852 (p30) 
495
 Ai, L. (2012). “Rule based but risk oriented” approach for combating money laundering in Chinese 
financial sectors. J of Money Laundering Control, 15(2), 198-209. doi:10.1108/13685201211218225 
496
Dongrong, L. (2005). China: Anti-money laundering in a foreign exchange area. Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, 8(4), 335-338. 
497
Ai, L., Broome, J., & Yan, H. (2010). Carrying out a risk‐based approach to AML in china: Partial or 
full implementation? J of Money Laundering Control, 13(4), 394-404. 
doi:10.1108/13685201011083894 
498
 Hansen, L. L. (2009). Corporate financial crime: Social diagnosis and treatment. Journal of 
Financial Crime, 16(1), 28-40. doi:10.1108/13590790910924948 
499
 Durrieu, R. (2013). Rethinking money laundering & financing of terrorism in international law. 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff. 
500
 Delston, R.S. and Walls, S.C. (2009), “Reaching beyond banks: how to target trade-based 
money laundering and terrorist financing outside the financial sector”, Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 41 No. 1, pp. 85-118. 
 213 
Palermo Convention in 2000 focused specifically on combating 
Transnational Organised Crimes but also strengthened the money 
laundering aspect of the 1988 Convention.501 Despite all this the Vienna 
Convention still remains the only hard law framework in existence for AML 
compliance although there have been a number of soft law guidelines that 
have been developed over the intervening years. Most notable are the 
FATF 40 recommendations on money laundering 502  and the 9 special 
recommendations on terrorist financing which have since been 
amalgamated, as well as the Wolfsberg principles.503 After the 9/11 attacks 
a special USA Patriot Act was also introduced in the US.  
3.4.5 Global Banking Regulation 
 
At an international level the main bodies who are responsible for 
monitoring and reporting on the international economic and banking 
issues, such as the IMF and the World Bank, have all endorsed the FATF 
guidelines and recommendations. 504  Meanwhile from the banking 
regulation sector there have been guidelines produced from the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision and the Financial Conduct Authority 505 
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as well as specific stipulations in the US Patriot Act 506  for US based 
banking services. However, there is also agreement emerging from the 
financial services sector that AML regulation is struggling to stay ahead of 
money laundering activities.507 Some of the reasons behind this may be 
linked to the bank’s perception of stricter regulation having an adverse 
effect on business growth, especially if suspicious reports are filed against 
certain countries or geographic regions. 508  Other factors may be 
associated with the ever increasing compliance needs and resources and 
concern for the rising associated costs.509 Finally, as AML compliance has 
a stronger interest in protecting the overall financial system rather than the 
interests of particular banks.  “AML laws are not intended to protect bank 
customers or the bank; they safeguard the U.S. financial system and the 
nation as a whole,”510 this could be another factor as to why banks are 
struggling to find the link between compliance and a benefit to their own 
business. 
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3.5 Banking Regulation & Responses 
 
One of the main challenges facing banks is, according to 
Masciandaro 511 a principal-agent relationship between the regulators on 
the Principal side and the banks as Agents on the other. The regulatory 
response so far has largely been to increase the level of compliance and 
reporting requirements. This has forced the banking sector to increase the 
number of reports submitted to FIUs, which has subsequently caused a 
decrease in the efficiency of these units, which are now inundated with 
undiscerning risk reports. 512  However, this approach also has to be 
considered against the impact of increased costs due to regulatory 
demand versus the limited and often decreasing resources available to 
many small businesses and organisations working within the financial 
services. The latter point is also an ongoing challenge to the banking 
sector 513  and needs to be considered when deciding to expand or 
encourage more reporting in banking AML models.  
 
Banks also have a principal-agent relationship with their clients and 
may sometimes be pulled between the two roles. However, it could be 
argued that this makes the assumption that money laundering is purely an 
economic activity since agency theory is primarily an economic analysis. 
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Although this is partly true, money laundering is also a banking 
phenomenon that has additional business and also in this context, criminal 
implications. From the banking perspective this means that to some extent 
the systemic effectiveness of information sharing systems and 
communication mechanisms, across banks and within banking structures, 
also need to be considered within any theoretical analysis. Finally, from 
the criminal perspective the changes in banking practice will have 
implications for how money laundering schemes will continue to develop 
and evolve; since it will require increased expertise and knowledge to 
bypass new regulations. In essence without this level of behavioural 
understanding, trying to develop risk based frameworks will be futile.  
 
 
3.5.1 Regulation and Information Gathering 
 
Many of the theoretical frameworks exploring AML regulation and 
banking compliance have focused either specifically on the Agency-
Principal relationships between the regulators and the banks 514  or the 
decision-making balance required in managing the risk taking behaviour of 
the client against the risk aversion behaviour of the regulators.515  This 
framework also considers these two prominent areas of discussion but in 
addition it examines other applications of agency theory, including 
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between professional launderers and criminals.516 Professional launderers 
are often accountants or trained legal practitioners, who are familiar with 
Anti-money laundering (AML) regulation and compliance requirements and 
can develop schemes that by pass many of the current AML systems.517 
 
The current response from financial regulators towards the issue of 
money laundering, has tended to focus on increasing the amount and 
monitoring the implementation of compliance regulation. Their aim has 
been to try and stamp out money laundering through a process of 
intelligence gathering and reporting of suspicious transaction patterns or 
Customer Due Diligence information.518 However, risk based approaches 
to money laundering cannot continue to operate within a model of ever 
increasing information, as theories of information overload and intelligence 
gathering will attest to. In other words, there has to be a system of 
reviewing and evaluating the value of the information gathered if it is to 
remain useful to risk assessment. Too much information can actually 
produce less rather than more intelligence, since the ability of both 
individuals and organisations to process information is limiting. 519  An 
effective system for making risk decisions based upon information sharing 
and the prioritisation of this information, requires a filter system to be 
developed within financial institutions.  
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The impact of weak information screening can be seen in the older 
systems of AML processes, which mainly used rule based risk assessment 
frameworks. These systems tended to focus on compliance regulations 
and checklists using “precise rules and hence legal certainty, but it also 
encourages formalistic over-reporting.” 520  Although rule based 
assessments require less information to be processed, since the 
information requirements are clearly defined, they are also open to missing 
information if it is not explicitly included on the checklists. An additional 
problem that arises when regulatory reporting requirements are increased, 
is that weaker rules based assessment reports will be used as these are 
often quicker to implement and require less time to complete, resulting in 
an overload of risk reports and a fear of internal risk assessment in case 
regulators deem them inadequate.521 
 
 
3.5.2 Assessing Financial Intelligence Data 
 
All banking structures across the globe, regardless of which type of 
risk assessment system is used, have to pass on the alert information onto 
national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) for further processing and 
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analysis.522 The effectiveness of these FIUs depends on the quality of the 
information received from the banks. From these units’ suspicious 
information can be passed directly onto law enforcement agencies if 
required. There is the need to filter information in order to determine the 
presence and categorisation of suspicious activity 523 and to ensure that 
the FIUs will not be overwhelmed with too much undiscerning information 
from banks that are failing to administer their own internal risk assessment 
processes. It should therefore be assumed that any underlying theoretical 
framework, for AML risk based approaches, would need to incorporate a 
theoretical perspective of the limitations of information understanding and 
analysis, as well as the impact of reporting requirements on bank 
behaviour (agent response).  
 
 
3.5.3 Bank Responses to Regulation 
 
According to research most responses to AML risk have been led 
by financial regulation bodies, rather than as a result of initiatives led by 
the banking sector.524 This provides a valuable insight into the theoretical 
context of the working relationship between banks and regulators. In order 
to understand the nature of this relationship further Araujo applied game 
theory to analyse the banking response to implementing new AML 
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approaches, as well as to understand the decision-making process as to 
how and when banks decide to implement AML regulation. Araujo 
discovered that banks decide whether to implement AML regulation as a 
business decision and often assess whether the costs of compliance are 
deemed too high, compared to the penalty costs of non-compliance. The 
Agent-Principal relationship is still applied but game theory results have 
tended to indicate that increasing the penalty fines is the only way to 
ensure that banks uphold compliance requirements because it is the 
cheaper option compared to being caught.525 
 
In other research the impact of regulatory responses on changes in 
criminal behaviour and ML crimes have been noted. The changing pattern 
of criminals’ behaviour to better adapt to their situation has been described 
by criminologists as crime displacement, although other authors have also 
challenged its existence.526  
 
Despite being questioned by some researchers as a guaranteed 
criminal behaviour change it has been witnessed as a phenomenon within 
the money laundering sector. In part the reason that TBML has become 
such an emerging area of concern for the financial and trade sectors, is 
precisely because criminal syndicates have responded to the increase in 
AML regulation by creating these newer and more complex schemes in 
order to bypass the regulation.  As many of the AML systems within banks 
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and financial services have developed and become more efficient they can 
detect the more traditional sources of ML such as cash smuggling and the 
use of financial institutions own ingenious systems to bypass or 
circumvent the new regulation or they will get caught. 
Another example of the application of a game theoretical framework 
can be to analyse the way in which banks have responded to the 
increased pressure from regulators to complete suspicious alerts and 
reports, in order to avoid both civil and criminal liability charges.527 The 
response of the banks has mainly included trying to avoid costly fines by 
over reporting suspicious transactions and inundating financial intelligence 
units with huge amounts of un cleansed data.528 This has now resulted in a 
situation whereby minor concerns and suspicions cannot be differentiated 
from the more serious offences. This effect of over reporting has been 
described in a separate economic theory of ML enforcement, known as the 
‘Crying Wolf theory’ 529 and expanded upon in work by other economists as 
a predictable outcome from too much regulatory pressure.530 Increased 
penalties and fines can therefore increase reporting, but this can also be a 
double edged sword.  More information is not necessarily better 
information or useful information. 
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According to O’Brien & Dixon the recent spate of cases in which 
banks and their regulators have been questioned, suggests that a 
fundamental reform is required in order to rebuild public confidence and 
trust in the banking and regulatory sectors.  The HSBC whistle blower 
Hervè Falciani suggested that other bodies including NGOs should play a 
role in monitoring rather than relying on a centralised unit. This proposal is 
not without its limitations since many NGOs by their very nature operate 
outside any formal state body. Groups such as Global Financial Integrity 
531 have produced major research reports focusing specifically on known 
illicit financial flows in countries such as Russia, as well as other 
developing countries. 532  Other organisations such as the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ)533 have undertaken their own 
investigations into known criminals and identified how illicit funds are being 
moved around the globe, which has highlighted gaps in the current 
banking system. This information might be deemed unsubstantiated but it 
can certainly be used as soft evidence to inform risk assessment reviews 
within the banking sector.534 However, banks adapt their risk assessment 
processes, the financial regulation sector is constantly having to evolve in 
order to meet the global and practical challenges, emerging in the banking 
and financial services sectors.535 Although there are not going to be simple 
solutions there are some models that have been suggested such as the 
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CEDAR approach to AML, which is a broader framework for developing an 
AML system “the five core dimensions of the CEDAR frame-work: 
compliance, ethics, deterrence, accountability, and risk.” 536  A new 
approach such as this considers AML as being beyond just a regulatory 
requirement and instead focuses on it being a fundamental part of the 
overall ethos and accountability structure of the bank and its governance 
model. 
 
 
 
3.6 Risk Assessment 
 
Although Agency theory is considered in this research to be the 
primary theoretical framework there are other theories that can further 
inform some of the agency relationships. Systemic risk theories consider 
some of the broader organisational influences that can affect risk 
assessment. These could include methods of communication and 
information sharing across businesses or as in this research within the 
banking structure. In Angell & Demetis’s work 537 they use systems theory 
to explain AML responses and highlight how AML regulation will never be 
the ‘solution’ but will be part of the decision-making process of trying to 
curb money laundering activity.  
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3.6.1 Systemic AML Risk 
 
Since risk assessment is a seen as a key element of corporate 
governance 538  then it seems logical that some form of systemic 
understanding of AML compliance and risk assessment is needed by the 
management structure, including internal audit. The challenge that most 
banks are faced with is how to simplify the definition of risk, within the AML 
risk assessment approach.539  
 
Systemic risk is often broken down into a series of specific types of 
risk e.g. financial risk or legal risk etc. which Angell & Demetis argue 
simply confuses the situation and misses the point. The point being that 
risk by its very nature is about uncertainty and cannot therefore be 
categorised into independent and isolated headings. Instead the work of 
Angell & Demetis considers the AML system slightly differently to the 
standard analysis of organisational risk.  They do not look at the banking 
system per se, instead they define a systems theory approach to AML by 
considering AML as one system, one that is based on activities that are 
either suspicious or non-suspicious. 
 
This whole systemic approach to AML is interesting. If a systemic 
approach just applied to the banking structure, then it would not 
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necessarily incorporate all the factors that AML compliance would be 
affected by. In particular, the bank’s relationship to regulation would not 
necessarily be incorporated into such an analysis and it is the structural 
elements of the regulatory bodies and their inherent relationship with the 
banks that is a key driving component for effective regulatory risk based 
approaches. Evidence of the impact of this system can be seen in further 
detail in the HBUS analysis, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
 
White collar crime analysts would also provide a systemic analysis 
to the criminal aspect of money laundering, and would also consider the 
influences of the broader economic and structural factors, such as 
capitalism. 540  In particular criminologists have used a theoretical 
understanding of capitalism to explain how regulation has failed especially 
within the larger banks, that are now viewed as underpinning much of the 
global economy 541  and are in essence ‘too big to jail’.542  This level of 
structural analysis is important but at the same time is beyond the scope of 
this research project.  Instead elements of systems approaches will be 
applied to the criminal motivation area of the framework. The points raised 
by Angell and Demetis in relation to AML being its own system will be 
considered in the data analysis section.  
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Finally, one of the effects of increased regulation and reporting is 
that an efficient and transparent system of data collection and information 
sharing is needed, otherwise individual units within the banking system will 
become overwhelmed with data. Unfortunately, modern risk based 
approaches for money laundering can produce high quantities of data 
which in turn require advanced systems of filtering and data cleansing, to 
determine the type and categorisation of suspicious activity.543 This is a 
situation that seems likely to continue to be problem, given that a recent 
report from PwC 544 (2014) on TBML stated that improved data was one of 
the main issues in the TBML detection race.  The research analysis of 
AML risk assessment process needs to be operationalised across the 
whole bank at some point and therefore does have systemic risk 
implications. 545  However, this research is instead seeking to contribute 
towards expanding the knowledge and understanding of TBML activity 
first; rather than immediately developing a systemic approach, although 
there will be contributions made to this discussion as well.  
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3.6.2 HSBC Bank in the United States of America (HBUS) 
 
During the course of this thesis a number of legal court cases and 
media investigations became public. These cases provided an opportunity 
to analyse and assess what was currently happening in the banking 
system with AML regulation. 
 
As an empirical example the HSBC case has provided some 
interesting insights into regulatory and banking relationships. As one of the 
largest global banking structures HSBC has a number of interesting 
factors about its case. Firstly, it is one of the largest financial institutions in 
the world, “…with over $2.5 trillion in assets, 89 million customers, 
300,000 employees, and 2011 profits of nearly $22 billion.” 546  It has 
operations in over 80 countries, with several hundred affiliate associations 
across the globe. The US section of HSBC known as HBUS, operates 
over 470 bank branches throughout the country with an estimated 3.8 
million customers. Therefore, given the size of its business operations and 
global reach then inevitably the size of its AML problems are going to be 
bigger than most other financial institutions. The HSBC Swiss private bank 
is one of the largest private banks in the world “With USD382 billion of 
total assets under management, HSBC Private Bank is one of the largest 
international private banks.”547 
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As part of their investigation into HBUS the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations raised a number of concerns in relation to 
the AML compliance standards at the bank. These included a lack of 
action in dealing with suspicious alerts within the bank; a lack of 
communication across different branches of the bank including with HSBC 
in London and HBMX in Mexico, as well as issues that were wrongly risk 
assessed or misunderstood by HBUS.  The situation in HSBC Switzerland 
also reflected a lack of communication between different affiliate branches 
as well as the use of banks in different jurisdictions to complete fraudulent 
transactions including tax evasion and possible money laundering. In both 
cases there was a corporate downplaying of the risks to the bank of being 
associated with fraudulent activity.  
 
 
3.6.2.1 HBUS Investigation 
 
In their report the Permanent Subcommittee investigation focused 
on five areas of irregularity in AML compliance 548  which all revolved 
around the cross border transfer of funds. The five areas were the lack of 
appropriate risk classification for affiliate banks, the risky use of bulk 
travellers’ cheques and bearer accounts, failing to file suspicious reports to 
the FIU and overriding the OFAC filters for dealing with countries 
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designated as high risk.  Details of each of the five headings are discussed 
in more detail below. 
 
3.6.3 Affiliate Banks 
 
The report found that high risk affiliates banks such as Mexico were 
not acknowledged as high risk and were categorised as low risk options. 
This meant that banking trade continued as normal despite the well-
publicised issues of drug trafficking, off shore dollar accounts and the high 
amount of cash deposits made through the affiliate service.  
 
“…it had high risk clients, such as Mexican casas de 
cambios and U.S. money service businesses; and it offered 
high risk products, such as U.S. dollar accounts in the 
Cayman Islands.”549 
 
The report also identified specific concern over HBMX as the HSBC 
affiliate in Mexico. In addition to its high risk location as a country known 
for drug related activities and criminal gangs, HMBX had a history of 
severe AML deficiencies. These included a lack of know Your Customer 
(KYC) information in client files especially for high profile clients who were 
known to be involved in drug trafficking. In addition, millions of dollars were 
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being cleared through bulk travellers’ cheque transactions each year. In 
addition to these findings other issues were also identified which included  
“...bankers who resisted closing accounts despite evidence 
of suspicious activity; …………. inadequate staffing and 
resources; and a huge backlog of accounts marked for 
closure due to suspicious activity, but whose closures were 
delayed.”550  
 
The HBSC group in London was aware of the difficulties in Mexico 
and had been working with them for a number of years to try and 
strengthen the weaknesses.  It did not however, enlighten its US affiliate 
HBUS of this situation.551 
“For eight years, from 2002 to 2010, HSBC Group oversaw 
efforts to correct HBMX’s AML deficiencies, while those 
efforts fell short.  At the same time, HSBC Group watched 
HBMX utilize its U.S. correspondent account, without alerting 
HBUS to the AML risks it was incurring.”552   
 
It also did not question the classification of Mexico as a low risk 
country despite a number of reports on the ongoing situation and risks 
connected to banking and the Mexican economy. Despite the lack of 
information from the parent company HSBC, the risk classification 
processes for HBUS were still clearly inadequate for the situations being 
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faced and lacked any independent research into patterns of current 
economic activities in the countries being used.  
 
 
3.6.4 High Risk Countries  
 
The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) has developed a list of prohibited persons and countries which 
banks use to create an “OFAC filter”, to identify and halt potentially 
prohibited transactions. These US government safeguards are designed to 
stop terrorist activities and drug activity as well as money laundering but 
were circumvented within HBUS. This had the effect of ensuring that those 
countries that posed a high risk of terrorist and criminal activities were not 
named on transaction data, because otherwise it could lead to delays in 
processing the transaction due to the extra AML checks that were needed.  
 
This example highlights some of the main potential problems in risk 
assessment strategies, when the impact of AML compliance starts to 
negatively affect business relations between the bank and clients. Some of 
the common tactics that the banks used to avoid such filters included 
stripping information from wire transfer documentation to conceal the 
participation of a prohibited person or country. Other methods included 
characterising a transaction as a transfer between banks in approved 
jurisdictions, while omitting underlying payment details that would disclose 
participation of a prohibited originator or beneficiary. 
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“At HBUS, documents provided to the Subcommittee indicate 
that, for years, some HSBC affiliates took action to 
circumvent the OFAC filter when sending OFAC sensitive 
transactions through their U.S. dollar correspondent 
accounts at HBUS.  From at least 2001 to 2007, two HSBC 
affiliates, HSBC Europe (HBEU) and HSBC Middle East 
(HBME), repeatedly sent U-turn transactions through HBUS 
without disclosing links to Iran, even though they knew 
HBUS required full transparency to process U-turns.”553 
 
As well as AML regulations examples of terrorist financing links 
were also disregarded as pressure was placed on HBUS by banks in 
Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh to continue operating their service there 
despite being named as high risk.554 In terms of a link back to agency 
theory 555  banks are responding to pressure from either side in their 
Principal – Agent- Client relationship. This has implications for how AML 
changes and risk assessment strategies are developed in the future. For 
example, if the bank does not see a distinct advantage to increasing their 
investment in AML compliance, then banking practices and common 
omissions will render the whole process useless.  
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3.6.5 Bulk Travellers’ Cheques 
 
The use of travellers’ cheques to facilitate money laundering was 
another risk that HBUS overlooked. Instead the bank was found to have 
cleared $290 million in bulk travellers’ cheques, often with consecutive 
serial numbers through its correspondent bank in Japan.  This was 
determined by law enforcement to have benefited Russian criminal gangs 
who were disguising money laundering through the importation of used 
cars. 
 
“..the Japanese bank had little KYC information or 
understanding why up to $500,000 or more in bulk U.S. 
dollar travellers cheques purchased in Russia were being 
deposited on a daily basis into one of 30 different Japanese 
accounts.”556 
 
 
3.6.6 Bearer Share Accounts 
 
HBUS was found to have offered more than 2,000 bearer share 
accounts to customers despite the high risk of money laundering due to 
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the anonymity of the accounts. “HBUS’ Miami office had over 1,670 bearer 
share accounts and generated annual bank revenues of $26 million.”557 
 
 
3.6.7 Suspicious Alerts 
 
HBUS did have an AML system in place that recorded red flag 
alerts internally in the bank. These alerts needed to be analysed by the 
AML section within HBUS, to decide whether further investigation by 
outside agencies was required. However, a lack of resources and a high 
level of staff turnover meant that, at the time of the investigation, there was 
a backlog of over 17,000 un-reviewed alerts. Many of these alerts 
identified potentially suspicious activities that needed to be passed onto 
the appropriate financial investigation unit and law enforcement bodies. 
 
 
3.6.8 Risk Assessment  
 
One of the key services, in the battle against money laundering, 
that banks perform is the filing of suspicious activity reports (SARs). These 
reports serve three main purposes; the disruption of crime; to bring money 
launderers to justice and thirdly to recover the proceeds of crime.558 They 
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are the link between the banking sector which witnesses the transactions 
and law enforcement who can prosecute the criminals. The motivation to 
complete and return these reports is provided through the regulators, since 
banks are not necessarily interested per se in working closely with law 
enforcement as part of their business. However, none of the examples 
listed through the HSBC cases could be considered as implementing the 
SAR system as intended. 
 
 
3.6.9 OCC 
 
Throughout the time period covered by the investigation into HBUS, 
the financial regulator that was responsible for overseeing the bank’s 
activities was the Office for the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) which 
is an independent bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.  
Although a number of concerns had been raised by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), since 2002 regarding HBUS and their 
AML responses, it was not until 2010 that the OCC finally, issued a 
supervisory letter outlining a series of very serious concerns and AML 
weaknesses within the bank.  Following this letter, a Cease and Desist 
Order was then issued in the following month, October 2010. There has 
been stringent criticism of the way in which the OCC operated, the 
Permanent Subcommittee report openly stated their disappointment “They 
were tolerant of the bank's weak AML program, too slow in reacting to 
repeat deficiencies, and failed to make prompt use of available 
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enforcement tools.”559 Other researchers have also highlighted the lack of 
engagement by the OCC even when blatant AML practices were being 
thwarted.560 
 
One of the key findings in the PSI report, in relation to the regulator, 
emerged from the Permanent Subcommittee investigation after they 
examined how money laundering compliance risk was classified by the 
OCC. The investigation discovered that many of the AML breaches that 
occurred within HBUS were then subsequently classified as client risks 
rather than business risks to the bank. This classification system was 
contrary to the practices of other regulatory bodies at the time and it was 
possible the PSI report claimed, that this could be part of the overall 
problem that allowed the HBUS situation to escalate. Consequently, the 
OCC had identified over 80 matters requiring attention within a five-year 
period, but none of these individually were classified as violating federal 
AML law. In other words, the AML risks were not viewed as a threat to the 
bank’s capacity to operate and other factors such as weak governance 
and corporate social responsibility policies were not considered at all, in 
their risk assessment framework. It was only when the whole AML 
programme was found to be a problem that the OCC finally recognised it 
as a legal violation. 
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Many of the challenges identified in the HBUS case ultimately 
became the responsibility of the governance structure of the bank. Poor 
decision making was one of the issues identified in the report,561 although 
this was further hampered by poor advice provided by the regulatory body 
(OCC) who failed to adequately inform the management and governance 
bodies of the risks the bank was being exposed to. The key to an effective 
corporate governance structure involves strong and clear internal reporting 
and monitoring, which according to Seal should be fully embedded into the 
organisation. In terms of AML oversight, the US Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation “Section 36 requires that banks establish an independent 
audit committee, and that they report annually on ‘Management 
Responsibility for Financial Statements and Internal Controls,”562 although 
only banks with assets greater than $500 million are subject to this ruling, 
for economic efficiency reasons. However, the HBUS and HSBC Swiss 
bank cases both had AML structures in place, the difficulty was how they 
operated alongside other governance priorities and what lobbying and 
influential strength they had compared to other priorities within the bank. 
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3.6.10 Governance Implications 
 
The situation in HSBC stemmed from a weak working definition of 
operational risk, which was restricted to the definition used by Basel II, 
which was defined solely as legal risk; rather than reputational or strategic 
risk.563 Although operational risk or is a key component of the governance 
role of a bank it can cover a multitude of different things. If, however, the 
only focus, for the governance structure are legal ramifications, then this 
explains the apparent lack of concern by HBUS. In their case the 
regulator’s decision was to classify the AML discrepancies of HBUS as 
client risks, which were classified as reputational or strategic risks, and 
subsequently perceived to have no legal binding. By the time the regulator 
had realised the severity of the situation and allowed the bank’s exposure 
to escalate to one of legal risk it was too late for the governance structure 
to avoid legal consequences. 
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3.6.11 HSBC in the US  
 
The HSBC case highlighted a number of ways in which AML 
compliance was not prioritized within the governance structure of the bank. 
Instead the following observations were noted 564 about the case whereby 
it could be assumed that; 
 
1. AML was viewed as a client issue and not a bank concern (view 
supported by financial regulator). 
2. Suspicious Alerts were viewed as an external compliance issue 
rather than a tool for risk assessment in the bank, therefore were 
given a lower priority. 
3. Advice from internal audit not heeded, not received, or not actually 
produced. 
4. Acceptance of bulk cash into banking system, regardless of the 
purpose or suspected activity of the client. 
5. Acceptance of bulk traveller’s cheques not seen as suspicious or 
the alerts were never processed. 
6. Unquestioning acceptance of affiliate banks and their AML risk 
assessment procedures, regardless of the country risk status, or 
evidence from research that contradicted this acceptance. 
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Most of these factors are reflection of a banking cultural attitude towards 
AML regulation. Similar findings were noted in the following Swiss HSBC 
case. 
 
 
3.6.12 HSBC Switzerland  
 
The HSBC Swiss bank case came to the media attention at the 
beginning of 2015 raising a number of red flags regarding anti-money 
laundering (AML) practices within the banking sector. In particular, the 
weak risk assessment systems meant that the banking sector was either 
directly or inadvertently playing a role in supporting or facilitating financial 
crime activities, especially since their risk systems were operating from a 
position of only dealing with the money and were not considering the 
source or intent of their client’s activities.  The main focus of the media 
reports in the HSBC Swiss case was on tax evasion and the loss of 
monies to EU governments and other developed economies.  However, 
the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) 565 
discovered through the leaked data files, that the Swiss HSBC bank had a 
number of clients who were residents of developing countries.  These 
clients were able to move illicit money from developing economies into 
Switzerland and from there onto offshore financial havens, thus depriving 
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their own country’s development and hindering aid and government 
assistance programmes within these countries.566 
 
In another case that involved the HSBC, this time in the Swiss 
private banking sector, the corporate attitude or CA was illustrated through 
the complicit and supportive role it played in facilitating clients to avoid tax 
and use the bank to move monies into off shore tax havens. The source of 
money being deposited into the bank was not viewed as a concern to the 
bank at that time, so the suspicions that clients were engaging in illegal 
activities to acquire the funds such as arms smuggling or diamond 
smuggling 567 were not challenged or reported. 
 
AML compliance was thus seen through a very restrictive lens, 
which focused exclusively on the basic criteria of filling forms and tick 
boxes whilst the wider purpose of preventing money laundering was 
clearly not a priority for the governance model at that time. Another 
example of indiscriminative form filling was the labelling of most woman 
business clients as ‘housewives’ on the beneficial ownership 
information.568 This according to the ICIJ investigation appeared to be the 
default setting when other information was unknown or had not been 
completed. This was despite several of the client files being for established 
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professionals including business owners, teachers and journalists. This 
illustrated either a significant lack of attention to detail or it supposed a 
deliberate neglect in gathering appropriate levels of information on each 
client.  
 
This also raises the question as to what is the purpose of AML 
regulation, is it to control the behaviour of banks or should it have a 
broader role in raising awareness of the risks that are associated with 
money laundering activity, and the wider social impact that this can cause? 
The examples illustrated here show that the basic compliance work was 
not being strictly adhered to which implies that further action from the 
regulators is needed. This could be a combination of approaches, 
including stricter enforcement, closer monitoring and feedback and also 
providing additional support and training to explain why the information is 
needed. 
 
There were a number of difficulties in both the HSBC situations 
However, O’Brien and Dixon summed up the global problem with the bank 
at this time “The global failure of compliance and oversight suggests deep 
structural problems with HSBC’s core business model.”569 This might be 
construed as a simplistic analysis given HSBC position as an international 
bank trying to operate across multiple jurisdictions. However, other 
investigations into HSBC have also identified structural inadequacies such 
as limited knowledge of client business transactions and BOI, a lack of 
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 243 
inter- bank communication on AML and a culture of minimizing risk 
assessment systems. 
 
In that business model AML compliance was not a feature and as a 
result a number of standard procedures and red flag alerts that could have 
prevented a court case occurring were ignored. In particular, within HBUS 
the internal audit function should ideally have developed a risk 
assessment system that addressed all the following issues: 
1. Red flag indicators for suspicious activity should have included bulk 
cash transfers. 
2. Customer due diligence should have been undertaken on clients 
from Mexico, regardless of the affiliate bank’s process for 
administering checks. 
3. The implications of not adequately dealing with suspicious alerts 
needed to have been clearly communicated to governance, auditors 
and the regulatory bodies.  
4. The allocation of country risk status should have been based on 
research and an understanding of the activities that could have 
been occurring to generate these funds.  
5. The broader social implications of being involved in facilitating 
criminal activities should have been highlighted to the governance 
structure and the risk to the bank emphasised, rather than 
assuming a position based solely on client risk. 
6. Corporate social responsibility should have questioned the activities 
that the bank was funding.  
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In the HSBC Swiss bank, the following issues that arose could perhaps 
have been raised through internal audits and AML audit reports: 
1. CDD checks -  to be widened to include international checklists 
such as UN.  
2. The bank’s governance model - towards AML processes such as 
introducing a rule of not accepting or supporting clients who were 
using the bank to avoid and evade tax requirements. 
3. Stronger Politically Exposed Persons` (PEP) checks - which would 
have required more detailed background information on client’s 
professional background and family contacts / businesses. 
4. Filing SARs - AML audits could have identified areas where SARs 
were not accurately filed with all with full information included. 
5. Beneficial ownership information - audits could have identified 
where clients were involved in a number of different companies and 
the relationship between each of these companies. 
 
The two cases identified here in the academic review section provide 
some level of insight into the challenges and current situation that many 
AML units are facing with regard to auditing AML compliance issues. 
There appears to be the lack of a cohesive strategy across most banks 
that links together the main players of AML compliance, internal audit, 
external audit and the audit committee, and finally, to the management 
and governance structures. The size and scope of international money 
laundering does not appear to be reflected in the current level of resources 
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and management given to managing money laundering risk within the 
banking structure.  
 
It is within this context that I sought to learn more about the techniques 
of TBML, and to begin to develop an understanding of how TBML activity 
can possibly occur undetected within the modern banking structure. The 
cases highlighted in this chapter and obtained through the media coverage 
and publicly available reports, such as the Homeland Security 
investigation, provide some valuable insights into how money laundering 
risks were not really understood, even within the larger global banks.  
 
The next stage for the research was to establish to what extent banking 
risk assessment gaps from the mid-2000s were still issues that were 
relevant to modern risk assessment systems for AML and TBML. 
 
The next section of the research process describes how information 
was gathered directly from banking personnel and associated 
professionals, to ascertain how accurate the literature analysis was in 
describing the current AML/ TBML detection issues. The research needed 
to determine how TBML was presenting as an issue within banking risk 
assessment, and what areas needed to be improved or reinforced in the 
AML sector. 
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CHAPTER 4  METHODOLOGY 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The methodology section describes the design process of the 
research. It identifies the main questions that the research wants 
answered and explains why the methods used were chosen. As part of 
this section different theories were discussed that might explain why things 
in money laundering practices actually occur.  
 
This section of the research presents the methodological approach 
adopted by the research and explains the underlying belief system that 
influenced the research design. The entire research process was guided 
by the development of a research framework and the first part of this 
section describes how the research framework was established.  
 
The aim of the research project was further refined and is ‘to 
examine and explore options for a risk/ control framework that applied to 
TBML clients and their transactions, when they are within the banking 
domain.’ The purpose that was identified for the research, was that it 
would explore and then generate, a detailed picture of how TBML 
transactions manifest within the banking context.  From this information 
the findings would be used to determine what role realistically the banking 
sector could play in intervening and ultimately stopping these actions. 
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The main gap that the research questions identified was the need to 
develop a greater level of insight and understanding of TBML and to apply 
or develop an appropriate theoretical and empirical framework. 570  This 
framework needed to be developed for both future academic research, 
especially in the area of risk assessment in banking, as well as for 
developing practical recommendations for AML staff and internal audit 
function / governance structures. 
 
4.2  Research problem 
 
The problem therefore that the research was seeking to explore 
was the need to develop a deeper understanding of TBML risk analysis 
and to make recommendations linked to enhancing or improving current 
TBML detection within the financial services sector. Most of the issues 
which are being explored, in this research are specific to the banking 
domain, although the implications of the results have the potential to 
influence wider academic and empirical discussion.  
 
One of the challenges facing the research design was to ensure 
that the results would provide a valuable and unique academic 
contribution. This was in addition to being considered alongside other high 
quality practice based research within the banking sector. Quality research 
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within banking is especially important in order to explore the practical and 
current events facing those actually working in the sector; a process that 
has been described as moving accountancy and banking into the realm of 
scientific practices.571 Whilst empirical research moves functions as part of 
the academic and scientific realm those engaging in it also need to be 
mindful that it remains relevant to current everyday practice and does not 
alienate those that it is trying to support, through inappropriate language 
and overly complex academic and theoretical explanations.  
 
This research project was seeking to understand a broadly 
empirical situation i.e., TBML detection within a banking context, but it is 
also linking this empirical situation into an academic and theoretical 
context. 572  This has been done in order to develop an appropriate 
theoretical framework 573 in which to interpret the findings and provide an 
explanation for the activities observed. In developing the research 
framework for this project this balance between practice and theory 574 has 
hopefully been maintained, by including both sets of issues throughout 
each of the main sections of the project, including the literature review, 
methodology framework and data collection and analysis. 
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4.2.1  Research Framework - Overview 
 
The research framework was broadly based upon the model 
developed by Saunders 575 known as the research onion model.  In this 
model Saunders describes how research consists of different layers that 
constitute the beliefs and values underpinning the research.  From these 
outer layers a methodology can be designed to suit the beliefs until finally, 
at the centre of the ‘onion’ model there is the data collection. The original 
model shows six actual layers which are; 
 
1. Philosophical stance 
2. Approaches 
3. Strategies 
4. Choices 
5. Time Horizons 
6. Techniques and procedures 
 
The adapted model used in this research is a more integrated version 
shown in the diagram below (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3–TBML research model - Adaptation of the Onion Model 
 
For this research project the onion model has been adapted slightly 
and is used more as a guiding template rather than a rigid structure. The 
reason for the adaptation is due to the nature of this research, which is an 
exploratory piece of work, rather than an experimental model which might 
be better suited to the rigid outline of the onion model. However, the key 
components remain the same including the research philosophy, 
ontological position, epistemological position, data collection methods and 
timescale. 
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4.3 Philosophical Stance 
 
The philosophical stance is outlined below and comprises three 
main sections the ontological position that the project is operating from; 
the underlying epistemological beliefs in relation to TBML and thirdly the 
philosophic set of assumptions that have been used or developed in the 
process of exploring this topic.  
 
4.3.1 Ontological Position 
 
An ontological position essentially offers an explanation of the 
research context and how the research interprets the contextual 
background to the topic. The research contextual framework in this study 
is underpinned by an ontological belief that TBML transactions are 
complex social and financial processes that occur across both the formal 
and informal banking sectors.576 In this research project a position has 
been adopted that these TBML transactions will continue to constantly 
evolve in complexity, which is partly as a response to the nature of 
regulation and AML monitoring that is being developed within the banking 
structures.577 Some of the other complexities are also outlined in the sub 
sections below. The research is thus established within a very naturalistic 
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setting 578 of the banking environment and has tried to maintain a research 
framework, both empirically and theoretically, that acknowledges the 
reality of the ‘real banking situation’. 
 
“In naturalist settings, realities are wholes that cannot be 
understood in isolation from their contexts.”579 
 
In the context of this particular research a naturalistic environment 
also means that every observation at a local banking level needs to be 
constantly related to the larger world of organised crime and transnational 
and international money laundering. This will enable a truer understanding 
of TBML to be acquired because it is a crime that occurs at an 
international level, with local banks only involved at certain points in the 
process. The research strategy has developed the following positions in 
relation to how TBML transactions currently present themselves within the 
banking context. 
 
4.3.2  Global Money Transfer 
 
The research position believes that following TBML transactions is 
a complex process, since the activities and transactions occur at a global 
level and involve a number of different agencies working together, 
including law enforcement, financial intelligence and auditing services, 
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banking representatives from AML, business units and management and 
also custom and tax officials.580 Despite this complexity banks have to 
constantly apply risk assessment strategies for TBML activities, even 
though they may be doing so without knowing the full context and 
background of the monies involved. Given the current range and scope of 
global financial services that banks offer, this research project is also 
assuming that criminals will continue to operate within the formal financial 
services sector, including banking, until they are stopped or strongly 
discouraged.581 
 
4.3.3 Risk Based Approach  
 
Within current Money Laundering risk assessment frameworks 
there has been a gradual evolvement and change in approach from a 
strictly rules based process, where definite criteria were looked for and 
checked, to a more flexible and increasingly complex risk based approach. 
The risk based approach acknowledges the increasing variety in ML 
techniques that can be used, and the different ways in which these might 
present within a banking context.582 Instead of definitive lists the banks are 
encouraged to develop their own system of detecting risk, working within 
and including their own specific perimeters, including country risk, client 
risk, business risk and other factors pertinent to the region in which they 
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operate. Global banks are finding this process to be especially challenging 
when they have branches located across many different jurisdictions, all of 
which face localised challenges that can be very different in relation to 
money laundering risks and are therefore not easy to coordinate at a 
central level. 
 
4.3.4 Vulnerabilities and Entry Points into the Financial 
Sector 
 
The increasing cost of maintaining and updating AML compliance 
and regulation demands has reached a point where many smaller banks 
and financial institutions are unable to offer full protection against some of 
the bigger ML schemes.583 This makes them especially vulnerable as entry 
points into the financial services sector, where laundered money can be 
first placed into the financial system. Larger banks will then face the 
challenge of being used as institutions through which launderers choose to 
integrate funds and will receive the laundered money as transfers from 
other banks and financial services, which is harder to detect, rather than 
catching launderers as they place the initial money into the system. The 
pattern of ML is thus constantly changing with the weakest points in the 
financial services sector being constantly identified and exploited by 
launderers. 
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The research is therefore focused on exploring those elements that 
will constitute a successful risk based approach, which is specific to the 
global banking context. The research questions have been designed to be 
practical in their approach and are exploratory in nature to try and 
determine how TBML can appear within a banking context.  
4.3.5 Epistemological Position  
 
An epistemological position is a statement of understanding about 
the knowledge we have on the topic of TBML. It is a summary position of 
the underlying values and beliefs that the project holds in relation to how 
TBML operations exist and how the research believes they are facilitated 
within the banking sector.  This position has evolved out of the literature 
analysis 584 and is underpinned by the theoretical framework, which was 
also developed as part of the literature review. In this research the 
underlying belief is that the bank will continue to operate as a profit 
orientated business even when faced with a possible money laundering 
threat, i.e. the primary concern is the future viability and profit of the bank. 
This is the application of an agency theory approach 585 whereby the first 
priority to be addressed is the bank’s self-preservation and operational 
success, rather than working on behalf of other outside agencies such as 
regulators or law enforcement agencies.   
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4.3.6 Dual Agency Role 
 
Before the increased focus on regulation and AML compliance, the 
banks’ primary focus had traditionally been to provide business support as 
an agent for the client, even if that client was involved in a criminal process 
(TBML). Nowadays this position is in obvious conflict to the other 
increasing role of the bank, which is to act as a regulatory agent for the 
state and international anti-money laundering monitoring and control 
authorities. The bank effectively has a dual agency role between 
supporting the client and meeting the demands of the regulator.586 
 
The epistemological understanding is important to the research 
when considering how to develop a realistic and workable risk assessment 
framework for AML within banks, since the nature of this dual agency 
(Client vs Regulator) dilemma has to be acknowledged.587 The research is 
therefore seeking to determine whether the nature of this dual agency 
conflict can be understood and described in an academic context, and 
whether the data gathered in the research can be used as part of the 
development of a more in-depth understanding of the TBML process.  
 
4.3.7 Application to Risk Assessment  
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The research aims to develop an in-depth understanding of TBML 
588 and the dual agency role of the banking sector.589 It will achieve this 
primarily through the data collection, but there will also be acquired 
knowledge from exploring issues raised within both the empirical and 
theoretical documents from the banking and financial criminology 590 
industries. This includes building on and critiquing the traditional AML risk 
assessment frameworks 591  which have been developed largely by 
analysing observed typologies e.g. AUSTRAC (2014).592 These typologies 
have been developed using sanitised case studies of actual reported 
TBML and ML cases and from these a system 593 of identifying red flags 
have been created that can be used by organisations and the banking 
sector to spot similar types of potential ML cases. The cases are also used 
to look for patterns of behaviour, before applying these empirical 
observations directly into the banking context. In addition to industry 
reports there have been a number of media and investigative journalism 
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reports that have emerged during the course of this research.594 These 
have shed some light into banking practices and AML compliance over the 
last few years and have added a legislative perspective 595  to risk 
assessment frameworks. 
 
This research also aims to expand this current knowledge base by 
seeking to use both the theoretical discussions and the empirical data, to 
establish patterns of AML compliance, and to consider whether these 
could work in future banking contexts. This knowledge could then be 
applied further afield and into the more complex situations of global and 
multi-banking TBML. 
 
4.4 Research - Theoretical Framework 
 
In this research project the theoretical framework is based upon 
Agency Theory and has been used to explain and predict the relationships 
that operate between the different partners involved in trade-based money 
laundering. In particular, the framework was used to consider three types 
of agency partnership; between the bank and the client, between the bank 
and the regulator and lastly between the criminal organization / client and 
a professional money launderer. The framework was specifically applied to 
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a risk assessment context, with the expectation that the findings could 
then be unilaterally applied across all the banking, financial and regulatory 
services.  
 
4.4.1 Framework 
 
Within academic work there are a number of theoretical frameworks 
that have been used during the analysis of money laundering (ML), 
However, most of this work has been built around economic frameworks, 
in particular those that have been used either to predict ML growth 596 or 
manage ML data.597 This research however is not a pure economic project, 
it is focused on the behavioural aspect of money laundering responses 
and therefore a broader theoretical framework was needed and 
subsequently developed.  
 
The research theoretical framework needed to be located within a 
clear empirical context that was directly relevant to the banking sector. It 
also needed to serve within the management and auditing functions 
especially of larger investment and global banks, whilst also remaining 
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relevant to the smaller financial institutions. Since the banking sector is 
only concerned with the risk assessment and detection of money 
laundering, rather than the wider global economic impact of money 
laundering, then the focus of the research theoretical framework was 
concentrated specifically on the influences of banking risk assessment.  
 
The framework that has been developed is a multi-theoretical 
framework. It has used the general economic theory Agency Theory as a 
base but has merged into this some of the specific agency related theories 
associated with the different banking relationships between clients, banks 
and regulators. This has included a third dimension, which is to include 
perspectives from the field of criminology, in order to incorporate a better 
understanding of the client’s criminal behaviour. This latter point has been 
included because the research is working from a position that in order for 
risk assessment to be effective, banking staff need to have an 
understanding of the contextual situation of TBML and that includes 
criminal motivation as well as the typology of TBML transactions.  
 
One of the challenges for all research is ensuring that the 
theoretical framework is relevant and appropriate to the study and to 
ensure that researcher bias does not overly influence the format of this 
framework.598 Even in the design choice of a multi-disciplinary framework 
there will still be elements of theoretical discourse that are excluded since 
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“Theories are themselves human constructions and thus potentially 
fallible.”599 In the next section the choice behind the design decisions are 
explained further. 
 
4.5 Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory works from the premise that a cooperative and 
economic relationship exists when one individual (a principal) gives 
authority to another individual (an agent) to act on their behalf in financial 
transactions.600 However, the goals of the principal and the agent are not 
necessarily mutually agreeable as each is working from their own 
agenda.601 So a contract is established to try and ensure that the agent, 
despite their own business interests, will still work to secure the best 
advantage for the principal. Agency theory has also been developed to 
consider the potential conflict and risk associated between 
companies/banks seeking to develop profit for themselves,602 possibly at 
the expense of their clients’ gain.603 
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In this typical principal-agency relationship the agent is often 
considered to be risk averse 604 and will work 605 to secure the business in 
this case the bank, over attaining individual principal wealth. This dynamic 
is deemed to be predictable within economic decision making and has 
been applied to operational risk scenarios in organisations, such as the 
theory of the firm.606 However, other authors 607 have challenged the notion 
that agents cannot be risk loving or risk seeking, and state that risk 
seeking should be expected as the norm, especially given the 
organisational culture of risk in which many agents operate. 
 
4.5.1 TBML & Agency Theory 
 
For TBML transactions the agency theory model has been 
developed beyond organisational principal-agent relationships, to consider 
the relationships between banks and regulators and in particular the 
outside constraints imposed on banks through regulation.608 Other work by 
Macey (1991)609 applies agency theory in the analysis of corporate criminal 
cases.  This research highlights the balance required by businesses in 
undertaking risk assessment, in particular between working and managing 
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the risk taking behaviour of the client, against the risk aversion behaviour 
of the regulators, whilst all the time trying to maintain a profitable corporate 
business. However, Macey 610 cites a clear warning after the findings from 
his research highlighted that a culture of risk avoidance may emerge 
rather than risk assessment.  This defensive approach to monitoring and 
considering risk Macey claims, will undermine and discourages any form 
of creative thinking and innovative AML responses. 
 
“Applying basic principles of agency theory to the issue of 
criminal sanctions yields two insights. First, corporate officers 
and directors have a natural proclivity to refrain from taking 
risks. Engaging in criminal activity is a form of risk-taking. 
Excessive enforcement can exacerbate this proclivity toward 
excessive risk avoidance, in turn, stifling innovation and 
creativity and leading to a general decline in social wealth.”611 
 
In their work on agency theory McCarthy, van Santen, & Fiedler, 
(2014) also state that criminals and professional launderers act in a 
rationale Principal-Agent relationship, whereby both sides will make a 
series of choices depending on the situation presented to them. The 
agency relationship between the criminal and launderer also to some 
extent mirrors the agency relationship between the bank and the regulator 
612  so that increased regulation in the banking sector will reduce the 
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willingness of banks to take risks. This in turn means that professional 
launderers can charge more in their fees because the job is more difficult, 
which in turn increases the viability for rogue bank officials to turn to 
money laundering as a viable risk. 613  So that the more complex the 
regulation procedures the more innovative the launderer must be to avoid 
them and the greater the cost to the criminal to pay for this level of 
expertise. However, McCarthy, van Santen, & Fiedler, (2014) predict in 
their model that increased regulation and more complicated laundering 
processes will actually build a market amongst professional launderers 
and encourage greater corruption options because the financial rewards 
will increase. Within this research project which is covering the complexity 
of TBML transactions, their research will become very relevant, as 
according to their work 614  professional launderers are possibly already 
involved in money laundering in order to facilitate many of the TBML 
schemes in existence. 
 
4.5.2 Agency Theory & Other Theoretical Frameworks 
 
There are critics of agency theory such as Wright, Mukherji & 
Kroll,615 who claim that the focus of agency theory is too narrow.  This can 
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work for very specific cases,616 but they were more concerned because 
they claim that the theory only deals with individual relationships, and the 
nature of these relationships are not really predictable because external 
conditions and environments can cause changes in the behaviour of 
individuals. However, most behavioural theories look at individual 
relationships and apply these broadly across the general population, so in 
that regard agency theory is no different.  
 
Wright & Mukherji (1999)617 acknowledge that the main weakness 
for them of agency theory is how it is applied to the broader concept of the 
firm,618 rather than the narrow focus of the theory itself. As information for 
this project therefore, it is important that the theoretical framework to be 
used, if it is to be centred around agency theory, would need to stay within 
the bounds for which agency theory works.619 This would mean developing 
a framework that would not be applied too generally and risk encroaching 
into areas where different theories might be better suited to explain the 
phenomena.  
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4.5.3 Multi-theoretical Frameworks 
 
One of the main challenges in the design of a multidisciplinary 
theoretical framework is to ensure that, despite their differences, the 
various theories are linked within a cohesive theoretical context 620  as 
opposed to just being linked through empirical design.  In this research 
design a multi-theoretical framework has been developed that has used 
overlapping paradigms that are loosely connected with the perspectives 
and applications of agency theory. This framework has applied the agent- 
principle element to various partnerships within a money laundering 
relationship.   
 
4.5.4 Multi-theoretical Approach 
 
In order to fully understand the implications of the agency dilemma 
experienced by banks two other theories were also considered in the 
research and remain on the outskirts of the research framework. The first 
of these was game theory, which provides some understanding of the 
implications of changing one aspect of the dual agency relationship.  This 
was seen as important when considering any changes to the regulatory 
framework, since research has been done to consider the impact on 
criminal behaviour in response to regulation change. 
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The second theory that was considered was systems theory, 
especially the work of Demetis & Angell (2005, 2007),621 which considered 
AML as a system and acknowledged the global aspect of criminality. This 
would provide some insight into the influences on criminal motivation and 
thinking at an international level and was broader than the banking 
context. 
 
4.6 Research context 
 
The research questions are supported by a contextual framework 
that includes the overall research philosophy, the background context and 
the underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions of the project.  
 
The empirical research context that was being explored was to 
understand under what kind of scenarios the TBML client might present to 
the bank. The current gaps that were highlighted from the literature review 
section showed that one of the challenges in establishing a contextual 
background would be the limited examples and case studies of TBML 
within banking. Alongside this there was a research assumption that there 
would also be a limited understanding of TBML amongst banking staff 
since there were no real training or research material available for them to 
have studied. There was also often only limited academic writing 
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specifically of TBML, and it covered several discipline areas including 
criminology, banking & auditing and IT data management. 
 
4.6.1 Research Paradigms 
 
The first stage in developing a framework was to establish a 
paradigm that the research could operate within. This was particularly 
important considering the mixed method approach 622  that was being 
considered. A paradigm is a belief framework that guides the work and 
ensures that the appropriate methods are selected for the nature of the 
research being conducted. 
 
“Within the science studies, the consensual set of beliefs and 
practices that guide a field is typically referred to as a 
‘paradigm’ .”623 
 
One of the challenges in defining a paradigm is that there are a 
number of different definitions used in research. Morgan identifies four 
different uses for the word, which include - worldview approaches; 
epistemological approaches; model examples and shared beliefs in 
research. All four types offer different perspectives that can be applied to a 
research framework. One of the most common types currently being 
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applied is the epistemological stance, whereby the epistemological, 
ontological and methodological approaches share a broad philosophical 
position.624 
 
This latter type of paradigm approach has been utilised in this 
research design, whereby the research used the definition of paradigm as 
a ‘world view on events’ 625 but also applied an epistemological approach 
to the research.  This is similar to a definition of paradigm that Schwandt 
used 626  and which Morgan describes as mixing two of the main four 
versions of paradigms. The world view of AML compliance was gained 
through the industry reports and case studies, whilst the ontological 
understanding and theoretical framework were developed from the 
academic literature. This information provided a set of research 
assumptions that according to other social scientists 627 is typical of many 
social science research designs. 
 
The traditional research paradigms of positivism and interpretivism 
were both initially considered as part of this research design However, it 
was felt that neither model offered exactly what was needed to support this 
particular research philosophy. 
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4.6.1.1 Traditional Paradigms 
 
Traditional research in the social sciences has tended to operate 
from within one of two main paradigms either of constructivism, or logical 
empiricism.  Both types have their own clear ontological and 
epistemological positions,628 and from each of these positions a group of 
clear research methods are used that support their respective positions. 
The broader paradigms of constructivism and logical empirialism are often 
seen as being in competition with each other 629 and are linked to the 
research approaches of interpretivism or positivism respectively. 
Interpretivism tends to be associated with inductive and qualitative based 
research strategies whereas the logical positivism is aligned with the 
deductive and quantitative research approaches.630 
 
However, modern research has recognised the need to develop 
research strategies that are more focused on answering the specific 
research question, rather than being entrenched into certain research 
styles.631 One way in which this can be achieved is through combining 
research methods into a different type of paradigm framework, whereby 
the purpose for combining these techniques is to provide both greater 
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breadth and insight into the issue being researched.632 This is known as 
the research philosophy. 
 
4.6.2 Level 1 - Research Philosophy for TBML Project 
4.6.2.1 Research Philosophy 
 
The research philosophy plays a pivotal role in the development of 
the research framework, because it provides a transparent means of 
identifying the assumptions and beliefs of the researcher and the research 
process in relation to the study being undertaken.  
 
The research project was looking for a philosophy that would 
enable empirical evidence to be strongly embedded into a theoretical 
framework. The challenge the research project was facing was firstly to 
seek a philosophical approach that would match the empirical nature of 
the TBML research questions, which were specific to the financial services 
and banking sectors. Secondly, the philosophy had to acknowledge the 
wide variety of opinions that participants would be bringing to the research 
through their own sense of reality and experiences across the globe. It 
was this individual perspective that was very important to capture in order 
to develop a true understanding of the global TBML situation. Normally 
research philosophies work form one of two frameworks; positivism or 
interpretivism. 
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4.6.2.2 Positivism 
 
Positivism is largely associated with scientific research where there 
is an emphasis on objective facts and a value free interpretation of the 
results. 633  It is an approach largely suited to laboratory controlled 
environments where independent influences can be managed by the 
researcher in a structured format. 634  Although there have been 
acknowledgements that value free science is a fallacy 635  the methods 
used in this approach and for the data analysis still tend to be 
predominantly quantitative.  
 
However, the nature of this research project meant that highly 
controlled environments were not relevant, since information needed to be 
collected from real life empirical situations, across a number of institutions 
and from different parts of the globe. Secondly, the various controls 
associated with the nature of this work are either largely unknown or too 
large to be controlled in any research design, therefore data had to be 
collected within an unpredictable but naturalistic environment.  
 
4.6.2.3 Interpretivism 
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Interpretivism or as it is sometimes known constructivism, was 
developed partly in response to reject the overly scientific and quantitative 
focus of positivism, especially within social science settings. 636  Instead 
interpretivism supported the view that every choice in research had a 
consequence. It was suggested that the researcher along with their beliefs 
and their knowledge, are also part of the research decision making 
processes.637 The research reality is thus created by the participants and 
researcher and incorporates all their beliefs and views of the world, as 
opposed to proving a truth from the analysis of data such as in quantitative 
designs.638 Most research in this category tends to be inductive and seeks 
to provide a descriptive narrative to explain underlying laws. 639  The 
methods associated with interpretivism tend to produce more qualitative 
data. 
 
The nature of interpretivist research, which seeks to look for 
underlying explanations rather than just causal links has caused several 
researchers to consider its use within social science research.640 Some of 
the subjects using this approach include areas similar to AML regulation, 
such as information systems within organisations.  
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“led many researchers to argue for an interpretivistic 
approach to the study of information systems.”641 
 
One of the difficulties with interpretivist methods is that they are 
often small scale focusing on case studies and a smaller participant 
pool.642 In this research project a broad cross section of respondents was 
needed in order to capture a global snapshot of TBML responses across 
the banking sector. Similarly using individual case studies was not an 
option since the amount of data within one bank would potentially be too 
small for analysis purposes.  The arguments raised by proponents of other 
research paradigms were also applicable here in this study such as the 
view that interpretivism was felt to be too subjective in its understandings 
and socio-political interpretations, whereas positivism was seen as being 
completely value neutral and having only a scientific focus.643 
 
However, this research design needed to consider beyond the 
traditional restrictive boundaries of interpretivism and positivism and seek 
something that was more compatible with the project, a point that Yanchar 
(2006) 644 also agreed was important. 
 
“…a growing recognition that the traditional qualitative-
quantitative debate has outlived whatever benefits it 
                                            
641
 Smith (2006) p196 
642
 Robson, C (2002) Real World Research (2
nd
 ed.) Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 
643
 Smith, M. L. (2006). 
644
 Yanchar, S. C. (2006). Beyond the qualitative–quantitative divide: How to proceed? New Ideas in 
Psychology, 24(3), 275-281. doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2006.10.005 
 276 
historically provided, that methods must be matched with the 
research question or problem at hand, and that these 
matches of question and methods must be accompanied by 
critical reflection and sound rationale.”645 
 
In response the researcher considered a third type of research 
philosophy that of pragmatism, which includes elements of both 
intepretivism and positivism. 646  This meant that in effect both types of 
philosophy, interpretivism and positivism were considered and although 
interpretivism was the stronger candidate for the research design, both 
philosophies were deemed to be too restrictive for the nature of the 
research being undertaken. This meant that the more pragmatic approach 
would enable the TBML topic itself to provide the links between any 
differing philosophies and methods. 
 
This research project had acknowledged from the beginning that 
differences in reality will exist amongst the project participants, simply 
because a number of different disciplines are involved that are operating 
from different contextual and epistemological positions, so therefore there 
will inevitably be a strong element of diversity.  A pragmatism framework 
will facilitate this by being more flexible and open to using different 
methods of information gathering, in order to seek clarification and 
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understanding i.e. developing a realistic contextual framework from the 
data as it emerges. 
4.6.2.4 Critical realism 
 
There are some similarities between the research approaches of 
pragmatism and critical realism.647 This section outlines the basic concepts 
of critical realism in order to highlight how elements of this approach could 
be used alongside a pragmatism framework.  
 
Critical realism acknowledges that empirical studies often need to 
be supported by other methods. However, unlike pragmatism, which is 
open to using other empirical based techniques to achieve this. Critical 
realism supposes that theoretical frameworks should be used to bridge the 
gap between the quantitative and verifiable data and the qualitative and 
more subjective data. Modell (2009) describes this approach as using 
three elements. 
 
“critical realism is based on a tripartite, ‘stratified’ ontology 
divided into the domains of real objects and mechanisms, 
actual events and empirical experiences.”648  
 
To apply that model to this research project then the elements of 
TBML/AML regulation would be seen as a real object or mechanism, 
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whereas the actual money laundering and also risk assessment would be 
classified as events. The third element is the empirical experiences of both 
staff and clients, which would be described in a critical realism framework 
but separated from the other slightly more objective elements. Historically, 
critical realism emerged, in part, as a way of explaining inconsistencies 
that were noted between theory and practice in positivist research.  They 
offered a third way by putting forward another interpretation of scientific 
research.649 
 
The main difference between critical realism 650  and pragmatism 
Modell 651 (2009) suggests, is that critical realism is more aware of the 
implications of abandoning a concept of reality that is governed by 
determined scientific rules.  In other words, critical realism is more aligned 
to positivist thinking and is still heavily influenced by the need to explain 
scientific events in indisputable terms.652 Following this line of thinking and 
as a logical follow on, pragmatism is not as restricted by functionalist 
perspectives and is more open to interpretivist views than critical realism. 
The latter point is an advantage in this research because the research 
project is also open to following an interpretivist perspective, unlike the 
                                            
649
 Smith, M. L. (2006). Overcoming theory-practice inconsistencies: Critical realism and information 
systems research. Information and Organization, 16(3), 191-211. 
doi:10.1016/j.infoandorg.2005.10.003 
650
Smith, M. L. (2006). Overcoming theory-practice inconsistencies: Critical realism and information 
systems research. Information and Organization, 16(3), 191-211. 
doi:10.1016/j.infoandorg.2005.10.003 
651
Modell, S. (2009). In defence of triangulation: A critical realist approach to mixed methods 
research in management accounting. Management Accounting Research, 20(3), 208-221. 
doi:10.1016/j.mar.2009.04.001 
652
Pluye, P., Gagnon, M. P., Griffiths, F., & Johnson-Lafleur, J. (2009). A scoring system for 
appraising mixed methods research, and concomitantly appraising qualitative, quantitative and 
mixed methods primary studies in mixed studies reviews. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 
46(4), 529-46. doi:10.1016/j.ijnurstu.2009.01.009 
 279 
general work and interest of Modell who tended to prefer functionalist 
approaches. 
 
The pragmatist approach was therefore considered the more 
flexible approach, that would aim to be objective as far as possible whilst 
at the same time mindful that many of the pieces of research literature to 
be reviewed, as well as the primary data would nearly all be from very 
subjective sources. 
 
The philosophy underpinning this research project can be 
summarised as, the belief that the subject matter of TBML is of great 
importance to the banking sector both now and especially moving forwards 
into the future. However, by the nature of its complexity TBML is a 
challenging topic to discover and undertake risk assessment for. 
Therefore, given the complex nature of the topic and the range of inter-
agency groups involved in the assessment of risk, and the subsequent 
reporting processes, this has led the research to consider an approach 
that is exploratory in nature.  
 
4.6.3 Level 2 - Research Approach 
 
The previous section outlined the philosophical stance chosen by 
the project and the differences that exist between pragmatism, and 
interpretivism or positivism. Since the research was operating within a real 
empirical context of money laundering and wanted to speak to current 
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professionals working in this field, the research sought to use an 
exploratory framework. This would enable opinions to be sought from 
individuals working in the area and in the analysis of such information it 
would provide the option to develop potential solutions to any problems 
that might be identified. These problems were not known at the start of the 
research and would emerge from within the data during the analysis 
phase. 
 
4.6.3.1 Delphi Analysis 
 
Delphi analysis is a research technique that was first developed in 
the 1940s at the RAND Corporation in California. The researchers there 
had determined that group expertise was more accurate than individual 
expertise and were exploring the possibility of developing a scientific 
application of this.653 Originally Delphi analysis was used only in military 
intelligence and research and therefore published discussion about its use 
was not revealed until the 1950s. 
 
In research one of the uses of the Delphi method is to gather 
information and reach consensus from a range of expert opinions and as 
in this research project, across a range of disciplines.654 The traditional 
Delphi Analysis approach involves using repeated questionnaires 
designed to encourage participants to revise their initial thoughts on topics 
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and merge opinions into a consensus. The aim is that consensus amongst 
experts is reached through a repeated process of reviewing and refining 
opinions based on new knowledge and opinions and it is through this 
process that validity is introduced rather than through using statistical 
results.655 
However, other research studies have used adapted versions of the 
methodology especially where the focus is broader across many diverse 
opinions.656  In Landeta’s research the Delphi model was evaluated using 
three different situations in order to ascertain the degree of flexibility and 
applicability of this research tool in different social science settings. 
Landeta 657 discovered that it had a wide range of flexibility and could be 
applied across a variety of social science research settings effectively.  
Other researchers have also supported the view that the Delphi approach 
has a degree of flexibility in its design and is amenable to using follow up 
interviews in addition to any questions or surveys used.658 
 
According to Cole, Donohoe & Stelleso (2013) the use of expert 
opinion is a positive way to establish a baseline position upon which to 
develop the rest of the research data collection process “...the Delphi is, 
therefore, the best for providing baseline information (perceptions, 
opinions, and insights) into a given topic where consensus can serve as a 
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springboard to additional conversation and development …. .”659 This last 
point is of particular interest to this research and was used as the basis for 
developing the data collection tools as well as determining some of the 
areas of literature to be considered within the review. 
 
4.6.3.2 E-Delphi  
 
This research project has opted for an adaptation of the traditional 
Delphi approach known as an e-Delphi approach.660 This approach was 
adopted since the focus of the research was on gathering opinions and 
thoughts from across the globe and from a variety of sectors involved in 
TBML investigation. This was similar to the challenges faced in the 
research analysed by Landeta 661 that had also used the Delphi technique. 
It would also enable a greater level of creative thinking in developing a 
solution by hearing different global voices and perspectives, which is one 
of the unique advantages of Delphi research techniques.662 
 
“The aim of this technique was to avoid the problems 
resulting from the multi-campus location of experts, their 
frequent travelling and stays abroad, their different 
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timetables, the differences between status and personality, 
the influence of their group or class interests and possible 
prejudices or concerns of a political nature.”663 
 
It was therefore not feasible to consider bringing the Delphi group 
members together and instead the use of the internet via electronic 
surveys, telephone interviews and email contact was used instead.  
However, despite the many advantages of using such a technique the 
usual limitations, including the time taken to communicate and circulate 
information to all the members of the panel still applied, although with the 
internet this was less cumbersome than using paper versions which is 
often used in the more traditional Delphi research designs.664 
 
The aim of the Delphi approach in this study was to act as an aid to 
decision-making in the development of a risk assessment approach within 
the banking context, and it was not expected that there would ever be 
complete consensus on the topic. The main challenge instead for the 
research project was to determine how the expertise would be identified 
and which representatives would be included in the Delphi approach, as 
well as establishing a clear trail of trustworthiness within the process.665 
 
4.6.3.3 Expert Panels  
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One of the problems of Delphi approaches is the reliance on the 
expertise of the group selected. Selection is therefore a crucial component 
of Delphi analysis, especially to choose a good or acceptable group, which 
fulfils the research standards. 666  One recommendation that was 
considered from literature on this topic, was to use different panels of 
experts for the different areas of work.667  However, this approach could 
have been quite cumbersome for this project given the broad scope of 
interagency involvement in TBML investigation. Instead of using this 
approach directly it was honed down on a practical level, to use two panels 
of experts; one for those working in the financial services and one panel of 
those experts who had a role in investigative TBML work.  
 
Initially in the research design four panels had been suggested to 
potential experts, which were later merged into the two final areas. 
Originally the financial services panel had been split into internal audit and 
AML officers /other, whilst the intelligence panel had been subdivided into 
law enforcement and financial intelligence units. However, a revised 
restructuring was undertaken to simplify things and because the expert 
panel were asked to self-select which group they felt their expertise was 
best suited. The feedback the researcher felt was coming from the 
experts, was that four panels was seen as too complex, with insufficient 
differences between the main elements of the panels. The downside was 
that even with the two different panels some experts still did not feel that 
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this covered their own area of work e.g. training consultants or financial 
advice consultants who worked across both sectors. As a compromise the 
research offered anyone participating in the surveys to choose where they 
felt the best fit was for them and the experts were also given the option to 
become members of both panels in order to try and maximise the value 
and relevance of their input. 
 
One advantage of using the E-Delphi approach, which was 
supported in the research design, was that the experts did not have to 
physically meet either each other, or the researcher and therefore 
confidentiality was assured.668 For most members of the group this aspect 
was felt to be vitally important for their participation. The experts that 
agreed to participate were sourced from across the world to try and 
capture a global AML/TBML perspective. The limited resources and 
numbers of experts in this area would potentially have meant that by 
focusing on one area of the global trade market, the research would be 
unlikely to elicit enough contacts for the project. The global nature of 
TBML also meant that shipping and trade incidents of TBML were likely to 
involve countries across different jurisdictions and with different 
approaches to AML detection.  
 
In addition, there were problems in isolating cases on geographical 
boundaries since this method could have proved quite difficult and would 
have meant relying on and being restricted by, the data available to the 
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limited resources of the FIUs in that area, and the banks of those 
countries. Instead the research decided to throw the net wide open and 
accept and contact experts and cases from across the globe, in the 
knowledge that this pool was not very big anyway and there would not be 
any great chance of being inundated with too many case studies or 
people. 
 
4.6.3.4 Expert Panel 
 
The research strategy consisted of collecting and analysing data 
from a number of different primary sources. The overall purpose for the 
research data was to try and identify an appropriate risk framework 
suitable for TBML risk assessment within the banking context.  In order to 
achieve this and to develop the data collection approach to be appropriate 
for the experts involved, the research process was designed to maximise 
consensus agreement for each of the main stages of the research 
process, using the two different panels of experts. This included 
establishing through the experts how many categories of TBML expertise 
there were. There were originally four groups, but it was felt there was too 
much overlap between the group headings and experts could not decide 
which group fitted them best. This was then narrowed to two which 
separated out financial investigation and intelligence from banking and 
AML detection. All the experts agreed to participate in an online survey 
and expressed interest in participating in a follow on interview or 
responding to email clarifications.  
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The two panels that were developed consisted of experts. For 
group one this was experts within the field of Financial Intelligence linked 
to both the banking sector and financial auditing sectors. This also covered 
people working within the regulatory services and intelligence staff from 
law enforcement. The second group of experts were from the Financial 
Services sector and consisted of experts working directly on AML / TBML 
issues, including internal audit and governance. 
The data collection phase of the research was divided into two main 
stages and these are outlined below; 
 
Stage one - Identify potential expert members and use their expertise to 
finalise research proposal. 
1. A literature review was completed that involved reading 
current empirical and theoretical literature on the topic of 
TBML, and noting key authors with their contact details 
and notes of other papers written or work undertaken in 
the sector. 
2. The expert panels were first of all invited to review the 
research proposal and to give suggestions for 
amendments, and asked if they would be interested in 
being involved in the project. A cross section of experts 
was targeted from across the globe and from within 
academic writing, auditing research and intelligence 
gathering for typology reports.  
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3. At this stage some of the experts stated that they did not 
feel they had the expertise and suggested other 
colleagues so there was an element of changing between 
experts until the appropriate people were in situ. 
 
Stage Two - Design online survey and follow on semi-structured 
interviews with those experts who wanted verbal discussion as well as / 
instead of email contact. 
4. Once a detailed proposal had been developed with a 
theoretical framework, clear methodology and simple 
literature review, the panel were invited to complete an 
online questionnaire on their area(s) of expertise, i.e. 
within financial intelligence and/or financial services 
including banking and auditing. 
5. The expert panel were also used to develop the online 
questionnaires that eventually were used in the research 
data. This was done by sending out pilot questionnaires 
using the four initial sub categories (Audit, Banking, Law 
Enforcement & Financial Intelligence). These were 
distributed to the panel and feedback was received as to 
whether other areas of questioning needed to be 
included.  
6. The final drafts of the questionnaires were then uploaded 
to ‘SmartSurvey’ and members of the panel who had not 
responded to the initial questionnaire were asked to 
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complete the online version instead. In the design of the 
on-line version and in response to some of the feedback 
from the panel, the researcher adapted the format to only 
use the two broader areas of Financial Services and 
Financial Intelligence, since it was felt that there was 
significant overlap in some of the other areas. 
7.  
4.6.4 Level 3 - Research Strategy 
 
This section explores the research strategy 669  employed by the 
project and the rationale for choosing the methods used.  The research 
strategy is still underpinned by the overall purpose of the research, which 
was to identify the influences that impact on a TBML transaction and to 
develop a deeper understanding of how these relate to the banking 
context. This was to be achieved by using a pragmatist philosophy, which 
was seeking to develop a risk assessment model that was transferable 
across the banking sector and would therefore use an abductive approach 
to gather and interpret the data. 
 
The next stage for the framework was to develop a strategy that 
would ensure that all the data and information could be collected and 
analysed in such a way, as to be suitable for understanding the banking 
risks that are linked to TBML activity. The philosophy underpinning the 
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strategy was to use a pragmatic but exploratory process that would 
maximise the potential for uncovering the full range of data on the subject. 
Finally, under the guidance of the pragmatism framework and the research 
strategy, the next stage was to consider the most appropriate methods of 
data collection, without feeling any undue constraint from the paradigms 
informing those methods.670 
 
4.6.4.1 Challenges for the research strategy to address 
 
The research strategy had to work around or address a number of 
challenges that had been identified in the course of developing the 
framework. These were listed under three main headings of; empirical 
challenges relating specifically to collecting data within the banking and 
related sectors on the topic of TBML; the multidisciplinary nature of the 
respondents with differing levels of expertise on the subject matter and 
finally, the last challenge was to integrate the theoretical framework into 
the research strategy so that theory and practical findings interlinked 
throughout the research project.671 The next section looks at each of these 
areas and discusses them in more detail. 
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4.6.4.2 Empirical Challenges 
 
In order to devise an appropriate strategy that would answer the 
research questions effectively, a number of difficulties had to be 
addressed at an empirical level, which had already been highlighted in the 
literature review section.  
1. Firstly, TBML was acknowledged from a number of 
sources as being a difficult issue to address. 672  This 
meant that there was not a straightforward solution 
expected from the research findings. On the other hand, 
these ‘difficulties’ also had to be broken down even 
further in order to develop and describe an accurate 
contextual situation.  
2. Another point to be considered was that TBML did not 
affect the banking sector in isolation, but was also linked 
into a number of other agencies and disciplines, 
especially once suspicious activity was detected. 
Therefore, the research needed to gain some of the 
opinions and insights from these other sectors as well, if 
a full picture of TBML within banking was to be 
developed.  
3. Finally, in order to develop an accurate risk assessment 
framework for TBML there needed to be some 
understanding of prediction, i.e. knowing the expected 
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consequences to the proposed risk assessment process 
if any of the other parameters changed. This meant that 
the data had to be located within a theoretical framework, 
one that dealt with consequences in order to understand 
the nature of the predicted behaviour and responses from 
TBML clients, as well as collecting information from an 
empirical framework.   
 
As part of the pragmatic approach, the research aimed to utilise 
existing larger and international pieces of work and from these pieces to 
discover and explore the issues that seem to be common and prevalent 
within the sector. These issues would be connected to TBML, and also the 
wider issues of financial crime section within the global banking sector. It 
was hoped that this would help to overcome some of the limitations in 
accessing relevant respondents, as well as any potential limited access to 
different agencies working on the issue of TBML. Rather than these issues 
being considered as a barrier to data collection, other data collection 
methods were built into the design of the research in order to overcome 
any anticipated difficulties. All of the above mentioned concerns were then 
included in the development of a data analysis framework, which could 
highlight areas of potential weakness due to lack of geographic 
representation, biases in representation from certain sectors or limited 
experience of TBML for some of the participants.  
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4.6.4.3 Multi-disciplinary 
 
The second issue to be addressed was the multi-disciplinary 
approach to working with TBML. A number of agencies are involved in the 
reporting and detection of suspected TBML activity, these include, 
financial intelligence units, law enforcement, financial regulators, as well 
as other banking and financial services. The challenge of analysing a 
diverse range of perspectives was incorporated into the research strategy 
by using a Delphic analysis approach 673 throughout the data collection 
and analysis periods. This ensured that views and opinions were collected 
from across all the relevant sectors involved in TBML transactions and 
reporting. This included gathering opinions from respondents in the 
centralised financial intelligence units and using material within published 
articles from law enforcement, and analysing secondary data in the form of 
industry reports from auditing companies. The literature reviews also 
considered papers written from all these perspectives to ensure that the 
academic input did not carry unnecessary bias through any 
misrepresentation of the sectors.  
 
4.6.4.4 Theoretical framework  
 
The final element was the theoretical framework that had to be 
integrated into the data collection and analysis process as well. This was 
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achieved through using a systemic literature review 674  that focused 
specifically on AML and TBML issues, including both empirical and 
theoretical perspectives from across a number of disciplines and countries. 
In addition to these approaches the data collection methods that were 
used, were from both the quantitative and qualitative approaches and were 
used in conjunction with each other 675 in order to expand the breadth and 
depth of understanding on the TBML topic. An established theoretical 
framework had been developed for the project, which has been described. 
However, there were other forms of theoretical strategy that could have 
been used in the research, the most considered of these was a grounded 
theory strategy.676 
 
4.6.4.5 Grounded Strategy 
 
Grounded theory starts from an open position with no established 
theoretical context, it then uses an inductive approach whereby the theory 
is developed after the initial observations have been gathered.677 This was 
seen as potentially relevant to this design because it would have ensured 
that the final theoretical framework was directed by the research findings, 
rather than theories being imposed on the initial research design.  
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However, given the complex nature of the subject matter it was felt 
by the researcher that some form of starting theoretical position was 
needed upon which to review the literature and to establish the contextual 
background to the project. The preliminary literature overview indicated 
that the agency dilemma was an important aspect in AML research,678 
especially within the banking context. It was therefore decided to use this 
broad theoretical framework as a starting point, rather than allow a 
theoretical approach to emerge.  
 
If necessary, this framework could be adapted and amended in 
accordance with the findings as it became clearer what the situation 
actually was. As with all research the chosen theoretical framework will 
add a subjective element to the overall interpretation 679 but the researcher 
was mindful that this framework was open to change if needed. 
 
Modell suggested that theory cannot stand alone and needs to be 
constantly integrated into the empirical findings and so the researcher tried 
to incorporate this viewpoint into the development of the overall research 
framework and in particular into the process of data analysis. 
 
“Hence, the interpretations of researchers are highly 
dependent on their choice of theories and should not be 
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conceived of as ‘accurate’ representations of an objective 
empirical reality ‘out there’.”680 
 
The research project is an exploratory piece of research that is 
seeking to establish banking related patterns of trade based money 
laundering and to collate this level of knowledge from across a number of 
organisations and disciplines. One of the challenges facing any researcher 
is the need to show methodological rigour 681 and this was considered 
especially challenging in this project given the newness and diverse 
discipline coverage that TBML spread across. It was deemed especially 
important that all the agencies and relevant sectors were represented in 
the data collection stage and that their views were given equal 
consideration.  In order to accommodate the vast array of opinions a 
Delphi system of feedback and collaboration was used; using experts from 
across the major identified areas of law enforcement, criminology, finance, 
banking and audit. 
 
4.6.5  Research Choices 
 
The research was exploring a new topic within AML regulation 
which specifically focused on trade based money laundering and risk 
assessment, and thus needed to incorporate an element of exploratory 
research into the design. Existing and previous research that had been 
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done on global AML issues had been more focused either on measuring 
the scale of global AML 682  and the implications in data software 
development.683  Or the research had been strictly country specific and 
focused on analysing trade data.684 
 
Prior industry studies had looked at feedback from within the AML 
sector 685  but had tended to be country specific and/or cutting across 
different types of financial services. This research wanted to work 
specifically within the global banking sector and look at risk assessment 
for TBML. 
 
4.6.5.1 Exploratory Research 
 
Exploratory research designs are often used to determine the 
nature of a problem that has not been previously researched. 686  The 
purpose of exploratory research however, is to offer insights and 
information rather than develop specific conclusions. 687  This approach 
might be construed as not entirely appropriate for this project, since 
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recommendations and a proposed model of risk assessment were one of 
the ideal outcomes from the research. However, the risk assessment 
model and any recommendations would be a suggestion based on the 
findings of the data, rather than a definitive answer to a problem, so in that 
sense the exploratory research outcomes did match. 
 
Exploratory research methods can be set within a real life situation 
rather than construed for research purposes such as in a laboratory 
setting. Research approaches such as naturalistic inquiry 688  have 
introduced mixed method techniques, which have combined qualitative 
and quantitative data collection tools and approaches.  However, 
combining methods from across the different paradigms of functionalism 
and interpretative design can also pose additional barriers and 
difficulties,689 especially when it comes to analysing and interpreting data. 
One of the advantages of using an interpretative design can be to ensure 
that researcher and research design biases are minimized, by including 
methods of triangulation 690 and avoiding the analysis of data in isolation. 
This can be further supported, by having a clear theoretical framework that 
can be integrated closely with the empirical work.691  
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The main challenge therefore is to provide a research framework 
that is able to accommodate the different paradigms in both the data 
collection and the analysis stages of the design 692. Otherwise there is a 
danger of trying to squeeze one paradigm into the other and force 
qualitative data to produce quantitative results and/or vice-versa.  
 
As with all research design and regardless of the approach 
adopted, all methods will reaffirm certain biases and will not offer 
completely impartial results.693 
 
The research paradigm in this project was focused on a pragmatist 
approach albeit one carried out on an exploratory basis, in order to 
understand how risk assessment in TBML cases could operate. The same 
research questions could thus be applied to each of the different data 
collection methods and a common lens of ‘TBML risk assessment’ could 
be applied to all the data in the analysis section. This supports the view of 
many pragmatists who have defended combining methods 694 from across 
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different paradigms 695 by saying that, multiple of views of the same object 
is a positive thing even if the observations produce different results.696 
 
This was especially true in this research case since the topic being 
researched is relatively new and was also an interdisciplinary topic, 
therefore agreed answers were unlikely to be attained given the context. 
One other factor that occurred alongside the research process but was not 
built into the design intentionally was the publication of a number of media 
investigations and articles covering emerging TBML cases. This provided 
a research opportunity since interviews and statements were made by 
senior banking officials to media journalists, these were sources the 
research project would not have been able to easily access but could use 
as secondary data to verify the contextual validity of the project. A 
research lens of ‘TBML information on risk assessment’ was applied to all 
the media reports covered and these were then included in the data 
section of the report.  
 
Within the pragmatist framework an exploratory research approach 
697  was selected as explained previously and since the nature of the 
research questions were largely exploratory and were not designed to test 
an already established hypothesis. This meant that a number of different 
research methods were considered in order to capture the full range of 
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opinions and thinking on the topic. The methods used included two 
surveys, used alongside one to one email correspondence / informal 
interviews and an analysis of secondary empirical data. 
 
4.6.5.2 Mixed Methods 
 
The research project has already been identified as an exploratory 
piece of work that is seeking to establish a more detailed context in which 
TBML activity occurs and is detected within the main banking context. 
However, the topic of TBML is relatively new and therefore there are 
limited existing studies available from which to compare and contrast the 
most appropriate research methodology that could be used, especially 
from research which included a focus on empirical studies. Since this 
research project was seeking to gather data from a number of different 
empirical and theoretical sources then it seemed logical to consider using 
a mixed method approach to capture both the breadth and depth of what 
experts were saying within the industry. 698  In using a mixed method 
(Qualitative and Quantitative) approach,699 a generic understanding of the 
pros and cons of mixed method approaches was important to consider. 
 
The term mixed methods research (MMR) has been used by a 
number of researchers and is usually used to describe using both 
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qualitative and quantitative research methods within a single research 
strategy or design.700 One school of thought for using mixed methods is 
that each approach has its own set of limitations and strengths, and by 
combining the two a stronger research design can be developed., so that 
the MMR design is often seen to produce more valid results.701 This is 
often done through using quantitative data as the primary method for data 
collection and supporting this with further qualitative data, such as case 
studies to support or provide greater insight into the findings from a 
survey.702 
 
Indeed, Yanchar has argued strongly in favour of rethinking the 
inclusion of quantitative approaches within interpretative research design. 
His argument suggests that numeric interpretation of data can be included 
or at least not explicitly excluded without some consideration, into 
investigative research. However, his strongest argument is perhaps that 
investigative research needs, by its very nature, to be flexible and open to 
using a multitude of methods and not be restricted by one approach over 
another. 
 
“[Researchers need to] be open to sophisticated, innovative 
uses of multiple data sources, including text, interviews, 
                                            
700
 Mengshoel. (2012). Mixed methods research - so far easier said than done? Manual Therapy, 
17, 373-375 
701
 Mengsheol (2012) 
702
 Modell, S. (2005). Triangulation between case study and survey methods in management 
accounting research: An assessment of validity implications. Management Accounting Research, 
16(2), 231-254. doi:10.1016/j.mar.2005.03.001 
 303 
artefacts, observations, numbers, and experiences of all 
sorts to further their investigative aims.”703 
 
However, critics of this approach 704 have suggested that the model 
Yanchar supports also limits the type of quantitative approach that can be 
used, since they are insisting on an established or closely aligned 
relationship to the qualitative methods being used.  Instead Dawson, 
Fisher & Stein support a different approach to merging the two traditions 
through the use of ‘problem-focused methodological pluralism.’705 They are 
strong advocates for a slightly more traditional qualitative approach for 
investigative research and are sceptical about the use, albeit adapted, of 
numeric data within investigative contextual research designs. Instead 
they suggest that the cognitive learning process of differentiation and 
integration can also be applied to ethnological developments, including re-
examining how positivist and interpretivist traditions have differentiated 
between quantitative and qualitative methods. Now they claim in the post-
positivist tradition the pendulum is swinging towards the integration of 
methods in research designs. 
 
As a pragmatist design the merger of the two different paradigms 
was not as challenging an issue, since the focus was exploratory and 
seeking to provide more details on a problem through the provision of a 
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stronger contextual situation. The decision to use quantitative data was as 
a mechanism to broaden the scope of the project rather than provide any 
statistical significance to the findings. The sample of qualitative data 
participants would be taken from across all the respondents who had 
already participated in the quantitative survey. 
 
4.6.5.3 Primary Data 
 
The final research design aimed to use an online questionnaire as 
the quantitative data alongside a series of online email and telephone 
interviews to enable the initial findings to be explored more fully. Both of 
these techniques would contribute towards the development of the 
emerging themes and models on risk assessment for TBML. All the 
primary data collection would be carried out between two panels of 
experts:  
 a) One within the banking and auditing fields and  
b) The second one within the investigation and law enforcement fields.  
 
 
4.6.5.4 Secondary Data 
 
The primary data source was to be supported by a secondary data 
analysis of empirical documents, including surveys conducted amongst the 
global banking sector on financial crime, ML and CDD systems. In addition 
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to these a number of academic and theoretical papers written across the 
subject, on the various aspects of TBML would also be analysed. Although 
Mengshoel 706 suggested that MMR should be done by 2 experts one in 
each field working together collaboratively, However, this was in reference 
to larger scale medical research whereas in a single research study such 
as this, both areas of data analysis could be done by one researcher.  
 
4.6.5.5 Mixed Methods 
 
Mengshoel also highlights the challenges of trying to merge data 
from different sources, especially when each data set tells a different story, 
the problem is, which data set is to be believed? Exploratory research and 
pragmatism is open to acknowledging that there is not one single truth to 
be uncovered, however unlike positivism answers are not seen as 
definitive proof, and similarly unlike interpretivism answers are not just 
seen as descriptions. Somewhere between the two ideologies, 
pragmatism states that the answers are all part of the truth, and that 
possibly there are other parts of the truth still missing. Westerman 707 
introduces the idea of a different paradigm being applied to the 
interpretation of data, when he suggests that in investigation and 
exploratory designed research, quantitative data can also be interpretive 
rather than always associated with the positivist paradigm. 
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“It reflects the fact that investigators in the field at large think 
about quantitative methods in very different ways. …… On 
the one hand, I argued that quantitative research is 
interpretive (even though many proponents and opponents of 
these methods would disagree) and that this is a necessary 
and desirable feature of such research.”708 
 
Although mixed methods research design aims to broaden the 
selection of sources and types of data it works with, it also still has to 
operate within a defined framework, one that will by its nature be inclusive 
or exclusive of certain methods and research approaches.709  Pluye, et 
al.710 have pointed out that despite its acceptance in mainstream research 
design, there are relatively few studies that have actually examined the 
quality of mixed methods research. This is an issue that is also raised by 
Hassen and Keeney 711 who highlight the challenges in using a Delphi 
approach, which is a mixed methods approach and is positioned across 
different paradigms of positivist and naturalistic approaches, there have 
been limited research studies on determining the reliability of using such 
as technique in all situations. However, this is not a reason not to use the 
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design, merely a consideration that warrants additional caution and 
explanation. 
 
“Aligning methods with problems insures that these 
integrations are not arbitrary, because the focus on 
addressing specific problems with a method leads to critical 
examination of its strengths and limitations for the specific 
problems.”712 
 
 
4.6.5.6 Triangulation with Mixed Methods Designs 
 
Triangulation 713  is the use of multiple data sources in order to 
substantiate results, or the use of different types of data in order to explain 
a concept in more depth. One of the main traditional uses of mixed method 
research designs has been to triangulate the different findings from both 
quantitative and qualitative data sources in order to determine a more 
accurate truth 714 similar to a sailor using fixed points to locate the actual 
position of his ship. Triangulation in the social sciences can be traced as 
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far back as 1959 and the work of Campbell and Fiske 715 who established 
that different concepts could be measured differently depending on the 
type of method chosen.  However, triangulation has been open to criticism 
especially where different methods underpinned by different theoretical 
perspectives have been used together in the same research design.716 
 
Triangulation is a specific tool used to verify data, which is separate 
from using mixed methods to supply background information prior to 
undertaking a research study.717 In a research project such as the one 
being undertaken in this study, it is acknowledged from the outset that 
different disciplines working on the issue of TBML will be operating from 
different realities, because it is such a wide subject matter. Therefore, it is 
to be expected that meanings and interpretation of data will be subjective 
and this bias needs to be built into the research design. Some of the 
concerns raised by critics of triangulation approaches over the use of 
cross over methods 718 from both the traditional paradigms, have identified 
issues such as differing ontological and epistemological positions which 
they can claim cannot be merged together. However, with a pragmatic 
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approach they can be addressed through developing a specific pragmatist 
framework that identifies these potential issues from the outset.719 
 
“If reality is seen as multidimensional and subjectively 
construed by researched individuals, the meanings attached 
to empirical phenomena will vary considerably.”720 
 
Some researchers such as Denizin 721 have distinguished between 
using between-method triangulation such as case studies and surveys and 
within-method triangulation such as different types of surveys. These it is 
argued, produce different outcomes in the way they are used to validate 
findings since within-method triangulation will still operate from a similar 
philosophy and approach, whereas between-method triangulation will 
incorporate differences in paradigms and philosophies.   
 
Other researchers have highlighted the importance of incorporating 
the different strengths and weaknesses of each of the different methods 
involved, such as work undertaken by Campbell & Fiske 722 who devised a 
multitrait - multimethod matrix.  This matrix was developed to illustrate the 
relative links between reliability and validity in measuring traits, and in so 
doing established the pattern that social constructs can rarely be 
accurately measured using one method over another, since all 
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measurement tools are subjective and operate from their own assumption 
framework. 
 
The subjectivity of triangulation can be minimised in the data analysis 
framework as suggested by Mengshoel: 
“In a concurrent triangulation design the data analysis 
strategies of quantitative and qualitative data has also to be 
connected.”723  
 
However, triangulation is not a panacea for all data differences and 
by itself it does not explain differences it only provides a broader 
framework for capturing the truth. “Recognizing the criticism that 
triangulation fails to fully reflect the co-existence of multiple and perhaps 
conflicting explanations.”724 
 
One way to try and strengthen the mixed methods research 
framework is to apply the principles of triangulation to the methods being 
used, rather than just focusing on the interpretation of the data results. 
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4.6.5.6.1 Method triangulation 
 
Method triangulation is a technique whereby one research method 
acts to triangulate or validate the findings from another method.725 This has 
been suggested as a better method for replicating experiments, since 
exact replication of research methods will possibly contribute to the 
continued distortion of the results. Modell also reviewed accounting and 
management research and specifically looked at methods of triangulation 
between quantitative and qualitative methods. His focus was on the use of 
case studies to support survey results, a model not too dissimilar to this 
research design although interviews were used instead of case studies. 
 
 
4.6.5.6.2 Theoretical triangulation 
 
The research has also incorporated an element of theoretical 
triangulation 726 by choosing to develop a theoretical framework using two 
main theories (Agency, Criminal Psychology) but also linking this to other 
prominent theories currently in the field (Systems and Game Theory). 
Linking empirical studies into current theoretical thinking is one way of 
ensuring internal validity of the research, which can be a challenge for 
interpretivist research designs. 727  Although as far back as the 1980s 
                                            
725
 Modell, S. (2005). Triangulation between case study and survey methods in management 
accounting research: An assessment of validity implications. Management Accounting Research, 
16(2), 231-254. doi:10.1016/j.mar.2005.03.001 
726
 Modell, S. (2005).  
727
 Modell, S. (2005). 
 312 
researchers such as Eisenhardt 728  had developed a framework for 
developing theoretical models using case studies. 
 
When it comes to applying theory based techniques to describe real 
world scenarios, Modell issued a warning. In relation to using theoretical 
triangulation by itself he argues that it is not the universal cure for ensuring 
research validity, instead it should be used in conjunction with other more 
empirical based triangulation techniques. 
 
“Even though this does not negate the use of multiple 
theoretical frameworks to make sense of research findings, 
such theory triangulation can never produce exhaustive and 
universally valid conclusions about the ‘real’ world.”729 
 
 
4.6.5.7 Validity within the research design 
 
One of the key aspects of research design is to ensure that the 
findings are valid and that they can stand up to outside scrutiny or 
criticism. In order to achieve this in quantitative research there are usually 
three types of validity that are considered, these are; internal, external and 
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construct validity. 730  However, in qualitative research, which is less 
scientifically experimental in design and can be more experiential in 
nature, some of these validity constructs are adapted to suit the nature of 
the research being considered. Rigour in qualitative research tends to be 
assessed in terms of trustworthiness which is composed of “credibility, 
dependability, confirmability and transferability.”731 Hassen & Keeney also 
add that in qualitative research dependability tends to replace the 
quantitative focus of reliability. 
 
 
4.6.5.7.1 External validity or Transferability  
 
This is usually considered in relation to the applicability of the 
findings across a broader population, especially where smaller case 
studies or sample groups have been used.  In positivist research this is 
often done through statistical projections whilst in interpretivist research 
this has more often been achieved through linking theory and empirical 
findings. This research has established external validity by using a Delphi 
approach to establish agreement across a number of sectors and using a 
broad and multidiscipline group of participants for the two types of survey. 
It has also employed a research design that combines both the theoretical 
framework and the empirical focus of the research into one framework. 
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4.6.5.7.2 Internal Validity or Credibility 
 
The need for strong internal validity is often considered a 
prerequisite for acquiring external validity, Eisenhardt 732 suggests that by 
asking the question ‘why’, and seeking to answer this then internal validity 
will automatically be developed in exploratory and interpretative research 
design. Using supportive and contrasting literature is also another way of 
establishing validity and developing a clearer construct.733 In their definition 
of rigour in interpretative design Hassen & Keeney state that 
conformability tends to replace objectivity in qualitative research. The use 
of an expert panel, with experience within the sector, was used as one 
mechanism by which internal validity could be established. 
 
 
4.6.5.7.3 Construct Validity 
 
Construct validity is seen as the link between theoretical and 
empirical constructs, so that what is being measured and is witnessed at 
an empirical level should tally with the theoretical framework being used. 
This can be challenging when research methods such as the survey 
method in this study are used, since the respondents represent a cross 
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section of sectors each one of which represents a very different construct 
reality.  In business the operating constructs have to be established since 
businesses do not operate by themselves 734  the same principal also 
applies to the banking sector which is a business context. 
 
Constructs are unlikely to remain the same for very long since they 
are constantly adapting and changing according to their environment,735 
this is one of the arguments against exact replication research since the 
social constructs being measured can never be the same. 
 
“The typical means of addressing construct validity issues in 
triangulated research following a theory testing logic is to rely 
on some qualitative inquiry prior to the distribution of 
surveys, occasionally as an integral part of empirical 
development of hypotheses to be tested in subsequent 
phases.”736 
 
In this research the qualitative inquiry method that was used to 
determine the construct in the primary data collection phase, was through 
the experts who were invited and recruited onto the expert panel. The 
experts were then asked to review the proposed survey questions and 
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confirm that the relevant issues were being covered from a number of 
discipline perspectives, before they were widely disseminated.  For the 
review of secondary data, the use of coding software to deconstruct some 
of the textual and thematic constructs was used, and then explored further 
where necessary through email interviews with the relevant experts across 
different sectors.  
 
 
4.6.5.8 Limitations 
 
The research is fairly innovative and therefore leading out into 
unchartered waters. The research methods employed in this study have 
illustrated research innovation and provided the opportunity to engage with 
experts on this topic from across the globe. However, there are limitations 
to using this approach and these have been identified in this section. 
 
 
4.6.5.8.1 Number of Experts 
 
Firstly, although the range of expertise involved in this project is 
fairly representative both geographically and from across a number of 
different sectors, it is still not all inclusive.  Some sectors especially within 
AML intelligence were not easy to acquire any information from and yet 
these would be lead players in the ultimate prosecution of cases and 
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would have more insight into the legal barriers and challenges to be 
encountered. However, there were over 20 members involved on the 
expert panels and this is perhaps more than most Delphi models use. 
 
“The Delphi group size does not depend on statistical power, 
but rather on group dynamics for arriving at consensus 
among experts. Thus, the literature recommends 10-18 
experts on a Delphi panel.”737 
 
 
4.6.5.8.2 Internal Audit 
 
Secondly the focus of the research included a section on the role of 
internal audit within the banking context. However, it became evident 
through out the research process that many people felt internal audit did 
not really have a substantial role and would not necessarily be involved in 
the development of a risk framework. This is obviously one area of thinking 
that the research hopes to challenge, given the expected role that FATF 738 
and other industrial leaders in this area are suggesting needs to be 
developed further for Internal Audit. Other academics and internal audit 
analysis 739 have suggested that internal audit is ideally placed to discover 
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red flags in fraud 740 and PwC recently suggested that internal audit had a 
valuable role to play in AML compliance. 741  The subsequent lack of 
inclusion of internal audit respondents in this research did mean that 
opinions on the role of internal audit were not very well considered. In part 
this is probably as PwC state that they currently do not engage very much 
in the TBML monitoring process at the moment. 
 
 
4.6.5.8.3 Online Engagement 
 
The use of international participants in the survey and expert panel 
meant that there was no face to face interaction.  This made encouraging 
people to engage with on line surveys and email requests or questions 
quite difficult and does not suit the way some people prefer to work. As 
previous research suggested 742 the non-response rate is a lot higher for 
on-line surveys and this meant that a very large initial selection group was 
required, which was being drawn from a sector that even globally was 
quite small. 
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4.6.5.8.4 Access to Banking Officials  
 
One of the challenges that always faced the research was the 
possible lack of engagement by banking officials, including internal audit 
and AML compliance / money laundering reporting officers (MLROs). This 
had been initially addressed by specifically targeting members of ACAMS 
(Association of Certified anti-Money Laundering Specialists) who are 
already engaged in discussions on money laundering activities and who 
are already publicly speaking about the issue. However, the research 
failed to engage with ACAMS staff who did not view supporting external 
research as part of their remit. Instead the research expanded its 
recruitment scope and also targeted banking institutions that had 
connections to the university business schools, and managed to reach the 
MLROs though this process. In addition the broader financial services 
TBML and AML experts would also be involved in the 
questionnaires/interviews as well as AML experts from across other areas 
such as law enforcement and regulatory bodies. In addition, secondary 
data was used as a verifying triangulation method to provide supportive 
information. This information was already being supplied to banking 
institutions on AML practices and is available in the public domain.  
 
4.6.5.8.5 Trade Data and links to Customs Officials 
 
The focus of the research is on the banking context; however, one 
of the major agencies involved in TBML activity is obviously customs and 
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excise, who hold a lot of information on trade data. 743  However, it is 
beyond the scope of this project to analyse the content of trade data in any 
great detail. The purpose of this research will be to identify gaps in 
banking knowledge and areas for collaboration. It is possible that further 
additional research will be needed to look at ways in which customs and 
global banks could work closer together. 
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4.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The research involved primary data collection from individuals 
working in the banking and anti-money laundering fields. The research 
also worked collaboratively with a number of other academics and experts 
across the field. The major tenets of ethical collaboration were used such 
as honesty, integrity, trust, accountability, mutual respect and fairness. 
Another reason that an ethics code is important is due to the nature of the 
research approach. As a social science project situated in a real life 
operational situation, the ethical concept of maintaining complete 
independence and objectivity is harder to achieve than in a laboratory 
setting. However, it has been suggested that laboratory values of 
objectivity and independence are not as useful in a social science setting, 
since they do not explain the actual phenomenon being observed. 
 
“Here the main claim is that although notions of 
independence and objectivity might assist our understanding 
the natural and physical world, it is ill-suited to the social and 
organisational context where most activity occurs.”744 
 
Subjectivity and researcher bias are two elements therefore that 
need to be minimised rather than eliminated. To achieve this the research 
produced its own code of ethics for collaboration that was shared with all 
participants involved in the project. The code is based upon the work of 
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both the Code of Ethics for the British Psychological Society 745 as well as 
endorsing the current code of ethics of the University. The need for an 
ethics code is especially important given the nature of the research 
material and the potential sensitivities of people that will be involved in this 
research project. In particular, this research focuses on outcomes to 
address criminal activity, including money laundering and tracking sources 
of terrorism funding.  Therefore, an element of ethical sensitivity is 
required throughout the research, a term that according to Jagger and 
Volkman is “the development of moral sensitivity.” 746  In other words 
recognising where ethical dilemmas might exist and being able to make 
decisions that are morally and ethically appropriate. 
 
Brocklesby also highlights one of the key tenants of ethical social 
research, which is when considering which methods to use the researcher 
should remain open minded as much as possible, to choosing the most 
appropriate methods for the design of the project. 
 
“One of the ground rules for ethical social engagement that is 
implicit in the “ethics beyond… ” approach, is that when 
presented with the opportunity to influence how a problem 
such as this is framed and advise on an appropriate 
methodology, the agent will be reasonably open-minded.”747 
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The choice of the Delphi approach was deemed the most 
appropriate because it addressed some of the key concerns of the project, 
such as collecting a diverse and cross section of views and trying to avoid 
bias when analysing the responses.  Some of the other key points 
considered in the research ethical consideration are discussed below. 
 
4.7.1 Voluntary Informed Consent 
 
All participation in the research is voluntary and therefore actively 
completing the surveys or agreeing to participate in the interviews has 
been deemed as consent for that participant. In order to prepare and fully 
brief any potential participant, all participants in the research were offered 
the opportunity to review the research proposal and to offer suggestions 
for amendment or change. An invitation was made in writing by email to all 
potential expert participants to become a member of the expert panel and 
also to participate in the semi-structured interview. Many of the experts are 
academic writers working in TBML or closely aligned areas of interest such 
as financial fraud and anti-terrorism initiatives. They have volunteered their 
time and input after having been approached as a fellow researcher 
seeking advice and support in a specialised area that could potentially link 
into their own work at a later stage. For future participants not involved in 
the expert panel this will just involve participating in the survey process.  
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Participants on the expert panel will also be offered the opportunity 
to review the proposed empirical risk assessment model being developed 
through the research findings, and they will be able to provide feedback 
and suggestions for change before it is finalised. All experts will have the 
right to be named or retain anonymity throughout the research project.  
 
4.7.2 Confidentiality 
 
The topics covered by the research are potentially very sensitive 
and difficult subjects to acquire information on or for people working in 
these areas to agree to participate in a research project such as this. 
Secondly the highly politicised impact of the findings on the crimes and 
criminals associated with providing illicit money, mean that confidentiality 
of sources and the need to present the findings in a politically sensitive 
manner are all areas that need to be considered by the researcher.  
 
All participants will have the right to highlight information that cannot 
be published even if it is shared with the researcher, and agreement will 
be made between the researcher and participant as to how the information 
can inform the research and recommendations / model design even if it is 
not included as a primary source of data. The ethics code will also outline 
procedures for responsible data management, data sharing, guidelines on 
authorship, confidentiality rules and data sharing policies. All participation 
in the research will be voluntary.  
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4.7.3 Anonymity 
 
The research ensures anonymity within case study description 
especially detailing specific communities and individual identities. It also 
seeks to portray a balanced global perspective on the issue of AML 
compliance, rather than highlighting all bad examples for one jurisdiction 
compared to positive cases in another area. The concept of objectivity is 
important in the research because it has to cross several different 
disciplines and be able to translate into their areas of expertise, therefore 
assumptions and subjective approaches taken by one discipline will not be 
easily acceptable without justifications in other areas of expertise. 
 
The research topic also covers sensitive political areas such as 
links to terrorism activities which also has the potential to perpetuate 
myths associated with racial profiling. This research will need to ensure 
that negative stereotypes associated with particular countries and ethnic 
groups are not reiterated in the research.  
 
All interview responses are reported anonymous, but according to 
the sector represented. Interview data and identity are known to the 
researcher and supervisor to ensure validity and authenticity of data with a 
codification system in place for referencing between 
researcher/supervisor.  However, this information will not be shared with 
anyone else.  
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4.7.4 Right to Withdraw 
 
There are a number of reasons why participants may decide to 
withdraw from the research process. In this research the main reasons 
are; confidentiality of information and possible conflict between 
maintaining confidentiality at work and sharing data or information with 
ourselves in the project. Secondly the secrecy component of the work and 
the impact on security and risk within the bank may cause some 
participants to review their level of participation in the project. Finally, staff 
and/or their workplace may decide that too much additional work is 
currently being carried out and some projects have to be withdrawn from. 
 
All participants were informed of this at the start and throughout the 
process. In addition, there are a number of options available to 
participants, so that if experts needed to pull back on their commitment 
they could opt out at any stage to only undertake an interview or to 
withdraw completely. The research does not depend exclusively on 
continued participation by everyone, nor is there any detriment to the 
research if participants join later on in the project, rather than at the 
beginning of the data collection period. The reason for this lies partly in the 
design of the research, which utilises a Delphi model of analysis and 
therefore relies on a number of individuals across differing areas of 
expertise, rather than relying on only one or two individuals. Secondly the 
nature of expertise required will vary at different times in the research write 
up and analysis stages. Therefore, expertise may only be required at a 
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specific point and not on a continuous basis throughout the entire research 
project, e.g. to understand a specific legal process, or to acquire access to 
certain cases or information. 
 
 
4.7.5 Detriment Arising From Participation in the Research 
 
The political sensitivity of the data has raised concerns about 
gaining access to various sources such as banking institutions, who would 
be seriously compromised if they acknowledged that they were knowingly 
not complying with legislation or AML principles.  However, the research is 
operating from a voluntary disclosure approach and the information is 
confidential and also not specific enough to have any legal ramifications. 
Participants are aware in the course of their work that many of the 
recommendations on AML compliance are still at the recommendation 
stage rather than legally binding, therefore disclosures made to the project 
of this nature could be assured confidentiality of the participant. 
 
4.7.6 Feedback to Participants 
 
The research has incorporated a Delphi methodology for data 
analysis to ensure that expert participants have the opportunity to offer 
feedback and amend suggestions arising from the research. This has also 
been done to ensure relevance across a number of different disciplines. 
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Any participant who will be included in the interview process will be 
informed of the purpose of the research and will have already participated 
in the survey. 
 
In return all participants and contacts made during the research 
process will similarly be expected to openly declare their intention in using 
or promoting any aspect of the research findings.  
 
4.7.7 Dual Role of Practitioner and Researcher 
 
One element of potential bias from the researcher is in the 
adoption/definition and understanding of money laundering.  Government 
sources are very emphatic that money laundering is a crime that has to be 
stopped by banks. However, this is not an opinion that is supported in 
every country. In many countries the legal definition is the means by which 
the money was acquired, that is the crime not the method by which it 
enters the financial system.748 This has been the position of banks for 
many years but this is now being challenged through the regulatory 
bodies. It is important for a sense of realism that all participants in the 
research are able to accurately reflect on their organisation’s position 
                                            
748
 “It follows from the simple definition above that money laundering cannot occur without being 
preceded by a crime which gives rise to the illegally obtained funds. Such crimes are called 
‘predicate crimes’. Countries differ in what they define as predicate crimes and what they define as 
money laundering. Each country’s definition is critical because if a crime is not a predicate crime then 
there is no money laundering activity” taken from "Module 3: Notes Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing – Definitions and Nature" of Advanced Certification in Anti Money Laundering. 
International Compliance Training Ltd England. Source: www.int-
comp.com/members/attachments/Mal-module3.pdf 
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without risk of compromising their relationship with government, state or 
regulatory bodies, or endangering the political fallout from seeming to be 
out of sync with other financial services.749 
 
4.7.8 Personal Safety 
 
The research participants are all professionals working in the sector 
of AML in some capacity; most of them are working or aligned to the 
research sector and as such would be very familiar with research ethical 
guidelines.  
 
Telephone and electronic contact were the primary source of 
material used and communication system in operation.   
 
4.7.9 Challenges in research ethics 
 
One of the biggest challenges facing researchers, especially in 
today’s electronic and virtual world are the issues of confidentiality and 
retaining privacy of information.750 The information that is available and 
which can be quickly accessed through the internet and social media is a 
lot easier today than in the era of more traditional research.  
                                            
749
 “The differences between countries on these key definitions make international cooperation 
difficult in circumstances where countries do not recognise the same crimes as predicate crimes” 
taken from page 88 "Module 3: Notes Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing – Definitions and 
Nature" of Advanced Certification in Anti Money Laundering. International Compliance Training Ltd 
England. Source: www.int-comp.com/members/attachments/Mal-module3.pdf 
750
 Hoser, B., & Nitschke, T. (2010). Questions on ethics for research in the virtually connected world. 
Social Networks, 32(3), 180-186 
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“While in the real world social standards and laws have been 
fought for and established to allow the individual to live (at 
least mostly) unintruded, these laws and standards have not 
been generally adapted to the virtual world. This holds for 
everyday life as well as for research .”751 
 
4.7.10 Timeline 
 
The research primary data collection was conducted over a 12-
month period. The overall time span for conducting the research project 
was three years. Media case studies and empirical studies that were used 
as part of the secondary data were all taken from within the last 10 years. 
The research has used a cross sectional time horizon, with specific 
emphasis on the last 10 years for reviewing media and current 
professional perspectives on AML compliance within the global banking 
sector. 
 
4.7.10.1 Ten Year Time Scale 
 
The reason for choosing a narrow timescale of 10 years (2005-
2015) was because money laundering is a relatively new area of 
regulation and compliance for the banking sector and to maintain up to 
                                            
751
 Hoser & Nitschke (2010, p180) 
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date relevance. A number of media cases emerged during the course of 
this study, which related to the time period 2007/8 and so it seemed logical 
to include material from within this period. In addition, developments in 
modern technology have been influential in causing or facilitating the 
increase in TBML opportunities, due to the increase in shipping routes and 
the ongoing regular increase in international trade. It was therefore also a 
logical decision to focus on the more immediate timescale and review how 
the technology revolution and increase in shipping routes has impacted on 
money laundering techniques. The third reason for a narrow timescale was 
that the predicted outcome of the research would be a risk assessment 
tool that could be used for future money laundering assessment. This 
meant that current and future issues were the immediate priority for the 
research rather than too many historical events.  
 
4.7.11 Historical Cases 
 
The media cases relating back to 2007 such as the HSBC Swiss 
leaks 752 , the HBUS case in the US 753  and the more recent Panama 
papers 754 have all emerged within the last 5 years into the public domain. 
The papers provided an in-depth analysis of the consequences of some of 
the checking practices that the banking sector were involved in, and they 
                                            
752
 ICIJ (2015) Swiss leaks: Murky cash sheltered by bank secrecy http://www.icij.org/project/swiss-
leaks/banking-giant-hsbc-sheltered-murky-cash-linked-dictators-and-arms-dealers 
753
 Homeland Security. (2012). HSBC exposed US financial system to money laundering, drug, 
terrorist financing risks. From permanent sub committee on investigations. US Senate. Retrieved 
from http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/hsbc-exposed-us-finacial-
system-to-money-laundering-drug-terrorist-financing-risks 
754
 ICIJ (2016) The Panama Papers  https://panamapapers.icij.org accessed 30
th
 June 2016 
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offered insights into AML risk assessment processes generally during this 
time. They were used in this thesis because of the level of insight they 
provided into the banking culture towards AML compliance during these 
periods of time. They also offered banks the opportunity to highlight what 
changes had occurred since this period and to provide a deeper level of 
awareness of AML actions currently taking place.  This information was 
politically sensitive and would have been difficult to ascertain otherwise. 
The cases that were used through typology studies were more recent and 
focused on current reports as they emerged within the years of publication 
between 2012 755 and 2015 756. 
 
The Financial Action Task Force reports on TBML were also written 
at the earlier time in 2006 and 2008. Many banks are therefore still 
operating on systems and thinking from within this earlier period and it was 
deemed important by the research to include all of this in the analysis. 
 
4.7.12 Techniques and Procedures 
 
In Eisenhardt’s (1989) framework for using case studies to develop 
theory, she advocates the need for a research strategy that uses multiple 
methods.  This strategy was adopted in the research design with the 
overlapping of the data collection and data analysis stages. This meant 
that emerging insights could be used in the final data analysis process. 
                                            
755
 APG. (2012). APG Typology Report on Trade Based Money Laundering. Sydney: Asia Pacific 
Group on Money Laundering 
756
 PwC. (2014). Goods gone bad. Addressing money-laundering risk in the trade finance system 
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This method was considered to be especially relevant in this research 
since there was the possibility to consider interviews as a way to 
strengthen the findings from the survey or earlier email conversations.  
 
4.7.12.1 Data Collection Methods 
 
The methods that were chosen for the data collection were selected 
to support the nature of the research questions, which were empirical and 
considered the global perspective of money laundering and TBML issues 
across the banking sector. The first priority was to collect the views of 
those working in the sector from both a banking perspective and also from 
a financial intelligence and analysis perspective and develop a broad level 
of information across the entire sector. 
 
4.7.12.2 Broad Information Outcomes 
 
There were three main outcomes expected from the broad level 
data, firstly it would enable the research to determine what and how the 
current approaches to money laundering risk assessment were being 
used.  Secondly it would enable the research to determine where the 
practitioners, rather than the regulators, felt the gaps were in assessing for 
money laundering risk. Finally, it would enable the research to see what 
other issues were being identified as problematic in the AML compliance 
sector.  
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In the literature review a number of the empirical research 
documents studied included financial crime surveys from various external 
accounting companies.757 However, many of these were also aiming to 
highlight gaps in the sector for which these companies had already 
established an area of expertise 758  or had a particular interest in 
promoting.759 Therefore, it also follows that if the auditing or accountancy 
company was not working in a particular problem area of AML compliance 
they were unlikely to highlight this as an issue. In order to address this 
potential bias across the current empirical data, the research wanted to 
run its own consultation survey and to focus it specifically on the banking 
environment and on the issues of TBML. This would afford respondents 
from within the banking sector, their own opportunity to state the AML 
issues and priorities as they saw them, i.e. irrespective of what issues had 
been previously identified in other surveys.  
 
4.7.12.3 In-depth Information outcomes 
 
The second priority was to explore the key themes that emerged 
from the broad level data and to examine this in more detail. This would 
require extracting a greater level of detail and opinions from key experts 
who had experience in this type of work. This presented two challenges for 
                                            
757
KPMG. (2013). Global anti-money laundering survey. 
KPMG. (2014). Global anti-money laundering survey 
758
PwC. (2014). Goods gone bad. Addressing money-laundering risk in the trade finance system. 
759
PWC. (2014b). Internal audit holding the line on BSA/AML compliance. Retrieved from 
http://antimoneylaundering-fiba.com/files/1499.pdf 
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the project, firstly how to determine who held this information and secondly 
how to access the data if it was too sensitive to be published publicly. 
 
4.7.12.4 Technology 
 
Finally, for each of the different elements of the data collection, the 
use of technology and the internet were also influencing factors in deciding 
on the most appropriate approach. The many advantages of internet 
based technology on research design such as increased sample size and 
diversity, reduced administration, and innovative data analysis tools are 
equally met with the disadvantages of new techniques.  Amongst these 
disadvantages is included that there is less research on these topics and 
therefore less acceptance, due to limited reports on the validity and 
reliability in using these systems.760 This point is highlighted in Dillman and 
Smyth’s commentary on using web based surveys with health 
practitioners.  
 
“The challenge for web surveyors in general and eHealth 
methodologists in particular is that the body of research 
addressing how survey error is affected in web surveys is in 
its infancy.”761 
 
                                            
760
 Cole, Z. D., Donohoe, H. M., & Stelleson, M. L. (2013). Internet-Based delphi research: Case 
based discussion. Environmental Management, 51, 511-523. doi:10.1007/s00267-012-0005 
761
Dillman, D. A., & Smyth, J. D. (2007) p90  
 336 
The research therefore had to balance using innovative research 
techniques alongside maximizing the use of technology, in a way that 
wouldn’t be detrimental to the overall project outcomes. 
 
4.7.13 Sampling technique 
 
The first challenge for the research data collection was to develop a 
sampling strategy that would be representative of the sector.762 Although 
experimental research is often associated with random sampling in reality 
even within quantitative research design this is not entirely true for all 
projects, Polit and Beck 763 went as far as to describe it as a myth that 
quantitative research uses random sampling stating that random sampling 
rarely produces random samples. In this research the aim was to capture 
the key experts in the field of TBML, and so the research design 
incorporated a selective expertise focused, sampling strategy. This 
strategy was developed by developing a database of existing contacts and 
names from published journal articles and reports on any of the following 
subjects; 
 
1. Trade based money laundering 
2. Money laundering  
3. AML compliance and regulation 
                                            
762
 Dillman, D. A., & Smyth, J. D. (2007). Design effects in the transition to web-based surveys. 
American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 32(5 Suppl), S90-6. doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2007.03.008 
763
 Polit, D. F., & Beck, C. T. (2010). Generalization in quantitative and qualitative research: Myths 
and strategies. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 47(11), 1451-8. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijnurstu.2010.06.004 
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4. Financial crime 
5. Internal Audit and compliance 
 
Experts were emailed and from this initial contact other names were 
also suggested which developed as a snowballing technique. Once 
experts were chosen from their relevant research areas and agreed to be 
contacted, they were asked to review the research proposal. If they were 
still interested they were invited to become part of a research expert panel, 
which would be involved in reviewing the research recommendations or 
models of risk assessment, from the perspective of their own area of 
expertise.  
 
As part of the introductory email experts were also invited to 
suggest changes or amendments to the proposal. During this process new 
names of colleagues or authors and papers, not already being used, were 
offered by some of the experts as potential allies who might be interested 
in becoming involved in the project. There was a lot of enthusiasm for the 
project although many respondents did not identify well with the title 
‘expert’.  
 
4.7.13.1 Broad level sample 
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Once the broad level data collection tools were developed in the 
form of the online survey,764 then experts were asked to encourage other 
relevant colleagues and contacts working in the area to complete the form. 
This also encouraged an expertise focused snowball effect that was part of 
the overall Delphi design. 765  This enabled an expert led approach to 
recruiting participants, that were deemed as relevant by the panel. One of 
the disadvantages of web based surveys is that literature pertaining to 
possible errors and weaknesses in design are relatively few “there is little 
information about the effects of using techniques developed for use in 
other modes or of using new web innovations on survey error in web 
surveys.” 766  There is also very little literature dealing with sampling 
techniques for use in web based surveys. However, some researchers 
such as Chizawsky and Estabrooks have suggested using a mixed 
method approach with web surveys,767 as one way to ensure rigor whilst 
also introducing a triangulation method into the research design. The 
mixed method approach suggested by Chizawsky and Eastabrooks was 
adopted in this research study whereby web based surveys were 
supported by web based interviews and case study analysis. This meant 
that a system of triangulation was created that enabled the researcher to 
cross reference opinions and thoughts in the survey alongside published 
                                            
764
Dillman, D. A., & Smyth, J. D. (2007). Design effects in the transition to web-based surveys. 
American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 32(5 Suppl), S90-6. doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2007.03.008 
765
Geist, M. R. (2010). Using the delphi method to engage stakeholders: A comparison of two 
studies. Evaluation and Program Planning, 33(2), 147-54. doi:10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2009.06.006 
766
 Dillman, D. A., & Smyth, J. D. (2007). Design effects in the transition to web-based surveys. 
American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 32(5 Suppl), S90-6. doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2007.03.008 
p90 
767
Chizawsky, L. L., Estabrooks, C. A., & Sales, A. E. (2011). The feasibility of web-based surveys as 
a data collection tool: A process evaluation. Applied Nursing Research: ANR, 24(1), 37-44. 
doi:10.1016/j.apnr.2009.03.006 
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research, media coverage of case studies and also to ask additional 
questions on emerging themes in the interview section.  
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4.7.13.2 In-depth level sample 
 
A convenience sampling combined with an expert focused method 
was used to select the interview participants. The reason for the two 
methods is perhaps contrary to traditional convenience sampling methods 
whereby “In convenience sampling no inclusion criteria identified prior to 
selection of subjects.  All subjects are invited to participate.”768 However, 
the larger pool of respondents was all selected using an expert focused 
approach in the broad level data collection, and it was from within this 
group that a smaller group of experts, who agreed to participate, were 
selected for the in-depth sample. All participants on the expert panel had 
the option of becoming involved in the interview process, However, due to 
a number of factors such as; work schedule or experts feeling they had a 
lack of specific banking TBML expertise not everyone availed of the 
process. 
 
Overall the two sampling structures seemed to target the right level 
of expertise, the referral and snowballing techniques was used until a 
saturation level was reached, whereby no new names were being 
suggested any more. In order to facilitate this process and the time lag for 
as long as possible both data collection systems were left running for 
several months. 
                                            
768
 Research Methodology (2015) Convenience Samplinghttp://research-
methodology.net/sampling/convenience-sampling/ 
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4.7.13.3 On-line Survey 
 
An online survey was seen as the best method for reaching as 
broad a range of participants as possible from across the globe, especially 
when they were also travelling and operating from a range of different time 
zones.  Most of the contact with the expert panel had been through email 
and initially it was thought that a survey could be emailed to potential 
participants.  However, the practical difficulties with this approach were 
quickly realised during a pilot run 769  which highlighted a number of 
challenges to using this approach. 
1. There were differences with the presentation of the data 
results and how participants decided to fill in the form. 
2. This also caused problems with a preliminary analysis of 
the data that would be sometimes incomplete or unclear 
as to which options had been chosen.   
3. It was also established as a cumbersome method, relying 
on the participant to download the form, work out how to 
electronically complete the questionnaire and to then 
promptly send it back. 
 
From this pilot scheme an electronic version of the survey was 
produced using smartsurvey.co.uk, which meant that links to the survey 
could be posted through email and results filled in online in an easy to use 
and regulated format. Initial analysis was also completed through the 
                                            
769
At the very start the initial questions were emailed to several experts on the panel to test run. 
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software and incomplete surveys were easy to notice and were not 
included in the final compile. 
 
The pilot survey used four different formats of survey to see which 
one’s people felt were most relevant. The four options covered all the main 
differences across the various groups involved in TBML, and linked to the 
banking context. In the end two surveys were finally agreed upon; one 
dealing with banking specific questions and dealing with the identification 
and collection of data for suspicious activity reports. The other survey was 
for those working on the analysis of the suspicious alert data, such as 
financial intelligence units, law enforcement or in large banks, where 
analysts might do this work. 
 
Current research has continued to monitor the advantages between 
the two types and initially web based surveys were associated with higher 
response rates compared to other kinds of survey method.770 However, 
other research has suggested that this trend could be reversing since 
some current online surveys do not always seem to have the same margin 
of success in response rates over postal and email surveys.771 
 
                                            
770
 Sánchez-Fernández, J., Muñoz-Leiva, F., & Montoro-Ríos, F. J. (2012). Improving retention rate 
and response quality in web-based surveys. Computers in Human Behaviour, 28(2), 507-514. 
doi:10.1016/j.chb.2011.10.023 
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 Hardigan, P. C., Succar, C. T., & Fleisher, J. M. (2012). An analysis of response rate and 
economic costs between mail and web-based surveys among practicing dentists: A randomized trial. 
Journal of Community Health, 37(2), 383-94. 
Akl, E. A., Maroun, N., Klocke, R. A., Montori, V., & Schunemann, H. J. (2005). Electronic mail was 
not better than postal mail for surveying residents and faculty. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 58(4), 
425-429. 
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“Response rates were best for the mail (26%) with the worst 
response rate coming from the web group (11%).”772 
 
These results are important to acknowledge since a good response 
rate is one of the key aspects of a successful survey, with higher numbers 
preferred in order to avoid or eliminate response bias.773 However, the 
evidence from studies regarding response rates for online surveys seems 
to depend on whether they are part of mixed survey designs 774 or whether 
follow on contact is part of the research design. 775  Some evaluative 
research even states that there is no difference in research responses 
between mail, telephone or on-line.776 There are also other differences that 
have been noted in using web based surveys such as that the responses 
received in one form of survey will be different when received in other 
types. 777  It ultimately seems to depend on the preference of the 
respondent and the persistence and support offered by the researcher. As 
with all surveys there will be a non-response group. 
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4.7.13.3.1 Reasons for Using an Online Survey 
There were other reasons for using an on-line survey design that this 
research was trying to utilise;  
 
1. Firstly, the capacity to reach a wider audience especially overseas and in 
different time zones was a distinct advantage though an online system. 
The instant analysis of basic statistics in order to provide the researcher 
with immediate feedback on the types and background / sector that the 
respondent was from was very useful especially for guiding the follow up 
emails.   
2. The initial questionnaires were piloted by email but these were not so 
easy to fill out, and if questions were left blank it was unclear whether this 
was deliberate or accidental. The online survey design ensured that a 
response of some kind was mandatory for all questions and the survey 
couldn’t be submitted until this had been complied with.  
3. Finally, in terms of administration and cost the research found the web 
based survey to be a cheaper and less time consuming approach to 
develop and administer, a finding which was supported by other research 
such as Hardigan, Succar & Fleischer.778 They had calculated that online 
surveys were 2.68 times cheaper than postal surveys.  
4. The time that was saved in design was diverted into follow up and asking 
respondents to help source other potential experts that might be 
interested in completing the questionnaire.  
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4.7.13.4 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
One of the challenges that the research design had to address was 
the problem that TBML activities were monitored across a variety of 
professional bodies, some of which have direct links to the banking and 
financial sectors and others that operated completely outside this sector.  
Those organisations with connections to the banking sector include 
external audit companies, law enforcement organisations and regulatory 
bodies as well as industry based AML consultants. The research questions 
were focused specifically on the banking context so the sample of experts 
were restricted to include those either working within the banking and 
financial services sector, or those that worked closely with them in relation 
to detecting money laundering.  
 
The interview questions were designed to follow on from the survey 
themes and both sets of data were linked to answering and developing 
understanding in relation to the research questions. 
 
“Your research questions formulate what you want to 
understand: your interview questions are what you ask 
people in order to gain that understanding.”779 
 
This process had the advantage that all potential interview 
respondents knew what topics would be covered in the interviews and 
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could make a self-selection decision as to whether this was an area of 
their expertise suitable for a research project. 
 
4.7.13.4.1 Telephone and email interviews 
 
The research had to use telephone interviews rather than meet 
respondents face to face, this was mainly for logistical reasons since most 
experts lived in other countries around the globe. There are advantages to 
face to face interviews that cannot easily be replicated in telephone 
interviews, such as reading facial expressions and responding to non-
verbal cues.780 However, the practical realities meant that the research 
design had to accept this potential limitation in order to ensure adequate 
representation form across all sectors. 
 
There were initially potential difficulties because some individuals 
preferred to receive a list of the questions beforehand and then decided to 
answer the questions by email directly rather than engage in a telephone 
conversation, especially when time zones were very different or the 
experts were travelling. The email interview system did however, work 
better for the researcher because the telephone interview answers had to 
be written up, and then approved by the respondent before the information 
could be used in the analysis, and not all participants were that quick at 
replying to the verification emails. 
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4.7.13.4.2 Participants 
 
All of the interview participants had already completed the on-line 
survey before being selected for the interview process. After being 
identified they were asked to agree to participate in a follow on semi-
structured telephone interview.  These interviews were designed to 
facilitate a greater depth of understanding on the core themes already 
covered in the on-line survey. The information through the interviews was 
still to be gathered from across the different expert groupings, so that there 
was a cross section of representation from amongst the different agencies 
and countries.  
 
4.7.13.4.3 Case Studies 
 
In addition to participating in the interview process members of the 
expert panel were also asked to identify any gaps in the research or to 
pass on any emerging information of relevant cases. This process enabled 
the researcher to access information on legal proceedings that may have 
been missed and to search for specific cases that were deemed relevant 
by different experts. Other academic articles and authors were also 
suggested from across a number of disciplines, which again facilitated the 
research process.  
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4.7.13.4.4 Time Management  
 
The high level of email correspondence between the researcher 
and more than 50 different experts from across the globe had a large 
impact on the researcher’s time. And their management of 
correspondence data. This was deemed to be a worthwhile investment but 
would need to be noted for others wishing to replicate such an approach. 
A number of software applications 781 were used in order to facilitate this 
process. These included a dedicated email account established just for the 
research project. A data software package called DevenThinkPro whereby 
a file could be developed for every member of the expert panel, with a list 
of all the email correspondence included in this. A note taking software 
app Evernote was used to facilitate and record any discussions and follow 
up actions to take and which could be linked to either a mobile phone or a 
laptop. This was in addition to the Literature software package called 
Sente6, which enabled text to be highlighted and electronic notes made as 
papers were read, as well as an easy copy and paste of references for 
Oxford style formatting. 
 
The web based survey was administered using smartsurvey.co.uk 
and links to the survey were emailed to all participants. The use of a 
professional company for the survey helped to establish trust and present 
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an easy to use format that all respondents could use. 782  This was 
recognized as an important way of both maximizing respondent 
engagement and also minimizing user error in the survey. 
 
“What they can do though is design user-friendly surveys 
that minimize measurement error based on what is known 
about respondent processing and response behaviour once 
inside the survey instrument.”783 
 
4.7.13.5 Secondary Data Collection 
 
The research project topic was relatively new and finding expertise 
on the subject matter was challenging given the limited sources available. 
In order to expand the knowledge base and also to gain access to 
information that might otherwise be considered too sensitive for research 
purposes, a number of secondary data sources were used that had 
already been released into the public arena. These included a number of 
AML banking legal cases covered in the media as well as the analysis of 
annual reports and FIU typology reports.  These articles and reports were 
analysed for two main reasons, firstly as secondary data because of the 
empirical examples they provided and secondly for the insights they 
offered into AML compliance procedures during these time periods. 
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4.7.13.5.1 Typology Reports & Case Studies 
 
One of the biggest challenges that the project faced was that of 
access to current TBML cases since these are rare at the moment, due to 
the relative newness of defining TBML as separate from other forms of 
cross jurisdiction ML activities. Gaining access to information on TBML 
case studies is also extremely challenging for an individual researcher, 
due to the nature of confidentiality and the legal implications if cases are 
still being processed. Certain organisations such as the national Financial 
Intelligence Units (FIUs), do have access to this information and have the 
remit to process and publish the data, in the interests of developing the 
banking sector.  
“These observations are intended to assist with identifying 
instances of suspicious financial activity in the real world.  It 
is hoped that the case studies and ‘red flag’ indicators 
included in this report will assist the front-line financial 
institutions and non-financial businesses and professions 
(casinos, accountants, lawyers, real estate, etc.) involved in 
implementing preventative measures including customer due 
diligence and suspicious transaction reporting.”784 
 
These cases are presented in a sanitised format through typology 
reports and provide researchers with the opportunity to use real cases and 
analyse actual money laundering techniques that have been used. 
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The organisations that produce these reports such as FIUs or the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) have professional credibility within the 
banking and financial sectors including recognition by the World Bank, IMF 
and the UN.  This was seen as important by the research because there 
has to be an accepted level of trust in the data being used if the 
recommendations are to be implemented within the banking sector, and 
these organisations meet that level of requirement. Alongside these 
groups the countrywide financial intelligence units publish completed case 
studies from within their specific region or country, such as AUSTRAC in 
Australia and Customs and Homeland Security in the US. In order to 
ensure both a legal and ethical responsibility to all involved, this research 
chose to work primarily from approved data from these recognised 
organisations. 
 
Given the lack of specific TBML case studies available and in order 
to expand the sources available to the project, this research used 
examples of case studies and typology reports on both ML and TBML 
activities. The purpose of the typology reports was to examine sanitised 
case studies of actual empirical examples that had been detected within 
the banking system already, and would therefore provide realistic 
examples from which to undertake a risk assessment analysis. The main 
reports that were used were; 
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• World Bank (Pirate Trails: Tracking the illicit financial flows from 
pirate activities off the Horn of Africa.) 785 
• APG Typology Report on Trade Based Money Laundering 786 
• AUSTRAC Typologies and case studies report 787 
• Methods and Trends of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing 
788 (APG, 2015) 
These documents were used to extrapolate details of how actual TBML 
cases operated or could operate, and to determine from this how the trade 
financial details and irregularities might have shown up in the banking 
context.  
 
4.7.13.5.2 Bank Case Studies 
 
The media covered a number of case studies during the compilation 
of this research project and three of these were deemed particularly 
relevant to this study. The following two case studies were chosen 
because of their recognised association with international correspondent 
accounts and TBML related activity. Both cases refer to HSBC and 
provided a global perspective on one bank’s approach to AML compliance 
across the globe during the time periods of 2007 – 2008 when the cases 
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actually occurred and 2015-2016 when the responses from the banks and 
the investigation results were presented. 
 
4.7.13.5.3 Industry Based Studies 
 
In addition to the case studies there were a number of reports and 
financial surveys that had been compiled in relation to ML activities and 
the broader area of financial crime. These reports included the annual 
financial crime surveys that KPMG 789 produced for 2013 and 2014. In 
addition to these PwC 790 had produced a handbook based on their global 
survey on customer due diligence procedures and the reporting of 
suspicious transactions across the globe. Between these reports the 
organisations had accessed a large number of banking and AML 
compliance staff, from across the globe and findings from their reports 
were deemed as particularly relevant to aspects of this research. 
 KPMG Annual Financial Crime Surveys (2013,2014) 
 PWC TBML Guidance (2014) and Customer Due 
Diligence (2015). 
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4.8 Conclusion Methodology  
 
The research framework was thus comprised of a number of levels 
as outlined in the research onion model devised by Saunders. Using this 
model there were six levels 
 
A. Research Philosophy 
B. Research Approach 
C. Research Strategy 
D. Research Choices 
E. Timescale 
F. Data Collection 
The research philosophy was a pragmatic model as suggested by 
Robson in his work on real life research designs and incorporated an 
exploratory design.791 In order to fully capture the range of mixed data 
sources available on this subject matter, the research framework used a 
mixed methods research (MMR) approach 792 and was influenced by work 
from researchers such as Mengshoel who identified many of the 
challenges and difficulties that were likely to be encountered using this 
approach. The research design finally selected to use both quantitative 
data in the form of a survey and qualitative data in the form of interviews. 
One of the challenges that Mengshoel highlighted was the need to be able 
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to access skills from qualitative and quantitative researchers in order to be 
successful in MMR research. 
“But conducting MMR seems to require broader sets of skills 
than needed to perform quantitative or qualitative studies 
alone.”793 
 
This challenge was overcome slightly by using an exploratory 
research design, which worked to the existing strength of the researcher. 
Both forms of data collection were similar in format since the on-line 
interview was an expanded version of the survey theme, thus the range of 
research skills required was manageable by one researcher. 
 
The research used both primary and secondary data sources to 
ensure that the full scope of opinions and discussion on the topic were 
represented. Secondary data sources included other academic research 
as well as empirical based surveys and reports. The emphasis was on 
Reichertz`s exploratory research design and applying an adductive 
approach 794 to the analysis, so that even in the quantitative survey design 
the focus was to explore options rather than to categorise responses 
numerically. 
 
“the secret charm of abduction: it is a logical inference (and 
thereby reasonable and scientific), however it extends into 
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the realm of profound insight (and therefore generates new 
knowledge).”795 
 
4.8.1 Diversity within the research responses  
 
This research project has always acknowledged that the social 
construct framework would have to encompass the variety of perceptions 
by experts across the fields of AML/TBML compliance. This variety was 
both between different persons working in the same organisation and also 
between different types of organisations involved in TBML investigations. 
In order to assess the commonalities across these different social 
constructs a number of data collection methods have been used, in order 
to develop as clear a picture of the overall AML/TBML compliance system 
currently operating within the generic banking sector. These methods were 
united in the design through the use of a Delphi approach. 
 
4.8.2 Delphi 
 
The Delphi methodology used by Hassen & Keeney 796 was integral 
to the research design even at the research proposal stage. This ensured 
that all components of the research including the theoretical framework, 
access to participants and draft survey questions were reviewed by 
                                            
795
Reichertz, J. (2010) p14 
796
Hasson, F., & Keeney, S. (2011). Enhancing rigour in the delphi technique research. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 78(9), 1695-1704. 
doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2011.04.005 
 357 
leading authors in the field of TBML. This was felt to be important because 
there was not a clear field of study e.g. banking, finance, criminology or 
law that held the expertise on this issue. Delphi techniques were originally 
developed in order to establish an informed collective opinion within a 
sector or “to obtain the most reliable consensus of opinion of a group of 
experts.”797 By working across the different sectors equally, it reduced the 
element of potential bias of including one sector claiming authority more 
than another, but more importantly it reduced the bias of the researcher 
trying to fill information gaps that might exist between the different sectors. 
 
In conclusion, the research framework was developed using three 
main components which were; a Delphi approach; using mixed methods 
research including an exploratory triangulation process; and finally, the 
incorporation of a theoretical framework. The next chapter presents the 
data and analysis of the results gathered through this methodology 
framework. 
 
4.8.3 Ethics 
 
The research involves primary data collection from individuals and 
as such will need university research ethics approval. The research topic 
contains an element of political sensitivity, although most of the 
information being gathered is already in the public domain. The focus on 
                                            
797
Dalkey,N,C and Helmer, O (1963) An experimental application of the Delphi method to the use of 
experts, Manage. Sci. 9 (3) 458-467. 
 358 
criminal activity, AML and terrorism funding are potentially sensitive and 
difficult subjects and all participants will have the right to highlight 
information that cannot be published even if it is shared with the 
researcher. All participation in the research was voluntary. A specific 
research ethics code will be developed that can be sent along with any 
email correspondence as and when required. 
 
4.8.4 Risk & Safety Assessment  
 
The research is designed to be completed either electronically or by 
telephone. However, if face to face interviews or meetings had been 
arranged standard risk assessment procedures would be followed, 
including arranging to meet where possible on university grounds or public 
venues.  
A. The research did not interview convicted money launderers as 
part of the research,  
B. The research did not work with young people under the age of 
18  
C. Telephone and electronic contact would be the primary source 
of material used and communication system in operation.  A 
referral policy was used that stated that inappropriate material, 
or messages received from any research source would be 
referred to the appropriate member of staff within the 
department.  
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D. Details of conferences attended as part of the research were 
logged and accommodation details and mobile contact 
information left with the appropriate member of staff.  
 
4.9 Participants - Voluntary Informed Consent 
 
The research sought to work collaboratively with a number of other 
academics and industrial banking experts across the sector. As with other 
social research the major tenets of ethical collaboration were used such as 
ensuring trust and confidentiality where required. The research produced 
its own code of ethics for collaboration that was shared with all participants 
involved in the project to reassure participants especially those still 
working in the banking sector, that advice and insights would be treated 
with the utmost confidentiality. This code will outline procedures for data 
sharing, guidelines on authorship, confidentiality rules and data sharing 
policies where appropriate. 
 
All participants in the research so far have been offered the 
opportunity to review the research proposal and to offer suggestions for 
amendment or change. Invitations were made to become members of the 
expert panel and also to participate in the semi-structured interview. 
 
Participants on the expert panel were offered the opportunity to 
review the proposed empirical model being developed and to provide 
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feedback and suggestions for change before it is finalised. All experts had 
the right to be named or retain anonymity throughout the research project.  
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4.9.1 Implications for Participants Workload 
 
The research was seeking to include experts and interested 
participants who are already working on this topic or have a professional 
interest in the subject matter.  To this end participation for most people 
was part of their normal workload and should not therefore have become 
an additional burden. All participation was voluntary and reasonable 
deadlines were allowed to facilitate work pressures and other 
commitments. 
 
Any feedback that was required was sent out by email and if 
experts gave feedback this was incorporated before asking for further 
advice or input. The research has maintained a fairly flexible approach 
throughout when responding to expert opinions and views. This has 
ensured that participants do not feel unduly pressurised or feel that an 
inordinate amount of time has been spent filling out information. Most 
feedback was in the form of suggestions and usually recommended that I 
checked out their thinking with other individuals first to ensure consensus 
where appropriate. 
 
4.9.2 Participants Right to Withdraw 
 
There are a number of reasons why participants might have 
decided to withdraw from the research process.  In this research the main 
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reasons are; confidentiality of information and possible conflict between 
maintaining confidentiality at work and sharing data or information with 
ourselves in the project. Secondly, the secrecy component of the work and 
the impact on security and risk within the bank may cause some 
participants to review their level of participation in the project. Finally, staff 
and/or their workplace may decide that too much additional work is 
currently being carried out and some projects have to be withdrawn from. 
 
All participants were informed of this at the start and throughout the 
process.  In addition, there are a number of options available to 
participants, so that if experts need to pull back on their commitment they 
could opt out at any stage to only undertake an interview or to withdraw 
completely. The research does not depend exclusively on continued 
participation by everyone, nor is there any detriment to the research if 
participants join later on in the project, rather than at the beginning of the 
data collection period. 
 
4.9.2.1 Follow Up On Participants Who Withdraw 
 
The research was targeted at professionals and so on-going 
relationship and communication would be maintained throughout and 
before the actual research commences. This was raised with some 
participants in terms of distance, company rules and relevance to the 
research topic. These issues have been discussed through and alternative 
solutions that work for both researcher and participant / expert have been 
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agreed.  It is envisaged that a similar process will be maintained 
throughout the research project. 
  
4.9.3 Detriment to Participants 
 
The research is aware of the potential political difficulties that this 
topic may generate for some types of organisation. The targeting of 
participants already engaged in the sector should ensure that at some 
level there has already been a thought through ethical consideration of the 
topic and the impact it may have on their own organisation. The research 
is not intending to work with anyone under 18 and has not sourced any 
participants currently serving jail time for crimes committed. However, if 
this opportunity did arise the participant would be asked to consider any 
legal implications that disclosing information may have on their own case. 
 
4.9.3.1 Avoiding disadvantage to any particular group of participants  
 
The research ensured anonymity within case study description 
especially detailing specific communities and individual identities. It also 
sought to portray a balanced global perspective on the issue of AML 
compliance, rather than highlighting all poor examples for one jurisdiction 
compared to positive cases in another area.  
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The research topic also covered sensitive political areas such as 
links to terrorism activities which had the potential to perpetuate myths 
associated with racial profiling. This research needed to ensure that 
negative stereotypes associated with particular countries and ethnic 
groups were not reiterated in the research. 
 
4.9.4 Privacy 
 
All interview responses were reported as anonymous but according 
to the sector represented. Interview data and identity will be known to the 
researcher and supervisor to ensure validity and authenticity of data. 
However, this information was not shared with anyone else. 
 
4.9.5 Feedback to Participants 
 
The research has incorporated a Delphic methodology for data 
analysis to ensure that expert participants have the opportunity to offer 
feedback and amend suggestions arising from the research. This has also 
been done to ensure relevance across a number of different disciplines. 
 
Any participant included in the interview process was informed of 
the purpose of the research.  
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4.9.6 Avoiding Researcher Bias 
 
To some extent the researcher is independent to any practitioner 
role within a banking context, due to the nature of separation between 
academic institutions and global banking institutions.  
 
The researcher is mindful that many regulatory sources are 
emphatic that money laundering is a crime that has to be stopped by 
banks, However, this is not an opinion that is supported in every country. 
In many countries it is the means by which the money was acquired that is 
the crime not the method by which it enters the financial system. 
Therefore, any recommendations on future risk assessment systems 
would need to be mindful of the transition many banks and regulators are 
undergoing at the moment in order to adapt to the newer definitions and 
requirements of the banking role. 
  
 366 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 DATA ANALYSIS 
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5.1 Introduction  
The data collection and analysis section presents the results of the 
empirical data that was collected as part of the research study. This 
section explains which tools were eventually decided upon, how the 
participants were selected or sourced and what results came into the 
research for analysis. At this stage it does not try to analyse the data in too 
much detail, but simply presents the raw data after it has been initially 
sorted. 
 
5.2 Data collection tools 
 
The research chose two main data collection methods. These were 
a broad reaching survey that aimed to reach 250 participants across the 
globe who were all connected to AML work in the banking sector and a 
more detailed follow on, on-line interview with a smaller group of specialist 
participants. 
 
Following on from the initial identification of issues in the literature 
section, the data collection tools were designed to initially include two 
surveys, that would collect views on the effectiveness of the current AML 
systems from the perspectives of  
a) Banking staff and also  
b) Individuals working within financial intelligence and law 
enforcement.  
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Opinions were sought from the expert panel on remaining gaps 
and/or possible areas for change from the themes that had been identified. 
The information from all these sources could then be compared and 
contrasted to findings from other secondary data sources such as 
international empirical surveys and research conducted from within the 
banking sector.  
 
However, once the data collection phase had been completed it 
was decided that the information gained from the financial intelligence 
survey would form a separate piece of work. This research project 
therefore only used the primary data collected from the first survey, since 
this was focused specifically on risk assessment for TBML within the 
banking domain. 
 
Having obtained data from a number of sources the biggest 
challenge for the project was to develop a framework for the analysis. This 
framework had to combine two different types of primary data i.e. the 
surveys and the interview results as well as merge the findings from the 
secondary data. 
 
5.2.1 Research Questions 
 
 How does TBML manifest within a global banking context?  
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 How do criminals wishing to manipulate banks for TBML gain 
access to the financial services they require?  
 What tools are currently used in TBML risk assessment in banks, 
and what are the strengths and difficulties associated with these? 
 What models of risk assessment/control framework can be 
developed for TBML?  
 
The development of such a set of research questions was tantamount 
to building the foundation of my PhD thesis. A sound and valid exploratory 
thesis had to return to a definitive set of questions throughout its course. 
An outline follows of the steps taken to develop the research questions 
that kept the arguments, rationales, data presentations and conclusions all 
heading in the same direction.  
 
Firstly, it became apparent at the underestimation made of how much 
time it would take to develop a set of original questions it required quite a 
lot of reading, legwork and contemplation. The goal for the research 
questions was not only that they be clear and unambiguous, but also that 
they provided answers that would make a substantial difference to the field 
of trade based money laundering.  
 
The journey to arrive at the stage of setting on these research 
questions for the thesis was that firstly, it began with a processing of 
reading as much as possible about the fields of money laundering, trade 
based money laundering, banking regulation, banking risk assessments 
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and also taking a look at the frequent cases and fines being reported in the 
media in relation to these areas. It may seem to be an obvious first step 
but it was critical to understand intimately the existing theories, and the 
contemporary research, in these fields, as well as the language that was 
used to express them.  
 
This led to being fully immersed in the current issues, challenges and 
realities of the field, and allowed for a decision to interrogate the 
methodologies of existing research 798 - asking, for instance, how a mixed 
methodology approach could benefit further research?  
 
“Could a blend of methodologies yield alternative results, as 
opposed to only qualitative or quantitative data?.”799 
 
The second step taken was almost in tandem with the first, and it 
was to speak to as many experts and professionals in the field of anti-
money laundering and trade finance as possible. Spending time exploring 
actual challenges with people on the ground was invaluable, and the 
discussions and email communication were very beneficial to the 
research. It was these lengthy discussions with Industry experts, with 
academic experts in the subject matter, and also with supervisory staff that 
led to the devising of questions that all felt and agreed were such 
questions being settled on that were very important and equally very 
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interesting. All parties agreed that such questions would be the most 
beneficial to the academic sector whilst also offering great benefit to the 
industry and contribute a great deal to the body of knowledge. 
 
To build suitable foundations for a PhD thesis that could make a 
material difference to real-world problems was obviously preferable to one 
that did not. It was this that pushed the thought process in trying to 
uncover questions that, if answered, would be of actual interest and value 
to professionals in both the academic field as well as industry. 
By the taking of these steps, the selection of research questions 
was ultimately a rewarding and useful experience. By immersing oneself in 
current information, it allowed for the arrival of very rewarding and exciting 
areas of contemplation. Regular discussions with the supervisory staff 
ensured the suitability and validity, from an academic perspective, of what 
was intended to be done.  
 
Distilling a finite set of questions to answer, from years of intensive 
and dedicated study was surprisingly difficult. No fight was put up against 
it being hard, but worked with that initial confusion and difficulty allowing it 
to lead down an original and interesting path.  
 
5.3 TBML Complexity  
 
The first issue that was identified as problematical and which 
affected the analysis, was the level of complexity of the subject matter, 
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namely TBML. 800  In particular, the challenge was to break down the 
different aspects of TBML into manageable themes or sub topics.  This 
process was started initially in the literature review section and then 
developed so that some of the emerging themes could then be used as 
the framework for the data analysis coding system.801 
 
The coding system that was developed eventually for the project 
focused on elements of both ML and also TBML. The research examined 
the issues that occurred most frequently across all the papers included in 
the literature review. This coding approach, like the literature review 
section, sought to identify and isolate the different components of TBML 
transactions and the problems that were presented within a regulatory and 
banking context. The codes were developed from a cross section of both 
theoretical and empirical related papers. 
 
5.3.1 Data Analysis Framework 
 
The research analysis framework consisted of two elements, the 
primary data results collected by the research project itself and coded 
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against the literature review themes and then secondly coding the primary 
findings against the secondary research data. The research project could 
then analyse the findings and compare and contrast the results, in some 
instances against other empirical research. 
The table that follows on the next page shows the research 
question themes and the links between the primary and secondary data 
sources that were to be used in the data analysis process.  
 
These questions represented the research question themes that 
had emerged from the literature review and literature analysis sections. 
They were designed to flow towards gathering data that would lead to the 
eventual development of an appropriate risk assessment tool. 
 
In order for this to be achieved the data needed to focus on 
developing a complete understanding of how TBML cases were being 
presented in the banking context and how they were currently being 
assessed. One of the primary questions to be answered was whether 
TBML needed a separate system or whether current AML frameworks 
simply needed to be adapted. As part of understanding the risk 
assessment process the research wanted to know who (which positions) 
within the banks were primarily responsible for AML and TBML detection 
since these would represent the first line of defence and require any 
upskilling training. The research was also interested to hear from staff 
where they felt additional support was needed, both in terms of resources 
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but also knowledge and management understanding of the problems they 
were working with in relation to TBML.  
 
By combining the research knowledge of how TBML works and how 
criminals are currently manipulating the system, as well as understanding 
the criminal’s motivation for wanting to move money in this way, it was 
hoped to match this to the systems of detection and where necessary 
suggested amendments to strengthen the process. As a result,  the 
research questions considered four areas of knowledge that needed to 
inform the final proposed risk assessment framework; 
 
The four areas that were used were : 
1. Understanding TBML activities  
2. Criminal motivation to change techniques or use certain 
approaches 
3. Reporting compliance requirements and  
4. Risk assessment strategies to capture information. 
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Table 3: Summary of research questions and primary and 
secondary data sources 
Research Question - summary 
Data Source Empirical 
Primary 
Secondary Data 
Q1 What is TBML, what does it 
look like? 
Case study reports 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Crime survey  
Q2 How do criminals launder 
money? 
 
 
Typologies of TBML 
activity 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Financial Services 
reports  
Journal articles 
Q3 –Operational Risk Processes 
-Suspicious Activity Reporting 
info (SARs) 
Customer Due Diligence 
Enhanced Due Diligence 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
HSBC case study 
 
KPMG report 
AML experts 
Journal article analysis  
IIA Guidelines 
FSA Reports 
 
Q 4 - What frameworks can be 
developed  
Case studies TBML 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Journal Articles 
* The table shows the research questions and both the primary and secondary data 
sources available that can be used to answer each question 
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5.4 TBML Typology Framework 
 
As part of the analysis process a TBML typology tool was 
developed. This model is an adapted risk matrix focusing on client 
behaviour that will be used to classify TBML activities. It differs from an 
ordinary risk matrix in that there is also an inner circle, in which neither the 
client behaviour nor the transaction activities might be identified as high 
risk, but together they pose an increased threat. Activities for example 
such as the purchase or shipment of ‘dual purpose goods’ i.e. items that 
could be used for either legitimate as well as illegal/terrorist purposes 
including computers or electrical hardware goods.  Other low risk 
indicators that could escalate to high risk very quickly might also include 
the following: 
A. Clients shipping goods through free trade zones where custom 
inspections are less stringent. 
B. Legitimate businesses used as TBML fronts.  
C. Clients changing business partners or establishing new types of 
business. 
D. Clients working in high risk countries or countries known for risks of 
bribery and corruption. 
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These techniques are also used for other criminal activity such as VAT 
and tax fraud so developing a strong risk assessment framework is 
important and can be applied across all techniques. 
 
The research is particularly interested in identifying potential escalation 
zone activities which could traditionally be categorised as low or medium 
risk, and therefore do not trigger any red flags by themselves. The aim is 
to develop a model that builds on information as and when it emerges or is 
investigated. This will hopefully ensure that only high risk profiles are 
reported as a SAR, rather than large numbers of transactions being 
reported without being systematically risk assessed.  
 
5.4.1 Coding the Data 
 
Coding data has been used in interpretive and qualitative research 
designs for a long time, dating back as far as the 1960s and the work of 
Glaser and Strauss.802 It was used originally in many grounded theory 
approaches, whereby the research theory emerged from the data analysis. 
This approach has become more popular with social scientists such as 
Robson 803  trying to work in real life scenarios rather than laboratory 
settings. In more recent studies such as work by Glaser and Laudel coding 
can be used in a number of different ways including using it alongside pre-
                                            
802
 Glaser, B, G. & Strauss, A, L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative 
research. Chicago, Ill: Aldine 
803
 Robson, C (2002) Real World Research (2
nd
 ed.) Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 
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existing theories and incorporating different mechanisms for coding 
themes to coding content.804 Coding generally therefore is about indexing 
segments of text and classifying it in some order. 
 
“The core idea of coding is that the texts containing the raw 
data are indexed. Codes— keywords, phrases, mnemonics, 
or numbers—that signal the occurrence of specific 
information are assigned to segments of the text.”805 
 
In grounded theory approaches according to Glaser & Strauss, no 
pre-existing literature theory should be used. Instead the grounded theory 
data should reveal the appropriate theoretical model. However, since most 
observations are themselves influenced by theory 806 and many qualitative 
researchers have already dismissed positivist observations for being value 
laden, then theory has to play some role in the analysis and development 
of codes. This is reiterated in the following statement. 
 
“They thereby deprive researchers of the most important 
function of prior theory, namely that of a source of 
(comprised, abstracted) information about the empirical 
                                            
804
 Gläser, J & Laudel, G (2013). Life with and Without Coding: Two Methods for Early-Stage Data 
Analysis in Qualitative Research Aiming at Causal Explanations [96 paragraphs]. Forum Qualitative 
Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 14(2), Art. 5, 
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs130254. 
805
 Gläser, J & Laudel, G (2013, p10) 
806
 Gläser, J & Laudel, G (2013) 
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object of their research, which has been collected by their 
colleagues in previous research.”807  
 
5.4.2 Qualitative Data Analysis 
 
One option that could have been used instead of coding was a 
qualitative data analysis approach, which is similar to coding in that it 
reduces the amount of data and summarises the key points into themes 
and topics. Although qualitative data analysis and coding can appear quite 
similar there are a number of differences, qualitative data analysis tends to 
reduce the data by replacing the original text with an abbreviated and 
shorted version, coding however, retains a link to the original content.808 
This latter point was believed to be important to the researcher as a 
means of ensuring consistency in the interpretation of meanings, so that 
the original text could always be referred to. 
“If at any later stage of the investigation the actual phrasing 
of a significant part of the information is important, coding 
and retrieval procedures are better suited because they offer 
better access to the original text.”809 
  
                                            
807
 Gläser, J & Laudel, G (2013, p10) 
808
 Gläser, J & Laudel, G (2013). Life with and Without Coding: Two Methods for Early-Stage Data 
Analysis in Qualitative Research Aiming at Causal Explanations [96 paragraphs]. Forum Qualitative 
Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 14(2), Art. 5, 
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs130254. 
809
 Gläser, J & Laudel, G (2013, p23) 
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5.4.3 TBML Research Coding 
 
The qualitative data responses in this research were coded and 
themed using the qualitative data analysis software HyperRESEARCH:810  
“HyperRESEARCH is a HyperCard-based application that 
allows for qualitative and quantitative analysis of textual, 
graphic audio, and video materials. HyperRESEARCH 
performs the following tasks: (1) The coding of text (of any 
length: a word, phrase, sentence, paragraph, etc.), graphics, 
coding of audio, video tapes using Tandberg computer 
controlled tape decks and several types of computer 
controlled video systems (video disc and video tape). A given 
segment of text, graphic, audio and video can be assigned 
multiple codes. (2) Retrieval of coded materials (text, 
graphics, audio and video segments) enabling the 
researcher to array all similarly coded material together. (3) 
The testing of propositions by performing Boolean searches 
on any code or combination of codes via the use of an expert 
system. (4) Hypothesis testing using artificial intelligence. 
The Expert System software technology uses production 
rules to provide a semi-formal mechanism for theory building 
and description of the inference process used to draw 
conclusions from the data. (5) A statistical option which 
                                            
810
 “Hesse-Biber, S., Dupuis, P. and Kinder, T.S., 1991. HyperRESEARCH: A computer program for 
the analysis of qualitative data with an emphasis on hypothesis testing and multimedia 
analysis. Qualitative Sociology, 14(4), pp.289-306. 
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allows for the simple analysis of coded data. The use of 
HyperRESEARCH as a methodological tool supports 
important advances in the validation, reliability and 
generalizability of qualitative data analysis.”811 
 
This software enabled the researcher to build up a bank of codes 
and to link the main themes as they emerged, to each of the research 
questions.  In particular, the research sought to identify patterns of both 
client and transaction behaviour that could be useful to developing a risk 
based assessment strategy. The analysis also considered any emerging 
potential weaknesses in the current AML and risk assessment systems.  
 
5.4.4 DATA RESULTS 
 
This section of the report presents the findings from both the 
primary and secondary research data sources. For the primary data this is 
primarily the online survey results for TBML and the financial services, as 
well as the follow up interviews with TBML and AML experts across the 
sector. The secondary data findings include the review of industry based 
publications on TBML and AML compliance. It also includes the extraction 
of data from interview reports undertaken in the media or business 
magazines with AML experts, in response to several banking 
investigations that have occurred during the course of this research 
project.  The final source of secondary data that has been used in the 
                                            
811
 Ibid. 
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research, is in the form of industrial experts such as external accountancy 
companies and AML compliance training companies. The research has 
utilised the booklets and guidelines that have been published and which 
represent their opinion of how AML and TBML detection should occur in 
the future financial services sector.  
 
5.5 Financial Services Survey 
 
The data collected from the TBML financial services survey was 
representative of most of the main divisions of the financial services 
sector. Including forensic audit and external audit.  In total 29% of all 
responses were not directly from the banking sector including audit and 
regulatory bodies, with the remaining 71% from the banking trade finance 
sections, AML Business Management and Internal Audit units. 
The survey consisted of 14 questions that focused on four broad 
areas of TBML detection within any organisation and which were of 
interest to the research project questions. The areas are listed below;  
 
1. General background including the percentage of time spent on 
AML. 
2. The detection of TBML within the organisation, how it was detected, 
which staff positions were responsible and whether it was recorded 
separately to other AML threats or risks. 
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3. The link between TBML and Internal Audit functions within the 
organisation  
4. The approach and culture of the organisation towards TBML 
detection, including links to governance and identifying factors that 
currently impede detection. 
 
5.5.1 Background of AML Respondents 
 
A total of 256 respondents took part in the online survey aimed at 
AML and TBML experts within the banking and financial services sector. 
Of these a total of 226 responses were deemed to be complete and able 
to be used in the research project. 
 
5.5.1.1 Countries Represented In the Research. 
 
The research was interested in attaining views from across the 
global banking sector. Since AML compliance is a global response it was 
felt important to get a representative picture from as many countries as 
possible. Also as TBML involves the movement of value across 
international borders there would be little point interviewing a few select 
countries and not having representation from the countries at the other 
end of the shipping transaction. 
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In total 58 countries were represented in the survey with 226 
completed questionnaires. There was a good spread of responses from 
across each of the continents even if individual country responses were 
lower due to the specialised nature of the topic. 
 
As a continent Europe had the largest return at nearly 35% followed 
by North America (19%), Asia (13%), Africa (11%) and the Middle East 
(10%). 
 
 
 
The survey was distributed across a broad range of the financial 
services sector, although responses were more forthcoming where prior 
connections were already in existence. 
 
The spread of countries was seen as beneficial because the 
research was viewing AML regulation as a global issue and the literature 
had suggested a move towards international standards, however, this 
meant that the return per country was quite small. If there had been a 
strong level of diversity in their responses this might have proven 
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significant, but as most countries are implementing international standards 
and all are reporting to FATF, then the overlap was probably quite strong.  
 
In other words, national TBML / AML strategies have largely been 
superseded in favour of an international response, given the international 
nature of the criminal activity. As such the research needed to also work 
from this international perspective especially since the findings would need 
to be reported back to international bodies such as FATF, the International 
Banking Federation and international business schools across various 
universities. 
 
Although there was a strong international representation the 
research was also mindful that some countries have been further ahead in 
addressing AML compliance than others. Perhaps the two countries that 
have seen clear changes and advancements in AML compliance and 
monitoring have been the United Kingdom and the United States. We had 
as strong representation of responses from both these countries (13% and 
12% respectively), which was viewed as being beneficial to the research 
data. 
 
5.5.2 Sector 
 
The graph on the following page shows the representation of the 
respondents according to sector. It had been the main interest of the 
research to hear from staff working directly on risk assessment for TBML 
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transactions and to capture first-hand the difficulties and challenges that 
they were facing along with examples of what was working well. 
 
The nature of banking meant that according to the size and location 
of the bank different roles would perform different functions, and this 
applied especially to the detection and reporting of AML concerns. There 
was also an issue that since TBML was a newer issue and required some 
level of trade finance knowledge, would it be considered an AML or a 
Trade finance issue. The levels of seniority were also difficult to capture 
because a senior manager of a small branch may have less responsibility 
than a MLRO in a larger bank, in relation to TBML monitoring and 
reporting. Instead the breakdown of participants was done according to 
their role within the organization.   
 
As a result, 35% of the respondents were from the trade finance 
department, this was further broken down in banking trade finance dept. 
(29), trade finance advisors (47) and trade finance managers (7).4% were 
from the general business unit, compared to 15% that were directly from 
Banking AML. Other replies came mainly from audit sections including 
external (8), forensic audit companies (10) and internal audit from within 
banking (21). The regulatory sector was also invited to reply and gave 4% 
of the replies (9 replies) along with banking management (11). 
 
The final breakdown of all replies can be seen in the chart below; 
the numbers represent the actual number of respondents. 
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5.5.3 Percentage of Time Spent On AML 
The final question in the background section asked for an estimated 
time spent working specifically on AML compliance issues. There were set 
options to choose from and the replies were classified in the diagram 
below. 
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It can be seen from these results that 17% of the respondents work 
on AML issues for more than 75% of the time, with a further 11% working 
between half to three-quarters of their time on AML related issues. The 
largest percentages of replies were from the less than fifty percent 
percentile.  
 
These results reflect the literature findings that resources for AML 
are not always available especially in smaller banks where staff may have 
multiple functions to perform. The question did not ascertain what other 
work these staff did but given that 50% of respondents were working in 
trade finance or business units it is to be expected that most were dealing 
with risk assessment of TBML if and when it occurred in their everyday 
client transactions, rather than specifically looking for TBML across all 
clients on a full time basis. 
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Only 14% of replies were from people who spent less than 10% of 
their time on AML related issues. 
 
 
5.5.4 TBML Risk Assessment 
 
The next section of the survey focused specifically on TBML 
detection within the organisation. The first question asked whether TBML 
had actually ever been identified within their organization. 
 
It was interesting that 64% of the replies stated that TBML had been 
detected in their organization, because this was a clear indication that we 
were speaking to the correct target audience.  
 
In line with the literature findings not all banks differentiate between 
TBML and other forms of ML activity and 16% acknowledged that this was 
the case in their bank.  
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In addition to the resources and overlap in roles many respondents 
reported that in fact nearly 63% reported that it was not recorded 
separately from AML with a further 26% saying it was sometimes or they 
were not sure as to its exact recording. 
 
5.5.4.1 Methods Used To Detect TBML Activity 
 
TBML was not necessarily recorded separately in their organization. 
 
Despite the anomaly in how TBML activity is recorded the next 
question focused on the methods used to detect TBML activity.  
Respondents were given a list of responses and a final ‘other’ option. It 
was also a multi-response question so more than one option could be 
selected. The five main techniques that were used were; 
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 Suspicious Transaction Activity - 92% 
 Suspicious Client Behaviour - 66% 
 Customer Due Diligence (CDD) Checks - 78% 
 Beneficial Ownership information 46% 
 Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) Checks - 40% 
 
These tools would have been identified in the literature section as the 
main AML techniques used to establish AML risk in all areas of banking 
activity. 
 
Other options that could have been used included using trade 
databases, having reports and links with customs and excise and 
geographic risk profiling. 
Only one organisation out of 67 cited that they used pricing of goods as 
a means to detect possible TBML activity, although this would be one of 
the main ways that TBML activity can be spotted if used in conjunction 
with suspicious transaction and customer activity.  
 
5.5.4.2 Main Person Responsible For Detecting TBML 
 
The final question in this section asked who in particular was 
responsible for TBML detection within their organisation. A list of options 
was provided which covered the main front office and AML compliance 
staff positions, and a final option of ‘other’ was also provided. It is 
acknowledged that all staff have a responsibility but this question asked 
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who was primarily responsible. The main person identified was the money 
laundering reporting officer (MLRO) with 80% of responses stating that this 
was the key person responsible along with another AML staff member 
(63%). 
 
In 10% of the cases the respondents identified another person who 
held primary responsibility for TBML detection within their organisation. In 
many cases this was a fraud or forensic accountant or another specialized 
position that was used to analyse trade and business transactions.  This 
obviously depends on the resources available and for many smaller banks 
in particular, this level of knowledge may only be available on a sub 
contractual basis. 
 
It would appear that for most financial organisations TBML is still 
deemed as part of the overall AML compliance structure and it is primarily 
the duty of the MLRO to work on TBML cases as well as other forms of 
money laundering activity. 
 
5.5.5 Risk Assessment 
 
Risk Assessment is the main process by which TBML risk is 
uncovered by any organisation, and the research was interested to know 
how risk was assessed specifically for TBML. In the next step of 
responses, the focus was on the risk assessment process being used and 
the identification of strengths and weaknesses within that system. 
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The first question asked about the specific process used to assess 
TBML risk and whether or not this was separate from the overall AML risk 
assessment approach. Respondents could choose multiple answers 
although most of these would only apply if they were actually using or 
developing a separate TBML tool.  
 
42% of the replies stated that they had undertaken training in 
specific TBML risk approaches and 38.5% had developed a specific TBML 
risk assessment tool, whilst 19% had started the process of developing a 
specific TBML risk assessment tool. 
 
25% of respondents said that they had also developed links with 
external agencies in relation to TBML detection and risk assessment. 
 
The remaining 27% of the respondents stated that their main 
system for TBML risk analysis was the same as their general AML risk 
system, and it could be assumed that they were not therefore developing a 
separate TBML tool.  
 
 394 
 
 
 
One organisation under the ‘other’ category stated that they used 
an integrated AML/CTF and TBML risk assessment tool and another 
stated they used a risk based audit plan, Finally, one group stated that 
their integrated approach included CDD checks, so some answers could 
also be included in the main results as well. 
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5.5.6  Internal Audit 
 
The previous questions highlighted the role that forensic and fraud 
accountants play in AML detection. Some of these services are external to 
the bank but within the bank there is also an internal audit system, which 
acts as one of the bank’s lines of defence against money laundering 
activity. 
 
The research project was particularly interested in the role that 
internal audit currently plays in relation to supporting and auditing AML 
compliance and risk assessment. Respondents were asked to define the 
nature of the relationship between internal audit and AML/TBML 
compliance within their organisation, and to choose one answer only from 
a number of set responses.   
 
The following replies show; 
 Some level of co-operation – 34.5% 
 Seeking to develop a more coordinated audit plan – 22.6% 
 A limited working relationship – 18% 
 No link at all 11% 
 Very close and strong working relationship – 8.4% 
 (Other 5%) 
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In the interview responses this question was developed further to 
explore how participants felt that internal audit should interact and support 
the AML compliance units in the future. 
 
It was clear from the results that if internal audit and AML are to 
support one another, there is still a long way to go with only 8% of the 
respondents stating that they had a very close and strong relationship 
between AML compliance and internal audit. In contrast 11% of the 
respondents stated that there was no working relationship between the 
two sections and a further 18% said there was only a limited working 
relationship.  
 
However, 57% of the replies did report that progress was being made 
to strengthen the relationship and integrate internal auditing and AML 
compliance systems to better support one another. Since both units are 
collecting information that could be useful to each other it would make 
sense that there continues to be development in linking these two units 
 
The challenge to this approach is the risk of compromising the 
perceived independence of the internal audit system. In the ‘other’ 
category which represented 5% of choices, many of the options sought 
instead to define internal audit and emphasise its independence from AML 
compliance. The following comment surmises many of these responses. 
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“The internal audit should assess the adequacy of AML 
compliance and identify any deficiencies so of course there 
needs to be an integrated working relationship.” (ID 
Participant 2) 
 
One of the participants sought to explain the distinction between IA and 
AML compliance in more detail. 
 
“They have different scope of activities: AML are responsible 
for setting rules, reporting, communication with authorities 
and collecting AML data (from both internal and external 
sources), audit are responsible for examining whether the 
rules are observed and the activities performed (including 
examination of AML themselves and compliance of the AML 
procedures applied with external regulation).” (ID Participant 
10) 
 
Overall there appeared to be a clear distinction between the two 
roles although again internal audit could sometimes be seen as simply 
checking that AML compliance was following the rules.  
 
The research respondents however focused less on areas of 
collaboration between AML compliance and IAF. This would be important 
to consider since both departments are data driven, and it would make 
sense that the development of AML data collection tools and the analysis 
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of risk assessment strategies and tools were developed together. This 
would mean that internal audit can measure the actual effectiveness of 
AML rather than simply ticking boxes that state that systems and protocols 
are being followed. IAF thus has the potential to become a second pair of 
eyes to support the efforts of AML compliance by analysing the efficiency 
and relevance of the overall AML system, whereas AML compliance will 
be more focused on the individual components and linking them to specific 
ML schemes.  
 
5.5.7 Improving TBML Detection 
The survey asked two questions in relation to TBML detection, the 
first was what would be needed to improve TBML detection within their 
organisation and the second asked what was currently impeding TBML 
detection within their organisation. The first set of responses outlines the 
improvements that are needed, these were provided as a multi-choice list 
of options (so participants could tick more than one response) including an 
‘other’ category 
 
1. Additional Training in TBML for AML officers - 84% 
2. More communication on TBML across the organisation - 76% 
3. More training for front office staff - 43% 
4. Internal audit more involved - 17% 
5. Stronger communication to management - 31% 
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Under the ‘other’ option one respondent also suggested installing the 
SWIFT SANCTION system to add information on suspect client 
transactions being made to other financial institutions. 
 
A total of 7% respondents clicked the ‘other’ option however some of 
these were just to say all of the above, other suggested greater awareness 
of trends in the sector and one response suggested greater automation of 
the systems. Finally, one respondent questioned why internal audit was 
mentioned implying that they did not see the link between TBML detection 
and audit involvement, so clearly auditing and AML are not being used 
together in some banks at all.  
 
5.5.7.1 Impediments To TBML Detection 
 
The impediments question sought to clarify whether or not a need 
existed for changes to be made in the TBML risk assessment and 
detection process of the respondent’s organisation. Five options were 
provided in a multi answer format, with an additional ‘other’ option. 
 
1. Inexperience in TBML by front office staff - 55% 
2. Lack of training in TBML- 77% 
3. Lack of communication on TBML to management - 57% 
4. Lack of resources - 52% 
5. No links with internal audit - 5% 
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In the other responses one reply mentioned the lack of efficiency within 
the regulatory bodies. Another raised the problem of an overall lack of 
industry intelligence whilst two other suggestions mentioned lack of 
knowledge of the client’s business activities was a challenge and the time 
and complexity of transactions made it hard to monitor everything. 
 
5.5.8 Governance 
The research applied the assumption that most risk assessment 
models for AML involve a link to management at some level, whether this 
is in the form of reports through the audit committee or reporting directly to 
management itself. In order for this process to be as effective as possible 
good lines of communication between AML compliance and management 
or audit committees are required, as well as an openness by the different 
levels of the governance structure to hear an honest appraisal of the AML 
system in operation. The next two questions on the survey focused on 
asking about the current communication process and the overall corporate 
cultural attitude towards AML compliance, within the respondent’s 
organisation. 
 
The question asked ‘how aware are senior management about 
TBML within your organisation?’ Five options and the ‘other’ option were 
available. The answers are shown below in descending order of 
responses. 
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1. Know the basics –56% 
2. Aware through audit committees – 22% 
3. Have a good practical awareness and actively seek further 
knowledge - 27% 
4. Very aware and practice in implementing new approaches - 5% 
5. Not aware at all - 10% 
 
Only 10% of organisations claimed that their senior management 
structure had no awareness of TBML issues, with the remaining responses 
illustrating that TBML is recognised at some level. The overall picture 
indicated that a basic level of awareness was there at senior management 
in more than half of the institutions but that more information was needed 
probably through further training  
 
The second question in this section asked ‘would you consider that 
TBML compliance is firmly embedded in your organisation?’ Five options 
were again provided with an additional ‘other option’ for organisations to 
write their own point if required. Again the results are presented in 
descending order according to the number of responses, (note 
percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number.) 
 
1. No but progress is being made - 52% 
2. Most of the organisation but not quite all yet - 6% 
3. Definitely not - 12% 
 402 
4. At least half of the organisation would have a good understanding - 
20% 
5. All very aware and proactive in implementing new approaches - 3% 
 
From the ‘other’ responses there was a level of vagueness about the level 
of compliance in AML across the organisation. 
 
1. Concerned people have a good understanding  
2. Based on what we see in the market 
3. AML procedures generally are compliant  
4. Sectors are mandated to be fully aware of the specific AML 
challenges. 
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5.5.9  Suggestions for Moving Forwards On TBML 
Detection And Compliance. 
 
The final question in the survey was an open-ended question and 
asked for suggestions to improve TBML compliance and detection within 
their own organisation.  The following responses have been summarised 
under the following themes. 
 
Table 4: Summary of suggestions directed towards improving 
TBML compliance.  
Theme 
Suggestions No 
responses 
Training and 
awareness of 
TBML 
 Training and greater awareness 
 More TBML training 
 Use of e-learning to get this known 
 Include TBML case studies 
 KYC 
 In-house training to reduce training costs 
 Cross border training on AML gaps between 
jurisdictions 
 All employees need awareness 
 In house awareness 
 Raising awareness of the risk that TBML poses 
 Educational training 
22 
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 More regional examples 
 Front office staff training key to detection of 
TBML (2) 
 Needs expert knowledge 
 Is a new concept for banking sector 
Model examples / 
Typologies 
 Greater information sharing of ‘war stories’ by 
FIUs 
 Keep abreast of typologies from FTAF 
 Live and relevant examples 
 Regular internal meetings to discuss possible 
scenarios for ML activity 
4 
Software 
 The use of International Trade Alerts software 
 Use of Analytic tools such as iDETECT 
 Audit access to treasury systems  
 Comparison of trade prices 
4 
Audit 
 Requires deep understanding of trade finance, 
often hid deeply  -needs auditing experience  
1 
Governance 
 Senior management acknowledge that TBML 
is a risk 
 Firmly embed AML awareness culture across 
organisation 
 Strengthening knowledge flow at international 
level amongst peers 
6 
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 Communication  
 Clear AML policies understood and developed 
at top management  
 Head office develop a specific TBML cell 
Risk management 
 Use of credit risk vectors 
 Still researching issues at this stage 
 Risk based approach peer review 
 Use of SWIFT 
 Need understanding of trade finance in risk 
management  
 Lack of integrated detection systems 
4 
External factors 
 Increased prosecutions for TBML crimes 
 Limit trade based activities 
 Registration of companies and beneficial 
ownership details available  
 Emphasis on enhanced CDD and KYC in other 
institutions 
 Need specific guidelines developed 
 Letters of Credit that are independent and 
have all documents checked 
 International approach across all banks 
 Specific government legislation needed on 
TBML 
8 
Resources 
 Small company therefore cannot spend time 9 
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on TBML  
 Resources not enough 
Other 
 Needs industry shakeup towards TBML  
No suggestions No 168 
*  Showing final response to the questionnaire - open-ended what needed to 
change in TBML detection 
 
The results illustrate that most respondents had very few 
suggestions for trying to improve TBML detection, both within their own 
organisation and also at a wider level. However, where suggestions were 
made most were for additional training and educational awareness, which 
was the prominent focus including the need to include relevant and up to 
date typologies. The training also needed to be targeted across all levels 
of the organisation and especially aimed at front office staff. There were 
also suggestions to make greater use of in-house training options, 
including holding staff meetings to specifically explore TBML scenarios 
specific to the local context.  The in-house approach was also seen as 
more cost effective rather than constantly relying on external companies. 
 
The use of IT and software was mentioned by several respondents 
especially gaining access to larger databases that may contain trade 
related information. Several replies also made comment on the complex 
nature of TBML and the need for multi-level responses including 
management, front office and stronger links to AML compliance. 
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5.5.10 Concluding Observations on the Survey 
 
The issue of TBML is still relatively new for some especially smaller 
organisations.  One comment that highlighted this was the following;  
“until I had this survey I was unaware completely of TBML” 
(Respondent 37 - non banking) 
 
Although some of the respondents represented outside agencies or 
audit companies with links to the banking context, most replies were 
directly from staff working within the banking sector. A common trend 
across all the respondents seemed to be the link between the size of the 
organisation and their ability to address TBML.  Part of this was no doubt 
due to restricted access to resources, including expertise in TBML, staff 
time as well as investment opportunities into software systems and risk 
assessment for many smaller firms and bank branches.  
 
Some respondents claimed that TBML was not an issue although 
some would be highly vulnerable, as products such as life insurance is a 
common money laundering vehicle.812 It also highlights the reality that it is 
the banking sector that will often be the first place that starts to ask these 
in-depth AML questions and that they cannot rely on smaller client and 
                                            
812
Lawrence, S. (2008). Money laundering in the insurance sector. Aisaninsurancereview. Retrieved 
from https://www.world-check.com/media/d/content_pressarticle_reference/aisaninsurance_08.pdf 
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partner businesses investing the time and resources required in order to 
TBML proof their own company. 
 
5.6 Interview Analysis 
 
The interviews provided part two of the data material and as part of 
this process the survey themes were expanded into a further 8 interview 
themes, which covered the main topics raised in the online survey. The 
purpose of the interviews was to try and establish what level and type of 
information banks needed in order to develop strong risk based 
approaches on TBML assessment.  
 
These questions were given to a sample of AML experts with 
experience or exposure of working directly on TBML issues within their 
own bank.  Experts were selected using the Delphic approach, and a total 
56 experts completed the questions, from across the globe, with some 
using phone interview and others by email in order to facilitate time zone 
differences. A final 50 valid answers were used in the research. The 8 
interview question themes were; 
 
A. Background details and company 
B. Main weaknesses in TBML detection  
C. TBML too much for the banking and financial sector? 
D. Areas to strengthen in TBML risk assessment 
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E. Link and role of internal audit in TBML risk assessment  
F. Use of external training agencies within banking and financial 
services for TBML training 
G. Investigation work in banks and financial services - how realistic is it 
for staff to undertake? 
H. Any other issues relevant to TBML that this research should be 
considering? 
 
The questions were worded as follows; 
 
1. What would you consider to be the main weaknesses or gaps in 
TBML risk assessment as you see it within the banking sector? 
(Can you give any practical examples or highlight any current 
problems or cases we could read) 
 
2. Is TBML risk compliance a step too far for many banks - especially 
as many appear to be struggling to cope with the average AML 
compliance (according to FCA, 2013).813  If yes why and if no why 
not? 
 
3. Where do you think the focus should be to strengthen banks TBML 
risk assessment, is it...  
a. further training and who needs to be trained? 
                                            
813
FCA. (2013). Banks’ control of financial crime risks in trade finance. TR13/3 Thematic 
Review 
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b. increased resources and where should they be - staffing, 
training, appointing specific designated TBML officers, 
management upskilling? 
c. increased engagement by governance, audit committees, 
board of directors, management? 
 
4. The research is interested in determining whether internal audit 
plays a role in TBML risk assessment and if so what should that 
role be? 
a. Is it purely oversight and other sectors of the bank put 
together the risk assessment? 
b. Do they jointly develop the risk assessment approach 
alongside AML and management? 
c. Do they have a role to develop a specific AML / TBML report 
for the audit committee and management? 
d. Should they routinely audit suspicious activity reports and 
follow the trail to assess the effectiveness of risk assessment 
tools and not just comment on their presence?  
b) -Are there other roles that internal audit could play in TBML 
detection and compliance? 
 
5. Various outside agencies have developed training on TBML, what is 
his opinion of banks engaging with outside training organisations 
that work across all types of financial services? 
a. What should be contained in this training? 
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b. Who should be attending this training? 
 
6. Should banks be taking on a stronger investigative role into client 
behaviour, beneficial ownership and transaction details? 
a. Does this contravene the confidentiality and trust that clients 
have in banks? 
b. Does it infringe too much on client’s right to privacy? 
c. Do banks have the skills to do this type of work? 
 
7. Are there any other questions or issues that we should be asking 
about in relation to TBML and the banking sector? 
 
5.6.1 Thematic analysis of the Interviews 
 
The results of the interviews were analysed using the software 
HyperRESEARCH, which is a qualitative research analysis tool.  
“HyperResearch is a qualitative research program that helps 
with coding and retrieval, building theories, conducting 
analyses of data, and testing hypotheses. Some of the 
program’s strengths include the ability to use multimedia 
such as, text, graphics, audio, and video data. Furthermore, 
it has comprehensive code-and-retrieve functions, the ability 
to create code groups, flexible auto-coding, and create a 
code map. It also has the capabilities to assist with theory 
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building, while having the ability and function to add memos 
with annotations and citing to sources or codes, as well as, 
serves as an effective database management system.”814 
 
Each interview was first transcribed onto the online smartsurvey 
tool, which also provided an option for interviewees to fill in the 
questionnaire online if telephone contact was too difficult to arrange. Each 
respondent was allocated a computer code through the smartsurvey form 
and the answers were then cut and pasted into a separate text file, ready 
for the HyperRESEARCH software programme.  
 
A thematic analysis approach was used whereby codes were 
allocated as they emerged during the analysis process. The software 
enabled easy coding and report generation, so once the data had been 
entered reports could be compiled showing all the comments under each 
coded theme. The ID number off the smart survey site was used as an 
identifier.  
                                            
814
 “HyperResearch is a qualitative research program that helps with coding and retrieval, building 
theories, conducting analyses of data, and testing hypotheses. The overall analysis included a hybrid 
model of precoding and coding that used inductive and deductive analysis, which accounted for 
general domains that led to more content specific concepts that connect to the conceptual framework 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). For example, Miles and Huberman (1994) preferred creating a “starting 
list” or precoding derived from a conceptual framework, which is deductive, but also described two 
other useful methods of coding, which lead to the uncovering of questions that relate to a specific 
area of research (p. 58). Similarly, Charmaz (2006) said a conceptual framework “provides starting 
points” for looking at data but “do not offer automatic codes for analyzing these data" (p. 68).” Dr. 
Jeffrey Glogowski available at: www.discoverthought.com/Vipassana/Data_Analysis.html  
Miles, Matthew B., and A. Michael Huberman. "Qualitative data analysis: A sourcebook." Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications (1994).  
Charmaz, K., 2014. Constructing grounded theory. Sage. 
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A sample screenshot is shown in the image below where you can 
see the imported text file on the right with all the questions answered. On 
the far left of the screen is the code sheet. 
 
As text is highlighted it is allocated a code, which can be seen in the 
middle pane. 
 
In total 16 different codes were identified through the analysis process 
before any amalgamation or linking occurred. These were; 
 
1. Accountability & governance implications 
2. Overall corporate AML risk of the bank 
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3. Relationship with external agencies re TBML issues 
4. Individual client AML issues 
5. Internal Audit 
6. Role of investigation in banking 
7. Use of outsourcing (audit or training) 
8. Role of the regulator in TBML compliance and support 
9. Resources 
10. Risk assessment model being used 
11. Weaknesses in RBA 
12. Tax evasion 
13. Examples and problems with TBML activity 
14. TBML training 
15. Technology and future technology needs 
16. Future priorities 
 
A report was generated through the analysis software, which listed all 
the comments under each theme. This was then used to manually group 
together recommendations or observations that the interviewees made on 
each topic. 
 
Finally, the 16 themes were then grouped together into lager clusters 
for reporting purposes, this was done according to relevance and 
relationship of the answers to one another. The final areas of reporting 
were under 4 broad themes; 
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i. Risk Assessment Model (Weaknesses in Risk Model, Technology, 
TBML activity inc. tax evasion, External Agencies) 
ii. Internal Audit (Corporate AML Risk, Outsourcing, Accountable, 
Regulator) 
iii. Training in TBML (Resources, External Agencies, Investigative 
Skills) 
iv. Future Direction (future priorities plus any comments from other 
sections) 
Within the next section the topics discussed are supported by 
references to the actual respondent who raised the issue. These have 
been coded 815 as R = respondent followed by their online interview code 
generated by the survey website. Although it doesn’t inform the reader as 
to who made the comments, it does help to verify that different individuals 
raised points and to illustrate where several people all made the same 
type of comment.  
 
5.6.2 Risk Assessment Model 
 
Risk assessment is key to any strategy to detect TBML activity and 
it underpinned many of the suggestions made by respondents during the 
interviews. It was also the category that received the highest number of 
                                            
815
 R= respondent, this number is from the online interview sheet which was generated through the 
smartsurvey website offering the participant anonymity whilst also allowing me to know who they 
were. 
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coding segments. Within this code a number of themes emerged and 
these are reported on separately in the section below. 
5.6.2.1 Risk Avoidance versus Risk Aversion 
 
A statement made by one respondent reflected the overall message 
from this section “I think the main risk is not doing the TBML risk properly” 
(R7508). Another respondent (R7280) highlighted that incomplete TBML 
risk assessments due to resources or lack of familiarity could prove to be 
particularly challenging. 
There was a general acceptance of the need for risk assessment 
and this risk assessment model should operate from a premise of averting 
risk rather than avoiding or ignoring risk and should be consistent across 
all units of the bank including business planning and governance 
structures (R4731). In order for this to be achieved there needs to be a 
good understanding of the types of risk the bank can be exposed to 
through money laundering, financial crime and TBML. The simplicity of 
some of the current risk assessment models was highlighted as 
problematic (R9498) with the potential for staff to either override the 
system or unintentionally undermine it through providing low level diligent 
reports. 
 
Some cases were cited by respondents where banks had decided 
to close certain operations in countries as they were deemed as too high a 
risk (R8718). The fact that this may need to happen more often was 
reflected in this response, “The financial services industry needs to 
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understand its wider responsibility.” (R8884). The lack of understanding of 
TBML by management and the inability to see it as a threat to the financial 
sector was also mentioned by other respondents (R9191). 
 
Other respondents (R0839) saw the potential for smaller banks to 
become specialized in trade finance and be better prepared for TBML 
assessment. This linked into the point made (R 4909) that understanding 
your client and their business was a clear component for any TBML risk 
assessment scheme. 
 
5.6.2.2 Developing Risk Management Expertise 
 
One suggestion and a possible future trend for smaller banks is to 
focus on a smaller range of client base (R0839) operating within 
determined and specific business areas. This would enable expertise and 
knowledge of the businesses and likely transactions to be developed over 
time and ensure that risk assessment was less onerous (R4731). This 
would also provide a more positive approach than the current dilemma 
facing banks of losing clients (R9191) due to onerous AML checks that 
could ultimately send the client to another institution anyway.  
 
Even though it was suggested by one external academic researcher 
and trainer in TBML that the fear of upsetting key political figures seems to 
underpin some strategies within banks rather than developing good 
governance structures (R9191), many other respondents identified as a 
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bigger problem, the need to strike a balance between the needs of the 
business client and the RBA of risk assessment (R6261). 
 
It would appear to make better business sense to increase profit by 
specialising rather than being constantly worried about AML compliance 
breaches and the costs involved. Again, one respondent identified many 
advantages that a smaller specialized bank in trade finance would have 
over the generic bigger banks when it came to TBML risk assessment 
(R0839). 
 
One respondent identified the level of expertise needed by 
describing that when a bank undertakes the risk assessment process for a 
new client “banks need to examine the intrinsic nature of the business and 
assess the risks involved.” (R1430). This can only be achieved if there is 
the appropriate amount of knowledge available for this particular business 
venture and if the bank makes the effort to get to know the client’s 
business well (R8718, R0839, R4909) including the need to review 
existing clients and ensure that CDD checks are still up to date and 
appropriate (R3734).  
 
In larger banks a specific and dedicated trade function is needed to 
deal with the concerns associated with trade finance risk. This unit could 
possibly develop stronger links with relevant external trade related 
organisations such as customs and law enforcement (R8718). It was 
emphasised that TBML is only likely to expand and become more prolific 
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in the future and so investment into addressing this issue cannot be 
delayed any further (R7508). 
 
It was acknowledged several times under the training section that 
respondents identified a clear lack of expertise on TBML within the 
banking sector. And that this was potentially detrimental to developing a 
sound risk based assessment for TBML. 
 
5.6.2.3 Understanding Trade Specific Risks 
 
The nature of transnational trade transactions means that there are 
a multitude of risks that the client can be exposed to in any regular trading 
agreement such as customer risk, market risk, and commodity risk. This is 
before money laundering and illegal trade activities are considered 
(R4412). Even when trade transactions may appear to be legitimate the 
fact that many legitimate goods can be used for non-legitimate purposes 
adds in another layer of complexity (R4731), a weakness that has already 
been highlighted by the last thematic review of the UK by the FCA.816 It 
was generally agreed that a simple checklist system was not adequate 
enough to cover the complexities of trade based money laundering 
(R4731), although some countries did not have any regulatory requirement 
to detect TBML per se (R1192). 
                                            
816
FCA (2013) Bank’s Control of Financial Crime Risks inTrade Finance. London: Financial Conduct 
Authority.   
https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/thematic-reviews/tr-13-03.pdf 
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The challenges of simplified risk matrices were also raised as an 
inappropriate tool for detecting the complexity of TBML (R7062). 
 
5.6.2.4 Standardised Operations 
 
For larger international businesses operating in different 
jurisdictions there is the added challenge of developing consistently across 
the offices (R1618) but at the same time developing localised risk 
assessment protocols and procedures (R4731). 
 
5.6.2.5 Know Your Customer  
 
One of the key tools in any ML risk assessment is to know the 
customer well (R7508), along with having in-depth knowledge of the 
business or trade being undertaken (R9773). There were several concerns 
raised in relation to the confidentiality of clients being compromised, 
through increased KYC research. However, some respondents stated very 
clearly that the bank was a partner in these transactions and in that 
capacity they had every entitlement to clarify concerns in order to be sure 
that they were not participating in a potentially illegal transaction (R5800). 
 
5.6.2.6 Beneficial Ownership 
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Beneficial ownership information is also a component of 
understanding the client and the businesses they deal with, and some 
respondents were clear that this should not be construed as an 
infringement of privacy rights (R7508). After all some money laundering 
schemes take advantage of the client and some transactions may occur 
without the client’s full knowledge or permission, so it is also to safeguard 
client’s businesses. Another respondent also highlighted that since the 
bank is involved in the transaction then asking for further clarification is not 
a breach of confidentiality (R5800), so long as the information is looked 
after within the bank. However, corporate clients who were expecting to 
keep information secret could no longer expect this level of collusion from 
the banks moving forwards (R9407). This process should be undertaken 
when first establishing a business relationship with the client (R3315), 
although due to the nature of TBML activity approaching established 
business owners this may also need to be updated or undertaken on a 
more regular basis. However, the challenges of trying to scrutinise 
complex businesses across different jurisdictions was raised (R1618). 
 
5.6.2.7 Risk Assessment Tools 
 
One of the challenges mentioned by respondents was whether 
TBML risk assessment is separate to other AML controls (R1192) or 
whether the two should be considered part of the same system. The 
reason that might be considered separate is because of the nature of the 
trade transactions and the fact that most AML tools are designed for non-
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trade based accounts (R1192). However, this does not mean that a more 
generic financial crime risk assessment tool could not be developed to 
encompass all kinds of crime was one suggestion (R4869). 
 
Several respondents stated that TBML detection is part of the 
overall AML process (R9068, R4869) and so this should not be seen as 
anything too big or out of the capacity for many organisations, However, 
other respondents highlighted that a strong AML base was needed first by 
the banks before TBML could be dealt with effectively “The response of 
banks is dependent on regulatory pressure to some extent, if basic AML 
measures are not in place then TBML definitely will not be possible.” 
(R9498). It was also emphasised that all AML work should be integrated 
across the organisation and should avoid isolating the work (R6427). 
However, it was acknowledged that most risk assessment models at the 
moment are focused on tick boxes and red flags based on standard and 
typical TBML typologies (R7877). The challenge faced was how to be 
more stringent on risk assessment without unduly affecting businesses 
and losing trade clients as a result. The time element of following up on 
reports can also be an inhibitor for small businesses, one respondent 
identified letters of credit searches taking a week to be returned (R6704). 
However, it was stated that banks and financial services needed to 
embrace this level of risk assessment or else consider leaving the trade 
finance sector completely (R8985). 
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In summary the risk assessment model should be comprised of the 
following components. 
 
A. KYC norms stringently implemented 
a. With a system for quarantining accounts 
b. Getting to know clients well - and keeping client information 
up to date 
c. Using behavioural risk assessment techniques 
d. Monitoring transactions for red flags and putting a hold on 
such accounts (to bring about transparency) 
B. Has to be a predominately human rather than technological 
assessment  
a. Need to assess and incorporate technology where 
appropriate 
C. Need to know the client’s business well 
D. Identify changes that could introduce additional risk - e.g. New 
trading routes and new countries that existing clients branch into. 
 
5.6.2.8 Weaknesses in TBML Risk Assessment 
 
A separate code was established for comments that focused 
specifically on identified weaknesses in the current risk assessment 
approaches.  
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5.6.2.9 Risk Matrices 
 
Risk matrices are commonly used in banking and there are a 
number of different models in use according to the replies, However, many 
smaller institutions tend to use simpler models which are not always the 
most effective system to combat different money laundering schemes 
“Some smaller banks use basic risk assessments and use the simple risk 
matrix (H,M,L) and by default the middle risk tends to get selected, 
compared to other models which can be very complicated, as seen in 
larger financial institutions which have highly developed systems in place” 
(R9498). 
 
5.6.2.10 Knowledge Gap 
 
One of the gaps in the current AML assessment approach is that 
money laundering risk assessment relies on the quality of information that 
is being gathered and conveyed up to other departments. How, or if this 
information is passed on, can sometimes be influenced by commercial or 
profit considerations (R4731) rather than risk interests. Trade finance 
information is often not understood by bank staff outside of the trade 
finance unit (R7889, R7508). A system of behavioural risk management 
was suggested (R8884), i.e. focus on the inherent risks from within the 
bank due to lack of training etc. as a means to prevent events occurring 
that might cause risky transactions occurring. Ultimately the quality of 
information being gathered would be dependent upon “the capacity and 
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skill set of those internally responsible for financial crime” (R9068). Some 
of the larger banks have specific financial crime units and these often 
utilise the skills of former police investigators (R9773), these skills could 
be transferred across other units within the bank and specially to front 
office staff. 
 
Another weakness is that the quality of information may be very 
poor, especially if only part of a series of transactions are occurring 
through the bank (R9068). This would mean that the level of expertise 
needs to be quite high amongst the bank staff, in order for these cases to 
be flagged as potential ML problems. Several respondents raised the 
issue of the role of the front office staff as being the first line of defence 
and so the knowledge and skillset needs to be improved at this level 
(R1551) as a major priority. There is also the need to constantly update 
client information, since many money laundering schemes are now using 
established clients as an entry point into the banking sector so many 
established clients can no longer be assumed to be low risk.  
 
5.6.2.11 Geographical Risk 
 
Many banks have offices across the globe and have tended 
traditionally to assume that the standards of money laundering control and 
risk assessment are comparable across offices within the same bank 
(R8718). Recent cases such as the HBUS in the United States and their 
trust in their Mexican affiliate of HSBC proved how ill-founded this 
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assumption was. In future each country will have to assess independently 
regardless of the name of the bank. Similarly, many banks have facilitated 
large cash transactions due to cultural reasons often linked to a lack of 
formal banking structures in certain areas of the globe. However, the 
increased use of digital payment technology means that most countries 
now have access to electronic payment transfer systems, albeit with a 
different set of risks. Bank staff will need to maintain research and 
awareness of the situations globally in relation to cash and electronic 
systems available. However, the reality is that many banks will be unable 
to complete detailed investigations into client’s accounts when multiple 
jurisdictions are involved “The problem is being consistent - how can 
banks scrutinise complex business relationships across jurisdictional 
boundaries for instance?” (R1618). 
 
5.6.2.12 A Step Too Far 
 
The respondents were asked, as part of one of the questions, 
whether TBML detection was perhaps a step too far for many banks and 
financial services at the moment, some respondents agreed that it was 
(R9602, R9321). Other respondents highlighted that banks are not a crime 
fighting force (R1192). However, it was also acknowledged that it is the 
very lack of knowledge of criminal behaviour and the limited understanding 
of how the banks are being placed at risk through criminal ingenuity, that is 
perhaps one of the biggest risks faced by the banks today (R7979).  
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The current system of KYC data and intelligence gathering is 
considered by some clients to be onerous enough. The feeling from some 
respondents was that if this process becomes any more complicated and 
burdensome on the client they will leave and use less accountable and 
also less traceable financial mechanisms (R1618). 
5.6.2.13 Understanding Financial Crime 
 
One weakness that was raised by respondents (R9773) was that 
banks are businesses and work with their clients who are also business 
owners. There is not really an understanding of financial crime within 
either group, but rather a focus on ensuring the business is not slowed 
down through bureaucracy.  If the system gets too complicated this could 
encourage bank staff to start circumventing the protocols in order to 
facilitate the client. This was illustrated through the HBUS case 817 where 
country filters were routinely bypassed because it delayed loan approval 
by some considerable time.  Another factor that was highlighted was that 
in a bonus driven culture the need to secure deals by staff might be 
advantageous to the criminal clients, who would be willing to pay the 
higher fees in order to launder money into the system (R7979). 
 
                                            
817
 Homeland Security. (2012). HSBC exposed US financial system to money laundering, drug, 
terrorist financing risks. From permanent sub committee on investigations. US Senate. Retrieved 
from http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/us-vulnerabilities-to-
money-laundering-drugs-and-terrorist-financing-hsbc-case-history accessed 4 August 2015 
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5.6.2.14 Cost of TBML Risk Assessment 
 
There are a number of resource implications in undertaking money 
laundering and TBML risk assessment.  Firstly, many of the units involved 
are not seen as profit centres within the bank but cost centres such as the 
trade finance unit (R7889), AML compliance and internal audit. This 
means that in a competitive environment a profit focused approach tends 
to be adopted and prioritised (R7889). This included staff and also 
investment into tuning and improving technological approaches within the 
bank (R9321). 
 
However, increased fines and the loss of profit through negative 
reputational risk are beginning to influence change at this level slightly. 
Respondents stated that directors need to take responsibility in TBML 
detection (R7979) which would mean assigning the right resources 
including appropriate staff numbers, access to relevant training and 
enhancing a culture of risk assessment to detect and stop all forms of 
money laundering across all units within the bank. 
 
5.6.2.15 Specific TBML reporting officer 
 
This suggestion was probably aimed at larger organisations that 
already have in place a structure of MLROs or money laundering reporting 
officers. On the one hand experts had called for TBML and ML to remain 
together and avoid confusion, However, in this suggestion there was 
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recognition of the different nature of TBML.  One expert suggested that the 
TBML officers could do some of the follow up research after suspicious 
reports had been raised by front office and non AML compliance staff 
across the bank (R9602). This role might also overlap with the current 
position of money laundering reporting officer (MLRO), who in some cases 
was seen as a legal protection for staff, who felt they were relieved of any 
responsibility once they had reported their suspicions onto this post 
“Banks and trading companies have to have Money Laundering Reporting 
officers to whom suspicious transactions must be reported, only if so 
reported will an employee avoid being charged with aiding and abetting.” 
(R7979). 
 
It was felt by several respondents that risk assessment was 
basically a systems problem (R9773) and that once the system was 
operating effectively this would be most of the battle won. “TBML is a 
practical rather than a theoretical problem and we need practical solutions 
and policies.” (R9498). 
 
5.6.2.16 Technology and Risk Assessment 
 
One of the concerns raised by respondents was how to deal with 
the vast amount of data that could be generated through analysing trade 
transactions. The problem was further compounded by the fact that few 
people knew what they were looking for from this data and even if they did 
time was limited and the data quantities quite vast.  The use of technology 
 430 
was mentioned a number of times as one possible solution to managing 
the data problem, along with the need to develop good AML software 
which was described as lacking in the sector (R9321). The main IT 
suggestions have been described in more detail in the section below. 
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5.6.2.17 Digital Document Formats 
 
One of the practical issues of examining trade documents is that 
most of these are physical documents (R1430) that have to be reviewed 
by hand and acquired from various sources. If some of this information 
could be developed (or it could be scanned and sent as electronic 
attachments) and then analysed through TBML software, this could assist 
in speeding up the automation process for approving letters of credit or 
other trade finance schemes.  One example from the UK mentioned a 
centralised service for commercial companies that exists, whereby trading 
documents could be verified quickly on a yes/no basis to the banks 
(R1192). 
 
5.6.2.18 Linking to Current AML Software programmes  
 
It was acknowledged that many banks do use automated 
monitoring systems to screen messages and emails (R7877). However, 
the difficulty is that the overall system of monitoring and IT is ineffective, 
“the overall approach is not structured to provide such assurance and 
systems are not capable of handling such volume of information.” (R8884).  
Additional software needs to be developed or adapted to include being 
able to scan for sanctioned or suspicious parties (R5800), possibly linked 
to Interpol databases. Some systems are currently being used, possibly by 
the bigger banks and include systems such as; 
 Worldcheck 
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 HM Treasury (for dual use goods) 
 International Maritime Bureau (to check vessel name and flag)  
 IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) 
 The United Nation’s Comtrade database 
 
 
5.6.2.19 Managing Trade Data 
 
The problem of access to good software to screen goods, ports and 
places was raised as one area of concern (R4412). Other respondents 
identified weaknesses in the current red flag system such as the UK 
regulators advice to check for price anomalies. 
“How would a banker know the market price for all the 
various commodities they work with? Especially taken into 
account that the chosen trade term may affect the price as 
well.” (R4412). Another comment was “Banks tend to not 
look into over-pricing / under-pricing or irregularities on every 
occasion - how can they?” (R1192) 
 
One suggestion was that automated monitoring systems needed to 
focus on TBML type transactions (R8718).  This was especially important 
given the large volume of trade transactions occurring at any one time 
which makes it difficult for staff to spot suspicious transactions (R7979). 
 
 433 
The use of Zdanowicz’s trade database (based on US exports and 
imports) as a system for exploring trade anomalies was suggested by one 
respondent (R6039) as a system that has been invented but not yet 
proven to be effective. They suggested that perhaps banks should be 
making greater use of this advancement in trade patterns rather than 
constantly seeking out their own anomalies each time. However, other 
respondents also stated the need for specific TBML algorithms (R8718) 
and the trade data results from Zdanowicz could then be used as the basis 
for developing such an algorithm. Other respondents suggested that the 
complexities and number of variables within TBML were too many to allow 
it to be fully automated (R9407, R7889). 
 
5.6.2.20 Using Technology to Manage External Risks 
 
Another use of technology that was suggested (R8718) was to 
assist in the research needed for dynamic risk assessment processes. 
“Banks should as far as possible use technology to enhance their control 
environment and align their control measures globally to assist them in 
identifying higher risk branches in other territories.” (R8718). 
 
5.6.2.21 TBML Data Management  
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A training consultancy firm that specialises in TBML training made 
this statement on a recent social media site, in relation to the possibility of 
developing specific TBML software to assist in risk assessment.  
 
“for TBML, there is simply no substitute for the human 
element in detecting possibly suspicious behaviour in trade 
finance. Automation of detection would be possible if 
automation of processing were possible. For trade finance, 
automated processing of transactions is simply not possible, 
due to the number of variables and variances in letters of 
credit, documentary collections, etc... As a result, the 
automation of detection is equally impossible, therefore what 
is left is the human element, a tool that can only be honed 
with specialised training” (Manchester, 2015).818 
 
Other documents on software systems and risk assessment such 
as the ACAMS White paper on Developing a Risk Assessment Tool for 
Internal Audit by Estreich 819 provides an overview of some of the AML 
factors that internal audit needs to consider.  However, in trying to be all 
encompassing of the AML issues, the paper ends up presenting a very 
                                            
818
Manchester, K (2015) TBML Forum 
https://www.linkedin.com/groupItem?view=&item=5965864558089244675&type=member&gid=650
9147&trk=eml-b2_anet_digest-hero-1-hero-disc-disc-
0&midToken=AQE00DQUTjTeHw&fromEmail=fromEmail&ut=2EQiTcnJypwSE1 accessed 4 
March 2015 
819
Estreich, J. (2013). How to build an audit risk assessment tool to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing. [White Paper] (White Paper). ACAMS 
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complicated risk assessment tool that ultimately is led by data 
management processes rather than audit analysis.  
 
This research paper is focusing specifically on TBML and so the 
AML risk assessment needs to be focused specifically on trade finance 
operations within the bank.  
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5.7 Internal Audit 
 
One of the areas of risk assessment and TBML detection that this 
research was keen to explore, was the relationship between internal audit 
and AML compliance. This was primarily because a recent report from the 
FCA 820 (2013) had suggested that internal audit should have a stronger 
role and  become more involved in AML risk assessment processes and 
other audit agencies such as PwC 821  had also suggested similar 
sentiments. 
 
“We found that some staff in compliance, internal audit and 
legal functions had a limited understanding of trade based 
money laundering risks. This meant they were unable to 
oversee or challenge the business effectively on decisions 
taken” (FCA, 2013, p35). 
 
5.7.1 Role of Internal Audit 
 
There was little evidence in the literature review that this issue of an 
increased role in AML risk assessment had been studied academically, or 
that suitable guidelines had been developed at an empirical level to 
support the FCA suggestion. In order to address this issue the interview 
                                            
820
 FCA. (2013). Bank's control of financial crime risks in trade finance. London: Financial Conduct 
Authority. 
821
PWC. (2014b). Internal audit holding the line on BSA/AML compliance. Retrieved from 
http://antimoneylaundering-fiba.com/files/1499.pdf 
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questions in this research included one question that was focused 
specifically on the role that the respondents saw for internal audit within 
TBML and AML compliance and risk assessment processes. The 
responses were mixed in terms of whether internal audit should become 
more involved or whether this would compromise their independence 
when reporting to the audit committee or management. In total 63% of the 
responses agreed that internal audit should have a role to play in AML 
compliance process but most agreed that this was separate to the role of 
AML compliance itself. The full range of suggestions for internal audit have 
been categorised into 2 main themes which are –the role of internal audit 
and the gaps or reasons why IA involvement in TBML would not be 
appropriate (See figure 4 on the next page). 
 
There were a variety of opinions regarding the role of IA, some 
respondents felt that there should be a greater level of involvement whilst 
others viewed IA as lacking the expertise to be able to contribute 
meaningfully to TBML risk assessment processes. 
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Figure 4: Role of IA 
 
At one end of the spectrum there were some respondents who felt 
that IA should be fully integrated with AML compliance - “AML unit should 
be part of internal audit in order to effectively manage anti money 
laundering activities of banks” (Respondent 9321). Another respondent 
suggested that internal audit should be one of a team of players involved 
in ongoing development and monitoring “Audit, along with other 
appropriate departments such as legal, compliance, tax etc. Must be 
involved in developing risk assessment approach.” (Respondent 8985). 
Stronger links between internal unit and trade units was another 
suggestion (Respondent 4412). 
 
This might be a more relevant strategy for smaller companies as 
one respondent identified “most small banks do not have the resources to 
Role of IA 
Advise 
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of risks 
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More audit 
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do this work and so have to use them [IA]. The monitoring of the work 
tends to be either compliance or internal audit” (Respondent 1551). In 
larger banks the options for integration are probably less favourable and 
internal audit and compliance would be very separate units. 
 
5.7.1.1 Separate Role - independent as 3rd line of defence 
 
The position that was voiced by a larger number of the respondents 
was that internal audit already has a very clear role to play in AML 
compliance by providing independent assurance through their third line of 
defence role (R9498), i.e., after risk management has been undertaken by 
the front office and AML compliance sections. One of the reasons 
suggested for maintaining this clear role distinction was to enable 
management to uncover any problems, rather than have them exposed by 
the regulator. “Senior management would prefer internal audit to find 
something rather than the regulators” (R 9068). 
 
Another respondent stated very clearly that internal audit should not 
be “creating the risk assessment” (R7508) but track “the evaluation of the 
risk process and whether the bank is adapting to changes” (R 9407).  
However, it was recognised that internal audit still needed expertise in 
TBML as part of its 3rd line of defence role in supporting governance and 
the reporting to the audit committee. 
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“The challenge is to ensure that IA can report up through the 
chain of command in governance any issues that they 
identify. For that there needs to be a level of expertise within 
IAF on AML/TBML.” (R9498). 
 
5.7.2 Internal Auditing of AML 
 
Nearly all of the respondents felt that at some level, that regardless 
of their perception of internal audit roles, there was still recognition that 
internal audit had to change how it tackled AML audits.  
 
This suggested that possibly AML compliance and AML auditing are 
two distinct areas of expertise. Therefore, an effective AML process needs 
to consist of both components i.e. audit and compliance operating as 
effectively and as efficiently as possible. One respondent identified that 
with increased attention to AML compliance at a governance level, then 
there is automatically a need for improved auditing services both internal 
and externally within the bank to meet this need (R7508). 
 
“It is important that IAF is able to identify the potential threats 
and risks to the organisation and address them in a timely 
manner, therefore the ability to identify and work on high risk 
issues is paramount in the work of IA and TBML is one of 
those risks.” (R9498). 
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One of the difficulties identified was the current focus within 
banking, on compliance needs rather than identifying risk. One respondent 
stated that there needed to be a shift in attitude and greater awareness 
towards the risk of criminal liability, “At present there is a focus on 
compliance with standards as the basis for a true and fair view. However, 
the threat of conviction for money laundering could be a significant 
business liability for banks and therefore better scrutiny over the 
management of risk would be appropriate.” (R1618). Internal audit should 
also present the audit report in relation to the specific context of the bank 
so that the findings and recommendations for change are practical and 
relevant to the other units in the bank, “The reports from auditors need to 
be set into the specific context of the bank so they can be used most 
effectively” (R9498). 
 
5.7.2.1 Risk Auditing 
 
The danger with risk auditing is when it is left to a yes/no process of 
compliance in ticking boxes (R8884), the audit has to move beyond this 
stage and provide useful and relevant feedback to the AML compliance 
section and the audit committee. In particular, a clear understanding of risk 
drivers and the suitability of the AML framework in place to overcome 
these drivers (R8884) needs to be at the core of the audit report, “Internal 
audit must determine the risks of the business in its various product sets, 
geographic footprint and customer characteristics” (R9407). In addition, it 
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was named that management in turn needed to act upon any red flag 
alerts that internal audit was raising (R9321), especially with regards to 
potential weaknesses or gaps in the risk assessment approach being 
implemented, “Internal audit must match the risks identified with the 
defences mounted by the bank.  If there are large loopholes or weak areas 
in defences, they must be identified to the audit committee and resolved 
ASAP” (R9407). 
 
The respondents made several suggestions as to how the AML audit 
might occur and these have been compiled as a revised list below:  
 
a) Make sure that adequate up to date policies and procedures are in 
place for TBML. 
b) Check that every staff member has successfully completed the 
mandatory training, which is refreshed regularly.  
c) Ensure that reports are being correctly handled by the MLRO. 
d) Ensure that executive and non-executive directors are receiving 
regular and accurate reports. 
e) Review and challenge were necessary the frameworks in place. 
f) Including a review of the AML controls being used by the bank. 
g) Periodically review and independently verify identified high risk 
cases. 
h) Review the SAR reporting process. 
i) Routine audits could potentially undermine the 2nd stage of defence 
system. 
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j) Follow the trail of SARs to review the effectiveness of the risk 
assessment tools rather than just commenting on the presence of 
the tools. 
k) Review the outputs sent to FIUs to assess the quality of the reports 
being sent. 
l) Be aware of current political and economic risks related to sanction 
regimes. 
m) Have a clear understanding of the business risks being faced by the 
bank e.g. geography, business products and customer 
characteristics. 
 
Underpinning this list of AML audit skills and tasks is the understanding 
that the expertise of internal auditors is capable and skilled enough for the 
job. However, many of the respondents questioned whether this was the 
case currently. 
 
5.7.3 Lack of TBML Expertise 
 
One of the reasons that was given for not involving IA in the TBML 
risk assessment development was that there was not enough expertise 
within most IA units to manage this, “Internal auditors are rarely experts in 
financial crime, so necessarily their role tends to be more of a ‘tick box’ 
approach looking at the compliance with the banks policies and 
procedures” (R9068). However, at the same time they are still expected to 
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audit TBML risk assessment processes and report on the levels of AML 
compliance and the gaps in the system. 
 
Another respondent (R8718) agreed with the above comments but 
suggested that outsourced expertise could be used to supplement gaps in 
IA knowledge.  However, there was still a need for internal audit to up skill 
in issues related to trade finance since outsourcing has a cost associated 
with it. This was mentioned by another respondent (R7877) who also 
added that the lack of trade finance knowledge was another reason why IA 
did not currently appear to have a strong role to play in TBML auditing. Yet 
another response stated “I don’t think it [IA] generally has the skills to be 
able to deal with the complex risk issues faced here” (R1618). 
 
To be effective one respondent suggested that internal audit needs 
to invest in staff and ensure the recruitment of appropriate skills “[IA] has 
to attract good people who wish to make a longer-term commitment to be 
effective” (R1551). A longer-term strategy supported with adequate 
training in TBML and AML compliance was therefore seen as the biggest 
issue to be addressed by internal audit, from this group of respondents.  
 
What was less clear from these respondents was if the skill level of 
internal auditors was raised, would they then been perceived as having a 
greater role to play in risk assessment? If this was to be the case then a 
future priority for all organisations would be to improve risk assessment 
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models and processes, and up skill internal auditors in this field of 
expertise. 
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5.7.3.1 Summary Internal Audit 
 
Although most respondents were clearly articulating the range of 
skills that are needed for an effective AML audit, there was also 
agreement that many of these skills were not currently available within 
most internal audit departments and units. This would imply that AML and 
TBML auditing is a future good practice strategy for many organisations 
especially smaller banks and financial companies, rather than a reflection 
of actual current practice. However, it does have implications for some of 
the other themes in this section especially training in TBML since there is 
now a distinction between TBML compliance and TBML auditing skills.  
 
5.7.4 Internal Audit and Governance 
 
One of the key themes that respondents were asked to comment 
upon was accountability, and where it lay within the banking structure for 
ensuring that AML compliance was undertaken effectively. Responses 
have been sub divided into the five themes that emerged under this 
general heading, these were:  
 Management;  
 Banking culture;  
 Regulators;  
 Resources;  
 Audit.  
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5.7.5 Management 
 
Some respondents believed that senior level management within 
many organisations was lacking in leadership capacity on AML risk 
management. They appeared to lack a strong level of commitment to 
addressing the gaps in the AML policies was one opinion (R9321). This 
could be rectified in one suggestion by having a greater level of 
involvement by management and audit committees in the oversight of AML 
and TBML systems (R9191). This could be achieved by management 
conducting its own assessment of the bank`s exposure and risk to TBML 
(R1192), and to use that as the basis for directing internal audit of its AML 
priorities (R8884). In practical terms this would probably be done by 
external audit, which is largely informed by internal audit, which in turn 
tends to be influenced by the existing governance structure. Therefore, 
there is the potential for this approach to simply reiterate the current 
practice.  
 
It was also stressed that the lead needs to come from the top 
(R7508), so that the correct culture of the bank towards AML compliance 
was established. However, as with all risk assessment processes a 
detailed understanding of TBML would be needed first, in order to assess 
the risk faced by the bank. Otherwise a superficial and misleading analysis 
could be undertaken that later prevents other units such as audit or 
compliance from raising concerns, “They need to develop a stronger 
understanding of the topic and a willingness to accept that AML is a 
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priority issue for the bank” (R9498). Although one suggestion was that the 
directors do not need to be involved directly at a practical level in AML 
compliance (R7508), at the same time the legal responsibilities do rest 
with the board (R7979). Therefore, there is a level of culpability that needs 
to be covered in any risk assessment system that includes the entire 
governance structure. This includes the feeds of information that need to 
reach the appropriate levels within the governance and audit structures 
and which need to be fed independently of the profit focus of the business 
(R4731).  
 
5.7.6 Culture of the Bank 
 
One of the concerns raised by the respondents was the lack of a 
supportive culture towards fully implementing AML compliance systems. In 
particular, one respondent stated that AML compliance can sometimes be 
a paper exercise especially when it came to dealing with war torn 
countries such as Iraq or Syria (R9321) or weak economies in developing 
countries. The importance of the integrity of the financial services was 
mentioned (R8884) as a new area of priority for many banks to take on “A 
lot depends on the support, corporate guidance and the priority that they 
give to AML” (R9498).  Following the global economic downturn many 
more members of the public have become sceptical of the traditional 
mainstream banking ethos and culture. They are not happy with the profit 
at any price approach to business, and factors such as environmental 
sustainability, ethical investments and supporting community development 
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have become keen factors of interest for the bank’s client nowadays. This 
in turn requires a cultural shift in the bank’s governance structure to 
ensure that these new areas of interest are represented amongst their 
services and prioritised within the business plans and distribution of 
resources. 
 
One of the influencing factors in accountability is the number of 
legal cases taken against bank`s which is beginning to influence corporate 
attitudes towards compliance, “Due to enormous fines, banks are facing 
the reality that they must evaluate the risks their customers impose for 
TBML” (R9407). 
 
5.7.7 Guidance and Resource Material / Regulators 
 
Another issue that was identified was the lack of guidance or clear 
policies on internal compliance procedures (R8985, R8246). This was also 
reflected in the lack of appropriate supervision for compliance staff 
(R8985). The role of the regulator was also mentioned because without 
clear guidance on what is expected of banks (R1192), it would be difficult 
for an appropriate and relevant risk assessment process to be put in place. 
AML guidance needs to be directed specifically at governance so 
everyone is clear on their role within the process (R9773) rather than it 
being left to AML compliance alone. Another respondent named how 
banks might respond to this clarity saying that they will take the role being 
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prescribed but nothing more otherwise client confidence might be 
compromised (R9602). Another argument could be that client confidence 
might be increased if they thought the bank was doing everything possible 
to alleviate potential money laundering threats appearing in the bank. 
Leadership needed to come from the bank it was suggested (R6704), 
since then the culture and approach of all staff would be consistent. 
 
Even in small organisations the overlap of roles such as credit or 
finance managers taking on MLRO roles was highlighted as problematic 
(R7979). 
 
5.7.8 External Audit 
 
The use of effective external audit companies to give a thorough 
analysis of the risk assessment procedures was suggested, but this was 
also questioned as a process since “external audit companies fear losing a 
client more than they fear inspection of their effectiveness” (R9191).  This 
would suggest that the remit given by governance would need to be very 
clear to the external agency, that what they wanted was a critical appraisal 
of the risk assessment systems being used and that they expected to 
receive a critical report highlighting areas for change. 
 
5.7.9 Corporate Responsibility 
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One of the questions that generated a broader range and array of 
answers was on the overall corporate responsibility that a bank or financial 
service had towards understanding AML risk. There were very mixed 
responses from the experts as to whether the banking sector as a whole 
was ready to address the complexities that modern ML scheme were 
presenting. The comments ranged from “I do not believe the Banking 
Industry as a whole is ready to focus on TBML/AML factors” (R8884), 
through to the more positive “I think that most banks are handling AML 
fairly well” (R7508).  The following section has divided the responses into 
two main areas - the challenges that banks are currently facing and future 
priorities that banks will need to embrace moving forwards. The focus of 
the question was on the overall banking approach and its corporate 
responsibility. This would include prioritisation of resources from 
governance and allocating the level of importance that AML compliance 
would occupy within future strategic plans. 
 
5.7.10 Resources 
 
One of the many indicators of TBML activity are discrepancies in 
trade documentation, and yet the biggest challenge facing banks is how to 
have the resources and access to data to verify this level of deception. 
One expert suggested this was not the role of banks at all (R1192), and 
continued to support the point by highlighting that in their sector there were 
no statutory requirements for TBML monitoring or reporting in their 
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country.  This latter point is probably because TBML is covered under the 
generic ML requirements, which links into an issue that was raised by 
several experts when they stated that TBML shouldn’t be separated from 
other forms of financial crime. 
 
Even if some experts (R9602, R6039, R1192, R0994, R7062, 
R5602) felt it was a step too far to start investigating potential TBML 
activity, it was noted that trade finance was going to be area of increasing 
concern (R7508). The challenge of secrecy was another point of concern 
and often seems to be raised and a reason why banks should not be 
passing information onto the relevant authorities. This was clarified by one 
expert who reiterated an earlier point that it is not a breach of 
confidentiality to seek more information (especially linked to acquiring 
beneficial ownership information) on a business transaction that the bank 
will be a part of (R5800). Generally, there was scepticism that the staff 
who work in a bank and therefore are trained in supporting a profit-making 
venture, will have the appropriate level of understanding about money 
laundering, that is required for AML compliance and risk assessment work 
(R9773, R8718). Perhaps understandably they want to speed up 
processes for their clients, rather than slow them down and risk losing the 
business altogether (R9773). In addition, trade finance along with AML 
compliance and audit are all considered as cost centres to the bank rather 
than profit centres, and therefore these will be viewed as lower in priority. 
Although training was mentioned throughout the interviews there was also 
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some emphasis placed on changing the culture of the bank or organisation 
towards prioritising AML compliance and detection. 
 
An additional challenge that banks face is the internal challenge of 
staff who facilitate criminal activity, especially through ignoring warning 
signs, in order to complete sales and receive bonuses. The bonus culture 
and reward system in banks is orientated towards profit and sales, it does 
not encourage risk assessment and reporting (R7979).  
 
5.8 Training TBML 
 
The final area in the interview themes and one of the key areas that 
respondents were asked about was training in TBML. In particular, they 
were asked whether the banking sector was open to the use of external 
training agencies to enhance the knowledge base within the sector and 
which areas of training were needed.  
 
5.8.1 Use of External Training Agencies 
 
The respondents cautiously approved the use of external agencies, 
often stipulating that the training had to be relevant and “competent”, so 
that it would provide additional information to that which the bank already 
had access to within its own skill set (R1430).  
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There was a suggestion that “industry forums” (R1430) or 
conventions (R6418) might be a more appropriate and relevant 
mechanism for updating bank staff on current AML issues. Another 
suggestion was to hold industry forums as well as training (R3668) and 
another option that was suggested was to have inter organisational 
training to share practical ideas and scenarios within the industry (R7979). 
However, given some statements this might be challenging since banks 
are often quite secretive around their compliance and risk assessment 
processes, “Banks are notoriously secretive and do not like opening up 
and working with outside agencies” (R1551). 
 
In the meantime, the following statement encapsulated several 
concerns that respondents expressed regarding the level of expertise 
present within the banking sector, “Outside expertise on TBML is needed – 
as the banks themselves currently do not have the expertise or enough of 
it” (R6666). 
The biggest problem seemed to be the quality of outside expertise 
and a strong criticism of current training programmes that were being 
offered. There was criticism from one respondent that many external 
agencies are lawyer led and tend to suit corporate organisations more 
than the banking sector (R7877). Other respondents suggested that much 
of the current training is at quite a high level (R4412) and perhaps future 
training needs to focus on becoming more practical, although it was 
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acknowledged that this is not as straight forward as it may seem, given the 
complex scope of TBML activity currently available.  
 
There was a consensus that training programmes should be tailor 
made for each bank and not simply an offering of generic TBML models 
that could well be outdated by the time the training was delivered. The 
training should therefore suit the individual staff position (R6666), the 
region that the bank was operating in (R0994) and for risk assessment 
suggestions to be cognizant of local cultural practices (R7062). 
 
Due to the changes in methods and systems of money laundering, 
it was suggested that annual training was not sufficient to capture new 
trends and methods (R5602). It was also noted that international banks 
that had offices and branches in different countries would need to look for 
risk assessment consistency across all the bank offices whilst also being 
aware of local cultural and regional differences (R0839). 
 
For smaller banks, there could be a greater reliance on external 
support and expertise “Especially if TBF is a new area for the bank and/or 
does not have a qualified internal training team.” (R7508).  The 
complexities of TBML and trade finance processes were raised a number 
of times such as “The technicalities of international transfer pricing are not 
always understood.” (R1192). There was also a suggestion that 
compliance staff need to have a thorough understanding of trade finance 
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risks if TBML is to be detected (R4869), and this could put further strain on 
the resources and staff in smaller organisations. 
 
There was a repeated emphasis that the training needed to link into 
the existing approach of the bank and compliment other internal AML 
processes, “External training can be useful if the necessary expertise 
meets internal requirements” (R 8985). It was also important that all staff 
became involved in the training (R8985, R9321, R9407, R9068, R6704, 
R9498) especially the front office and back office staff who were actually 
processing a lot of the data (R6704). A number of respondents also 
recommended that trade finance staff should be prioritised for training in 
TBML detection (R3315), although several suggestions mentioned that the 
risk assessment framework should ultimately determine who accesses 
which training and when (R1192). One suggestion was that other forms of 
training such as e-learning (R1992) could be a way to access outside 
support in a more cost effective and easier to manage format. 
 
5.8.2 Training Approach 
 
Several respondents identified the need to provide more practical 
focused training rather than being theory led (R9498). They stated that 
training should be given by practical experts with experience rather than 
just scholars (R5800), who tend to have limited practical examples and 
work related experience. The traditional approach to training about money 
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laundering is still used which places the emphasis on the placing, layering 
and integration of money into the financial system. However, many 
schemes of ML are far more complex today and TBML in particular does 
not follow this format (R7979), so training needs to be updated. 
 
One of the ways that the respondents identified that the training 
could be made more relevant was through providing practical findings and 
highlighting money laundering flaws within the banking context (R9321).  
Regional examples and realistic scenarios (R9068) were other 
suggestions to ensure that staff could directly relate to the material and 
context being presented. This would also increase the motivation to learn if 
it was seen as directly relevant to their work (R9068, R1551), and would 
assist in developing a stronger AML culture within the bank, including 
having the opportunity to challenge existing practices and discuss gaps in 
the system with the trainers (R5602). 
 
Ideally a broader training programme relating to all aspects of 
financial crime could be developed linking the different areas of “identity 
theft, forgery, tax evasion and terrorist activity” (R8985), whilst other 
respondents (R1192, R5800) also stated that TBML should not necessarily 
be isolated from other fraud and financial crime training since many of 
them used similar structures. Perhaps at this juncture TBML is one aspect 
of a broader group of illegal trade activities, which would include tax 
evasion, capital flight, sanctions evasion and money laundering. 
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5.8.3 Topics to be Covered 
 
There were several suggestions for specific topics that needed to 
be covered in any training on TBML. These included the following;  
1) Explaining the standard typology overviews that the various FIUs 
work with. 
2) Identifying and updating the red flag alerts and TBML indicators.  
a) Recognising that indicators are just that, indicators of 
possible activity and not definitive. 
b) Training on the obvious indicators of TBML.  
3) The use of dual purpose goods and the need for training to explain 
this further. 
4) Possible scenarios that may be used in trade finance transactions.   
5) Old systems such as layering and placing having been replaced by 
criminals who need to speed up the process and these newer 
systems needed to be reflected in future training. 
6) Using live examples or perhaps simulated transactions as part of 
the training approach. 
 
It was suggested that the risk assessment model should be the key 
determinant as to what training is required and by which staff (R4869) and 
that training should be needs-led rather than resource directed (R9498). 
There were several suggestions relating to the training needs and 
determining the relevance of information and training required, according 
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to banking staff positions. For TBML work there has to be some level of 
understanding on the process of shipping and this needs to be acquired 
through external agencies and interagency links as well as across the 
banking units. This information is required in both the home country of the 
bank and the destination country of the client’s trading business. 
 
5.8.4 Guidelines 
 
Several respondents suggested themes for guidelines that could be 
developed, these included; 
• A know how on detecting suspicious activity (R9602). 
• Typical TBML transactions. 
These guidelines may also serve to provide criminals with information on 
what banks are doing to stop certain activities and therefore will have a 
short shelf life for some methods of TBML activity (R7979). 
 
One of the downsides to money laundering activity is that the 
methods used are constantly changing (R6704), and therefore the 
implications for training are that banks require some system of constant 
updates and information sharing. This would be different to many of the 
other training programmes that the banks employ which can be one-off or 
have lengthy periods in between refresher courses. In addition, the nature 
of TBML as a transnational crime means that international examples, 
especially where practices are changing, would also need to be included in 
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any training approach (R4412). One respondent identified that at the end 
of the day “the effectiveness of the human element is dependent upon the 
training program provided by the bank” (R9407). 
 
5.8.5 Investigative Skills 
 
The role of banking in undertaking more in-depth investigations 
received mixed responses, some respondents felt that this was the role of 
the police and that regulators and governments needed to focus more on 
strengthening the agencies who are already trained in this level of work 
such as law enforcement, “I am not totally convinced that governments 
have really exhausted other methods such as good old police work and 
international cooperation between law enforcement agencies” (R9602). 
Another respondent highlighted that most legislation, and especially in the 
US placed an emphasis on all bodies in the state having a role in AML 
detection and not placing the responsibility solely on the banking sector. 
 
5.8.6 Future Priorities 
 
There is no doubt that trade will remain a fundamental component 
of global banking and economic development. One expert pointed to the 
trade not aid policies, that will encourage investment and trading into the 
developing economies. In response to this area of growth the banking 
sector will need to develop strong KYC and CDD approaches, in order to 
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protect the financial sector against possible fraudulent trading and the illicit 
transfer of goods and money (R4731). One of the aspects of banking that 
will have to change as suggested by one expert, was their exclusive focus 
on revenue performance rather than considering “the implications of the 
integrity of the financial market” (R8884). In other words, a continued 
inward view of banking tended to ignore how public perception could be 
weakened through such a narrow focus, at the expense of the bigger 
financial picture. Especially, since clients and the media in this era, are 
more aware of what is happening globally now and the role that the 
banking sector plays in supporting criminal activity, if it is not deterred.  
 
There was one suggestion that the focus for AML compliance 
should be on what the bank is doing rather than always focusing on client 
transactions (R8884). However, as with many suggestions there is the 
need for a strong knowledge base to be established first within the bank, 
so that staff and auditors know what should be in place before they can 
offer critiques and evaluations on what is missing. Developing a stronger 
internal audit system was one means through which this could be 
achieved (R7508), whilst placing more emphasis on the role of 
management in financial crime was another suggestion (R4869). 
 
Training was an underlying theme that was raised under many of 
the question headings and under corporate responsibility it was mentioned 
that there is an obligation on the behalf of management to take a firm 
stance against ML activity (R6704), and to ensure that all staff received 
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the appropriate amount of training (R3315). One expert stated that in their 
organisation (R9773) the financial crime unit or security department would 
often be comprised of ex-police or law enforcement officers. This would 
bring an increased level of awareness of investigative skills into the 
organisation and could become more common place in the future, 
especially in many of the larger banks in order to have constant and quick 
access to this type of skill level.  The need for banks to acquire these skills 
in some shape or form was suggested by several experts (R8985). 
 
5.8.7 Secondary Data Reports 
 
One of the limitations of the research project was acquiring the level 
of reach required to justify the findings as relevant and representative of 
the banking sector. There were only so many experts that could be 
contacted through a simple online survey and interview approach, within 
the limited timescale and using the contacts available to the researcher. In 
order to ensure that the context and suggestions being made were 
representative of the sector, a number of industry based surveys were 
examined that had access to a larger database of experts. Two reports in 
particular were deemed as especially relevant, these were the PWC report 
on Internal Audit (2014) 822  and the Financial Conduct Authority report 
(2013) 823 on AML compliance.  
                                            
822
 PwC. (2014). Internal audit holding the line on BSA/AML compliance. Available at: 
http://antimoneylaundering-fiba.com/files/1499.pdf  
823
 FCA. (2013). Bank's control of financial crime risks in trade finance. London: Financial Conduct 
Authority. 
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Both of these organisations used their knowledge and experience 
within the sector to share opinions, and in the FCA report to share 
outcomes of small scale research review, on topics relevant to this 
research project.  
 
5.8.8 PWC Report (2014): Internal audit holding the line on 
BSA/AML compliance 
 
The importance of AML compliance has become more widespread, 
possibly due to the increase in court cases taken against banks by 
regulators for lack of AML compliance such as HSBC 824 or by clients for 
failing to implement AML reporting requirements. The role of internal audit 
has also become a focus of the conversation in some practitioner 
handbooks and guidelines. One of these publications that the research 
reviewed is the PWC publication. In their publication on Internal Audit and 
AML compliance they state very clearly that a shift has occurred within the 
internal audit role. 
 
“The days of the BSA/AML checklist audits are well behind us. 
BSA/AML compliance is now heavily scrutinized by the regulators for all 
banks, from the small local banks to the largest US financial institutions. 
Having the right team with the right skills is not enough; banks must take a 
                                            
824
 Homeland Security. (2012). HSBC exposed US financial system to money laundering, drug, 
terrorist financing risks. From permanent sub committee on investigations. US Senate. Retrieved 
from: http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/us-vulnerabilities-to-
money-laundering-drugs-and-terrorist-financing-hsbc-case-history accessed 4 August 2015 
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risk-based approach in developing an efficient and strong BSA/AML 
internal audit program—one that can hold the line on compliance.”825 
 
The PWC report 826 reiterates the traditional risk assessment model 
of three lines of defence, which are;  
 
Line 1    -  Operational, risk management and quality controls. 
Line 2 - Quality assurance, risk management, validation and    
compliance testing.  
Line 3    -   Internal audit. 
 
The focus of the report was on internal audit and therefore the other 
two lines of defence were not discussed, although the role of internal audit 
in relation to the other two lines was mentioned, as part of their audit and 
oversight function.  
“Additionally, regulators have expressed that independent testing of 
the BSA/ AML and OFAC programs must improve, and they expect 
internal audit departments to provide a more robust third line of defence at 
the nation’s banks.”827 
 
However, despite the requirements and vision for internal audit, 
PWC reported that on the whole the skills within internal audit generally 
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 PwC, (2014) Internal audit holding the line on BSA/AML compliance. Available at: 
http://antimoneylaundering-fiba.com/files/1499.pdf accessed 30 March 2015 p11 
826
 PwC, (2014,p3) 
827
 PwC, (2014) Internal audit holding the line on BSA/AML compliance http://antimoneylaundering-
fiba.com/files/1499.pdf accessed 30 March 2015 (p3) 
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were not able to deal with these new expectations “Internal audit’s 
assessment of AML risks and audit planning processes are insufficient to 
develop an effective testing plan and typically do not leverage data 
analytics to better focus on the risks.”828 
 
The main gaps in audit function for AML compliance testing were: 
insufficient data testing and not commensurate with AML risks; lack of data 
analytics in testing; insufficient risk assessment and AML planning; and 
finally, a lack of knowledge of AML risks within the audit sector.  
 
5.8.9 Commentary on the Report 
 
The PWC report reiterates the standard model for risk assessment 
with the assumption of three lines of defence against money laundering, 
and it does not challenge this approach at all. However, one of the 
weaknesses of this model is that if a knowledge gap exists at each line of 
defence then the vulnerabilities become similar to those in the Swiss 
Cheese theory model 829 which is often used in policing and accident risk 
assessment; whereby each line of defence has its own weaknesses like 
holes in slices of Swiss cheese, the vulnerabilities are not a problem until 
they are aligned like lining up the holes in the slices of cheese. In this case 
the knowledge gaps could provide a major vulnerability that cuts across all 
the lines of defence thus exposing the entire banking operation to money 
                                            
828
 PwC, (2014,p7) 
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 Reason, J. (1990) Human Error. Cambridge: University Press, Cambridge 
 467 
laundering risk. Therefore, strengthening internal audit is one component 
of the operation, but it is also imperative that each of the other lines of 
defence are strengthened as well. Ideally perhaps internal audit should be 
used to ensure that the first two lines of defence are operating effectively 
rather than using IA as a safety catch, one that currently appears to have 
very big holes in it. 
 
Another option would be to consider a more holistic model of risk 
assessment that encouraged a culture of AML compliance and risk 
containment across all units in the bank, instead of relying on certain units 
such as AML compliance and assuming that they would respond to all the 
issues. 
 
5.8.10 Financial Conduct Authority 
 
The Financial Conduct Authority produced a report in 2013 which 
was a review of banks risks to trade finance. The methodology included 
visiting 17 banks of a variety of sizes and they focused on risk assessment 
processes including policies and training material.  
“We aligned our review with the scope of the Wolfsberg 
Trade Finance Principles and looked specifically at the 
mechanisms used to finance the movement of goods and 
services across borders. Our focus was on Documentary 
Letters of Credit (LCs) and Documentary Bills for Collection 
(BCs), where trade-related documents (invoices, bills of 
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lading, etc.) are routed through banks and examined for 
consistency within the terms of a trade transaction.”830 
 
Their findings highlighted a number of weaknesses in the AML 
regime in relation to identifying trade risks, these included an inconsistent 
approach to AML compliance, which tended to focus specifically on 
ensuring compliance rather than assessing for money laundering risk. 
 
“We found an inconsistent approach to risk assessment. 
While a few banks had conducted a discrete trade finance 
AML risk assessment, and kept it up-to-date, others had not. 
And we found that banks tended to have a more 
sophisticated, and better articulated, approach to managing 
the risk of sanctions breaches, than to managing money 
laundering risk.”831 
 
In terms of specific TBML policies these were largely non-existent 
or very weak, which tended to mean that lines of responsibility and 
communication channels were also weak, again highlighting vulnerabilities 
that cut across all three lines of defence.  
 
“However, we were concerned that the majority of banks had 
no clear policies or procedures for staff to follow when 
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 FCA. (2013). Bank's control of financial crime risks in trade finance. London: Financial Conduct 
Authority. P7 
831
 FCA. (2013,p13) 
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assessing money laundering or terrorist financing risks in 
trade finance.”832 
 
The FCA review focused largely on trade finance documentation 
and found that for banks issuing letters of credit, then due diligence and 
appropriate AML checks were nearly always undertaken. Letters of credit 
were rarely if ever given to unknown customers, and most had an 
established relationship with the bank. Finally, the review identified its own 
list of red flag indicators that were categorised under five main headings, 
these were: 
• Customer, 
• Documents, 
• Transaction, 
• Payment, 
• Shipment. 
 
The review concludes with examples of good and poor practice for 
TBML detection, where the overarching theme across both sets of 
examples is the need to screen specifically for financial crime risks and to 
have clear policies and lines of responsibility in place for this. There is little 
doubt that the examples of good practice involved a significant resource 
investment both in terms of training and ongoing staff time to undertake 
the work at the level of detail suggested. There is a note to companies in 
relation to considering the examples, which encourages business to 
                                            
832
 FCA. (2013, p15) 
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consider the size of their own company in relation to the risk exposure they 
are likely to experience, “This includes taking into account the size, nature 
and complexity of a firm when deciding whether a certain example of good 
and poor practice is appropriate to its business.” 833 
 
5.8.11 Commentary on the Report 
 
One of the criticisms of the report is the lack of specificity in relation 
to which banks were compliant and promoting good practice and which 
were not. There were some very good models that could be followed and 
also some very worrying non-compliance issues raised. A few statistics to 
state the percentage of banks largely compliant versus the number that 
were not would have given a stronger context to the research. Similarly, it 
would have been useful to have the size of banks and their work at a 
global level versus compliance and models of practice, which would also 
have indicated at what level AML compliance was being implemented and 
where gaps in the system might need to be addressed.  
 
In an interview with John J Byrne executive vice president of 
ACAMS, the following statement was made regarding the media coverage 
of suspected money laundering compliance failures at Capital One 
Financial Corporation. 
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 FCA. (2013). Bank's control of financial crime risks in trade finance. London: Financial Conduct 
Authority. P42 
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“It could be something as simple, but still serious, as 
compliance deficiencies, like they didn't file reports on time 
because they had so many. Money laundering is very broad, 
so it's hard to tell from the regulatory filing. In most cases, it 
is not intentional money laundering. My educated guess is 
that it's something with systems or policies.”834 
 
AML compliance is ultimately all about systems and policies so his 
statement does not really shed any light on anything new there. However, 
declaring that something can be ‘not intentional money laundering’ is an 
interesting statement and it would be interesting to know what activities 
would be classified under this heading? 
 
5.8.12 HBUS Risk Assessment Profile 
 
The risk assessment approach adopted by HBUS was 
fundamentally flawed in a number of ways. 835  The case has been 
discussed in detailed in section 3.6.1 through to the end of the chapter The 
AML framework that was in operation consisted of a strategic level and an 
operational level. There were errors in both areas. However, the errors at 
the strategic level had the greatest impact; because they effectively 
stopped the operational work being carried out. Brief analysis on such a 
                                            
834
Holan, M (2015) What exactly does an anti-money laundering specialist do? We asked an expert 
http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/blog/2015/02/what-exactly-does-an-anti-money-
laundering.html?ana=lnk&page=all accessed 7 March 2015 
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 O'Brien, J., & Dixon, O. (2013). Common link in failures and scandals at the world's leading 
banks, the. Seattle University Law Review, 19, 941-972 
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strategic decision can look at models behind the choices made. An 
example of a model that is beneficial in determining behavioural outcomes 
is below by Cornish and Clarke. 
 
Based on the decision making model presented by Cornish & 
Clarke,836 where B=f{P.S}, and decision behaviour (B) is influenced by 
Personality (P) and Situation (S). A similar equation of risk could be 
applied using the model B=f{CA.S} where CA is the Corporate Attitude of 
the bank and S is the AML situation or problem being presented. In HBUS 
the CA was determined by a number of factors including a focus solely on 
the legal risks that ML presented to the bank, a lack of resources given to 
the AML Director and the misclassification of AML risks as client risks 
rather than banking risks. 
 
CA = AML low level of priority x minimal pressure from OCC x lack 
of clarity from internal audit. 
S= Alerts rising above 17,000 (seen as administration issues). 
B= Short term input of resources. 
 
The board agreed to short term injections of resources in response 
to unwieldy administration problems, rather than classifying the problem as 
a major AML concern. Therefore, strategic decisions at the governance 
level appeared to have been influenced partly by resources and also by 
the absence of a strong argument made by the audit committee and 
                                            
836
Cornish, Derek B, and R V G Clarke (eds). The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice 
Perspectives on Offending. reprint ed. Transaction Publishers, 2014. 
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internal audit to address the areas of AML concern. As the pressure 
increased from the regulator (OCC), additional resources were identified 
and made available and the concerns and priorities of AML began to be 
addressed. 
 
5.8.13 HSBC Switzerland Risk Assessment Profile 
 
In the HSBC Swiss case the equation could be applied as follows; 
 
CA= Acceptance of clients regardless of CDD concerns. 
S= Incomplete customer profiles and CDD checks. 
B= High risk acceptance of criminal clients who subsequently used 
the bank to evade tax and launder money through the system. 
 
This case therefore has repercussions for all the banking sector 
since it actually provides a legal ruling outlining the responsibilities of the 
bank, not just to the regulator in terms of AML compliance, but also to their 
clients and business partners that the bank works with. 
 
5.8.14 Conclusion Secondary Data 
 
The secondary data sources were chosen because of their 
empirical research and related findings from various case scenarios. 
These organisations all had access to data that this research was not able 
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to access, such as ongoing legal cases, and access to the reports 
generated through the banking sector. In addition, public media cases 
involving AML compliance failures were used and analysed in order to 
establish if there were any legal findings relevant to this study. The 
combined secondary data has been used to form a contextual framework 
in which the primary research data can be analysed. This will enhance the 
credibility of the research in terms of making recommendations and 
generalisations by providing a broader selection of data. 
 
One of the criticisms that was identified in the literature review, and 
which was also raised as an issue in the primary data results, was that 
many of the guidance documents and red flag indicators for money 
laundering are too generic and lack specificity. The banking sector is 
asking for more detailed examples of risk assessment models and 
guidance resources, which can provide a greater level of awareness. This 
research has sought to access as much detailed information as possible, 
given the legal constraints and issues of confidentiality that affect the study 
of this topic, in order of developing a risk assessment model that can give 
more specific guidance for TBML transactions and which can be used for 
general money laundering risk assessment as well.  
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CHAPTER 6 FINDINGS 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
The findings section highlights what has been discovered through 
the research process and links together the data analysis, literature, 
reports and theoretical analysis. It links the findings back to the original 
research questions that needed to be answered, and see whether this has 
been achieved. 
 
This section has been divided into two main parts whereby the first 
part has been presented to answer the main research questions listed 
below.  
 
1. What is trade based money laundering and how does it manifest 
within a global banking context? 
2. How do criminals wishing to manipulate banks for TBML gain 
access to the financial services they require? 
3. What tools are currently used in TBML risk assessment in banks, 
and what are the strengths and difficulties associated with these? 
4. What models of risk assessment / control framework can be 
developed for TBML?  
 
The second part of the findings section focuses on determining 
whether a specific risk assessment framework could be developed that 
would be cognisant of the information gathered from across all the various 
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data sources. In particular, as part of questions 3 & 4, the researcher 
wanted to consider if a risk assessment framework needed to be 
developed specifically for TBML, or whether a generic financial crime 
framework could be developed that would incorporate a number of 
financial crime risks. This was followed by a second interest area which 
was to consider what implications this risk framework would have for the 
role of the internal audit function (traditionally viewed as the third line of 
defence in most standard risk assessment processes within the banking 
structure). Initial analysis from the data implied that TBML and ML audits 
were separate processes to the actual risk assessment process.  
 
The second part of the findings section has therefore been sub divided 
to cover these two main sub topics, namely of TBML risk assessment and 
TBML / ML risk audit processes. Together these two components are 
expected to form part of an overall risk assessment framework for TBML 
that can be applied to the banking and financial services sector. 
 
6.2 Research Questions 
  
Q1 - What is trade based money laundering and how does it manifest 
within a global banking context? 
Trade-based money laundering has been recognised by the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF, 2008) as a serious threat to the formal 
financial services, since it views the misuse of the trade system “as one of 
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the main methods by which criminal organisations and terrorist financiers 
move money for the purpose of disguising its origins and integrating it into 
the formal economy” (p3). In simple terms money is often converted into a 
trading commodity and shipped across different jurisdictions, from where it 
can be converted into whichever currency is required, these transactions 
can then be presented as a legitimate business exchange. Despite the 
simplicity of the definition, the money laundering schemes used to move 
the goods can be highly complex and involve multiple jurisdictions and the 
use of different financial services.  
 
The banking sector often becomes involved in these transactions 
through their trading finance services, which uses an array of 
documentation, much of which can be forged through using false 
identities, shell companies, front businesses and falsified shipping and 
invoicing documents. In addition to difficulties in verifying trade and 
shipping documentation, the ports of origin and destination can be 
misdirected through the use of free trade zones. 837  Finally, given the 
complex nature of the business transactions and in order to accurately 
assess and verify each business and trading transaction, a number of 
agencies including customs, revenue, law enforcement as well as the 
banking services would need to co-operate together on a regular basis. 
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 FATF (2010) Money laundering vulnerabilities of free trade zones. France: Paris: FATF/OECD. 
http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20vulnerabilities%20of%20Free%20Trade%20Zones.pd
f accessed 28 July 2015 
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Q2 - How do criminals wishing to manipulate banks for TBML gain access 
to the financial services they require? 
 
The research considered a number of scenarios and typology 
studies 838  that provided detailed insights into how criminals were 
accessing and using the financial services system. A number of factors 
emerged that have implications for risk assessment processes, in 
particular many of them concern the verification of the client and the 
source of their business funds. The main categories of findings include the 
following; 
 
 The first point is that given the complexity of many TBML schemes, 
in many cases criminals need to co-operate together in order to 
access the financial services. Schemes that involve the falsification 
of invoices in particular, require both trading parties to agree on the 
scheme, other examples of criminal co-operation include; 
 Structuring funds through an account using different people 
and accounts. 
 Using free trade zones to disguise shipping destinations.  
 A second challenge for criminal launderers is that many financial 
services and banks already have in place basic customer due 
diligence systems that first need to be bypassed. This has created a 
situation whereby criminals have sought to acquire an easier 
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 FATF. (2008). Best practices paper on trade based money laundering. Paris: FATF/OECD. 
Available from: http://www. fatf-gafi. org/ [accessed 11th May 2015]. 
AUSTRAC (2014) Typologies and case Studies Retrieved from 
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access route into the banking system without attracting attention. 
One of the ways that this can be achieved is by using existing 
customers who have already cleared CDD checks. Other examples 
of bypassing CDD checks include; 
 Using accounts of family members or associates to move 
money through. 
 Using off shore accounts and shell companies. 
 Hacking accounts and mirroring other business transactions 
(cuckoo smurfing). 
 Another challenge for the banks is to verify and authenticate the 
goods, that many criminals are trading in. Some commodities such 
as diamonds are difficult to value and have become a useful tool for 
money launderers to move.  
 The final challenge is for banks to verify the source of the funds 
being used to finance the business. There have been cases such 
as the HSBC Swiss bank whereby clients had acquired money from 
sources of bribery and corruption, as well as predicate offences 
such as smuggling and art theft.  
 
All of these factors highlight the level of imagination that criminal 
schemes are able to implement, and many of the schemes appear to have 
been developed in response to increased AML controls and stricter 
customer verification checks. However, one of the difficulties is that as 
money laundering schemes evolve to counteract the larger banking 
responses to AML detection, these then place additional pressures on 
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smaller banking systems of which are located in more vulnerable and 
weakened economies and are less able to deal with these complexities. 
These vulnerable systems have the potential to become entry points for 
money launderers through which to move funds into the larger financial 
banks and services in countries with stricter and more developed AML 
checks. Therefore, a global response to AML regulation and control needs 
to be pursued in order to effectively protect the whole banking sector. 
 
Q3 - What tools are currently used in TBML risk assessment in banks, and 
what are the strengths and difficulties associated with these? 
 
TBML risk assessment has been traditionally focused on the trade 
finance units of the bank as well as AML compliance, but the findings from 
this research and other case studies of TBML activity, imply that the 
money laundering activities will cut across all areas of the bank. In 
particular, TBML can affect or be detected by any staff member involved in 
customer interaction, business units, trade finance, audit, training and the 
allocation of resources. Although TBML compliance and other AML 
compliance systems may be currently used as one system within a bank, 
there are several main areas of consideration that relate specifically to 
TBML transactions which need to be included within a risk assessment 
framework for trade related money laundering activity. These differences 
also need to be considered in light of other noted weaknesses within 
generic money laundering risk assessment models, so that all the gaps 
can be plugged at one time. 
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6.2.1 Weaknesses in Risk Assessment Models 
 
There are a number of weaknesses inherent in any risk assessment 
model, but the biggest weakness in money laundering risk assessment is 
underestimating the impact that it has on the client and the business focus 
of the bank. Many of the difficulties highlighted in recent cases including 
HSBC in the US, have arisen as a result of trying to quicken up 
assessment processes for the client, for example overriding the OFAC 
filters. In order to provide an effective business service to clients and for 
clients to understand the money laundering risk process, there is the need 
for a clearer system of communication between bank and client. This 
system should aim to facilitate the business focus of the client whilst not 
expose the bank to an increased AML risk, due to a lack of adequate risk 
assessment processes. Obviously, this also has a downside because the 
more information you provide to the client about risk assessment, then the 
more information you are effectively also giving to the criminal to 
circumvent the system. 
 
6.2.2 Information That the Client Needs To Know 
 
In a more stringent AML regime the client can also be an ally in risk 
assessment processes, especially if they are prepared beforehand and 
can supply the information required. In order for that to occur, the client 
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needs to be aware that the following areas will be assessed and hence 
potentially take time. 
1. Geographical profiling and client partners are also under 
assessment - Confidentiality can operate both ways in that clients 
do not necessarily need to be aware of all these checks until they 
are seeking international trade finance. Before submitting an 
application, they should be advised that they will need to provide 
information to comply with BOI and EDD checks depending on the 
nature of the business. The results of the risk assessment profiling 
do not need to be shared with the client, but the questions giving 
rise to any concerns do need to be asked of the client.  
2. Complete list of information needed for clarification  
- A complete list of documentation required should be provided to 
the client rather than a drip response of needing one piece and then 
after submission a second piece.  This can cause unnecessary 
delays and frustration. 
 
Although information can also enable criminals to prepare ways around 
the system (they will do this anyway), the aim is also to encourage 
businesses to become more aware of their own risks and exposure to 
money laundering activity. The bank also has a responsibility to the client 
to ensure that their business and account are not being used without their 
knowledge for fraudulent activity. Checks still need to be stringent even if 
the client presents all the paperwork, However, not knowing which 
paperwork to present is not an efficient part of risk assessment. 
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6.2.3 Front and legitimate companies 
 
The use of front companies or legitimate clients has been proved, 
through the sanitised case studies 839 to provide an effective entry route 
into the banking structure and to enable criminals to comply with CDD and 
KYC checks. The implications of this in terms of risk assessment 
indicators mean that; 
1. A system for routinely monitoring low risk clients may be needed 
since these will be potential targets for criminals, especially if there 
are family or business links to criminal groups. This monitoring 
process could be computerised or automated to spot unusual 
transactions and changes in business practices / business partners 
or third party involvement in the business. 
2. Beneficial ownership checks are becoming of increasing importance 
since the client presenting the business plan may not be the 
beneficiary of the business. In particular, family members may 
undertake CDD checks instead of members with known links to 
criminal activity. 
3. Monitoring family member accounts especially those of politically 
exposed persons could become a requirement after identifying 
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 485 
suspicious client behaviour or high geographical risks for certain 
clients.  
 
6.2.4 Geographical Risks 
 
Geographical risks are an important consideration in any risk 
assessment model. These include an awareness of sanctions against 
certain countries and / or product sanctions within certain countries: 
1. These can also include developing an awareness of illicit financial 
flows moving from developing countries into developed economies. 
2. Movement of funds from developed economies to high risk 
countries known to support terrorism.  
3. The use of free trade zones to mask the final destination country 
being a potential problem, that needs to be explored as much as 
possible. 
4. Certain countries have been highlighted through UN reports for 
being vulnerable for smuggling such as diamonds or endangered 
wildlife; these should be used as part of the geographic risk 
assessment process. 
 
6.2.5 Trade Patterns 
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Trade risks remain a priority as they become the more mainstream 
way of moving products and cash from one jurisdiction to another, often as 
part of complex criminal financial networks: 
1. Traditional trade red alerts including over and under invoicing, 
falsified shipping documents and the use of free trade zones to hide 
entry ports are all factors that need to be monitored or detected. 
2. Financial crime risks need to form the basis of a risk assessment 
framework. This framework needs to incorporate the links between 
the various different financial crime risks of tax evasion, capital 
flight, TBML and corporate fraud. 
 
6.2.6 Technology 
 
Technology and the related skills of data analysis need to be 
incorporated as and when appropriate, into the risk assessment model. 
However, this software and data use needs to become more specific to 
complex money laundering schemes, including the use of trade and 
shipping, rather than being too generic and only focused on simple cash 
based ML schemes. 
 
There is still a dearth of software that can be used in banking to 
support AML compliance, however, some work has been done especially 
in the US. Certain models such as trade transparency units have 
established a method of sharing information across different agencies. 
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Since a lot of shipping routes pass through or include the United States 
then these data bases are of use even within the European or Asian / 
African banking sector.   
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6.2.7 Training and Resources 
 
A primary concern raised by many of the respondents, and named 
as a key area of weakness, was the overall knowledge base of the staff 
involved in risk assessment. This concern included all front office staff and 
those interacting with clients, as well as audit and AML compliance staff. 
At a basic level if there is limited awareness of the types of fraud that 
clients can be involved in, then detection of such schemes will become 
very difficult.  The knowledge required amongst all staff would include the 
use of falsified documentation, using front businesses and hiding behind 
family members’ accounts. At the stage where suspicions have been 
raised, there then needs to be a clear system for reporting this information 
to those staff involved in anti-money laundering compliance. In turn this 
information also needs to be reported to those units within the bank that 
may be involved in other aspects of the client’s business and finance 
arrangements.  
 
The main problem associated with increasing knowledge and 
expertise is that it requires an investment in training. However, external 
training agencies, which tend to be the major expense, can also be 
supported through in house training and peer information sessions. 
Another way of supporting the training information is to encourage staff to 
participate in regular exchanges and meetings with staff in different units in 
the bank, with a focus on money laundering. This could also allow for the 
development of local typologies and sharing of suspected problems or 
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weak areas in AML compliance.  A combination of these different methods 
could be used to develop and identify the potential ML schemes that could 
work in the bank, as well as aiding in the analysis of weak entry points into 
the bank’s structure. Finally, the knowledge base needs to extend across 
all levels of the staffing structure through to the management level. This is 
to ensure firstly that there is a clear understanding of the resource 
requirements and training needs, and also secondly to understand the 
implications of any audit reports which may be used to highlight 
weaknesses in the AML processes and structure being implemented. 
Throughout the development of an effective AML system training is a vital 
component for developing the human component of TBML detection, and 
ultimately reducing the bank’s exposure to financial crime risks. At the very 
basic level this training needs to be: 
1. Appropriate to include all staff at the basic level and then tailored to 
the specific skills of staff who are involved in client’s accounts.   
2. Practical so that staff can relate to its relevance in their work. 
3. It needs to be regularly updated and to use current models and 
examples of known and reported ML / TBML activity. 
 
6.2.8 TBML Auditing 
 
One of the findings to emerge from the research, or to gain clarity in 
significance, is that AML auditing and AML risk assessment are separate 
processes. One of the areas that respondents failed to reach a conclusive 
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agreement on was to clarify how the role of auditing and compliance link or 
interlink for AML systems. The model of internal audit holding the third line 
of defence has still to be challenged effectively within the banking domain, 
and so this model continues to permeate and direct auditing responses. 
However, many empirical studies were clear to highlight that auditing skills 
are still lacking in this area. In particular, the research found that specific 
audit skills need to be developed which can be focused on financial crime 
auditing including TBML audits: 
 These can consist of being able to effectively assess the suitability 
of risk approaches being used in the different units, and  
 Can also assess the efficiency of the overall system for 
communicating risk assessment findings across the entire bank. 
 
In the discussion so far, a number of areas have been highlighted. 
Some of these themes relate directly to developing risk assessment 
processes and some relate to the overall risk support framework that is 
needed to ensure that risk assessment remains effective and up to date. 
The next section of the report focuses on the development of an overall 
framework for risk assessment and TBML within the banking context. It 
has then developed this framework into a practical tool to assist risk 
assessment processes within banking, that can be used by any staff, at 
any stage of a reviewing a client’s account or business. 
 
Q4 - What models of risk assessment / control framework can be 
developed for TBML?  
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The fourth research question focused specifically on the theoretical 
and empirical implication findings in relation to developing a risk 
assessment model. One of the key points that arose from the HSBC 
cases, as well as also arising in the comments from participants, was that 
a simple risk matrix that just followed a series of check boxes was not an 
effective approach. In particular, it would not suffice in combating the 
serious criminal misuse of trade finance, that was currently occurring 
through the banking sector. FATF in their 2006 and 2008 reports 840 
advocated a more dynamic risk approach that could respond to different 
ML scenarios as they emerged, although a model that was too 
complicated would not be practical to implement either.  
 
In this section the researcher has devised a risk assessment 
framework in response to the issues raised throughout the research data 
and literature analysis. In particular, the assessment framework responded 
to the following issues that were highlighted by participants: 
 The risk model should be designed to ensure that a minimum base 
level of staff training and competence levels in TBML detection is in 
place. 
 There should be an assumption that resources will be made 
available and a commitment made at senior level to developing 
TBML risk processes. 
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 FATF. (2008). Best practices paper on trade based money laundering. Paris: FATF/OECD. 
Available from: http://www. fatf-gafi. org/ [accessed 11th May 2015]. 
FATF. (2006). Trade based money laundering. France. Financial Action Task Force. 
 492 
 Existing guidelines and red flag indicators from key FIU reports and 
FATF on TBML should be utilised. 
 
This project is suggesting that there are three separate but interlinked 
elements to risk assessment:  
1. A risk framework and within that  
2. A risk assessment process and  
3. A risk audit process.  
 
6.3 Risk Assessment Framework 
 
The risk assessment framework involves all areas of the bank 
including governance and audit committees. It has been sub divided into 
three tiers, that each work in tandem with each other, to ensure that the 
model operates most effectively. The aim of the framework is to develop a 
culture of proactive AML detection and the prevention of any type of 
financial crime. The three tiers of framework are: 
 Tier One - Resources and Governance. 
 Tier Two - Risk Assessment Matrix – including research and 
technology. 
 Tier Three - Risk Auditing for TBML. 
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6.3.1 Tier One - Resources and Governance 
 
The first tier in the model arose out of responses from the research 
participants who stated that for any risk assessment framework to be 
effective there are two things that they identified as being crucial.  The first 
was the need to have adequate access to resources, which also includes 
appropriate staff skills, time and training. The second and perhaps most 
important point was that there needed to be support from the top of the 
governance structure and this needed to infiltrate through the entire 
organisation. These two points have been described in more detail below 
before moving onto the other elements of the risk assessment framework. 
 
6.3.1.1 Resources and training 
 
One of the findings of the research is that risk assessment 
processes cannot operate in isolation. In particular, underpinning any 
effective risk assessment model is that there has to be a commitment to 
provide appropriate levels of resources and training, which are tailored 
towards equipping staff with the AML tools being developed. One of the 
biggest challenges for those responsible for resource allocation, is the 
reality that most banks are under business pressure to produce profit, this 
means that inevitably cost centres such as AML compliance are not 
usually the first priority for resource allocation. Although increased 
pressure from regulators may be perceived as one way to elicit extra 
resources, a more sustainable approach would be to develop a more 
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efficient system within the bank; one that is supported by governance and 
meets the needs of the bank’s own business strategy. The tool proposed 
in this project was especially mindful of the fact that allocating huge 
resources was not an option for many of the smaller banks and other 
financial services. 
 
The other challenge that most banks face when considering or 
developing AML training programmes, is the need to develop an AML tool 
that can be utilised by all staff, regardless of their existing level of 
expertise in trade finance or international banking. Again this suggested 
that a simpler tool was required that could encompass many of the 
requirements of a responsive risk based approach. However, one of the 
benefits of rule based approaches and tick box checklists, is that they can 
act as a guide for staff. Therefore, if a risk based model could be 
developed that retained this added level of guidance and support by 
utilising the checking process, then this could enhance the model and be 
used across all the staff teams, without incurring a large training budget or 
developing only a few core specialist staff. 
 
6.3.1.2 Governance 
 
The role of governance has been highlighted by many of the 
respondents in the survey and interviews, as being vital to the success of 
any AML / TBML risk assessment process. It was also highlighted as an 
area of major weakness in some of the cases such as HSBC where ML 
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controls failed to identify risks from clients and audits did not report 
effectively on the low levels of AML compliance. In the HBUS case the 
regulator also came in for criticism because they did not provide enough 
guidance to the management structure and did not highlight the risks that 
the banks was being exposed to.841 
 
The governance structure within the bank can be responsible for 
making fundamental changes in behaviour and attitude amongst the staff, 
especially in the corporate attitude and cultural practices associated with 
AML compliance. The HSBC Swiss bank case suggested that the bank’s 
corporate attitude was to support clients to evade tax requirements and to 
use the formal financial sector and existing international practices to 
achieve this. 842  If future AML strategies are to be effective and 
implemented across all units within the bank, then the corporate attitude 
towards money laundering and financial crime also needs to reflect this 
new approach.  
 
One of the pillars of governance that requires a change in role is the 
internal audit function. This function is responsible for providing a link 
between the practice happening in the bank units and reporting the 
weaknesses in this structure to the audit committee / management. Many 
of the empirical reports on money laundering, that this research project 
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 Homeland Security. (2012). HSBC exposed US financial system to money laundering, drug, 
terrorist financing risks. From permanent sub committee on investigations. US Senate. Retrieved 
from http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/us-vulnerabilities-to-
money-laundering-drugs-and-terrorist-financing-hsbc-case-history accessed 4 August 2015 
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ICIJ (2015) Swiss leaks: Murky cash sheltered by bank secrecy http://www.icij.org/project/swiss-
leaks/banking-giant-hsbc-sheltered-murky-cash-linked-dictators-and-arms-dealers  accessed 2 
March 2015 
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considered tended to focus solely on the AML compliance and risk 
assessment processes. The other role of governance is to ensure that 
adequate AML audits are carried out that can analyse the use of 
resources, and the success of the system being used, including the 
relevance of the risk assessment processes and the effectiveness of the 
reporting structure to the financial intelligence unit. For this reason, AML 
compliance should be considered as part of an overall AML risk framework 
that includes each of these different components of risk assessment, risk 
audit and compliance requirements. 
 
6.3.2 Tier Two - Risk Assessment Matrix 
 
Tier two of the risk assessment framework is the actual risk matrix. 
This model builds upon existing risk assessment matrices currently in use 
within the banking sector. In this research the proposed model is a simple 
matrix comprising of four areas of risk assessment that have designed to 
be made into a visual representation of the client risk. The model was 
influenced by statements from respondents in the research, as well as the 
literature, which referred to the FATF indicators 843 as well as other red 
flag alerts of money laundering activity such as the AUSTRAC reports 844 
                                            
843
FATF. (2013). "Methodology FOR ASSESSING TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE FATF 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AML/CFT SYSTEMS". FATF, Paris, 
France. Available at: www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013.pdf 
844
 AUSTRAC (2014) Typologies and case Studies Retrieved from 
http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/typologies-report-2014.pdf 
AUSTRAC. (2013). Typologies and case studies report. Australian Transaction and Analysis Centre. 
Retrieved from http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/typ13_full.pdf 
 497 
and the APG report 845. One of the problems that the researcher noted 
was that red flags are usually presented in these guidelines and reports as 
one long list with no classification or sub themes. In this research the 
indicators or red flag alerts have been grouped under four main headings, 
which the researcher believes covers all the themes raised by participants 
and the various typology reports that have been reviewed. This risk 
assessment tool is designed for use against all types of financial crime, 
including TBML and uses the following four headings; 
 
• Geographical risk 
• Client Behavioural risk 
• Client Transaction risk 
• Client Partner or Third Party risk 
 
These four headings encompass all the core themes that the 
experts and the questionnaire results identified as being paramount to 
trade-based money laundering detection. As part of the design process the 
generic FATF indicators for TBML activity have been reclassified using 
these same four headings to ensure that everything can be covered in this 
format. As a further exercise following the descriptions, the research has 
also taken the main indicators identified by AUSTRAC (2014), the 
Australian Financial Intelligence Unit, and these have also been 
reclassified to illustrate how all the indicators regardless of the area of 
                                            
845
APG. (2012). APG typology report on trade based money laundering. Retrieved from 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Trade_Based_ML_APGReport.pdf 
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money laundering can be sub divided into these four categories. As well 
as providing a risk assessment framework this model can also be used as 
a training tool to help explain and develop a better understanding of TBML 
risks. Underpinning the framework and the four key elements is always the 
need for governance support for the model, and emanating from this are 
the assurances of adequate and ongoing training and resources.  
 
6.3.2.1 Geographical Risk 
 
The nature of global banking means that every client involved in 
shipping and trade is potentially engaged in business with another country, 
and therefore the bank is at risk of providing money either directly or 
indirectly to countries that are blacklisted, or supporting the entry of 
products that are blacklisted by those countries. In order to mitigate 
against this risk an element of geographical risk assessment is 
incorporated so that the client and the bank can identify the extent of this 
risk. If required, further clarification and documentation may be required by 
the business to assure the bank that the client’s business is not connected 
to any international criminal smuggling trade, such as illegal arms 
trafficking, human trafficking or goods smuggling including using goods to 
launder money. According to FATF some indicators or red flags for 
geographical risk in TBML include;  
 The commodity is shipped to (or from) a jurisdiction designated as 
“high risk” for money laundering activities. 
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 The commodity is transhipped through one or more jurisdictions for 
no apparent economic reason. 
 
This is probably the area of greatest change for bank’s risk 
assessment processes. It does involve more research initially but 
obviously once a country has been researched then that information can 
be used with all clients involved in trading in this region. Research also 
needs to be ongoing to monitor media and other reports such as UN 
updates on products or countries at civil unrest. However, it is no different 
to traditional risk research into companies and investment options, the 
focus of the research is slightly different and would need a researcher 
competent in financial risk analysis. Alternatively, certain Financial 
Intelligence Units 846 may already collate some of this information and it 
could be made available to bank research units (or trade finance units) as 
required. 
 
6.3.2.2 Client Behavioural Risk 
 
Client risk has tended to focus on obvious data verification methods 
such as establishing identity and credit history. However, many clients are 
either using falsified documents or using legitimate clients and businesses 
as fronts for their criminal activities, therefore standard CDD checks are 
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FIU Netherlands. (2015). FIU Netherlands annual report 2014. FIU-the Netherlands. Retrieved 
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not necessarily picking up on this level of fraudulent behaviour. Suspicious 
behaviour such as making multiple deposits into different branches, 
evading verification checks and being reluctant to provide information on 
clients or business partners are all indicators of suspicious behaviour that 
needs to be documented. Front office staff who deal with customers are 
often most likely to witness any of these behavioural traits and therefore a 
system for filing alerts internally at this level would need to be developed.  
FATF indicators for suspicious client businesses and types of commodity 
being shipped that they designate as “high risk” for money laundering 
activities include the following indicators: 
 The size of the shipment appears inconsistent with the scale of the 
exporter or importer’s regular business activities 
 The type of commodity being shipped appears inconsistent with the 
exporter or importer’s regular business activities 
 The shipment does not make economic sense 
 There are irregularities in the trade documentation being provided 
 Significant discrepancies appear between the description of the 
commodity on the bill of lading and the invoice 
 Significant discrepancies appear between the description of the 
goods on the bill of lading (or invoice) and the actual goods shipped 
 Significant discrepancies appear between the value of the 
commodity reported on the invoice and the commodity’s fair market 
value 
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 The transaction involves the use of repeatedly amended or 
frequently extended letters of credit.847 
 
Although any or all of these indicators can change as criminals 
continue to try and work around the AML system, the main pattern is to 
watch for trading transactions that appear to be overly complex and/or 
offer a sudden change in normal business practice for this client without a 
reasonable explanation. This data may not be readily available or 
understood by front office staff, who are often the staff carrying out CDD 
and EDD checks. This is a key area for future training within the banking 
context since understanding how trade data can be manipulated is an 
essential requirement to stopping or uncovering trade based money 
laundering techniques. 
 
6.3.2.3 Client Transaction Risk 
 
Transaction risk is the one area where automation and technology 
may be introduced, to enable computers to trawl through data seeking 
anomalies or sudden changes in transaction patterns. However, the 
programmes still need to be informed by human observations and data 
analytic software needs to be developed specifically to seek out trade 
patterns that could be risk related. Currently the standard indicators of 
money laundering activity relate to examples such as the structuring of 
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funds through micro deposits to avoid detection.  However, finance trade 
patterns also need to focus on possible under and over invoicing through 
price misrepresentation activities, and complex financial transactions 
involving multiple accounts and different jurisdictions. The FATF indicators 
that apply to this category are; 
 
 The method of payment appears inconsistent with the risk 
characteristics of the transaction 
 The shipment finance does not make economic sense 
 
6.3.2.4  Third Party Risk 
 
This is also a new area of risk assessment and links into the 
increased focus on beneficial ownership of companies and transactions.848 
It has become increasingly evident through FIU reports and media 
coverage of banking cases, that many clients are hiding their trading 
activity through the use of third party businesses and people. Illicit financial 
flows from developing countries into the western economies often involve 
politically exposed persons (PEP).  These PEPs know that they will be 
checked through enhanced due diligent systems and so they use third 
party members and friends to hide the source of the money. Sometimes 
criminal organisations will also approach legitimate business owners for 
                                            
848
 FATF. (2014). Transparency and beneficial ownership. France: Financial Action Task Force. 
FATF Guidance. Retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/guidance/transparency-and-
beneficial-ownership.html 
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them to undertake financial transactions on their behalf and avoid CDD 
checks. This means that the bank CDD process also needs to incorporate 
the analysis of key beneficiaries within the business and to verify 
ownership information. It is often through this process that suspicious 
client behaviour may come to the fore, as the client becomes 
uncomfortable with the process. The FATF indicators include; 
 
 The transaction involves the use of front (or shell) companies. 
 The transaction involves the receipt of cash (or other payments) 
from third party entities that have no apparent connection with the 
transaction.849 
 
These four areas encourage the risk assessment process to consider four 
particular aspects of their client’s business -  
 Where the client is doing business 
 Who the client is doing business with 
 Whether the transactions reflect a legitimate business  
 Whether the client appears to represent a legitimate business. 
 
This is advancement on the traditional model which has so far only 
considered the legitimacy of transaction patterns and an assessment of 
the client. The other challenge for risk assessment in banks is that this 
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two-pronged approach has been undertaken in a vacuum, without 
understanding the nature of the business and the risks of third party 
involvements and country risks. The four-pronged model of risk 
assessment requires banks to undertake greater and more enhanced 
checks, but to consider them in a systematic way. For example, if the 
destination country being traded with is low risk, but the goods are being 
taken through a complicated shipping route then it makes sense to 
prioritise analysing the route and reasons behind it, rather than 
undertaking lots of research on risks within the final destination country.  
 
To illustrate this point further at the end of the next section in the 
findings the researcher has reviewed the indicators of a number of 
different money laundering cases, as presented by the Australian financial 
intelligence unit AUSTRAC. These indicators have been categorised under 
each of the four headings in the risk assessment model as an example of 
how any indicator can be used in this way. This ensures that the model is 
constantly evolving and all banks have to do is to keep categorising any 
additional or emerging indicators into the different themed headings. 
Although it does not eliminate the problem of enormous lists of red flag 
alerts it does provide the basis for reducing the amount that have to be 
searched through at any one time.  
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6.3.2.5 Risk Matrix 
 
The four headings in the previous section are a useful way to 
categorise red flag alerts, However, the aim in this risk assessment model 
is to also assess and record client’s overall risk from money laundering. In 
this case the red flags are used to provide additional information to the 
bank staff when using the risk matrix.  
 
The risk matrix being proposed in this research is based upon the 
traditional risk assessment model, which has tended to view client 
behaviour and account transactions as the two main components in a 
simple risk matrix. In the traditional model with two axis it produces four 
possible outcomes of  
1. Low for both client and transaction risks,  
2. High for client but low for transaction risk &  
3. High for transaction but low for client or  
4. Very High for both client and transaction risks.  
However, the research was interested to determine what would happen 
if this matrix was expanded further to incorporate two additional 
components, namely geographical risk and client partner or third party risk, 
this will provide a different style of pattern as shown below. This risk matrix 
is slightly more complex but will operate along the same kind of principle 
as the simple matrix. 
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Table 4: Risk assessment 
Geographical Risk 
Examples of possible questions: 
Is the Client dealing with a country deemed as high risk? 
Is the client dealing with goods or trades deemed as high risk for 
the country involved? 
 
 
 
10         9         8        7         6         5         4         3         2         1 
Client Behavioural Risk 
Examples of possible questions: 
Is the client open and willing to provide information relevant to 
their KYC and CDD? 
Does the business proposal make sense in terms of cost, 
shipping routes, goods / values/ financial requirements? 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
 
10         9         8        7         6         5         4         3         2         1 
 
 
Client Partner Risk 
Examples of possible questions: 
Are there partners involved and if so is KYC data available for 
them? 
Are family members involved in the business, and if so are they 
resident in different countries? 
 
 
 
1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8         9         10 
 
 
Client Transaction Risk 
Examples of possible questions: 
Does the account receive funds in such a way that they could be 
structured? (i.e. Money that doesn’t equate with the nature of the 
business - lots of small amounts of cash deposits for large 
costing items) 
Is the money making complicated transfer routes and across 
jurisdictions to the final beneficial owner? 
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The risk assessment process is undertaken as follows; 
 
A. In this model a risk rating is applied separately for each of the four 
areas of the risk assessment model on a scale of 1-10. 
B. This would lead to four separate marks one for each of the four 
headings, these are then being marked on the matrix. 
C. The next stage is to draw a simple line between each of the four 
points on the different axis.  
D. This will produce a shape in the middle of the risk assessment 
matrix around the centre cross.  
E. How far out the shape expands from the centre will depend upon 
the rating for each sector, so four axis x 10 ratings would be the 
maximum or very high risk score and would produce a shape 
covering the four outer sides of the matrix. At the other extreme four 
x 1 ratings would produce a small square in the centre and most of 
the matrix would remain outside of this space indicating that it was 
low risk score.  
F. Depending upon which areas of the graph are showing highest risk 
this would determine where additional follow up and enhanced due 
diligence processes need to be applied. 
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6.3.2.6 Reasons for Developing a More Complex Risk Assessment 
Process 
 
The risk matrix may on the one hand appear more complicated if 
banks are only undertaking simple risk matrix testing, or it may seem 
unnecessarily repetitive if banks have a specialised unit which is currently 
undertaking in-depth research on individual clients. There are a number of 
reasons as to why risk assessment needs to evolve within the banking 
context; firstly, it needs to become more complex in order to capture the 
increased complexity of known money laundering schemes but also it 
needs to become more standardised across the different staff undertaking 
this process in the organisation. Both of these factors are important 
because of changes occurring within the compliance and regulatory 
background. 
 
A. The Financial Action Task Force reports on a country by country 
basis.  Therefore, there needs to be consistency across all banks 
and financial services within a particular country, to ensure that an 
adequate and effective national strategy against money laundering 
is achieved. 
B. As AML systems evolve they are becoming the responsibility of all 
staff within a bank and therefore there needs to be an accountable 
and transparent approach taken that all staff can follow. 
C. There is a challenge in trying to marry consistency along with 
flexibility and so a model needs to be used that enables additional 
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indicators and knowledge to be added to the system, without 
undermining the consistent approach. 
D. Justifying the use of dedicated resources on risk assessment and 
research will need to be illustrated in AML audits, and so the model 
needs to clearly outline why and how additional due diligence steps 
were agreed upon and what evidence underpinned these decisions. 
E. Suspicious reports need to be filed with the national FIU, but these 
need to be evidence based and should justify why the FIU should 
spend more resources and possibly delay client’s business dealings 
investigating cases further. One of the downsides of increased 
regulatory pressure has been the over reporting of cases that could 
have been investigated within the bank.  
F. AML audits should be able to analyse the trail of investigation and 
determine whether the model is effective and where the gaps exist 
in the system. They also need to make clear evidence based 
recommendations to governance, of areas that can be fixed or 
amended with additional training, resources, or changes in banking 
communication systems etc.  
 
In essence the banking approach to AML compliance needs to become 
more manageable and integrated into the other main stream banking 
systems. In order for this to be achieved the AML system needs to be both 
simple and yet fit for purpose. One of the most important components of 
this risk assessment system is that staff are trained in and have the 
access and use of resources such as research material, databases and 
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specific IT systems. These resources will all enhance the quality of 
material and information that the risk matrix is using, the better informed 
the staff are, the more effective the risk matrix system will become. 
 
6.3.3 Tier Three - Research and Technology 
 
The final tier of the framework is the research and technology layer. 
This tier recognises that a simple matrix of tick boxes will only ever provide 
a basic overview of the potential risk that a client poses, and a fuller 
picture will always be needed. The risk matrix designed in this research 
provides greater insight into four main areas that need to be considered or 
prioritised in follow up research. In order to strengthen the impact of the 
risk matrix the high points and very high risk scores will possibly need 
further research, and this can be done using the four main headings 
depending on which areas have flagged as potential risk.  
 
6.3.3.1  Research Sources 
 
For each of the four areas on the matrix there are a number of 
follow up research approaches that can be used, examples for each of the 
headings are highlighted in the following section but these are not 
exhaustive by any means. Some of these areas may also require links to 
other external agencies such as customs, revenue, law enforcement or the 
national financial intelligence unit.  
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A. Geographic Risks - media searches for conflict areas, UN reports 
for war areas, piracy, political instability and increased use of illicit 
financial flows. 
B. Client Risks - research into business background and previous 
businesses owned. Media coverage on criminal cases client has 
been involved in, company director register, political relationships, 
links to countries of political or economic instability. 
C. Transaction Risks - transaction history, previous suspicious 
transaction patterns, average turnover, use of international 
transfers, history of using alternative remittance systems or other 
financial services. 
D. Third Party Risks - family members or friends involved in 
businesses connected to the client, family members as beneficial 
owners to any of the businesses named by the client. Family living 
or working in jurisdictions blacklisted by the bank.  
 
Some of the research can be enhanced by the use of technology such as 
in the examples provided below. 
 
A. Online research and access to media coverage, reports and other 
publicly available documentation on the economic and political 
situations of countries, that clients are involved with either 
personally or through their business.  
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B. Big data programmes to analyse simple transactions patterns that 
could be deemed as suspicious given the nature of the client’s 
business. 
C. Trade data programmes to compare costs of goods around the 
globe to estimate the viability of the business proposal and trade 
finance packages being provided through the bank.  
D. Email support to third party agencies to seek clarification on details, 
rather than launching directly into filing a SAR which could be too 
vague at this stage. 
 
6.3.3.2 Advantages of the Revised Risk Matrix Model 
 
Despite the simplicity of risk matrix models it is a system that many 
people are familiar with, who are working within the sector. This also has 
the added advantage that it is a tool that can be utilised easily and without 
intense additional training. The two additional categories of risk 
assessment geographical risk and third party risk add to provide a fuller 
picture of all of the factors involved in complex ML and TBML activity. As 
stated previously even new indicators should be able to be listed under 
any one of the four areas for all conceivable types of money laundering 
activity. The visual nature of the model means that at a glance staff can 
see the risk rating for a particular client and the area in which this risk is 
highest. This tool is designed as a summary of the risk assessment 
process, it is not intended to replace the research and in-depth analysis of 
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the client’s accounts.  It is a start to determining what questions need to be 
asked, and where at a glance are the high risks likely to occur within this 
client’s business or account.  
 
The system also helps to categorise risk indicators into more 
manageable headings and categories rather than having to use one long 
list with no links to each other. This should assist and speed up the 
practical reviewing of accounts. The risk assessment model proposed in 
this research has a number of practical advantages that could be used to 
speed up risk assessment without losing any quality and effectiveness. 
Some of these advantages are listed below; 
 
A. Risk categorisation can focus on more specific areas that need 
further analysis, rather than having to look at all components at 
once. 
B. This focused approach makes the workload more manageable.  
C. Completing suspicious activity reports will become more meaningful 
because risk areas can be described in more detail. 
D. Clients will be clearer which element of their business is holding up 
clearance for trading finance (e.g. Third party business or country of 
trading, etc.) so that they can be better prepared next time an 
application is prepared. 
E. The model is transparent and can be worked on by a number of 
staff in different units if required. 
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6.4 Comparing the Risk Assessment Matrix to 
Industry Reports 
 
This section of the research highlights how the proposed headings 
for the risk assessment matrix can be used. It takes standard basic red 
flag indicators for money laundering as suggested by current researchers 
in this area from AUSTRAC, and reclassifies them into the new model.  
 
6.4.1 AUSTRAC Typology Reports 
 
In each of the different typology and case studies reports produced 
by the Australian financial intelligence unit AUSTRAC (2011,2013,2014) a 
number of indicators were identified after each study. It is their standard 
practice to present the key indicators after providing a scenario or detailed 
case study, however, for this research project we are interested in the 
overarching indicators common to many money laundering schemes and 
especially related to TBML activities. As part of this research project the 
AUSTRAC indicators from 2014 850 have been used but re-classified under 
the same four new indicator headings that were developed in the previous 
section of this research, to see if the same pattern continues across all the 
typologies for all financial crime related risks. The results of that process 
are shown below where they have been classified into four key themes of 
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Geographic Risks, Client Risk, Account Transaction Risks and Third Party 
Risks. 
Reports such as FATF and AUSTRAC tend to list red flags as one 
long list of indicators specific to each type of money laundering activity. 
The key difference with this model is that all financial crime risks are 
analysed using 4 risk headings. This means that regardless of the 
suspected type of criminal money laundering activity being used, or if a 
combination of types is used then this matrix can be developed to include 
everything. 
 
AUSTRAC red flags have been used in this example because they 
are derived and sourced from real live investigation cases that have been 
analysed and then sanitised. This gives a section of indicators that cover a 
wide variety of money laundering techniques, all of which are based on 
actual ML scenarios. They are normally presented after each specific case 
to help banks identify potential risk areas and the type of money 
laundering activity that may be being used, however in this example they 
have been used as generic red flags and listed under the four categories 
of the risk matrix to illustrate how all ML cases can be assessed using 
these four generic headings. 
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6.4.2 Geographical/ International Funds 851 
 
International fund transfer is in itself a full risk factor and every 
international transaction needs to consider the risks inherent such as; 
A. International funds transfer to a country of interest to authorities / 
International funds transfer to high-risk jurisdictions 
B. Structured international funds transfers within a short period of time 
C. Use of overseas bank accounts (suspicious use) 
D. High-volume and high-value incoming international funds transfers 
to Australia for no apparent logical reason 
E. Incoming international funds transfers from a high-risk jurisdiction 
F. Multiple international funds transfers, which are inconsistent with 
the established customer profile 
G. International funds transfer to overseas businesses similar in total 
value to recently received cash deposits 
H. Multiple low-value international value transfers 
I. Cash used to pay for international funds transfers 
J. International funds transfer where an individual is both the ordering 
and beneficiary customer 
K. Large cash withdrawals in a high-risk jurisdiction 
L. Use of tax secrecy jurisdictions 
M. Outgoing funds transfers sent to offshore entities followed soon 
after by incoming funds transfers of similar amounts from the same 
offshore entities 
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6.4.3 Client  
 
Client risk has traditionally been part of simple risk assessment 
matrices for AML, and this should continue although suspicious behaviour 
and sudden unexpected changes in business practice are of particular 
note. 
A. Customer unwilling to produce identification when requested by 
reporting entity staff 
B. Structuring of gaming chip cash outs to avoid reporting obligations / 
High-value or structured casino chip cash buy-ins 
C. Use of false identification 
D. Conflicting or incomplete identification details provided for different 
transactions 
E. Customer becomes irate when questioned over financial 
transactions 
F. Large amount of cash used to place bets at a casino over a short 
period of time 
G. Refusal to show identification when undertaking cash buy-ins of 
gaming chips 
H. Customer undertaking complicated transfers without a business 
rationale 
6.4.4 Transaction 
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Transaction risks were again always part of the basic framework, 
however the knowledge and understanding of many money laundering 
schemes has now evolved and this list has become more specialized 852. 
A. Multiple low-value international funds transfers 
B. Increase over time in the value of transactions with a digital 
currency exchange 
C. Structuring of multiple cash deposits below AUD10,000 to avoid 
reporting obligations 
D. Multiple cash withdrawals below the AUD10,000 reporting threshold 
(that is, structured cash deposits) 
E. High-value cash deposits at multiple bank branches over a short 
period of time 
F. Multiple same-day cash withdrawals conducted at ATMs and the 
same bank branch 
G. Customer undertaking transactions that appear to be inconsistent 
with their customer profile and transactional history 
H. Large cash withdrawals from multiple bank branches on the same 
day  
I. High-volume and/or high-value cash withdrawals at multiple bank 
branches and ATMs 
J. Outgoing international funds transfers to pay out a mortgage 
K. Use of debit cards to purchase high-value goods 
L. Structured financial transactions in personal and business names 
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M. Sudden increase in financial activity inconsistent with individual’s 
transaction history 
N. Withdrawals conducted quickly after deposits 
O. Unusually large volume of cash deposits and withdrawals 
P. High-volume account activity involving significant amounts of cash 
funds 
Q. Customer receives international funds transfers described as ‘loan’ 
 
6.4.5 Business Partners / Third Party involvement 853 
 
This is another new area in risk assessment, which is the 
relationship to other business partners. Many clients can be used as fronts 
by launderers and some third party business deals may actually be 
exchanges between multiple companies owned by the same client. This 
factor also needs to be considered in light of the geographical risks and 
transactions risks to establish a full picture of the business arrangements. 
A. Multiple customers linked by common addresses, conducting 
international funds transfers to the same overseas beneficiary 
B. International funds transfer from an individual account to several 
offshore accounts held in the names of third parties 
C. High-value transfers to accounts held in the name of a casino and 
gaming venue 
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D. Third-party transfers to and from accounts for no apparent logical 
reason 
E. Multiple domestic transfers to third-party accounts  
F. Structured cash deposits into a bank account from third parties 
G. Third parties making regular cash deposits into a business account 
H. Multiple electronic transfers from third parties 
I. Multiple customers conducting international funds transfers to the 
same overseas beneficiary  
J. Use of an accountant to facilitate unusually complicated 
transactions 
K. Use of charitable organisations with a lack of business rationale  
L. Use of third-party company accounts in an attempt to complicate 
transaction activity  
M. Use of third-party or family member accounts  
 
The difference with this model is that risk assessment is seen within 
one framework rather than being segregated into lots of different 
typologies. Using the AUSTRAC or FATF guidelines the banking sector 
would have to analyse every client using every single money laundering 
scenario unless there was a clearer way to amalgamate data and 
undertake an overall analysis of risk. 
The case studies that were used in this report covered a range of 
different money laundering schemes including the use of casinos as well 
as business transactions and the use of personal accounts or family 
member accounts. As can be established from this exercise all the 
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indicators can be classified under one of the four identified headings 
suggested for TBML.  This would imply that all AML risk assessment 
regardless of the specific technique, can operate from within the same 
basic risk assessment framework. Although some of the specific indicators 
may only relate to certain systems and approaches used in money 
laundering, the principle of looking across four different components of risk 
is the same. This should facilitate training programmes since the same 
basic techniques are being reinforced even when new schemes are 
discovered.   
 
I have held back from offering any critique in the form of intelligent 
analysis to the Austrac material that has been taken from their reports. 
The point behind its use was to demonstrate where the criteria fits in with 
the new model I am proposing and not to assess the effectiveness of 
Austrac`s red flags which are accepted and already in use internationally. 
 
6.5 AML Risk Auditing 
 
The second part of the risk assessment framework is the AML audit 
component. This is the objective assessment of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the risk assessment mechanisms that are being used 
across all units within the bank. It also produces alongside this an 
evaluation of the resources being utilised by implementing the AML risk 
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framework and examines the impact that this investment has had on 
reducing the banks’ risk of exposure to money laundering activity. 
 
6.5.1 Internal Audit 
 
During the interviews and the questionnaire, the respondents were 
asked about the role of internal audit within AML compliance. Many of the 
answers assumed that internal audit did not have a role to play, with some 
responses suggesting that there would not be the skill level within internal 
audit to be involved at any level “I don’t think it [IA] generally has the skills 
to be able to deal with the complex risk issues faced here.” (Respondent 
1618). However, internal audit has been identified as the third line of 
defence 854 therefore it has to develop a role for itself at some level, and 
the knowledge base does need to be raised in relation to regulatory and 
compliance requirements. “Internal auditors collectively must have 
comprehensive knowledge and a deep understanding of BSA/AML 
regulations and leading practices.”855 
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6.5.2 The role of audit within AML compliance  
 
Despite the widely held view that internal audit does not have a 
major role in the detection of AML activity within banks, it is understood 
that it has a role in auditing AML activity. The difficulty is perhaps in 
identifying the difference between traditional and AML auditing practice, 
and from that information being able to develop a system that addresses 
the deficiencies in current AML auditing practice.  In order to understand 
what an AML audit is in more detail the following sections describe the 
areas that need to be included in the audit, as well as the differences 
between AML auditing and AML compliance. 
 
6.5.3 AML Auditing (and TBML) 
 
Internal audit is responsible for the auditing of TBML and AML 
compliance measures within the bank. This means that by default internal 
auditors need a good understanding of AML compliance and a strong 
awareness of the current risk assessment models in use.  Traditionally 
internal audit may develop an audit plan that highlights which sections of 
the bank are due for audit that year, which means that AML compliance is 
only ever audited in sections across the bank depending on which unit is 
due for auditing that year. However, since TBML and other complex 
money laundering schemes are becoming such a strong issue that affect 
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all units across the bank, then the audit plan will need to change in relation 
to this particular approach. 
 
A number of issues arose during the interviews including the need 
to specifically address the problems that TBML activity was causing across 
the bank. The following implications from TBML activity were noted. 
 
1. Trade Finance Annual Audit - Trade Finance units in the bank 
would initially need to be audited annually and cannot be 
overlooked or given longer timescales between audits. This is 
important because trade finance is the hub of where TBML activity 
will be occurring.  Criminal clients and schemes of money 
laundering will often change considerably during a 12-monthperiod; 
this is in addition to the unit acquiring new criminal clients.  
2. Front Office Staff - Similarly work with front staff will need to 
prioritise auditing trade finance clients and business clients using 
cross border transactions, as these are most vulnerable to TBML 
abuse. 
3. Red Flag Review - A review of red flag indicators and sources of 
risk assessment research will need to be considered and updated 
each year, as trade data and AML publications change constantly. 
A global interest in TBML prosecutions as well as all cases of 
money laundering across jurisdictions and the methods used will 
need to be catalogued within the trade finance unit. The relevance 
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and dates of material needs to be routinely assessed as part of the 
audit. 
4. KYC information - The completeness of KYC information including 
CDD, EDD, PEP and BOI all need to be reviewed annually.  This 
information should be logged and can be audited through an IT 
programme initially to detect completeness of various fields, 
followed by manual random inspection. This can be used to check 
the quality of information and accurateness of the completed 
documents. 
5. A Review of Suspicious Activity reports - SARs need to be 
reviewed and catalogued within the AML unit.  There is also a need 
to record the reason the SAR was initiated and the final outcomes 
including ongoing monitoring outcomes for each client.  This will 
ensure that lessons gained from each suspicious activity are being 
fed back into the AML loop of information. These catalogues should 
also form the basis for internal research conducted through any risk 
assessment process.  
6. Audit will also need to consider changes and recommendations 
produced at an international level through organisations such as 
FATF as well as other FIU reports. 
7. A national AML compliance strategy should also ideally be in 
place, that can then guide best practice for AML audits within each 
country 
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Some of these processes can be automated or computerised, 
However, the real strength of internal audit is the capacity to physically 
inspect and interview staff involved in the process. This means that 
genuine concerns and findings can be captured as early as possible and 
redressed either through training, communication and collaboration with 
other units or by linking into outside agencies as appropriate. If other 
mechanisms are required, then these can be developed and 
recommended as part of the internal audit report to the audit committee 
which can also be followed up by the external audit team.  
 
6.5.4 Internal Audit or AML Audit 
 
The role of AML audit has been allocated unofficially to the Internal 
Audit Function (IAF) because it is a structure that is currently in existence. 
The question at this stage is whether a dedicated AML audit team would 
be a better option, one which would start with a strong AML knowledge 
base that could over time gradually incorporate regular internal audit 
functions into its remit? Although this question extends outside of the remit 
of this thesis it is an important discussion for banks to have, since major 
resources will be invested into AML compliance issues over the next five 
years or so and all options in relation to potential cost benefit effectiveness 
should be considered at this earlier stage. 
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6.5.5 Difference between AML Compliance and AML Audit 
 
The remit of the thesis does not extend to fully examining the 
differences between the two distinct processes of AML compliance and 
audit.  The main difference is that AML compliance is the practical process 
of carrying out the collection and inspection of KYC information and 
tracking accounts. This is usually undertaken by all members of the bank 
at various levels depending on the relationship the client has with the 
different sectors of the bank and the services being utilised. Whereas it is 
the role of AML audit to assess the relevance and effectiveness of the risk 
assessment system being used, a role that is usually undertaken by an 
objective and separate role within the banking structure such as internal 
audit. It is also the role of audit to make recommendations to the audit 
committee and governance on the allocation and relevance of resources, 
training and staffing allocation to deal appropriately with the AML 
compliance requirements.  
 
However, in reality, according to some of the research responses 
internal audit tends to perform a checklist audit that determines whether a 
risk assessment system is in place.856 The effectiveness of the system is 
not usually considered as part of the audit process beyond ensuring that 
suspicious reports are generated and sent onto the FIU as part of the 
regulatory requirement. In other words, most internal audit reports focus 
on the compliance aspect of AML regulation rather than its effectiveness.  
                                            
856
 FATF. (2006). Trade based money laundering. France. Financial Action Task Force 
 528 
 
Although the role of internal audit has been identified as needing 
autonomy and to be distinct and separate from the role of MLROs and 
other AML or business unit staff, it still currently retains a position as the 
third line of defence within AML risk assessment. If a role is to be kept for 
internal audit function within AML compliance and risk assessment, then 
the skills of auditors need to be specifically tailored to understanding trade 
and finance money laundering. Therefore, in many cases internal auditors 
do need their knowledge to be improved if they are to retain a relevant and 
useful role within the overall AML compliance response.  
 
6.5.6 Data Technology 
 
The use of technology has been suggested by some authors 857 as 
a way of assessing some of the risks associated with trade related money 
laundering schemes. However, using trade data within audit has not really 
been suggested other than to be noted by some auditing companies that 
the use of data analytics is not adequate by internal audit.858 
 
6.6 Layer Defence Model 
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Traditionally the banking model has operated from a three lines of 
defence approach to AML risk assessment, which have been designed as 
a hierarchical system whereby each level is intended to check the level 
below and ensure it is operating effectively. In this model the first line of 
defence is supposed to detect actual money laundering activity as it enters 
the bank by the banking staff across the different units. At the second line 
of defence there are compliance testing and quality assurance systems 
that can check that risk assessment systems are happening, whilst at the 
third line of defence internal audit provides an outside objective check that 
systems are being adhered to.  
 
Line 1 - Operational, risk management and quality controls 
Line 2 - Quality assurance, risk management, validation and compliance 
testing  
Line 3 - Internal audit 859 
 
However, one of the fundamental flaws in this design is that it is still 
possible that inherent weaknesses can undermine all three lines of 
defence at once. Even if the weaknesses are in different areas within each 
of the different lines it is very possible, rather like the Swiss cheese model, 
that the holes or gaps in the system can still be lined up and permit money 
laundering activity to pass through undetected. Examples of some of these 
areas of weakness can include the following; 
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Line 1 
a) Lack of specific knowledge of different money laundering schemes 
at the operational level. 
b) Lack of communication between different units within the bank 
regarding concerns about a specific client. 
c) Lack of training provided on the bank’s own internal systems for 
reporting suspicious activity. 
 
Line 2 
a) Quality assurance framework is not linked to national and 
international standards.  
b) Lack of support from governance meaning that audit reports are not 
responded to appropriately.  
c) Governance focus is on compliance risks rather than legal or 
money laundering risks. 
 
Line 3 
a) Internal audits are conducted on a unit by unit basis rather, than 
undertaking a full AML audit across the bank. 
b) The knowledge of different money laundering schemes in IAF is 
weak and therefore staff are unable to assess the effectiveness of 
the bank’s AML systems. 
c) Audits are regulatory and compliance led rather than assessing for 
effectiveness.  
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6.6.1 A New Model of Risk Assessment 
 
The risk assessment model that is being suggested in this paper 
has developed a risk framework that has also incorporated the three lines 
of defence approach. However, this research paper is suggesting that a 
different use of the three lines of defence should be considered. In this 
model it comprises four lines of defence since the actual development of a 
risk framework is another line of defence that has been added. 
 
Line 1 - Risk framework, governance corporate attitude, resources  
Line 2 - Operational risk management - risk matrix - all units of the bank 
Line 3 - National compliance and international compliance standards, 
quality assurance 
Line 4- AML audit process - link to line 1  
 
In this model there are not hierarchical lines of defence, but instead 
layers of defence that operate in an integrated model of AML risk 
assessment. Each layer operates alongside the other layers and they each 
continue to inform and regulate each other.  This reduces the risk of 
money laundering activity passing through one layer and onto the next 
undetected, because in this model each layer constantly interacts with 
each other.  
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This model reflects the learning that has emerged from the research 
project under a number of headings and from across both the research 
data and also findings from empirical studies and case reports. The key 
learning from these sources has been summarised below; 
 
1. AML Audit is a separate part of the risk assessment process, which 
currently fits into the role of internal audit function because it also 
requires an independent and objective assessment. 
2. The enhanced role of governance is needed to ensure that 
appropriate levels of resources are allocated as and when required. 
3. The allocation of resources is now determined in line with a 
strategic plan for risk assessment, rather than individual lobbying by 
the AML compliance section, or relying on decisions made in 
isolation by the audit committee. 
4. Since countries are assessed by FATF on an individual basis they 
are therefore able to respond to this feedback through a strategic 
national plan for addressing deficiencies and weaknesses in money 
laundering compliance. Both of these international and national 
standards for AML compliance need to be reflected within individual 
organisational strategic plans for AML compliance. 
5. Operational risk is not a line of defence but it is an ongoing process 
undertaken by different units within the bank at different times with 
the same client.  
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6. Operational risk processes need to be audited in line with 
international and national standards and also against governance 
priorities and resource allocation. 
 
6.6.2 National Quality Standards 
 
One of the issues that was not raised at any level within the 
research and which may need to be considered in the future, is the 
establishment of national quality standards frameworks for AML 
compliance within the banking sector.860 
 
The FATF have continually produced guidance documents and 
have issued the 40 recommendations,861 which are generally viewed as 
international standards, However, at a national level it could be considered 
useful to develop a quality standards system that includes linking to the 
specific law enforcement, financial intelligence units and other agencies 
that have designated roles as well as the banking and financial services 
sectors.  
The national standards could be more specific and link to the 
specific legislation as well as named units within external agencies 
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including law enforcement. FATF continues to produce national country 
reports which are used to highlight areas of weakness as well as 
considering legislative and regulatory issues at a national level, it would 
therefore appear logical that a national body would be able to implement 
their own strategic plan for AML compliance through the development of a 
set of national quality standards. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
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7.1 Introduction  
 
This research project has focused specifically on the impact of trade 
based money laundering (TBML) within the banking sector and explored 
possible options for improving the risk assessment processes and 
detection rate within banks. The research was interested in exploring what 
systems are currently in place within the banking structure to detect TBML, 
and where potential gaps might exist within these systems. In particular, 
two areas of interest have been explored throughout the research;  
1. The role of internal audit and changes that may need to be made to 
develop an effective risk audit response and  
2. Risk assessment for TBML activity and the different requirements of 
trade related laundering techniques compared to standard AML risk 
assessment processes.  
 
One of the roles of the bank is to try and build an understanding of the 
client and their business 862 (so that TBML does not occur using the bank’s 
resources or facilities). In this research the focus was specifically on trade-
based money laundering as it applies within the global banking sector. 
Although the two areas of audit and risk assessment might be considered 
as separate entities, and as such topics for two different theses, the link 
was made in this study that TBML and AML risk assessment needs to be 
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developed within an overarching framework of a comprehensive AML 
system. In other words, auditing and risk assessment can no longer be 
considered as separate and independent functions within the bank, 
instead they both need to be fulfilling the requirements of a broader AML 
strategy. 
 
7.2 An AML Risk Assessment Strategy 
 
The primary focus of this research study was to develop a risk 
assessment framework that was cognizant of the two different but 
interrelated functions of auditing and assessing risk. The AML framework 
needed to be useful and relevant to practitioners within the banking sector 
and at the same time embedded in knowledge from previous studies and 
academic or theoretical analysis. This was ultimately achieved by 
considering the opinions and evidence from a wide range of practitioners 
and academics, all of whom who are currently working in the field of TBML 
and AML detection, and to amalgamate the findings from these multiple 
perspectives into one cohesive framework. Alongside this and throughout 
the research two important elements were continuously reviewed; these 
were evidence from the empirical data and from staff working in the 
banking environment and secondly the theoretical and academic 
perspective on TBML. The model that was finally developed had both a 
theoretical and an empirical component that could both be supported by 
the research findings. 
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7.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical framework that has been developed in this project 
and which is to be applied to money laundering cases, revolves around the 
principal agent theory or Agency theory. 863  In particular, the literature 
identified that the response of banks to pressure from the AML regulator 
has been recognised as part of a principal-agency principal theory, 
whereby the regulator is the principal and the bank acts as the agent.864 
Although the bank effectively acts as an agent to the regulator it is also 
noted that in the absence of strict rules and regulations it will not be as 
diligent in its tasks.865 This is partly due to the nature of the bank - client 
relationships where the bank also acts as an agent to the client and there 
is therefore an inevitable conflict in roles when regulation starts to interfere 
with client’s business.  
 
One data study source that was used in the research was the 
HSBC case in Switzerland.866 In the Swiss bank case the agency theory 
model has also been applied beyond banking/client principal-agent 
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relationships, to consider the relationships between banks and regulators 
and in particular the outside constraints imposed on banks through 
international regulation and legal challenges.867 This was noted through 
the impact of tax evasion of other economies outside of Switzerland, due 
to the actions of the HSBC bank. The role of international media and 
whistle blowing is potentially an extension of this theoretical framework, 
and provides yet another source of pressure on banking behaviour, i.e. 
internal pressure from staff or ethical conflict between some members of 
management and/or staff within the bank. 
 
A similar situation was witnessed in the Credit Agricole case 868 
whereby an external client took legal action against the bank for failing to 
implement effective due diligence processes and failing to file a suspicious 
activity report.869 The bank claimed that CDD and suspicious alert systems 
were not as advanced in 2000 and that this situation would not have 
occurred in the current context.870  However, other investigative reports 
such as the ICIJ 871 and also industry research reviews such as PwC 872 
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and KPMG 873 all highlight that many systems are operating the same 
today as they were back in 2000 since there has been little up skilling or 
training available to adequately inform banking staff of the increased risks. 
When the defence team stated that the bank did not know that the 
money was being used for illicit purposes, the prosecution asked that the 
Judge consider the outcome of another banking case, Sinclair Investments 
(UK) Ltd. v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd [2011] 4 All ER 335 874 in which 
Lord Neuberger declared that the case would assess what the banks 
should be expected to know or should have known, given their experience 
and professional knowledge. The judge in the Credit Agricole finally 
decided that the bank should have known from the nature of the 
transactions that this was a fraudulent business. 
 
Instead in this situation regulatory pressure has been reinforced 
through a legal ruling which in a theoretical context means the legal 
system has increased the strength of the principal. The bank as an agent, 
now has less flexibility in choosing how or whether to implement and 
check AML compliance systems. The case was also an illustration to 
regulators that others may step in and also challenge their work, since this 
case should perhaps have been flagged through the national regulator 
rather than taken as an independent legal challenge by a third party client.  
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The final legal case that was discussed was the HBUS case in the 
US. In this situation AML compliance was not being treated as a priority 
and the regulator was forced to intervene and raise concerns.875 Although 
this places pressure on the banks most cases taken by regulators result in 
affecting the banks reputational risk through negative media coverage and 
having to pay a fine, rather than any criminal charges being taken against 
the bank or its employees. The lack of criminal liability or gross negligence 
cases means that banks can still consider AML compliance purely as a 
cost centre rather than a legal obligation. The risk of losing clients on one 
side of the agency dilemma versus increased pay-outs in fines is the 
current situation that banks are having to negotiate with, and this can be a 
fine line to tread financially, given the ever increasing costs of 
implementing AML compliance.  This means that in effect a large amount 
of change is dependent on the overall corporate attitude of the bank and 
whether it chooses to prioritise AML risk assessment rather than being 
compelled to do it through increased regulatory pressure. This latter point 
under the agency model, would need to be increased quite considerably 
before it had any major productive impact on international money 
laundering given the current response rate. In other words, not enough 
change is occurring in the banking system because there is not a clear 
international requirement to do so. 
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7.3.1 Influences on the Agent - Corporate Attitude 
 
Alternatively, if other influences on the agent from internal sources 
changed, then this would also influence the agent principal relationship. If 
for example the corporate attitude of the bank changed and re-prioritised 
AML risk assessment then a shift in attitude, training and resources would 
also occur. Internal pressure could come from whistle-blowers and outside 
clients, who were sources in two of the cases used in this research that 
highlighted ineffective practices occurring within the banking structure. 
However, very few staff members might be willing to jeopardize their future 
careers especially if banks made it clear that this practice would not be 
tolerated. A stronger culture of secrecy could encourage a more 
entrenched and defensive approach to compliance rather than opening the 
dialogue and moving it beyond the realm of the banking sector. 
 
The media has become a strong influence on the banking culture 
since it has started chasing criminals and organisations and tracking their 
financial flows. Different organisations such as Global Financial Integrity 
876 have been tracking and raising awareness of how corruption and other 
related crimes can cause illicit flows from developing economies into 
developed economies and the impact that this is having on international 
development. The international consortium of investigative journalists 877 
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have highlighted how they are willing to work alongside governments with 
data acquired from whistle-blowers. The United States investigative 
departments such as the FBI and International Customs (ICE) have 
started to take cases through the courts that have begun to identify how 
banks are inadvertently facilitating illicit financial flows, so that banks are 
being named in public court documents, which leaves them vulnerable to 
further follow on investigations.  
 
All of these factors place additional pressure on the corporate 
governance structures within banks and can influence how management 
and audit committees decide to prioritise their AML responsibilities. The 
increase in media coverage across the globe has also affected the 
information that stakeholders and clients of the bank can obtain about the 
bank and the expectations that they have for the way in which the bank 
operates. 
 
7.3.2 Implications Arising From the Theoretical 
Discussions  
 
The theoretical discussion so far has highlighted two main factors - 
firstly that there is a limit to what regulation can achieve. In fact, increasing 
regulation in isolation will encourage more defensive reporting 878 leading 
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to the risk that AML reporting and risk assessment will become compliance 
led rather than risk based. The second point is that international media 
pressure and highlighting the link between different financial crimes, can 
perhaps encourage banks to develop a more holistic approach to financial 
crime generally. This might be more productive rather than perceiving 
money laundering compliance as a separate and costly activity that is only 
being implemented for someone else’s benefit i.e. the regulators and state 
bodies such as law enforcement.  
There are also other theoretical frameworks that could be applied at 
this juncture since it is also fits into the rational decision making model, 
whereby governance structures are facing a multitude of decisions and 
respond to wherever they feel the greatest pressure is coming from. In this 
model rationale decision making theory becomes one influencing factor 
within the Agency model. However, one fact that has emerged from both 
the rationale decision making and agency theories is the following; since 
the AML decisions will continue to present as situations requiring 
resources and prioritisation, then the influences towards implementing a 
risk based approach towards money laundering and financial crime need 
to become stronger and more forceful in order to be heard. In other words, 
the louder voice will be heard but regulation by itself probably is not loud 
enough. 
 
7.3.3 Broader Application of Theoretical Analysis 
 
 545 
There are a number of practical implications to using a risk based 
framework, some of these benefits can be seen by considering some of 
the legal and media studies used in the research. For example, if an 
overarching AML framework had been present in the HBUS case instead 
of an isolated AML compliance unit, then trying to lobby for resources and 
raise awareness of the difficulties it was facing might have been more 
successful. In that situation the large backlog of 17,000 suspicious alerts 
879 would have been seen as a failure to adequately implement the AML 
compliance framework, which should have been flagged internally by all 
the pillars of governance (audit committee, internal audit, governance and 
external audit) and viewed as a high priority.  Instead the alerts were 
viewed as an administrative error or mismanagement of staff time, and this 
was then designated as a low priority for the bank’s governance and audit 
review.  
 
To apply this to the agency dilemma model the pressure on 
governance was weak and unsupported, therefore it wasn’t being flagged 
within the system and demanding a response. The needs of the clients to 
conduct business and the need of the bank to ensure that the business of 
the bank continued to operate, were viewed as more important issues. 
This corporate attitude of prioritisation was not changed until the regulator 
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finally reported the problems, thus placing greater pressure onto the agent 
to change behaviour. 
 
The final question in relation to the theoretical context of the 
framework is to determine whether the other financial crime activities 
would fit into this model as well or is it only specifically for money 
laundering. In the HBUS case one of the issues was bulk cash smuggling 
through correspondent accounts, which is still a large concern and is being 
used by criminal organisations despite international AML requirements.880 
However, bulk cash deposits along with the bulk travellers’ cheques are 
both issues that can be highlighted through a more stringent internal risk 
assessment framework. Research on the countries involved in the 
transfers would have flagged drug smuggling and a high risk of cash 
deposits; this should have informed the categorisation of risk. Following on 
from this categorisation and independent of whether the risk assessment 
process was implemented at a staff level, the internal audit should have 
outlined all the risks the bank was exposing itself and other services to by 
facilitating these transactions, this information should have been presented 
to the audit committee. Finally, if the governance structure had developed 
a corporate attitude that supported decisions and information provided 
from the audit committee and equally supported a culture, which refused to 
engage in potential criminal activities, then the governance structures 
within HBUS would have heard the concerns earlier and prioritised 
resources to address the issue.   
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One of the weaknesses in the HBUS case was that the governance 
structure operated in a climate of knowledge deficiency, even the 
information from one of the regulatory bodies was seen as misleading and 
may have been an attributing factor in the slow response to address the 
problems at a management level. 881  Although this reflects the agency 
model it also fits into the rational decision making model, whereby 
governance structures are facing a multitude of decisions and respond to 
wherever they feel the greatest pressure is coming from. However, rational 
decisions can only be made if the appropriate level of information is 
available. For this reason, even regulatory advice needs to work alongside 
other factors such as the bank’s risk based approach that seeks to 
determine the risk classification of clients and countries. All the information 
needs to be analysed within a stronger internal risk framework, one that is 
supported by independent research rather than relying on a correspondent 
bank name or a named individual.  This risk framework based system 
helps to ensure that decisions on risk status are transparent and 
consistent, based on research from multiple sources including checks with 
other banks.  
 
7.3.4 Summary of Theoretical Analysis  
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The theoretical framework was used in this study to help 
understand how and why banking decisions regarding AML compliance 
have been made, and how they are likely to be made in the future. Without 
this contextual understanding it becomes harder to develop a risk 
assessment framework that can work. 
 
One future role of a risk assessment model could be used by the 
bank to determine whether the use of resources needed for AML 
compliance was effective, since it would highlight where gaps in the 
system existed and which areas needed resource inputs. The same AML 
risk framework would also guide the audit committee so that they would 
have a clearer framework from which to operate, and it would ensure that 
their agenda on AML compliance was not in conflict with governance over 
the same issues.  The overall process of AML decision making would 
become part of the AML risk framework, as opposed to the current 
situation in many banks where individual activities are being carried out in 
isolation, such as identifying the risk alerts and assessing trade finance 
risks, where budget allocation is assessed as an administrative add on. 
 
7.4 Research Proposals 
 
The research survey and interviews highlighted a number of areas 
of development that banking AML risk assessment perhaps needs to 
consider in the future. As a result of this research analysis the following 
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suggestions have been made as a way to further strengthen current 
banking approaches to AML and TBML risk assessment planning. 
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7.4.1 New Empirical Risk Assessment Framework 
 
It was always planned that the risk framework that was finally 
developed would be used or piloted within the banking sector at a later 
stage, therefore it needed to be practical and realistic. The final design that 
has been proposed was based on a model that was already familiar to 
most banking institutions, that of a risk matrix. Many banking institutions 
currently use various adaptations of a simple risk matrix model however, 
this particular matrix can be applied with varying degrees of complexity, 
depending on the resources of the institution seeking to utilise it.  
 
The research has produced a new format for risk assessment that 
also provides a model for analysing and using individual money laundering 
red flags, from any scenario. 
 
7.4.2 Four Areas of Risk (as opposed to the traditional two) 
 
In its basic format there are four key areas of money laundering risk that 
have been identified in this research, which are; the  
1. Client behavioural risk,  
2. Transaction risk,  
3. Geographic risk and  
4. Third party risk.  
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Together these four headings have been shown to cover all the major 
red flag alerts connected with TBML schemes and other money laundering 
techniques as identified by prior reports and research in this area. The use 
of the four headings, it is hoped will encourage a holistic analysis of the 
client’s account and business. Another advantage of this simpler design 
was that even if it was only applied as a tick box checklist, it would still 
ensure that four different categories of risk would be considered. This is 
still an advancement on the traditional risk assessment model whereby 
only client and transaction patterns were considered, and red flag alerts 
were listed as one long group without any differentiation.  
 
Alternatively, the risk model could be used as a resource to facilitate 
other more complex risk assessment techniques, such as a means to 
categorise indicators and to apply these categories into their IT solutions 
for AML, or other computerised software. However, despite the level of 
complexity of the individual banking risk assessment approach for TBML, 
all risk assessment systems in the future will need to reflect the increased 
complexity that criminal organisations are now using in order to access the 
formal financial services. In particular banks need to look beyond the basic 
standard large scale cash deposits and suspicious unknown clients. Many 
money laundering schemes have developed in sophistication and are now 
using complex international wire transfers as well as using existing and 
well established clients within the bank, as front businesses for their 
money laundering activity. 
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7.4.3 Implications of Needing TBML Knowledge 
 
The biggest challenge for both the banking institutions and the 
regulatory agencies when undertaking TBML detection, is the amount of 
specialised knowledge that is needed on trading and shipping finance. The 
knowledge that is required extends beyond the financial element to include 
an understanding of international shipping routes, the use of free trade 
zones and the use of forged invoices for both the importation and 
exportation of goods. Typology studies provide some level of insight into 
schemes that have been used, but more often banks are having to 
uncover variations of these schemes for themselves. In order to protect 
the bank a deeper level of understanding is required about the nature of 
the client’s business including knowledge of the nature of the goods being 
used and the third party business clients that are the other part of the 
transaction. All of this data needs to be researched and analysed which is 
both time consuming and costly, and yet as legal cases are beginning to 
illustrate failure to do so can result in the liability resting with the bank, for 
failure to carry out their suspicious activity compliance requirements.  
 
There is a need to develop stronger links with FIUs and other 
organisations that have created databases of information relevant to AML 
research. This includes the investigative journalist groups (ICIJ) beneficial 
ownership and off shore accounts database, trade databases as well as 
government registers of beneficial ownership. 
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7.4.4 Governance and AML Risk Assessment 
 
The research project developed an overall risk assessment model 
of which the risk matrix was one aspect. The other layers of AML defence 
included audit and governance involvement. The TBML risk framework 
introduced the concept of a specific role for governance and the need to 
develop a strategic AML plan for the business or bank as a whole, one that 
could be implemented by all units within the bank. One of the advantages 
of a strategic plan is that ensures that all aspects of AML compliance, 
including resources and auditing, as well as setting targets of 
achievement, are unified across the bank. The difficulty in having a 
specific unit within the bank, which is called AML compliance, tends to 
encourage an attitude of assuming others are taking responsibility. This 
then works against the concept of a holistic approach, whereby AML 
compliance is seen as an issue to be tackled across the entire bank. The 
proposed model of a risk assessment framework also challenged the 
existing model of AML protection used within banking, namely the three 
lines of defence model.  
 
7.4.5 A New Layer of Defence Model for Risk Assessment 
 
This model uses the traditional areas of operational risk, quality 
assurance and internal audit as the three main mechanisms by which 
money laundering risk is reduced. In the new model proposed by the 
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research findings though a four mechanism model is suggested, one that 
interlinks each of the four components of; governance, operational risk, 
quality assurance and audit. The increased role for governance and also 
the clearer distinction between AML risk assessment and AML audit are 
both new elements within the banking context for many financial services. 
 
7.4.6 AML Audit 
 
As part of the proposed increase in responsibility within the banking 
governance structure, the risk framework separated AML audit from AML 
risk assessment and defined a clear role for both units within the bank. 
Internal audit function was still considered to be the natural home for AML 
audits, but there was the stipulation that skill levels and expertise needed 
to be raised within the internal audit units. There was a noted knowledge 
gap between what internal auditors were expected to know and what many 
respondents and empirical reports suggested that they actually knew on 
the topic. 
 
AML audits have been suggested as a system for informing 
governance of the progress in eliminating risk of exposure from money 
laundering activity. AML audits will differ from standard auditing 
procedures by becoming more focused on assessing the effectiveness of 
risk assessment processes, rather than assuring governance that a 
system is in place. The increased responsibility that governance is now 
facing through legal challenges, means that they now need to be able to 
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defend the AML system in place and to illustrate how they know that it is 
the most effective system for their bank. This means that both external and 
internal audits need to report on levels and relevance of AML training that 
is undertaken in the organisation. They also need to analyse how research 
is incorporated into risk assessment systems and to examine the 
communication and feedback systems within the bank that deal with 
producing the suspicious activity reports. Finally, AML audits also need to 
be aware of how reports are deemed suitable to be filed with the financial 
intelligence unit and what follow on activity occurs once they have been 
filed.  
 
Finally, the governance influence on the bank’s performance can be 
seen from the impact of corporate attitude and banking response 
behaviours. This was highlighted as an issue in several of the legal cases 
and this research compared banking responses to the model used by 
Cornish and Clarke in their equation for determining behaviour outcomes. 
Therefore, there needs to be active leadership towards AML responses 
from the top management positions, otherwise the actual corporate 
attitude of the bank will prevail and policies will be undermined. 
 
7.5 Empirical Research Material 
 
One of the key aspects of AML research is the need to access 
relevant material to support CDD and EDD checks as well as beneficial 
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ownership information. TBML data is potentially huge and as well as 
training, the relevant banking staff need access to databases that hold 
much of this information. 
 
The research developed the risk assessment model using a 
combination of data sources, it was able to access its own data from 
interviews and questionnaires, but alongside this there were also a 
number of high profile legal cases. These cases provided a useful data 
source for analysis and could be used to determine weaknesses within the 
current AML regime of many of the larger global banks. Although the dates 
of information in the cases largely pertained to the early 2000 - 2010 there 
was some evidence to suggest that changes have only minimally occurred 
since these situations were uncovered. The legal cases also provided an 
important insight into the banking culture, an issue which is largely kept 
confidential and difficult for researchers to access. Typology studies are 
another way in which sensitive cases can be analysed. However, these 
reports provide examples of situations that have already been detected, 
often through the banking sector and they do not really give an insight into 
weaknesses within the system or highlight the types of cases that are 
currently not being detected.  
 
The issue of TBML is still a relatively new topic even with the 
institutions that are most exposed to the risks, and as such many experts 
and practitioners within the field are still grappling to understand the 
different aspects of this practice and the wider implications for the global 
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banking sector. This means that even the data received from practitioners 
is still in an embryo state and many of the opinions shared by the experts 
are based on limited experience. This presented a number of challenges 
to the research which is why a theoretical model and the analysis of legal 
cases was also included as a means to triangulate the findings and seek a 
common message. Ultimately by combining all the sources together a 
general pattern of issues and challenges did emerge and from this a 
proposed model of a risk framework was developed.  
 
At this stage a proposed model of risk assessment has been 
produced which captures the key points raised by a number of experts 
within the field. The next stage for a research project on this topic could be 
to pilot the model within a number of financial institutions and to gain 
feedback from practitioners and management within the sector on the 
feasibility and difficulties that such an approach might create. The 
research is also open to further academic debate since a number of 
papers have been developed from this work, which can hopefully start to 
contribute to the discussion of TBML risk at a different level. These papers 
have explored some of the issues raised in this document in more detail, 
such as analysing the different legal challenges connected to breaches in 
money laundering compliance and the implications to the global banking 
sector from each. Other topics also included the compliance implications 
for banks, of being involved in facilitating illicit financial flows due to the 
nature of the funds managed by clients that are actually the proceeds of 
corruption and bribery related crimes. These topics all explore the 
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exposure that banks face when not pursuing beneficial ownership 
information and/or researching the source of client’s funds, especially 
when they are politically exposed persons, including from large 
commercial companies.  
 
7.6 Concluding statement 
 
Different forms of financial crime, including the laundering of money 
through trade related activities, continue to present as challenges to the 
global banking sector. The banks traditional approach of making a 
distinction between the source of the funds and the money in the client’s 
account is now facing stronger scrutiny by regulators and legislators 
across the globe. A number of factors are beginning to influence changes 
in how money laundering risk is being perceived by the financial services 
sector and by those who are stakeholders and customers of these 
services. These influences include increased awareness of the use of 
different methods of laundering including the use of the international trade 
sector. In response new proposals for increased regulation are being 
suggested and introduced in different countries, possibly influenced to 
some extent by heightened media awareness of weaknesses identified 
within the AML systems of many banks. In essence the global criminal 
laundering landscape is changing and the banking response to detecting 
money laundering activity has to change with it, or risk being perceived as 
part of the problem. 
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This research aimed to contribute to the discussion and also to 
increase the level of awareness at both an academic and an empirical 
level on the topic of money laundering and financial crime. It has focused 
specifically on the complexities of trade based money laundering as a 
potential scheme that is increasingly being used amongst criminal 
organisations across the globe. It has also linked TBML and money 
laundering activity so that banks can use a more holistic model of risk 
assessment to support their work. This report has summarised the findings 
of the research in the form of a practical but new and innovative risk model 
that has taken the traditional red flags identified by FATF and other 
guidelines and has produced a practical system for being able to use that 
data with real clients. In addition, the research has also suggested to 
academic’s further areas for potential future research in this area. 
 
7.6.1 Reflective Statement 
 
This research study was unique in that it focused exclusively on one 
type of a money laundering scheme: Trade Based Money Laundering. 
This type of laundering is relatively new and fairly complex to understand, 
and so the research study raised a number of issues that would be 
pertinent to banking risk assessment and AML schemes.  
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1. AML risk assessment systems needed to become more robust and 
flexible in their approach, rather than seeking to track ML schemes 
in isolation and independently of one another. 
2. Money laundering is a global crime and so information and data 
sharing systems were needed that could be used across different 
jurisdictions and agencies. 
3. TBML is a complex form of laundering and is broader than just 
misinvoicing or tax evasion schemes. It involves purchases, 
shipments and the international transfer of value. In order to be 
properly detected it requires the co-operation of customs agents 
and financial services.  
 
The research study has highlighted the potential for a high prevalence 
of TBML schemes being administered through the financial services 
sector. During the research it has also been discovered that TBML works 
alongside other ML schemes and many criminal launderers will mix 
methods according to whatever barriers are in place.  
 
This has implications for how risk assessment schemes are being set 
up and maintained, including the need to share and exchange information 
across organizations. It has also shown how improvements are needed in 
internal communication systems amongst different units within individual 
banks, e.g. between front office, trade finance and AML in particular. 
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The research worked from a theoretical framework that examined the 
agency relationships between the regulators and the banks and the banks 
and their clients. This provided an academic argument as to why 
increased regulation can potentially lead to increases in the complexity of 
money laundering schemes being used. Therefore, any regulatory 
changes need to be developed alongside enhanced risk assessment 
training and risk system development, otherwise smaller banks and 
institutions could become the target for launderers if they are deemed to 
have weaker AML systems in place. 
Future research is needed on AML risk assessment systems to provide 
more detail of why gaps in the system emerge. There are three key areas 
of research that could be pursued which are; 
 
 Monitoring and refining the implementation of a four point 
risk assessment matrix (such as the one suggested in this project). A case 
study approach would enable a more detailed understanding of how risk 
assessment is actually being used within specific banks. 
 Working with a wide number of banks to monitor how the risk 
matrix model is used across different jurisdictions. This research could 
analyse feedback from across several financial services located in a 
number of different countries. 
 Working in a specific region in order to identify localized 
patterns of TBML and links to other ML schemes. 
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It is hoped that this thesis can offer new insights into money 
laundering, especially TBML and the risk assessment challenges that go 
with them. The study should be of benefit to the financial industry including 
banks, regulators and other financial providers. 
 
One of the major changes that the financial services has to address 
is identifying the source of a client’s money, which has become a more 
important element of AML assessments. TBML is often used as a method 
in illicit financial flow activities, where money has been sourced through 
crimes such as bribery and corruption and is being moved out of a 
developing country’s economy into another one. 
 
This means that risk assessment systems need to be able to 
assess both the source and destination sources of funds. This in turn puts 
added pressure on criminals to disguise how the money is being moved. It 
is because of this that TBML will remain a popular choice since trade and 
shipments add an additional layer in which to hide such transfers and 
enable money to be easily moved from one country to another. 
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